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Uppsala University and to Fred Saunders, PhD
candidate, at the School of Life Sciences,
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This book by Gloria L. Gallardo Fernández is a
study of the interdisciplinary subject of social
and political action aiming to reverse the
extinction of edible shellfish along the Chilean
coast. The man-made process confronted
through this action threatened not only the
existence of the fish but also the livelihood of
thousands of fishers and the very eco-system of
the coastal waters. Accelerated destructive fish-
ing locked nature and society to each other in a
vicious circle of self-subversion. Trying to
reverse it meant turning non-sustainability into
sustainability. Conceptually as well as practi-
cally, this was a process linking politics to
economics; local to regional to global, and
nature to society. Studying and assessing such
an attempt calls for an equivalent dialectic.
It is highly appropriate  and very encoura-
ging  that the first monograph to be published
within Uppsala Centre for Sustainable Devel-
opment (CSD Uppsala) moves boldly in such
troubling waters and crucial areas for research
on sustainable development. Furthermore, CSD
is most pleased to publish this book in colla-
boration with Co-Action Publishing, a Scandi-
navia based Open Access publisher of scholarly
books and journals. In this way the text
becomes a global common.
The book is a detailed study of a
co-management example, i.e. territorial use
rights in fisheries (TURFs), of two local fish-
eries on the Chilean coast which depend for
their survival on benthic resources, and where
the shellfish Loco plays a central role. The
TURFs are aimed at a more sustainable use of
threatened coastal resources. The larger context
is the critical situation of fisheries in the world.
Fish as a resource is globally on decline since
the mid-1990s. Several main fish populations
have been exhausted or even become extinct
since then, not surprisingly since the intensity of
ocean fishing increased by a factor of nearly
40 during a period of 100 years (19002000).
The situation of the fisheries in the world has
been perhaps best summarised by the Millen-
nium Ecosystems Assessment reports in 2005.
Fishing is one of the key renewable resources
under serious decline. This threatens the sus-
tainability of the planet. Mismanagement at any
point along this truly global path will have
consequences at all the others.
Since ocean fishing is by definition interna-
tional it is difficult to regulate, it is a global
common and its decline is a case of the ‘‘tragedy
of the commons’’ or the ‘‘tragedy of open
access’’ as Gallardo prefers to call it. But also
fishing under national jurisdiction is under
threat and has been very difficult to regulate
in a way that protects the resource. The regula-
tion of fisheries and the description of success
stories, which the Loco fishing outside Chile
seems to be at least in part, are important to
provide and study, and this is exactly what
Gloria Gallardo has undertaken to do.
Here we approach a difficult but central
issue of the topic of management of common
resources: To whom do these resources belong?
To whom does the fish in the ocean belong? A
reasonable view is that this resource belongs to
us all, inhabitants of the planet. An even more
radical view would be that it is no one’s property-
or the property of the planet, and should be
protected for its own sake. This is a so-called bio-
centric ethics, also possible to defend.
In the context of the two case studies
presented in detail, it is clear that the emotions
stirred by the conflict of ownership are strong.
Gloria Gallardo as a sociologist gives these a
colourful description by introducing many of
the artisanal fishers, using participatory rural
appraisal (PRA) to elicit information on values,
behaviours and interests. PRA is a methodology
that seeks to empower participants whilst
enabling researchers to gather information.
The question of resource management has
been studied by the well-known political scien-
tist Elinor Ostrom. She has provided many
examples showing that the tragedy of the
commons does not always apply. In fact tradi-
tional societies were often quite good at mana-
ging common resources, although examples of
the opposite, such as the collapse of the Easter
xi
Island (presently belonging to Chile), do of
course also exist. It seems that the larger scale
brought by modernity increases the likelihood
of tragedy. On the larger scale there is more
competition, less well-defined responsibilities,
and consequences of mismanagement seem far
away. This, however, is not quite so clear any
longer. We all suffer from global  and ulti-
mately local  mismanagements. This also
applies to fisheries. Thus one key aspect of the
present book is how to connect the local to
the global. Is it possible to apply the solutions
found along the Chilean coast to other socie-
ties? What did we learn that may be useful in
other places, on other scales? Previous success
stories do exist, perhaps lobster fishing outside
the coast of Maine, US, is best known, or the
Japanese TURF which shows many similaries
with the Chilean TURF.
Gloria Gallardo spells out the consequences
of changed fishing regulations for the develop-
ment of local fishers’ organizations. She goes
into the question of self-regulation which is
central here and touches on the issue of how the
local level  below and/or beyond the village but
below the State  may be the proper level to
accomplish what we need, a functioning man-
agement of limited resources.
As social, natural and interdisciplinary
scientists working at the Uppsala Centre for
Sustainable Development we salute our collea-
gue, the author of this work.
Uppsala, June 2008
Eva Friman
Senior Lecturer of Ecological Economics, CSD
Uppsala University
Lars Rudebeck
Professor of Political Science, CSD Uppsala
University
Lars Rydén
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CAR-PESCA Comité de Asignación Regional de Pesca (Fishing committee of regional allocation)
CBCRM Community-based coastal resource management (Manejo de recursos costeros basados en comunidades)
CCCM Community-centred co-management (co-manejo basado en comunidades)
CEDOC/INE Centro de Documentación, Instituto Nacional de Estadı́stica (Documentation Centre, National Statistics
Institute)
CEMUS Centre for the Environment and Development Studies (Centro de estudios del medio ambiente y desarrollo)
CFQs Community Fisheries Quotas (Quotas comunitarias de pesca)
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7.24 Men’s problem-tree (Árbol de Problemas) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
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IPART
FISHERIES: BETWEEN THE
GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL
1 The Study Setting
INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND
Coastlines and oceans around the world are
slowly turning into landscapes of extinction.
Diverse studies have detailed the dire worldwide
situation of marine resources, which are largely
exploited under open access conditions, and
heavily affected by land based activities (Hauck,
1998; Sweijd and Hauck, 1998; Gordon and
Cook, 2000; Naylor et al., 2000; Garcia et al.,
2003; Myers and Worm, 2003).
Due to the current NorthSouth market
dynamics, will edible marine resources soon
turn into a rare luxurious food to be consumed
only by rich consumers? An overwhelmingly
significant proportion of the catch of many
threatened species, such as sturgeon * the fish
from which black caviar is extracted * ends up
on a dinner plate in rich countries. Producers in
the South get minuscule revenue compared to
the prices for which the products are sold
abroad.1 Compared with 1950, there is presently
only 10 percent left of the predatory fish
communities. The loss seems to be irreversible
as species populations that are left will never
reach the numbers they once had as they will be
fished before reaching maturity (Myers and
Worm, 2003).
Since the 1940s, ocean fishing shows three
main tendencies: (1) The increasing transition
from small-scale fisheries to large-scale indus-
trial exploitation allowing increasingly larger
captures in the sea, later also embracing in-
shore fisheries and aquaculture; (2) The scaling
up of fishing management transfer, i.e., from
local level, to national, and to supranational
levels; (3) An increasing tendency to substitute
local production by international production in
the globalization of food systems, where local
fishers are presently involved in a world wide
competition (Garcia et al., 2003; Symes [1996]*
in Pı́riz, 2004, pp. 1, 3132). As a result, the list
of devastated marine species around the world is
long. During the 1940s the Indian sardinella
fisheries collapsed. This was also the fate of the
Japanese sardine in the 1940s and 1950s,
the South African pilchard in the mid 1960s,
the Atlantic herring, Greenland cod and
Georges Bank haddock, all in the late 1960s,
the Namibian pilchard and the Peruvian ancho-
veta in the early 1970s, the Gulf of Guinea
sardinella in the mid 1970s, and in the 1990s the
Canadian Atlantic cod (Garcia et al., 2003).
The impacts on the ocean eco-system derive
from fisheries and non-fisheries activities. The
interferences of industrial fishing are large and
varied. Over-fishing stresses the eco-system by
diminishing the stocks of demanded high level
predators, thus modifying the trophic chain.
Over-fishing also alters the habitats by destroy-
ing and disturbing the bottom topography
(Garcia et al., 2003). Physical, mechanical and
chemical human activities alter and damage sea
habitat: physically, by introducing alien struc-
tures such as aquaculture installations, artificial
reefs, mechanically through the ‘‘ploughing’’
effect of dredges and trawls, and chemically
through a variety of ways including the injection
of nutrients, pesticides, heavy metals, drugs and
hormones. The chemicals in particular pose high
levels of uncertainty with little information
known about the damage and duration of effects.
Compounding and additional adverse impacts
result from destructive fishing techniques, inap-
propriate fishing practices like trawling in the
1 In Azerbaidzian, one kilo of caviar costs around US$418
in 2006, while in the West it is sold for US$9,762 (Aale,
2006). Caviar as a delicacy will soon be history as
sturgeon is in danger of extinction. Sturgeon can live to a
100 years old, and it has been on earth for 250 million
years. UN declared 2006 export prohibition for all the
countries around the Caspian Sea except Iran. It is
believed that this species has decreased by 90 percent
during the last 20 years due principally to dam
constructions, pollution, poaching and corruption.
* When a quoted or mentioned author brings up another
author, the year of the reference of the latter is given in
brackets []. These indirect references are not listed in the
reference list at the end of this book (e.g. Symes).
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wrong habitat, pollution from fish processing
plants, use of ozone-depleting refrigerants, and
dumping at sea of plastic debris that can entangle
marine animals or be swallowed by turtles.
The lack of selectivity associated with
industrial fisheries affects associated and depen-
dent species resulting in wasteful discarding
practices, juvenile mortality resulting in addi-
tional threats to endangered species. All of these
impacts have important and long-lasting effects,
despite the prevalence of the 1982 UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, which states that
fisheries management must take care also of
bycatch species. Concerning consequences of
over-fishing in the trophic chain, Garcia et al.
(2003, Chap. 3, p. 2), based on Goñi [1998],
refers to the following examples:
The hunting of sea otters (Enhydra lutris) in the
Northeast Pacific caused a large-scale expansion of
sea urchins, the increased grazing of which caused the
decline of the important kelp forest ( . . .) In the Bering
Sea, the expansion of the fisheries on pollock (Theragra
chalcogramma) during the 1970s has been considered as
a probable cause of the decline of several populations of
marine mammals, e.g. sea lions (Eumetopias jubatus) by
76%, seals (Callorhinus ursinus) by 60% and (Phoca
vitulina) by 85%, as well as the decline of several seabird
populations (Urea algae, U. lomvia, Rissa brevirostris,
R. tridactyla). All these non-fish species compete
directly with the pollock fisheries since the target
species represent 2190% of their diet (Garcia et al.,
2003, Chap. 3, p. 2).
As Garcia et al. (2003) note, at the beginning of
the 1970s, the contamination effects on aquatic
eco-systems, both coastal and continental, de-
rived from non-fishing activities on land, were
considered to be the main factors responsible
for fisheries degradation:
Land drainage, sewage, river outflow, wind and rainfall,
economic activities as agriculture, manufacturing or
chemical industries, incineration of toxic wastes, human
settlements, etc., released excess nutrients (e.g. nitrates,
phosphorus) as well as contaminants (e.g. polychlori-
nated biphenyls (PCBs), mercury, dioxin), radioactive
wastes, oil, antifouling paints (tributyl tin), human
pathogens (e.g. cholera, salmonella), plastic and other
debris (Garcia et al., 2003, Chap. 4, p. 1).
Today, there is more emphasis on the direct
(removal and related impacts) and indirect
(eutrophication leading to depletion of oxygen)
consequences of over-fishing as the main cause
adversely affecting marine eco-systems (Garcia
et al., 2003, Chap. 4, p. 1). The following quote
from the same source stresses the complexity of
eco-systems and the interconnection between
human land-based activities and non-human
activities:
At the end of the 1960s, the Black Sea was the most
productive area of the Mediterranean, with a high
diversity of pelagic and benthic fauna. After 1970, a
very strong modification of the chemical and biological
habitat occurred as a consequence of industrial devel-
opment and intensive agriculture. Inputs of phosphorus
and nitrate increased threefold and tenfold, respectively
while the input of silicate decreased fivefold. This
resulted in a significant modification of the structure
and functioning of the coastal eco-system, including a
change in dominance of the algal communities from
diatoms to small-size dinoflagellates (Dinophysis spp.).
At the beginning these modifications appeared favour-
able for the eco-system and fisheries. Phytoplankton
production and copepod abundance increased and with
them the abundance of plankton-feeding fishes. Fishing
effort increased, leading initially to an increase in
catches from 200 000 tonnes in 1970 to 600 000 tonnes
in 1985 but resulting finally in overfishing. The ultimate
consequence was an explosion of carnivore jellyfish
(Aurelia aurita and Mnemiopsis leidy) consuming eggs
and larvae and occupying the ecological niche formerly
occupied by the small pelagic species depleted by
overfishing. The biomass of jellyfish increased from
one million tonnes in 1970 to 700 million tonnes in
1985 (about 5 kg/m2). These jellyfish, having no
predators, are a trophic ‘‘dead end’’, and their mortal-
ity generates an important bacterial activity and a large
quantity of anoxic water near the bottom, reducing
further the habitat for fishery resources (Bouvier [1998]
in Garcia et al., 2003, Chap. 4, p. 2).
The interrelated ecological and productivity
damages to the ocean have largely occurred in
a few decades, between 1940 and the 1970s
(Garcia et al., 2003). From the 1970s, problems
started to become manifestly evident that the
period of abundance was over (Mackenzie,
1983), yet in the late 1990s FAO estimated that
27 million tonnes of bycatch and discards were
dumped each year (Garcia et al., 2003).
Ensuring the continued productivity of mar-
ine eco-systems is critical for those millions of
people dependent upon it for current and future
food security. Almost all catch from small-scale
fisheries is used directly for human consump-
tion, while most of the capture from industrial
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fisheries is channelled for reduction (animal feed
and other products) (FAO, 2005). The relevance
of small-scale fisheries for the world fish supply
and their contribution to food security both
directly in the daily diet, and indirectly through
the generation of foreign income, has been
underlined by FAO (2005). Export values in
this sector rose from US$15 billion in 1980 to
US$56 billion in 2001 (FAO, 2005).
Regarding sector distribution of the labour
force, worldwide ca 90 percent of the 38 million
people recorded as fishers and fish-farmers are
classified as small-scale. This corresponds to
around 34.2 million people. To this we can add
an estimate of more than 100 million people
employed in other fisheries associated occupa-
tions (i.e., processing and trading). This means
that directly or indirectly, those employed in
small-scale fisheries and aquacultures were in the
vicinity of 135 million in 2002. These figures do
not consider seasonal or occasional fishers who
are not registered as ‘‘fishers’’ in official statistics
(FAO, 2005). Industrial fishing would occupy ca
10 percent of the total fishing labour force,
corresponding to around 3.8 million people.
Studying global fish production during the
last five decades makes clear a tendency in the
NorthSouth relationship, namely, the transfer
of ocean fish production from developed to
‘‘developing’’ countries’ waters. Developing
countries in the South channel production to
export markets as well as leasing their fishing
rights to international capital (Hersoug et al.,
2004). Taking a global view, fish production
(marine, inland and aquaculture) has increased
from 40.5 million tonnes2 in 1961 to 142.1 million
in 2001, an increase of 250 percent, while the
world population during the same period has
increased by 98 percent (Hersoug et al., 2004).
De-aggregating these data according to the
dichotomy richpoor countries highlights the
fact that it is the developing world that contri-
butes most to the total fish production (marine,
inland and aquaculture). While the developed
world increased its fish production with 40
percent from 1961 to 2001, the developing world
increased it by 540 percent over the same period.
Population in the latter increased by 128 percent,
which means that production increased far more
than population. Within the developing world,
the Low Income Food Deficit Countries
(LIFDC), to which 80 of the poorest countries
belong, increased fish production by 857 percent
between 1961 and 2001. Dealing specifically with
marine production, while the developed world
increased marine fish production by 31.3 percent
between 1961 and 2001 (from 21.7 million tonnes
to 28.5 million tonnes), the developing world
increased it by 318.5 percent during the same
period (from 13.5 million tonnes to 56.5 million
tonnes). Regarding export and import of fish
products, in 2001 the developing countries ex-
ported twice as much as they imported (i.e.,
US$28.03 billion in export versus US$10.66
billion in import). This import usually deals
with the cheaper species, while the converse is
the case with high value commodities going to
export (Hersoug et al., 2004).
Export ‘‘success’’ of many high value com-
modity species demanded by consumers from
rich countries leads to over-exploitation and
commonly to the severe depletion or extinction
of the species in the South, as the example of the
edible sea shellfish Concholepas concholepas
(false abalone) in Chile (local name Loco,
derives from Mapudungun, Mapuche’s lan-
guage), object of this monograph, will show.
The Chilean Loco fishery is one of the world’s
most significant gastropod fisheries (Geaghan
and Castilla, 1988, p. 58). South Africa experi-
ences a similar situation with another threa-
tened species, the shellfish abalone which, like
the Loco, is threatened by poaching and hence
facing extinction (Pictures 1.1 and 1.2). Both
species are demanded by consumers in Asian
countries. Developing countries seem to have
PICTURE 1.1 Loco
2 Tonnes are metric, i.e., 1 tonne is equivalent to 1,000
kilos.
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common problems and challenges regarding
endangered marine species and those whose
livelihoods are dependent on these species. The
Loco and abalone cases in Chile and South
Africa respectively, are both cases in point.
Abalone poaching and stocks exhaustion
are a worldwide problem (Cook and Sweijd,
1997). In California two species have become
extinct. During 19891999, the worldwide catch
from wild abalone fisheries declined by about
30 percent (Gordon and Cook, 2000, p. 567).
The only country where abalone fisheries have
increased over the past 10 years is Australia, but
it has decreased considerably in Mexico, the
USA, and Japan. The situation with regard to
cultured abalone is the opposite. During 1989
1999, the production of cultured abalone in-
creased by over 600 percent.
In the South African case, scholars agree
that attempts to restrict abalone poaching
through law enforcement have been unsuccessful
(Cook and Sweijd, 1997; Hauck, 1998; Sweijd
and Hauck, 1998). Poaching is not decreasing
due to the decimation of abalone resources,
rather the opposite is true. More stakeholders
become involved and get better organized.
Chinese syndicates have been established in the
legal abalone industry in South Africa as a way
to obtain control over both legal and illegal
markets due to the lucrative nature of the
activity and the relative impunity whilst poach-
ing. The price of a special dried abalone can
reach US$1,200 per kilo (not sun dried, but
processed in a special, often secret and ceremo-
nial form in Asia, which once dried, only keep
10 percent of the ‘‘in shell’’ weight) (Gordon
and Cook, 2000, p. 568). Fresh and canned
abalone cost US$45 and US$80 per kilo,
respectively. In 1980 in South Africa a kilo
of perlemoen was sold abroad for ZAR3080.
In 2002 it was locally sold for ZAR300 and, in
the Far East for up to ZAR1,400 per kilo
(Redpath, 2002). Whole villages, including
gangs with links to drug syndicates, have
become involved in the illegal trade with wars
taking place between poachers and police.
People have been killed and children younger
than 12 years old are being used as runners
because they are immune to prosecution (Red-
path, 2002).
As a solution to the extinction of the species
in South Africa, Hauck (1998, p. 3) recommends
a holistic multi-prolonged approach that con-
siders all the affected stakeholders, among which
are abalone divers, quota holders enjoying the
exclusive and disputed rights to dive, processors,
leisure divers and informal fisherfolk, to count
only those more directly involved contesting the
right to harvest the resource. Furthermore there
is a poaching hierarchy embracing those living
near the sea and up to highly organized Chinese
triads. Consequently, abalone poaching is a
coast-wide phenomenon involving a wide range
of stakeholders, having different socio-economic
and ethnic background (Sweijd and Hauck,
1998, p. 4). The problem is thus socially
complex, as are also suggested solutions.
Long-term solutions must recognize the ‘‘intri-
cate history and circumstances of the people
involved in the industry’’ (Sweijd and Hauck,
1998, p. 1). For the same reasons, diverse role-
players must be targeted with interventions at
different levels. A project of co-management, in
Hawstone town, where thieving problems have
been more severe, and whose goal was to build a
sense of ownership among users of the resource
and to restore their internal social relations, did
not materialize. As the authors emphasize, so
long as the conflicts remain, the resource
continues to be destroyed and at the end, all
will lose as there will be nothing left for anyone.
Long-term protection of natural resources re-
quires not only law enforcement, but also
effective resource management promoting bio-
diversity and sustainable resource utilization. It
is about vesting in the resource users the
concern for the eco-system upon which they
depend through encouragement, empowerment
and development, instead of loosing valuable
PICTURE 1.2 Abalone
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means chasing the violators as Hauck suggests
(1998, p. 3).
Although over-exploitation might increase
profit in the short-run, large-scale degradation
of resources is, in the long-run, also a threat
to the reproduction of capital itself. After all,
the maintenance of the commons is one of the
legs on which commodity productions stand
(Goldman, 1998). Globalization is primarily
about renewed expansion of capitalism into
new formerly uncommodified social arenas
(Dickens and Fontana, 1994), not subsuming
those relations of productions that are not
directly necessary for the reproduction of
capital, as for example small-scale artisanal
fishing. Capital has varying needs and it can
exploit non-capitalist relations of productions,
people and markets in different ways; for
example as sources of cheap labour, the
country’s market as springboard from which
firms can export their products, as resource
pools from which to extract resources to feed
the needs of transnational corporations. The
outcomes of such development are global,
more frequently than not having detrimental
ecological and social effects in Southern coun-
tries. Often the role of international fisheries
companies in the South is disadvantageous
to small-scale fisheries, local low-income con-
sumers and the environment. This is exemplified
by the presence of salmon fisheries in Chile.
Liberal market supporters, government repre-
sentatives and middle- and upper-class Chileans
often highlight with pride the development of
the salmon industry for export. Salmon, a
carnivorous species that is a non-native of Chile,
is a high-value commodity that has been
marketed mainly for industrialized countries,
driven by commercial farms using primarily
intensive and semi-intensive production meth-
ods (Naylor et al., 2000).
NATIONAL BACKGROUND
Chile has over 18,000 km of ecologically
significant coastline (see Map 1.1) (Caballol et
al., 2006). The waters outside Chile holds for
example, over 1,000 fish species, more than
80 species of seaweed and 50 shellfish species.
Fisheries catch around 150 different commercial
species (Svensson, 2003), making Chile highly
attractive for international fisheries firms.
Unequivocally, Chilean fisheries are directed
towards international markets and as early as
1985, 85 percent of the national fish production
value was commercialized in foreign markets
(Ahumada and Retamal, 1988, p. 648, 651). In
contrast to Japan and Russia, Chile captures all
fish within its territorial waters.
In 2003 Chile occupied seventh place in
world fish landings, but in 1994 it reached its
landing peak with around 8 million tonnes of
fish, occupying fourth place globally (Subsecre-
tarı́a de Pesca ‘‘Subpesca’’, 2004). The reasons
for the decline after 1994 have not been focus for
attention. The export ‘‘success’’ of salmon farm-
ing is often touted by the press and very rarely
are the ecological and social downsides given
any coverage. This is except by those critical to
this export-based economic growth, who are
mainly environmentalists and neo-liberal system
critics, who are seldom represented in the main-
stream press.
The negative effects of the process of
globalization on natural resources seem to be
quite direct in the case of the Loco, showing that
once integrated into the international trade
sphere, artisanal fishing is also involved in
depletion of marine resources. Considered a
delicacy by the Chileans, the Loco  as discussed
above  has been near extinction due to indis-
criminate extraction.
Critical for the species decline was the
opening of export markets in 1975 due to
the implementation of neo-liberalism during
the Pinochet regime. Until 1975, the extraction
of Locos for the domestic market was on
average 4,300 tonnes/year. During the export
period, extraction reached its peak in 1980
with 25,000 tonnes (Castilla, 1995; IFOP,
2000), which is an increase of 481 percent in
five years. Industrial fishing shows a similar
tendency. From 1976 to 1992 total catch
increased by over 400 percent.
The export ‘‘success’’ of the Loco attracted
the interest of those working in other sec-
tors into fishing, including mining workers.
Management and Exploitation Areas for
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Benthic3 Resources (MEABR) was the regula-
tion introduced primarily to protect the Locos
from over-exploitation. From this regulation a
localized Management Area (MA) could be
established all along the coast. This initiative
had also the effect of increasing the number of
fishers and therefore also the pressure on all the
benthic species. Measures like national bans to
extract the species implemented before the
introduction of the MAs had a similar effect.
The first extraction ban (19891992) (IFOP,
2000) which allowed for a moderate recupera-
tion of the species, led simultaneously to illegal
extraction and the prices rose 500 percent,
giving further incentive to illegal extraction.
The situation could be characterized as the
‘‘tragedy of open access’’ (Stevenson, 1991)
(usually referred as the ‘‘tragedy of the com-
mons’’), not due to the lack of regulation, but
because different measures aimed to control
extraction did not work or worked only par-
tially. This experience has parallels to what has
occurred in others part of the world, South
Africa being a case in point (Cook and Sweijd,
1997; Hauck, 1998; Sweijd and Hauck, 1998;
Gordon and Cook, 2000; Redpath, 2002;
Garcia et al., 2003; FAO, 2005).
There are no simple explanations for either
the diminution of the Loco population or for
the failure of conservation plans. The species is
sensitive to harvesting and easily over-exploited
and increased rivalry in fishing, commercializa-







3 ‘‘Marine biota can be classified broadly into those
organisms living in either the pelagic environment
(plankton and nekton) or the benthic environment
(benthos [bottom environment]). Some organisms,
however, are benthic in one stage of life and pelagic in
another. Producers that synthesize organic molecules exist
in both environments’’(Encyclopædia Britannica, 2008;
my emphasis). Benthic (zool): that lives in contact with the
sea bottom (Pequeño Larousse Ilustrado, 1989, p. 142).
Examples: Jaibas (see Picture 1.3), Loco (Concholepas
concholepas), Lapas (Fissurella spp), (see Picture 1.4),
Algas (like Champa) (see Picture 1.5), Piure (Pyura
chilensis) (see Picture 1.6), Picoroco (Austromegabalanus
psittacus) (see Picture 1.7), and Erizo (Loxechinus) (see
Picture 1.8). (Subpesca, 2005c, Iconografias de peces,
Permission from Bolbarán, D., Subpesca, Pers. Comm.
via email 2008-04-08).
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The scattered habitat distribution of the Loco
excludes industrial fishing or large commercial
operations (Geaghan and Castilla, 1988, p. 58)
and artisanal hand extraction are used. The
growing period of the Loco is long, taking,
depending on the region, over 3.5 years to reach
the minimum legal longitudal shell size of 10 cm
(Geaghan and Castilla, 1988).
The Loco is sold internationally as Chilean
abalone. It is also called false abalone or South
Pacific abalone due to its physical similarity
with the abalone. The Loco belongs to the
Muricidae family being alone as a species
within this family. The abalone proper belongs
to the Haliotidae family. Chilean exporters,
instead of highlighting the exclusivity of the
Loco, expediently it was associated with the
abalone that already occupied a privileged
place in Asian markets (Reyes, 1986). The
abalones are found in warm oceans almost
worldwide. The Concholepas is restricted to the
coast of Southern Peru (local name Chanque)
to the south of Chile (Stuardo, 1979; Gallardo,
1979; Castilla, 1995; Rodriguez and Inostrosa
(s.a.).
In Chile the depletion of Concholepas con-
cholepas and other benthic species threatens not
only the eco-system but also the economic
survival of the artisanal fishers along the
Chilean coasts; a group already living on
society’s margins. Artisanal fishing activities
support, directly and indirectly, ca 400,000
people (Subsecretarı́a de Pesca (Subpesca),
2003). The number of artisanal fishers amounts
to ca 54,751 (Servicio Nacional de Pesca,
(Sernapesca), 2005a).4
However, in this rather dark ‘‘seascape of
extinction’’, and under the shield of the new
1991 Fishing and Aquaculture Law (Ley de
Pesca y Acuicultura, LPA 430/1991, Art. 48),
there are also some hopeful emerging scenarios
of a more locally-based development that ad-
dresses sustainability’s environmental and socio-
economic aspects starting with the small-scale
fishing organizations themselves. This new fish-
ing law, which nestles the referred MEABR,
emerged in a new political climate marked by
the transition from the military government
(19731989) to one elected in 1990, bringing in
new democratising ideas. It became clear that
regulatory measures were quite pointless until
the users, the artisanal fishers themselves, rea-
lized that they held the primary responsibility
for conserving the species they economically
depend on. Chilean authorities in recognizing
this have partially changed strategies, intention-
ally or not * an issue that deserves to be
studied * very much in accordance with
principles dictated by international organiza-
tions. Among them we have the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea for marine
resources management, the FAO Committee on
Fisheries (COFI) of 1991 which recommended
new approaches to fisheries management such
as the Code of Conduct of 1995 to foster COFIs
policy, and other agreements, declarations and
legislative frameworks emphasizing a more
participatory approach at grass-root levels
(Garcia et al., 2003; FAO, 2005; FAO, 2006).
THE EMERGENCE OF NEW CULTURAL
LANDSCAPES
Facing diminishing species, some Chilean fish-
ers’ organizations located at El Quisco * my
first study case * and Quintay (Region of
Valparaı́so) have, with the help of university
experts, pioneered the development of strategies
to reduce the threat of Loco depletion, thereby
providing space for new cultural landscapes.5
They protected their traditional fishing areas,
which later stimulated and informed a new more
localized approach called the Management and
Exploitation Areas for Benthic Resources
(MEABR), which was subsequently formalized
by government. The manifestation of MEABR
4 Fishing Subsecretary and National Fishing Service,
respectively.
5 The World Heritage Convention acknowledged in 1992,
in Article 1 of the Convention that cultural landscapes
represent the ‘‘combined works of nature and of man ( . . .)
They are illustrative of the evolution of human society and
settlement over time, under the influence of the physical
constraints and/or opportunities presented by their natural
environment and of successive social, economic and
cultural forces, both external and internal’’ (Unesco,
2007).
Chapter 1: The Study Setting 9
on the ground is commonly known as a
Management Area (MA). I henceforth use this
term to refer to individually established reserves
under the MEABR framework. As a fishing
administrative measure, MEABR’s main objec-
tive is to stop open access and decentralize
fisheries management (IFOP, 2000; Gelcich et
al., 2005). In short, as I will return later to this
central issue, MEABR comprises a kind of
paradigm shift in the fishing policy of benthic
resources ‘‘to halt the scheme of free access ( . . .)
that reigned in the exploitation of the said
resources, which fomented, on one hand, the
over-exploitation of these, and on the other,
generated negative socio-economic and techni-
cal conditions for the artisanal fishers.’’ (IFOP,
2000, p. 1).
It is precisely these kinds of conditions,
characterized by an escalating scarceness in the
availability of fish resources, and a major
awareness about it, which have raised the
economic question of costs and benefits of
acquiring territorial rights for fisheries (Christy,
1992). Thus, MEABR came to empower
defined users with the right to exploit benthic
resources within a publicly owned, limited
portion of the sea, not implying ownership,
but exclusive access, or put more appropriately,
sea tenure (Christy, 1992). Following Schlager
and Ostrom’s (1992) bundles of rights, these
include access, withdrawal, management and
exclusion of specific fishing ground for the right
holders. In the international literature they are
known as collective territorial use rights in
fisheries (TURF), and are based on a common
property approach (Christy, 1992; Pı́riz, 2004;
Gelcich et al., 2006b) thereby constituting a
co-management between the state and the
principal stakeholders. This approach is in
direct response to years of failed centralized
fisheries management.
Certainly, the rights embodied in TURF do
not exist in a vacuum but they are part of a
defined social context. As resource management,
TURF is part of national fisheries management,
and here the concept of ‘‘co-management’’ is
relevant. Co-management is defined broadly
as, ‘‘the sharing of power and responsibility
between government and local resource users.’’
(Berkes et al., [1991] in Hauck and Sowman,
2003, p. 20). This implies a shift in the perspec-
tive from fisheries to the fishers, including
also the ‘‘non-scientific knowledge of those
depending on the environmental quality of
coastal waters for their livelihood’’ (Pı́riz, 2004,
pp. 45). This is indeed an important shift
from a democratic point of view that places the
fishers as subjects in other spheres other than
those merely related to their own immediate
production.
In Chile the organization and implementa-
tion of MAs enabled under MEABR are
financed through national and regional autho-
rities and supervised by both universities and
consultancy firms. Thus, the concerned action
of these actors is central. Therefore, although
the users (artisanal fishers) are required to
organize themselves in order to obtain use rights
over a sea area, it is ultimately the state that
defines the legal framework. Once organized
collectively, only the local fishers (be it in the
legal form of union, associations or coopera-
tives; more about this in Chapter Four) are
allowed to exploit MA resources.
There are different reasons for introducing
co-management in a country. In Chile it was
introduced after other more centralized resource
management approaches failed. Failed in this
context means that an economic surplus was not
produced or sustainable stocks maintained.
Hersoug et al. (2004) stress that in many
developing countries fishers are likely to be
marginalized in setting the management objec-
tives and more broadly through implementation
of co-management projects. This infers that co-
management policies are usually government
initiated, thus remaining top-down.
The evaluation of extensive experiences in
community-based coastal resource management
(CBCRM), co-management and integrated
coastal management (ICM) projects from Phi-
lippines seems to be positive at least in terms of
the development of so-called soft assets (e.g.,
social ‘‘capital’’, social resources and networks).
Soft assets support fishers’ efforts to undertake
steps towards sustainable development. Similar
assessments come from other Southeast Asian
countries, such as Vietnam and Cambodia where
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CBCRM has been applied (Ferrer et al., 2001).
Similar to the Chilean experiences under
MEABR, the economic outcome of the South-
east Asian experiences is not clear from an
evaluation of ICM projects. ICM projects are
broader in scope and scale than CBCRM pro-
jects, which are usually locally oriented, commu-
nity based initiatives (Pomeroy et al., 2005).
In that the Chilean MAs are allocated and
operated by the fisher organizations, they are
similar to the Japanese version of TURF, whose
co-management is also based on fishers’ coop-
erative associations. TURF is perceived as
successful (Pı́riz, 2004, p. 45), especially for
sedentary species. This judgement also seems
to be valid in the Chilean case, based on
20 years of experience (Castilla et al., 2007).
It is important to stress that MAs are not
automatically attached to local villages or com-
munities in the sense of involving the families or
other formal or informal institutional forms
usually found in a community.6 MAs are
situated in coves, many of them being rural
and geographically isolated, often whose only
inhabitants are likely to be fishers. However,
coves vary. Some are located in rural and urban
settings and some nestle communities, while
others do not. The fishers and their families,
forming a community, inhabit some rural coves
but their legal status in respect to the land they




Through the MEABR reform and the setting
up of MAs fishing use rights have been
delegated to the fishers in an effort to redress
the depletion of benthic marine resources. It
can be reasonably concluded then that the
perception of these key actors, the ‘‘guardians
of the coastal eco-systems’’ (Pı́riz, 2004, p. 79),
towards the MAs will be central to their
success or failure. Thus, understanding atti-
tudes and beliefs are important for further
policy development and to inform other co-
management policies worldwide for threatened
marine resources (Gelcich et al., 2005; Gelcich
et al., 2006b). As Pomeroy et al. (1997, p. 102)
express it:
If there is an interest in understanding the success and
sustainability of Community Based Coastal Resource
Management projects, it is essential to understand
perceptions of the present and possible future impacts
of these projects. Perceptions of impacts may explain
some of the variance in long-term, as well as short-
term, project success.
However, in spite of their expansion, the
implementation of MAs is still at an early stage.
As FAO (2005, p. 50) states:
The transition from open access to effectively managed
fisheries can be expected to bring long-term improved
benefits for the fisheries and for society as a whole.
However, there is a time-lag, usually of some years,
between the implementation of management measures
and the realization of the stream of benefits resulting
from the changes made.
Nonetheless, since 1991 the MAs have expanded
all over the Chilean coast, embracing almost
every cove and almost half of the 687 artisanal
fishing organizations in the country, involving
in 2006 ca 40 percent of its 42,091 members
(Sernapesca, 2005a). These figures could be
easily interpreted as an indicator that MAs are
viewed by many of the organized fishers as a
valid organizational alternative. An initiative
6 There are at least 94 definitions of the concept
‘‘commmunity’’ (Gallardo, 2002), but there is
nonetheless some general consensus about the elements
required to talk about a community: the territory, the
population, and the feeling of belonging to a particular
group. However:
when physical territory does constitute one of the basic
elements of a community, it corresponds to a relatively
specific and limited space, known by the community
members who share it, whether it is for real or
symbolic. The population consists of a group of people
who are linked to each other by a network of relation-
ships, sharing some common norms and values. The
feeling of belonging to a particular group stems from
the existence of linkages between people. These
linkages can be such as kinship, ethnicity, friendship,
common interests (Gallardo, 2002, p. 125).
Obviously these elements are present among the fishers,
except that the families are not part of the population as is
the case with many other working or producing activities.
The community of the fishers’ organizations will be more
of the symbolic kind. I return to both of these issues later.
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involving such a high mobilization of people,
organizations and economic resources would
not appear to be the result of only top-down
policy enforcement. Top-down policy enforce-
ment seldom succeeds if grass-root organiza-
tions are not convinced of its benefits.
Nonetheless, approximately 23 percent (12,660)
of the registered fishers at Sernapesca are not
affiliated to any fisher organization. Further-
more, there are many organizations that have
not applied for a MA.
Doubtless, the seriousness of the situation
during the last few decades has placed the
fishers in a better position to change their
non-sustainable practices, validating Ostrom’s
(1999) idea that when resource users notice
changes that threaten the natural resource they
depend on, they act collectively in order to solve
the problem. In 2001, 90 percent of the MAs
had Locos as their main target species, and all
the collected Loco in the country comes from
MAs (Gelcich et al., 2006b).
The enhanced self-esteem and self-reliance
of the fishers in forming local responses are
configuring what I metaphorically call ‘‘seas-
capes of confidence’’.7 Nonetheless, new solu-
tions often lead to new problems, threatening
the newly won, still embryonic seascapes of
confidence. The solution to the problem of over-
exploitation, giving management rights over a
part of the main means of production for the
fishers * the ocean * leaves the problem of
their settlement and infrastructure on land
unresolved, leading to new seascapes of con-
flicts. This situation arouses old latent power
relations, and tenure conflicts re-emerge at the
same time as new stakeholders enter the scene.
New power constellations crystallize, adding
major complexity to the situation. These pro-
blems are not only about different stakeholders
in the contested places of MAs, but also about
the legal framework and different law interpre-
tations. In addition there are complex jurisdic-
tional issues with different law enforcement
authorities controlling different natural re-
sources, such as land (police) and sea (Maritime
Governance). All of these conditions constitute
a potential threat to the enduring viability
of MAs.
The spread of MAs is not only changing the
physical landscapes but also the cultural land-
scapes of land and sea tenure, opening an arena
for potential tensions and conflicts principally
among the fishers and the landowners. This
issue has not received much research attention.
It deserves a wider and deeper discussion than
the one offered in this book. The corollary is
that, with some exceptions, social aspects are
given little attention by both authorities and
scientists, despite the warning signs discussed
above and the fact that economic results are still
uncertain in terms of improving the fishers’
livelihoods.
Gelcich et al. (2005) analyse fishers’ per-
ceptions in some MAs finding positive and
negative attitudes towards them. The authors
warn about conflicts among fishers in regard
to claims of rights to the fishing places where
no management areas have been implemented
(so-called historical areas), and that some
areas used by fishers’ organizations have
been encroached with the introduction of
MAs, leaving fewer alternatives for those who
have not adopted the official MA alternative.
Historical areas are those traditionally lucra-
tive for fishing and where no MA or other
concession has been implemented, and where
formally open access reigns, except for those
resources that are under a ban or subject to
other restrictions. Some evidence suggests that
the expansion of MAs, seen as a success by
government, might hide conflicts among fishers,
weakening their social bonds (Gelcich et al.,
2005).
The reason why not all fishers’ organizations
have applied for MAs remains to be studied.
There is likely to be diverse explanations for
this, such as lack of unification, interest, means,
and time amongst others. Or perhaps their
7 The World Commission for Protected Areas The World
conservation Union (IUCN (2008) defines a seascape as
an: Area of land, with coast and sea as appropriate, where
the interaction of people and nature over time has
produced an area of distinct character with significant
aesthetic, ecological and/or cultural value, and often with
high biological diversity. Safeguarding the integrity of this
traditional interaction is vital to the protection,
maintenance and evolution of such an area.
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efforts have not yet resulted in an application.
Some fishers also hold the idea that diving is a
free activity and find it difficult to depend or
submit to the collective regulation required for
an MA. They turn from free gatherers to
cultivators at agreed times, as a fisher from El
Quisco expressed (July 2001).
In the rest of the country’s fishing places
(historical areas) there has been a total ban
on Loco fishing since 1989. The last ban
decree spans from July 2003 to December
2008 (Sernapesca, 2007d; D.S. 1593/05). Most
probably after that it will be enlarged in order
not to risk the MEABR regime (Paillaman, A.,
Sernapesca Pers. Comm. via email 2006-08-25).
MAs are, in other words, excluded from this
ban since they themselves manage the resource,
having their own regulations. In another study
Gelcich et al. (2006a) warn also about the
effects of the MAs upon fishers’ traditional
institutions (I will return to this issue in
Chapter Eight).
Nonetheless, with the new management,
fishers are experiencing a transition from ‘‘no-
madic’’ fishing to a ‘‘sedentary’’ harvesting of
the species in fixed places leading to a transfor-
mation of their life-style. The transition from
hunting to harvesting also means that tradi-
tional diving skills become less important,
giving place to new negotiation and manage-
ment abilities (Gelcich et al., 2005).
However, to manage sea resources in com-
mon in this situation does not involve owner-
ship, as the sea is res publica. However,
regarding land the dominion of the state is quite
limited as the land around the coves is mostly in
the hands of large private landlords (see Chapter
Three). The fishers seldom belong to this social
group, so their access to land is problematic. If
the MAs and the ban initiative results in
sustainable harvests it could be reasonably
conjectured that the transition from temporal
and nomadic to fixed location fishing would
lead to social tensions and legal problems as the
fishers become increasingly settled on the
coastal lands without entitlements. Alterna-
tively, the fishers do not have the possibility to
settle at all, or lack the option of developing
required infrastructure to support their fishing
livelihood. The fishers of Puerto Oscuro
(Region IV of Coquimbo) * my second case
study * exemplify the latter situation (own
observations during 20002003). The same is
valid for the fishers of Puerto Viejo in Northern
Chile (Region III of Tarapacá), that although
mostly under precarious conditions, they al-
ready live in the cove and are suffering from the
hostility of the landowner; a case that has
featured in the media. The insecurity regarding
rights to land bordering the sea, coves and
beaches discourages the building of infrastruc-
ture on the land where the coves are located. For
fishers to build houses in the coves if these are
within private property, is out of question.
However, the rights over natural resources
vary from region to region depending on
whether land bordering the sea is public or
private, urban or rural. I return to this issue
both in Chapters Three and Six. A study of use
rights allocation of the Puerto Oscuro MA and
its effects on the physical and social surround-
ings hopefully sheds light on sustainability of
other rural MAs in Chile.
Eco-systems do not recognize social and
political borders and ecologically the sea is
indivisible (Pı́riz, 2004), as is society from
nature. Nonetheless, the borders of socially
defined space-time scales of artisanal fishing
exist and might work provided allocation rights
are well-defined, including those on land. This is
even more evident in the case of sedentary
species for which the model of collective or
community territorial use rights in fisheries
(TURF) has been tried with positive outcomes
(Pı́riz, 2004). This makes the application of this
model promising for the sustainable use of
benthic resources in Chilean MAs, provided
that land problems are taken into the equation.
The Chilean experience might constitute a
positive example in the global efforts for a
more sustainable social and ecological use of
marine resources.
As Pomeroy et al. (1997) state, what is
crucial in assessment of projects is their impact
on the ‘‘well-being’’ of the coastal eco-system,
including non-humans and humans. Therefore,
ideally a comprehensive evaluation would be
interdisciplinary. However, such assessment of
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‘‘well-being’’ of both nature and humans can be
complex and expensive (Pomeroy et al., 1997).
Ideally, any evaluation of this type would also
compare data gathered before the implementa-
tion (baseline data) with data collected after
some years of experience. Likewise, the same
instruments or operational definitions of vari-
ables (or indicators) should be used during both
periods. In reality, conditions seldom allow ideal
evaluations (Pomeroy et al., 1997).
A review of the literature indicates that to
date, a comprehensive evaluation of MAs in
Chile has not been completed, perhaps with the
exception of Castilla et al. (2007). What has been
written so far dealing with threatened species
falls predominantly within natural science, more
specifically marine biology (Castilla, 1974;
Tobella, 1975; Castilla and Cancino, 1979;
Gallardo, 1979; Stuardo, 1979; Dubois et al.,
1980; Castilla and Duran, 1985; Geaghan and
Castilla, 1988; Castilla, 1988; Varela and López,
1989; Cespedes, 1990; Oliva and Castilla, 1990;
Rodrı́guez and Inostrosa s.a., etc). The presence
of social sciences in the literature is scarce.
However, among the studies, mostly by natural
scientists, that consider socio-economic aspects,
we find Castilla, 1983; Moreno et al., 1987;
Geaghan and Castilla, 1988; Arrizaga et al.,
1989; Castilla et al., 1993; Gallardo et al., 1993;
Payne and Castilla, 1994; Castilla, 1995; Stotz,
1997; Vildósola and Rossón, 1997; Castilla and
Fernández, 1998; Meltzoff et al., 2002; Castilla
et al., 2007. In this category we also find Gelcich
et al. (2005, 2006a and 2006b) in a study that
addresses attitudes, beliefs, and financial risk-
taking among fishers in some areas. Among the
studies written by social scientists (sociology and
psychology) we can count Cereceda and Preiss
s.a.(a), Cereceda and Preiss s.a.(b), Cereceda
s.a.(c). Also de Laire (2002) touches upon MAs
in a study about artisanal fishing in Chile.
Biological models alone are not enough to
‘‘understand the socio-ecological interrelations
derived from the use and managements of fish-
eries resources’’ (Pı́riz, 2004, p. 40). Social
sciences would enrich the discussion regarding
the adequacy and sustainable management of
forms like the MAs under the cpr approach. This
is even more important in Chile as awareness
about the commons institutions as a manage-
ment solution is meagre, which the case of
agricultural communities in Chile’s Norte Chico
exemplifies (Gallardo, 2002; Gallardo, 2004).
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this monograph is to qualita-
tively study and analyse MAs as a socio-
economic reproduction alternative and organi-
zation using the common pool resources (cpr)
theoretical approach evaluating principally the
pioneer MA of the Sindicato de Buzos y
Pescadores of El Quisco (Fishers and Divers
Union of El Quisco), Region V of Valparaı́so,
from the fishers’ perspective. The case of the
fishers’ guild of Puerto Oscuro cove (Region
IV of Coquimbo) is included in this study to
portray the landscapes of conflicts as the own-
ership/claim of the nearest land to the coves is
contested.
A key concept that appears when the ques-
tion of the MAs is discussed in the mass media
and scientifically is ‘‘sustainable development’’.
My first reflection was how the fishers them-
selves understood such a concept and how it
was related to the MA in El Quisco. The
research questions, mainly for El Quisco, then
became: How do fishers understand the concept
of sustainable development? How do members
of the union perceive their experiences with MA
and their role? Do they consider it to work?
What is the background and reasons for orga-
nizing a MA? What problems and constraints
do the fishers perceive both in practical and
legal terms regarding MAs?
The problem of land disputes was a main
issue due to my own experiences from Puerto
Oscuro and what I have understood from the
mass media regarding the case of Puerto Viejo
in Northern Chile. While the evaluation of El
Quisco deals more with the performance of
MAs, Puerto Oscuro engages more with the
‘‘seascape of conflicts’’. El Quisco is therefore
the principal case study and Puerto Oscuro an
auxiliary case study. Although the MA at El
Quisco started de facto to function in 1989, it
officially became a MA in 1993. Puerto Oscuro
became a MA in 1998 (IFOP, 2000).
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I hope, first, through my cases, to illustrate
how MAs, as national examples of the territor-
ial use rights in fisheries (TURF) for the
exploitation of marine benthic resources, may
be a sustainable natural resource management
alternative against the overall process of com-
moditization of rural livelihoods, showing how
they, after several years of implementation, are
performing economically and socially. I hope,
second, to highlight the particular situation of
rural coves and the new seascape of conflicts
that are emerging with the spreading of MAs
along the Chilean coasts, to provide social
science input into a national fishing policy to
address these problems.
Using a case approach the study aims to
identify common features that MAs share with
other institutional arrangements of the com-
mons such as those described by Ostrom (1999)
and Stevenson (1991). Thus the specific theore-
tical aim is to contribute to building a common
base for an approach that both defines and
explains this form within the national context.
The more general aim is to contribute with
empirical knowledge from the Chilean cases to
CPR theory and practice. In ecological and
theoretical terms, MAs are relevant as they can
show that marine species can be exploited
sustainably under the institutions of the com-
mons (Stevenson, 1991; McCay and Acheson,
1996; Ostrom, 1999).
RATIONALE BEHIND THE SELECTION OF
THE CASES
The Fishers and Divers Union of El Quisco was
the pioneering MA in Chile, forerunners in
protecting a sea area from over-exploitation
in order to save the Loco. The initiative,
together with others, led to the promulgation
of MEABR and the legal capacity to establish
MAs. Landon, who originally inspired me with
his TV program on Chilean artisan fishing,
directed me to the Union of El Quisco. Landon
also gave me the name of the Chilean Loco
expert Dr. Juan Carlos Castillla, at the Centre
for Advanced Studies in Ecology and Biodiver-
sity, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile,
Santiago. Dr. Castilla then referred me to
Armando Rosson, a marine resource technician,
a consultant who has worked with the fishers
and the MA in El Quisco for several years and
who ended up assisting me in the field with this
research. Since 1982 Universidad Católica de
Chile, Santiago, has an experimental marine
protected area (La Cruces) in concession from
the state, near El Quisco.
I undertook fieldwork in El Quisco during
July 2001 with financial support from the Dept.
of Rural Development Studies, Swedish Uni-
versity of Agricultural Sciences (SLU). Puerto
Oscuro was not initially in the scope of this
study, however having experienced conditions
there during several vacations, I thought it
would provide valuable insights into seascapes
of conflict. Puerto Oscuro is a small natural
harbour that also gave its name to the private
land estate (fundo or hacienda)8 that surrounds
the cove or harbour. I am very familiar with the
cove and the beach areas of Puerto Oscuro, and
it was during my vacations there that I saw the
emergence of their MA- related problems with
the owners of the land estate, Puerto Oscuro. I
am also acquainted with the property and its
colonial history as part of my PhD investigation
(Gallardo, 2002) about the agricultural commu-
nities in the Commune of Canela embraced the
Puerto Oscuro property. Canela is the area
where I have my cultural roots. I have close
associations with the Puerto Oscuro fishers and
their families. Furthermore, I personally know
the owners of the estate and have been exposed
to their arguments in defence of their own
interests. In other words, I have seen the fishers’
powerlessness, and also unfortunately, the open
hostility of the other party, especially against
the people that have rather humble summer
houses on the beach. The inclusion of Puerto
Oscuro thus illustrates many of the problems
that the fishers confront in rural coves along the
Chilean coasts, forming part of the experience
8 The concepts of latifundium, hacienda or fundo are
commonly used in Chile indistinctly to denote a large
landed estate. The concept of minifundium refers to small
landed estates. Historically the minifundium has its roots
mainly in the latifundium, resulting from the subdivision
of the latter (Borde and Góngora, 1956; Gallardo, 2002).
Chapter 1: The Study Setting 15
that threatens the enduring viability of the
MEABR initiative.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) is the
approach used in this study. What follows is a
discussion of the general characteristics of
qualitative methodology. This will reveal how
and in which way PRA shares the general
characteristics of qualitative research, except
that participatory approaches put participation
at the forefront of attempts to emancipate
disempowered people. Denzin and Lincoln (in
Creswell, 1998, pp. 1516) define qualitative
research as being
multimethod in focus, involving an interpretive, natur-
alistic approach to its subject matter. This means that
qualitative researchers study things in their natural
setting, attempting to make sense of or interpret phe-
nomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.
Among the characteristics common for qualita-
tive methodology, Creswell (1998, p. 16) high-
lights (a) the natural setting as source of data; (b)
the researcher as key of data collection; (c) the
collection of data in the form of words or
pictures; (d) seeing the result more as a process
than as product; (e) the inductive analysis of data;
(f) paying attention to the particular; (g) putting
the focus on participants’ perspective, and their
meaning; (h) the use of expressive language.
PRA is evolving all the time and is therefore
not easy to define, but it can be described as ‘‘an
approach and methods for learning about rural
life and conditions [by, with and from] rural
people’’ (Chambers, 1997, p. 104). More recently
it has been used in urban settings and extended its
focus from learning to analysis, planning, action
monitoring and evaluation. For others, PRA has
deeper resonance implying ‘‘philosophy and a
way of life which stress self-critical awareness and
commitment to the poor, weak and vulnerable’’
(Chambers, 1997, p. 104). The three foundations
of PRA are: ‘‘(i) the behaviour and attitudes of
outsiders, who facilitate, not dominate; (ii) the
methods which shift the normal balance from
close to open, from individual to group, from
verbal to visual, from measuring to comparing;
and (iii) partnership and sharing information,
experience, food and training between insiders
and outsiders, and between organizations’’
(Chambers, 1997, pp. 104106).
Participatory approaches have been used
extensively in sustainable development studies.
In this approach, in contrast to extractive re-
search, ‘‘methods are being used not just for local
people to inform outsiders, but also for people’s
own analysis of their conditions’’ (Pretty et al.,
1995, p. 56). Using PRA, I also complied with the
spirit of global efforts of international fishing
organizations and protocols (Garcia et al., 2003;
FAO, 2005; FAO, 2006), to anchor the investiga-
tion at grass-root-level, in order to fully take
account of the fishers’ own evaluation of the
methodology and process, including the role of
the researchers (Pretty et al., 1995).
Using PRA tools, the subjects involved
follow their own process, defining and structur-
ing problems and solutions, performing the
reflection and the analysis (Pretty et al., 1995).
Through this exchange process fishers had the
possibility to collectively elaborate and expose
their ideas and visions, creating opportunities to
create empathy for the position of others
(Scoones and Thompson, 1994). This exercise
in information exchange and understanding
should contribute to the empowerment of the
fishers and the Union, strengthening their own
role as resource users. Furthermore, PRA is
gender sensitive providing tools to explore, for
instance, gender differences in power and deci-
sion-making in economic activities. It is in this
way that women’s own experiences and pro-
blems are given a meaningful separate focus
that more effectively enables pertinent gender
issues to be revealed (Jiggins, 1994).
In choosing this methodology, the focus
here is squarely on the fishers, the protagonists
of MAs, and their perceptions. As Pı́riz (2004,
p. 71) puts it:
The perceptions of problems and solutions by resource
users must be captured and understood, because
regardless of whether these could be considered as
‘‘real or false’’, ‘‘right or wrong’’, they will contribute to
the understanding of cpr [common pool resources]
situation, the search for and implementation of solu-
tions and ultimately the fishers of the future.
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Given that this study is principally about one
case (El Quisco), it cannot be considered to be
representative of MAs in Chile, nor of all the
members of the Union. It is, rather, exploratory
research significantly based on the chosen cases,
thus reflecting specific fishers’ perceptions in
accordance with the aim of the study.
One of the central issues of external validity
is the representativity of the sample. That is, the
characteristics of the subjects must reflect the
characteristics of the population that is under
research. In this view it is essential that the
sample is as representative as possible of the
population from which is drawn.9 However,
field conditions are never ideal and the re-
searcher often has to adapt to the social context.
Due to field conditions, the sample was not
statistically representative of either the fisher
members of the Union responsible for mana-
ging the MA under study, or of their women. Of
the three types of non-probability sampling
(convenience, purposive and quota sample)
(Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, p. 184), my
sample coincides with a convenience sampling
approach. This is where the researcher selects
the sampling units that are conveniently avail-
able. In this,
there is no way of specifying the probability of each
unit’s inclusion in the sample, and there is no assurance
that every unit has some chance of being included
(Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, p. 183).
However, quantifying statistical patterns based
on a representative sample of the population is
not an aim of qualitative research. Such studies
are more concerned with capturing textured
details of social events and the perceptions of
respondents about these events. This is not to
say that it is impossible to quantify and measure
perceptions, or for that matter that the percep-
tions found among fishers in El Quisco could
not be valid for fishers of other MAs. Case
study research does not aim to extrapolate its
results for the whole population of the studied
phenomena, as the results are site specific and
therefore also limited in their geographical
scope. This approach may lack generalization,
but it hopefully gains in depth.
Qualitative research is characterized by
paying attention to the particular (characteristic
f), and to the kind of data that does not need to
be measured in quantitative terms. The present
study has two different cases (one primary and
one auxiliary). Instead of counting occurrences
across a large population and controlling pos-
sible contaminating variables, using statistics
and replicability to validate generalization
from survey and experiment, qualitative studies
are
open-ended and set up research opportunities designed
to lead the researcher into unforeseen areas of discovery
within the life of the people s/he is investigating. Also,
they look deeply into behaviour within specific social
settings rather that at broad populations (Holliday,
2005, p. 5).
There is a significant difference in the philoso-
phy underlying qualitative and quantitative
research traditions. The key assumption of
quantitative research is that through the use of
correct technique it is possible to obtain objec-
tive facts about the world; in contrast, qualita-
tive research is interpretative offering gradual
pictures of reality, pictures that themselves are
also interpretations of a socially constructed
world.10
9 A sample is considered representative if the analysis made
using the researcher’s sampling unit produce results
similar to those that would be obtained had the
researcher analysed the entire population.
10 This is not to postulate an idealist ontology. The ontology
behind this hermeneutic or social constructivist position
is not to deny the existence of a material world outside
our consciousness or for that matter, its importance in the
way it conditions human life, but there is a difference
between the physical, material world, and the social
world. We cannot explain social reality with objective
observation language since knowledge is based on and
created through language; reality and language being
inseparable (Bergström and Boréus, 2000). There is a
helpful distinction between social or institutional facts
and so-called ‘‘raw’’ facts (Searle in Bergström and
Boréus, 2000) that here helps to avoid social
constructivism to fall into an idealist ontology denying
the existence of a world outside our minds. Examples of
raw facts are that the earth gyres around the sun, and
institutional facts such as Chile being ruled by a
dictatorship between 1973 and 1989. While the first
fact is valid independently of our language (although to
sustain this we need a language), the social fact is
unthinkable without language.
Chapter 1: The Study Setting 17
Given that the researcher is the key to
gaining information (characteristic b), s/he is
an instrument of data collection, gathering
words or pictures, and although the researcher
brings their own questions of how and what, s/
he is an active learner who can tell the story
from the participants view rather than being the
‘‘expert’’. In PRA the researcher is a facilitator
of the inquiry process. Regarding the character-
istic that collection of data takes the form of
words or pictures (characteristic c) and (char-
acteristic h) expressive language, visual repre-
sentations are especially important as they can
fulfil two-folded purposes: First, when the study
subjects lack formal education, which was very
much the case with the fishers, visual represen-
tation avoids the use of written language to
express things (see also Chapter Seven). Second,
pictures better than words visualize complex
situations, and when it is the researcher that
lacks knowledge regarding the studied activities,
the pictures help to fill their lack of knowledge.
Thus, the sea transects and pictures showing
diving activities were useful to solve my ignor-
ance in matters of fishing and diving. The
process of working with PRA tools seems to
have been important in sharing experiences with
others discussing the issues targeted by the tools
during which fishers also acquired new insights,
judgments and knowledge (characteristic d).
Thus, the process provides benefit for the
participants and the products or results are
more important for the researcher as they are
the data on which s/he bases the analysis.
This epistemology, which leads to a specific
inductive data analysis (characteristic e), means
that knowledge is contextual and consists of the
material constructed by the participants, in
contrast to extractive deductive analysis where
the converse is true and the research steps move
from theory and hypothesis to reality. Putting
focus on participants’ perspective, and their
meaning (characteristic g), means that research-
ers show in their work data produced by social
subjects, or a re-drawing of them. The inter-
pretation of the researcher comes only after
presenting the participants’ own drawings, or a
re-drawing of them, and as a second step in her
analysis. Here the identified information and
elements are related to each other, to other
similar field experiences/cases and to a theore-
tical approach. This relates again to the differ-
ent significance that the process and the
products or results have for both the social
subjects involved in the inquiry and the re-
searcher, respectively, fulfilling two different
functions; a kind of ‘‘winwin’’ social situation
and interchange in contrast to extractive re-
search. Thus, while in the process the fishers
and the women define and structure both
problems and solutions, perform the reflection
and the analysis (Pretty et al., 1995), with the
results the researcher hopefully gets the answers
to the posed questions.
THE METHODS
Since the reasons to include the two study cases
are different, so are the methods used to gather
data; the overall methodology is characterized
as qualitative. The central methodological de-
vice used in the field research to collect data in
El Quisco was Participatory Rural Appraisal
(PRA). PRA tools were used to do a bottom-up
evaluation of how the members of the Union
perceived their experiences with the MA, illu-
minating problems and constrains experienced
both in practical and legal terms. The specific
tools used in El Quisco are exposed in a
separate section below.
Beside PRA and interviews with qualified
informants, and in order to grasp the multiple
sources of evidence and to address the research
questions, further data collection consisted
of gathering and systematizing national statis-
tics on artisanal and industrial fishing, relevant
grey literature, fishing rules and laws, a lawsuit
over land ownership and the Union’s rules. All
these types of data were complemented with
national and international scientific articles and
reports, as well as with intensive email contact
that was maintained with key informants and
scholars and institutions on the implementa-
tion, results, successes and problems of MAs.
The national information technology integra-
tion of public institutions, due to demand
for transparency, has radically changed the
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information conditions for scholars and the
public, making it easier for research.
Since Puerto Oscuro was included to
integrate social tension over access to land in
the cove area, data gathering specifically regard-
ing the MA of Puerto Oscuro differs from that
of El Quisco in that it includes more stake-
holders than the fishers and their MA. It
comprises the history behind the conflict over
the cove and the inclusion of other stakeholders
is achieved by studying the ongoing law-suit
between the landowners and the cove’s summer-
house owners, as well as through observations
and dialogue with those involved. My familiar-
ity with the area, from both a personal and
academic perspective, was also helpful in gain-
ing cooperation from and understanding the
perspectives of the stakeholders. Puerto Oscuro
obtained its MA later than El Quisco, its
experience is also shorter and data in this regard
different and limited in scope.
The information from the Puerto Oscuro
MA is based on semi-structured and open
interviews with key informants. Two fishers
were especially important (see Chapter Six).
The information of the interviews was comple-
mented with IFOP’s (2000) study, the Base Line
Study (ESBA) and the Proposition of Manage-
ment Plan and Exploitation of the Management
Area Puerto Oscuro, both necessary as prere-
quisite studies to officially obtain MA status.
For the ongoing lawsuit and demographic
data from Puerto Oscuro I received assistance
from a university geography student who also
helped me collect data in Los Vilos and Canela
during 2005. She interviewed several local
informants and representatives from municipal,
marine and judicial authorities. The historical
background of the property, Puerto Oscuro, was
derived from Gallardo (2002), where in order to
reconstruct the land tenure structure from the
1600s onwards, judicial, notaries and parochial
archives, land property registers and sales were
used. I undertook the translation from Spanish
to English of the different laws, rules, letters,
interviews and other documents used in that
monograph.
ON THE FIELD CONDITIONS IN EL
QUISCO
When I initiated my field-work in El Quisco
during the second part of July 2001, I was
somewhat ‘‘assisted’’ by the stormy weather
conditions that forced the fishers to remain
ashore for several days. Thus, many of the fishers
were around working with their boats and
socializing. Meetings in this situation were
relatively easy to arrange. After three days, and
after familiarizing with Armando Rosson * the
marine resource technician who helped me in the
field * and giving him PRA technique orienta-
tion, I concentrated on understanding the Un-
ion’s Junta (Board), the geographical layout and
features of the cove, and met some of the
individual fishers that were around. Mr. Rosson,
who heads BITECMA (Biologı́a y Tecnologı́a en
Recursos del Mar, Sea Resources’ Biology and
Technology), the consultancy firm, which along
with the university has been working with the
Union in the development of the MA, was of
great support during my visit to El Quisco.
An ad doc meeting was then called after the
first days in the place, by a member of the union
using the megaphone that could reach the cove.
A group of 20 fishers came to the meeting,
which is about 22 percent of the total of the
92 members. In this first meeting, I presented
myself and part of my personal history. I also
explained to them the aims of my investigation,
why it was a participatory evaluation, as well as
about the role of us as facilitators (Rosson, A.
and myself).
Of the 20 fishers that came to the first
meeting, 12 participated constantly in the
exercises (in groups of two, three or four
persons, depending on the exercise/tool) during
the ensuing days, although their numbers dur-
ing the initial few days were higher. Over the
entire period different fishers participated at
different times. After the first few days of PRA
exercises several fishers witnessed the ongoing
process. Although they were curious, they did
not directly take part in the exercises, staying
behind those who were sitting and more directly
engaged. While some of these standing, upon
my encouragement, accepted my invitation to
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get involved, others declined, perhaps because
they thought it was more difficult to join at this
later stage. Standing behind those who worked
was an easier way to withdraw at any time
if they felt like it. Some may have also felt
intimidated because they could not draw or
write well enough. However, standing behind
those directly active did not hinder the obser-
vers from giving their comments, opinions and
suggestions. Yet, only the names of those who
participated formally were recorded. None of
them wanted to be anonymous; the same for the
women. Later, I interviewed one fisher indivi-
dually and he asked to remain anonymous. He
was the only one who had a less positive
attitude towards the MA. His reasoning was
that he found it difficult to accept impositions
on when and how to fish Locos when he was a
diver, i.e, he could no longer exercise his
profession in the same way. I decided to leave
aside more information about this fisher as
more details could threaten anonymity.
The meetings were held in the Union’s social
centre, just beside the boats and the sheds. The
social centre is the gathering place for the fishers
and their families. Here they can eat, rest,
smoke, socialize and get warm during chilly
days. Outsiders can also eat fresh fish or other
food here, cheaply. The place is well visited
during the weekends by people coming to their
summer houses in El Quisco. In front of the
social centre there is another, more exclusive
restaurant that is owned by the Union and run
commercially.
After less than a week the weather calmed
down and the fishers went off to sea. Most of
the planned exercises were complete but those
engaged in the exercises continued to participate
until all exercises were complete. The last
exercises (men’s Problem-Tree and Problem-
Solution) were performed in the open while
fishers were preparing fishhooks. I was thus able
to take pictures of fishers, the cove and of all the
flipcharts (26 in total). These were displayed in
the social centre, covering all of the walls during
the days of my field visit there, which in total
embraced less than 20 days. In this way the
fishers who had not engaged directly in the
exercises could observe what the participants
had produced.
Mr. Rosson’s good reputation helped me gain
acceptance fast. We worked 10 intensive days
together undertaking the group exercises. In the
evenings I stayed with the women. This way we
could advance quite fast.11 I integrated women
into the study by involving seven participating
fishers’ wives, including the two responsible for
the social centre. We worked during the evenings,
when women are traditionally at home to meet
their returning husbands. Some women brought
their children and some husbands were around
waiting, giving companionship in the dark sur-
roundings of the cove (Pictures 1.9 and 1.10) .
PICTURE 1.9 The social centre (behind the boats)
PICTURE 1.10 Flipcharts of the exercises hanging
in the social centre’s wall
11 To work fast was important to me as I had my then seven-
year-old son with me. Furthermore, the economic means
were limited to engage Mr. Rosson for extra time.
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Working with women was a bit different.
They were quite decisive, organized themselves
quickly and cooperatively divided up the tasks
within the group. They started working
quickly as soon they understood the exercise,
and the results were promptly displayed on
the wall. They also showed considerable con-
fidence, perhaps because I was a woman too.
They were also better at drawing and writing.
All the women that came worked, and some
of the accompanying children emulated them
(Picture 1.11). They enjoyed doing their own
map of the village.
THE PRA TOOLS USED IN EL QUISCO
The PRA tools used for El Quisco were 14 in
total. Unlike the Puerto Oscuro case, no other
stakeholders were part of the study. As hitherto,
fishing is mostly a male activity, there is not a
single woman registered as a member of the
Union, either as fisher or diver (Lista de Socios
Sindicato de Pescadores Caleta El Quisco,
2001). Most tools were aimed at this main
relevant production activity. Consequently, all
the tools were used with men, but only seven
were employed with women in an endeavour to
capture a gendered perspective. Although the
tools were the same for both genders, the issue
to be studied could be the same (e.g., effects of
the MA), or different (e.g., MA Problem and
Solution Tree for men; Life and Household
Problem and Solution Tree for women). The
daily calendar tool was used for different
categories of respondents, such as divers, fishers
and women. Table 1.1 below, describes the tools
used and their purpose.
In Table 1.1, the tools are ordered in three
parts: background, production and commercia-
lization system, and economy and daily life in
order to give a first impression of these three
broad categories and the content of the ex-
ercises. The treatment of the results and analysis
in Chapter Seven will follow a different logic. In
Table 1.1, Part One embraces the reasons for the
introduction of the management area in El
Quisco (Stepping Stones), followed by how the
fishers perceive the concept of sustainable
development (linked to the introduction of the
MA) (Drawing Concept). The Historic Profile
deals with the time perspective of the fishing
village, and the maps with the spatial distribu-
tion of the different areas of the village as
perceived by men and women (Village Map).
The Venn diagram deals with the institutional
linkages between the Union and the other
actors/institutions including those both local
and remote and public and private. This institu-
tional mapping exercise also included an eva-
luation of their relationship to the Union. This
was complemented with an ad hoc extra tool.
This produced a diagram that described the
Union’s internal organization, including the role
and responsibilities of committees.
Part Two includes the production and
commercialization system, starting with Sea
Transect which deals with how the harvest of
the Locos and Lapas (Chilean limpe, Fissurella
Spp.) is performed by the crew while submerged
beneath the sea. Also captured was the distribu-
tion of benthic species, as well as what the
fishers consider being predators of the Loco.
This is followed by the System Flow Analysis
tool that deals with the linkages between
different economic activities both on land and
sea, and their interconnection both with the
households and the market. The two Impact
Analyses undertaken by men and women (se-
parately) convey the effects that the MA has
had on their lives, thus being their evaluation of
this production initiative. An evaluation is
incomplete if it is not followed by an analysis
of both the problems that the fishers perceive in
PICTURE 1.11 Women having refreshment after PRA work
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connection with this experience and suggested
solutions to solve these difficulties (Problem-
Tree and Solution-Tree). Problem-Tree and
Solution-Tree with women, instead of dealing
with the MA, dealt with the problems of their
own lives including household situation and
family.
Part Three includes economy and daily life
with three tools: the Seasonal Calendar, which I
have subdivided into several tables and dia-
grams comprising the availability of resources,
labour distribution and economic assessment of
both production spheres, i.e., inside and outside
the MA. Also the daily calendar of a fisher,
diver and three women are included and illus-
trate a working day. The empirical analysis also
includes the participants’ evaluation of the
methodology. In this last part I have also
included an interview on the most common
species fished outside the MA.
The results and analysis of the fieldwork in
El Quisco (Chapter Seven) starts with the voice
TABLE 1.1 PRA tools used in El Quisco
Tools Men Women Purposes with the tools
Part One: Background
1. Stepping stones X Reasons for introducing the Mas
2. Drawing concepts X Understanding the concept of sustainable
development
3. Historical profile X History of the Union/fishing cove
4. Village Map X X Spatial distribution of the different areas of the
village
5. (see below)
6. Venn diagram X Institutional linkages between the Union and
the surrounding instances, including their role
in relation to the Union. An assessment of the
Union’s committees is also considered here.
Part Two: Production and Commercialization System
7. Sea transects X Spatial distribution of the species in the sea,
harvesting techniques and predators of the
Loco
8. System flow diagram X Production and trade systems, complexities
and relationships.
9. Impact analysis X X Effects of the MAs
10. Problem-Tree X X Men: Problems with the MAs. Women:
Problems with their lives and the household
11. Solution-Tree X X Solutions to the problems
Part Three: General Economy and Daily Life
12. Seasonal Calendar X X Men: availability of resources, labour
distribution and economic assessment of both
production spheres, i.e., inside and outside
the MAs. Women: yearly illness and related
expenses
13. Daily calendar of a fisher, diver and
women
X X Daily life during a working day
14. Methodology and process evaluation X X Evaluation of the methodology
Additional tools
5. Organization diagram of the Union X Union organization, committees and their
roles
Interview: Most common fished species in El
Quisco
Most common species fished outside the MAs
Based on Pretty et al., (1995).
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of the fishers and the women, instead of a more
conventional presentation with their voice back-
ing my analysis. I regard this sequence to be
more sincere and in accordance with PRA
methodology, although this way of approaching
it may have analytical implications. Where
relevant the results have also been complemen-
ted and/or contrasted with information and
data from other primary and secondary sources.
EVALUATION OF THE METHODOLOGY
USED IN EL QUISCO
This was the first time I used PRA in research
and was impressed by the advantages offered by
the methodology. Up until then my experience
of PRA was theoretical, from teaching, tutoring
and from developmental fieldwork with rural
communities within an EU-project with Latin
America (ADITAL).12 I also had, as course
convenor, the field experience of leading master
students from the Department of Development
Studies from SLU during their field trip to the
Philippines (2002) to practice the same metho-
dology.
Rosson was also new to PRA. Both of us
acknowledged the experience as positive recog-
nising that we had learned a lot. As we shall see
in Chapter Seven, the opinions expressed by the
participants confirm the advantages of the
PRA. Both male and female participants pro-
vided positive evaluations of the experience of
working in groups and discussing common
problems in a way that allows everyone to
express their opinion. The men found the
democratic spirit of the process enriching and
also felt they learned about their own work
activity. The role of the facilitators was assessed
positively by both groups. The most common
item underlined as negative by the male parti-
cipants was the lack of engagement of the rest of
the fishers in the exercise; a (..exercises; an)
issue that cannot be directly attributed to a fault
with the methodology.
The women emphasized the positive experi-
ence and dynamic character of the common
discussion, which made them discover the
collective character of their life problems, pre-
occupations and reflections. They also learnt to
draw collective conclusions and developed con-
fidence individually in their own ideas when
discovering that others had had similar reflec-
tions. They emerged strengthened from the
experience, being able to express ideas freely,
and losing part of their insecurity. At the same
time they learnt to know each other better. Both
men and women agreed that there was nothing
in the approach that they saw negatively.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
I am of the opinion that not only ‘‘historically
significant’’ persons have the right to appear
with their real names in literature, but also those
who through their daily life and actions make a
difference in every society; those whom in social
science research are easily made anonymous,
invisible and faceless, even when it is not
ethically motivated. I therefore, with the consent
of the respondents, attribute accounts to people
using their real names. It is a way of paying
tribute to them and it can also provide a
moment of pride for their children, so short of
paragons from their own social class. After
conveying my ideas on this, the participants
consented to use of their names, and to
reproduce some of the created flipcharts.
Furthermore, in error some Daily Calendars,
which were done at a fishers’ home, lack the
name of the fisher and diver who created them.
THE PRA FIELD-MATERIAL
The philosophy of participatory approach
implies that the material produced by the
participants belongs to them and not to the
researcher. Therefore I took careful pictures of
all the produced material to take back with me,
and with the intention to leave the material in
the hands of the Union, but they declined,
12 Agricultural Virtual Community of Latin American and
Europe: this portal gives the opportunity to swap
experiences concerns with farmers, ranchers and
technicians of the agricultural sector throughout the
world and especially the partner countries, Spain,
Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Denmark and Sweden.
The registered users from the partner areas can make use
of the distance learning programs with courses adapted
to the necessities. They can also have an education with
available timetable.
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alleging that I would have more use for the
material since ‘‘it was me who was going to
write about them’’. I respected their opinion,
and took the flipcharts. However, as soon as I
had returned to Sweden, I sent back several
sets of photos of the flipcharts (both of the
people and of the exercises) to the Union,
Rosson and many other participants. I intend
to present this monograph to the Union some-
time in 2008, even though it is in English,
which will make it hard for people from the
area to access it. I lack financing to translate
this monograph and produce a popular version
in Spanish. PDF files of the monograph will be
sent to the different institutions and persons
that I
collaborated with as well as to the main public
university libraries in Chile, and obviously to
the Municipality of El Quisco and Canela.
The El Quisco Union will get a hard copy of
the book.
With one exception (Loco harvest), all the
pictures of the flipcharts of Chapter Seven and
those in the present chapter were taken by me.
The pictures from the species have been taken
from the Iconografı́a de Especies en Chile
(Subpesca, 2005c). Maps have different sources,
mostly websites, and I have required permission
to use them. The same is valid for tables,
diagrams, specific pictures, figures and all data
I got from different authorities.
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2 Fishing Management and
Property Rights: A Conceptual
Framework
INTRODUCTION
Small-scale fisheries have been paid little atten-
tion in policy and management theory. Up to the
beginning of 2000, none of the mainstream
journals had editorial focus around small-scale
management (Berkes et al., 2001, Chap. 4, p. 10).
Academic Journals usually have their origin in
high-income countries in the north, and are
therefore dominated by agendas set by these
countries (Sachs [1999] in Berkes et al., 2001).
Both Symes [1996] and Phillipson [2001] in Pı́riz
(2004, p. 40), in referring to the European
context, support the view that research on
small-scale coastal fisheries has been especially
neglected.
This situation contrasts with the worldwide
importance of small-scale fisheries (See Hersoug
et al., 2004, chapter one in this study). Berkes
et al. (2001) in Table 2.1 compares small-scale
and the large-scale fisheries.
This next section will discuss the multi-
dimensional importance of small-scale fisheries
in terms of the economic, cultural and ecological
benefits they provide. The contribution of small-
scale fisheries to world fish supply and its impact
on fish food security is significant; almost all fish
from small-scale fishing is aimed for food
(FAO, 2005, p. 15). Small-scale fisheries are, on
one hand, regarded as less threatening for the
eco-system and, on the other, receptive to
eco-system approaches due to their flexibility
regarding institutional structures, which often
are based on intimate relations among fishers.
Additionally, they rely on multiple-species and
multiple employments, either from the fishing
sector or from other sectors (Garcia et al., 2003,
Chap. 9, p. 4). Among the comparative advan-
tages of small-scale fisheries according to FAO
(2005, p. 2) are: greater economic efficiency, less
environmental impact and greater ability to
spread economic and social benefits, due to a
less geographic concentration of the activity.
Also fishers’ cultural and environmental heri-
tage is highlighted.
Berkes et al. (2001) divide fisheries into two
main sectors: the harvest and post-harvest
sector. The first one includes all types of fishers
and respective gears and resources. The second
includes buyers, processors, market, consumers,
government and the society in general. In order
to overview the differences between different
fishers, Berkes et al. (2001) group them into
three categories and in doing so considers a long
list of dimensions involving scale, catch size,
TABLE 2.1 Comparison between large-scale and small-scale fisheries.
Key Features of the Fisheries Large-scale Fisheries Small-scale Fisheries
Direct employment in fishing 500,000 people 50,000,000 people
Fishery-related occupations  150,000,000 people
Fishing household dependents  250,000,000 people
Capital cost per fishing job US$30,000$300,000 US$20$300
Annual catch for food 1540 million tonnes 2030 million tonnes
Annual fish bycatch 520 million tonnes B1 million tonnes
Annual fuel oil consumption 1419 million tonnes 12.5 million tonnes
Catch per metric tonnes of oil used 25 tonnes 1020 tonnes
Source: Berkes et al. (2001; Table 1.2). With permission from Bill Carman, IDRC.
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boat ownership, extent of marketing, amongst
others. The first two categories are commercial
large-scale industrial and small-scale industrial
fisheries, and the third, subsistence and artisanal
fisheries which these authors gather in a single
category, despite their differences. Even subsis-
tence fisheries are commercial as very few fishers
catch exclusively for household consumption. In
many Third World countries most small-scale
fisheries would fall into the two last categories
(small-scale industrial and subsistence/artisa-
nal), but through globalization some artisanal
fisheries are starting to show characteristics of
large-scale fisheries. The Chilean Loco fisheries
are an example of this and in order to illustrate
this, I have plotted my estimation of the
attributes of the Locos fisheries in Chile, via
the zig-zagging line in Table 2.2 below, against
the fisheries related characteristics identified by
Berkes et al. (2001).
The position of the line (left, centered, or
right) is an approximation of the nearness to the
described features. Where Berkes et al. (2001)
have several specifications in a given dimension
and one of these is more representative for the
Loco fisheries, I have emphasized this in italic.
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In places I have also added specifications of my
own in brackets ([]) in the tables.
As seen with the added line, the most
deviant characteristic of the Chilean Loco fish-
eries is the dimension ‘‘extent of marketing’’,
which is the main reason for the intensification
of the exploitation that these benthic resources
have experienced. In other words, it is the
integration of high value species into the global
economy that is changing small-scale and sub-
sistence fisheries. Through the incentives of
profit pursuing export business, the fishing logic
and commercialization of small-scale fisheries
has become part of the global economy. Even
demand for environmental friendly, non-indus-
trial production in rich countries is putting
stress on resources as it intensifies the produc-
tion of selected species that used to be locally or
nationally consumed.
In spite of the fact that the harvest of many
coastal high value species is performed by
artisan hand-collection methods, over-fishing
has still been the result, threatening marine
resources and fishers’ livelihood. Researchers
still do not adequately include humans as pre-
dators, or the negative associated consequences
of short-term market driven fishing profit upon
marine resources (Berkes et al., 2001).
The commoditization of high value marine
resources for export, and the resulting decline in
production has started to make small-scale
fisheries less marginal from a policy and stock
assessment point of view. Considering the large
amount of small-scale fishers basing their
livelihoods on fishing, independently of whether
they fish high value species or not, it is not
difficult to understand international and na-
tional concern about the social and ecological
costs of stock collapses.
The pressure of international market de-
mand and consumption on coastal resources
shows the vulnerability of local fisheries, expos-
ing the interconnected nature of the world
(Berkes et al., 2001). Due to the interaction of
the parts, the food web relations, predatorprey
relations, multiple flows and life cycles in the
eco-system, resource exhaustion in the open sea
caused by industrial fisheries (Hauck, 1998;
Sweijd and Hauck, 1998; Gordon and Cook,
2000; Naylor et al., 2000; Garcia et al., 2003;
Myers and Worm, 2003) also affect coastal
marine resources.
Fish yields are normally taken as an indi-
cator of ecological soundness and if fish yields
decline this is usually a clear message that things
are not as they should be. Some examples of this
are Chilean Concholepas or Chanque in Peru
during the 1980s and the abalone worldwide
(Cook and Sweijd, 1997; Gordon and Cook,
2000). The incorporation of other high value
benthic species to international markets, like the
sea urchin in Chile (Moreno et al., 2007), has
showed the same declining tendency. Biological
extinction (the worse scenario) means the van-
ishing of the species, while economic extinction
means the diminution of the species so that it
becomes unviable for commercial fishing
(Berkes et al., 2001).
The diminishing of coastal marine resources
becomes the economic concern of fishers, the
ecological concern of scientists and the social,
political and conservational concern of both
national and international authorities. It is the
threat of stocks collapses in the 1980s that
stimulated the movement towards sustainable
management approaches. Initiatives like co-
management and territorial use rights for fishers
(TURFs), which put emphasis on more people
centred models for natural resource manage-
ment, are a clear example of this trend.
Fishery is a complex social activity that has
an extensive impact on the eco-system. It
includes many dimensions: cultural, economic,
commercial, political, biological and technolo-
gical. Many of these impacts move beyond
national boundaries, involving consequently a
broad spectrum of fishing resource users and
stakeholders at different levels, over broad
regions of space and with different economic
and political power. The term resource user
refers to:
Individuals or groups whose position (as proprietors,
claimants, etc) in relation to fisheries results in them
being likely to affect or be affected by the use and
management (or non-management) of fisheries (Pı́riz,
2004, p. 62).
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The term stakeholder considers all those
social agents that have a relation with, interest
in, or affect on all aspects of fisheries manage-
ment (Berkes et al., 2001). Although in the
literature it is not always clear whether govern-
ment and fishing authorities are included as
stakeholders, it is clear that they play an
important role: as the overall resource manager
and as the ultimate resource ‘‘owner’’ of the
coastal realm and beyond. In this regard,
stakeholders can be placed in a continuum
with fishers at one extreme and government at
the other, with the other stakeholders some-
where in between.
It is also difficult to know whether the term
stakeholder includes social agents beyond
national borders, although the importance of
international market and consumers is central in
how the resources are used, even though they do
not have a direct say in national management.
The conception of stakeholders could also be
extended to include those international organi-
zations that have sponsored fishing agreements
and conventions signed by the Chilean Govern-
ment. And by extension of all co-signatories of
these agreements and conventions.
As social activity, fishery involves rights and
property rights. But what is then the resource
upon which rights and property rights are
exercised? Although the ocean is indivisible,
lacking clear eco-systems boundaries, socially
constructed divisions and appropriations have
been historically imposed on it. Therefore
before I examine the question of the resource
and related property rights, it is necessary to
give a short historical description of the devel-
opment of marine property rights. In doing so,
relevant definitions are also given to the modern
subdivision of the ocean. I underline in italic or
in quotation marks [‘‘ ’’] the concepts used in
order to draw attention to them.
SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED
SUBDIVISIONS OF THE OCEAN
Many of the subdivisions of the ocean that exist
now have come into place as a result of long-
standing and complex international agreements
such as several United Nation Conferences on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I (1956), II (1960)
and III (1973) and successive Parts), which
resulted in the 1982 United Nation Convention
on the Law of the Sea. However, it was not until
1994 that this Convention came into force
(Kjellén, 2007). In the beginning (in the 1950s),
the treaty was signed by 117 countries, and by
2000 the number had increased to 140 countries
(Sea, law of the, Encyclopædia Britannica, 2008).
The 1956 UNCLOS, came to replace the
doctrine ‘‘freedom of the seas’’ which had
originated in the 1700s (UNCLOS, UN, 2007).
It eventually became recognized and then for-
malized among nations during the 17th and
18th centuries (Christy, 1992) that a country
could acquire exclusive jurisdiction over the sea
to the extent that it could defend it from land up
to where a cannon shot could reach, the rest
being Mare liberum. Mare liberum means free to
all and belonging to no one; and hence was
exploited under open access conditions. This is
perhaps captured by McCay (1996, p. 195) when
she talks about open access common property
rights. During this period a cannon shot could
technically reach up to three nautical mile or
5.5 km.1 from which the traditional three-miles
territorial sea limit developed; substituted later
by the 12-miles from the 1960s (UNCLOS, UN,
2007). Map 2.1 portrays the different zones in
which ‘‘property’’ rights are assigned interna-
tionally today.
Historically, colonial open access to the sea
as a doctrine is not related to rights attached to
customary communal traditions of nearby vil-
lages, but to imperial interests and the struggle
to secure rights for countries and overseas
companies. Spain and Portugal tried to protect
their commercial interests to the sea. After
Columbus’ first trip to the Americas, Spain
and Portugal, through a Papal Bill endorsed by
Pope Alexander VI in 1494, divided the ocean
among themselves. While Spain claimed the
Pacific and the Gulf of Mexico, Portugal was
given the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean
(UNCLOS, UN, 2007). This was later chal-
lenged by the other colonial powers, such as
France, England and Netherlands, that had their
1 A nautical mile is 1,852 meters, or 1.8 km.
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own interests in ensuring continuing an open
access to the sea. Commercial interests secured
not only ‘‘free’’ commerce of material/products
and humans (slaves) among continents, but also
the right to fish indiscriminately and without
constraint all over the world. The larger the
boats became, the longer they could reach into
this open access ocean. Accordingly: ‘‘Freedoms
of navigation, trade and fishing were essential to
capitalist development’’ (McCay, 1996, p. 196).
Parallel to this, the privatization of fishing
rights of coastal fisheries and fishing rights of
villages, communities or collectives went, like in
England for example, hand in hand with the
privatization of common lands. Therefore, the
‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ in reality better
corresponds to the ‘‘tragedy of the commoners’’
(Ciriap-Wantrup and Bishop [1975] in McCay,
1996, p. 200), as they lost their commons.
Although in USA, immigrants tried to maintain
free fishing rights, in the end they were unsuccess-
ful and these rights were eventually privatized
(McCay, 1996).
Since the middle of the 1900s fisheries have
gone through several phases (Berkes et al.,
2001). The 1950s saw the reconstruction of the
fishing fleets after World War II. The next
decade brought new technology, long-range
fleets and new fishing grounds. Expansion con-
tinued during the 1970s, which resulted in
growing concern about over-fishing. With the
incorporation of the 200 nautical miles national
jurisdiction and management, the 1980s meant a
redistribution of open access. From the late
1990s, environmental concern grew globally,
which led to a search for alternative, sustainable
fisheries models in order to avoid total depletion
of marine species. For example, the 1998
eco-system-based fisheries management ap-
proach emanating from the USA put focus on
the users, emphasising that what is managed is
the economic activity (Garcia et al., 2003). This
gave place to the eco-system approach to fish-
eries 2002 (FAO in Reykjavik), which better
corresponded to the FAO Code of Conduct,
taking more criteria into consideration such as
development, planning, food safety, etc. (Garcia
et al., 2003). An eco-system is defined as a
system of complex interactions of populations
between themselves and with the environment,
and populations as ‘‘including people, and
specially people involved in fisheries, with their
technology and institutions’’ (Garcia et al.,
2003, Chap. 2, p. 1).
Before the extension of the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (EEZ) of territorial waters up to
200 nautical miles was agreed upon, open access
benefited those with fleets that could move
between distant waters, fishing adjacent to other
countries’ coastal waters. This led to coastal
waste and pollution, increased maritime traffic
and, not less important, oil and gas exploration
and present and future production expectations
in the late 1940 and 1950s led some countries to
declare unilaterally their jurisdiction of the sea
to the continental shelf of their coasts. First to
take this initiative was USA (1945), followed by
Argentina (1946), Chile (1946) and Peru (1947).
In the case of Chile and Peru, the 200 miles
of the EEZ include the rich waters of the
Humboldt Current (UNCLOS, UN, 2007).
MAP 2.1 Jurisdictional division of the ocean
(nautical miles and km)
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The EEZ * an example of territorial use
(nota bene; not property) rights in fisheries
(TURFs) * is defined as a sea zone over which
a State has special rights over the exploration
and use of marine resources. The EEZ was given
binding international recognition by the Third
United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea in 1982 with the aim of giving better control
of maritime affairs outside territorial waters.
Article 55 of the Convention on the Law of the
Sea states that the
Exclusive Economic Zone is an area beyond and
adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific
legal regime established in this Part, under which the
rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights
and freedoms of other States are governed by the
relevant provisions of this Convention (Law of the sea,
UNCLOS/UN, 2008, Art. 55, p. 43, emphasis added).
Provided that there is a marine physical
space in front of coastal countries, the EEZ
usually embraces a distance of 200 nautical
miles (370 km) out into the sea, perpendicular
to the baseline of the country holding an EEZ.
When two or more EEZs overlap, it is up to the
individual states involved to define the bound-
ary themselves; this being a potential source of
dispute.
Extending up to 200 nautical miles, the
EEZs overlap both the 12 nautical miles of
territorial waters and the 12 nautical miles of
the contiguous zone. The states are free to
enforce any law, regulate any use and exploit
any resource on territorial waters. In the follow-
ing 12 miles of the ‘‘contiguous zone’’, coastal
states have the power to exercise certain rights,
such as preventing violations and enforcement,
including the powers to pursue, arrest and
detain suspects as smugglers and illegal immi-
grants. The territorial water baseline from which
it is measured is the low-water tide limit. The
waters inside the baseline (see Map 2.1) are
consequently the internal waters where coastal
states have complete jurisdiction. In other words,
the nearer the coast the particular zone is, the
stronger the jurisdiction of the particular
coastal state over it, ranging as seen from
‘‘complete’’ to ‘‘certain’’ rights. In Chile, the
high-water mark designates the beginning of the
national good of public use reaching up to the
territorial waters (i.e., 12 nautical miles or 22
km.) over which the State declares sovereign
rights. National goods of public use are those
that belong to the whole nation (see Chapter
Three and definitions below).
Beyond the EEZ is the continental shelf of a
coastal State, which is defined as
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that
extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of
the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance
(Law of the sea, UNCLOS/UN, 2008, Art. 76, p. 47).
In those cases where the continental margin
extends beyond the 200 miles, nations may claim
jurisdiction up to 350 miles from the baseline or
100 miles from the 2,500 meter depth in which
case these States must share the revenue derived
from the exploitation of mineral resources be-
yond the 200 miles. An exception is made for
those developing countries that are net importers
of that mineral (UNCLOS, UN, 2007). None-
theless, in 1970, the UN General Assembly
declared the resources of the seabed beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction to be the ‘‘common
heritage of mankind’’ (UNCLOS, UN, 2007).
Oceans and seas outside the national jur-
isdiction are extraterritorial waters, interna-
tional waters, high Seas or Mare liberum, being
under the jurisdiction of international laws.
‘‘Freedom of the high seas’’ is
open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by this Convention and by other
rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both
for coastal and land-locked States: (a) freedom of
navigation; (b) freedom of overflight; (c) freedom to
lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other
installations permitted under international law, subject
to Part VI; (e) freedom of fishing, subject to the
conditions laid down in section 2; (f) freedom of
scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII (Law
of the Sea,UNCLOS/ UN, 2008, Art. 87, p. 51).
Fisheries regulation became a significant
aspect of the EEZ, which presently can be
defended more easily thanks to modern vigi-
lance systems. According to UN, 99 percent of
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the world fisheries fall under national jurisdic-
tion (UNCLOS, UN, 2007), which does not
mean that fisheries are exploited by national
interests.
In extraterritorial waters industrial scale
vessels still harvest the largest share of the
catches. Ships navigating in international waters
undertaking fishing in this zone do it commonly
under flags belonging to specific states, but any
country can exercise jurisdiction if piracy or
slave trade is discovered or suspected. Although
governmental resource protection based fish-
eries management was already developed by the
North European Fisheries after the First Over-
fishing Conference in London in 1936, fisheries
management in international waters is still in its
infancy. Much later, the Rio Conference in 1992
fostered a position of striving for sustainable
development, which included specific clauses
related to the protection and preservation of the
ocean. Agenda 21, Chapters 17 and 18, deals
with the protection of all seas, rational use and
development of living resources as well as the
protection of quality and access to fresh water
resources (Kjellén, 2007, pp. 3 and 98).
PROPERTY RIGHTS, COMMON
PROPERTY, OPEN ACCESS
As discussed, many concepts are used when
referring to states’ rights to the ocean. The
question of property rights in regard to re-
sources is central, independent of the kind of
resources it deals with. But concepts and laws
are always loaded with ambiguities and scien-
tific concepts are no exception. The concepts
used to analyse and characterize social relation-
ships among individuals in regard to resources
are intricate, making interpretation difficult for
the scientific community, policy makers and
resources users. Social relations of non-private-
owned resources, such as common property,
common pool resources and resources situated
in open access regimes are even more of a
challenge to understand. The meanings of
concepts also differ in different languages as
we shall see regarding the concept of property
in Spanish and English. Therefore, before
beginning the discussion on rights and property
rights in relation to the ocean and its fish
resources, it is necessary to examine the mean-
ing of some concepts.
In economic theory the social relations of
both physical and non-physical resources are
included in the concept of rights and property
rights: ‘‘Whereas rights are relationships be-
tween persons, property rights are specifically
relationships between persons regarding use of a
thing * whether corporal or incorporeal’’
(Stevenson, 1991, p. 50; emphasis added).
Property entails rights and duties, both for
property holders and for non-holders. In Schla-
ger and Ostrom’s words (1992, p. 250) ‘‘all rights
have complementary duties. To possess a right
implies that someone else has a commensurate
duty to observe this right. Thus rules specify
both rights and duties’’. If there are neither
rights nor duties, then there is not property
either (Stevenson, 1991).
According to Schlager and Ostrom (1992)
‘‘rights’’ refer to particular authorized actions.
‘‘A property right is the authority to undertake
particular actions related to a specific domain.’’
(Schlager and Ostrom, 1992, p. 250). Rights are
therefore not to be confused with rules as rights
are the product of rules. Thus ‘‘rules’’ ‘‘refer to
the prescriptions that create authorizations’’ or
‘‘generally agreed-upon and enforced prescrip-
tions that require, forbid, or permit specific
actions for more than a single individual’’
(Schlager and Ostrom, 1992, p. 250).
If there is no property and therefore neither
rights nor duties, there is no owner and there-
fore open access conditions prevail. I adhere to
Stevenson’s definition of open access and
common property. While common property
represents property; open access does not
(Stevenson, 1991, p. 49). Consequently, open
access is on one hand, defined by Stevenson
(1991, p. 49) as
as depleteable, fugitive resources that are open to
extraction by anyone, whose extraction is rival, and
whose exploitation leads to negative externalities [ef-
fects] for other users of the resource.
Common property, on the other hand, is
a form of resource management in which a well-
delineated group of competing users participate in
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extraction or use of a jointly held resource according to
explicit or implicit understood rules about who may
take how much of the resource (Stevenson, 1991, p. 49;
emphasis added).
Property, common or private, entails on one
hand (ex ante) rights for the rights holders,
those who can be multiple or single, and on the
other hand, duties for those who are non-
property holders (Stevenson, 1991, p. 49). A
person’s property rights are defined by a com-
bination of rights, duties, liberties, powers,
immunities and liabilities defining, at the same
time, how others are required, morally or
legally, to behave in respect to the object of
property. A list that defines the degree of
ownership is long and includes: right to possess,
right to personal use, right to manage, right to
income, powers to alienate, immunity from
expropriation, power to bequeath, rights re-
garding term of ownership; duty not to use
the property in ways harmful to others; liability
(legal responsibility) to expropriation for un-
paid debt, rights and duties regarding their
reversion of lapsed ownership rights (Stevenson,
1991, p. 50).
How extensive or limited these rights are
depends on the property regime/s of a given
society. Different property regimes can coexist
in a society. To define rights is to specify the
prerogatives that determine the rights and duties
of the holder in the use of a natural resource
(Bromley [1991] in Pı́riz, 2004, p. 44). However,
one of the most fundamental questions regard-
ing property is the question of exactly who the
owner/holder is. Different social actors, indivi-
dual or collectives, come into play. Hara (2003)
summarizes the four main ideal types of prop-
erty rights regimes, including open access (Table
2.3). One can ask whether open access; i.e., the
absence of property rights, can be considered a
property regime. Does not open access rather
refer to the use, exploitation, administration,
management; i.e., the conditions under which a
resource is delivered rather than to the appro-
priation of the resource itself ?
I have added a further regime category to
Hara’s table, which has been derived from the
economic theory of government; the regime of
global public goods that has been extrapolated
from the national to the global level (Koh,
1999) to catagorize those globally shared re-
sources or goods. The definition includes sev-
eral of the Bruntland Report’s (1987, p. 43)




Free-for-all; resource use rights are left unassigned, are neither exclusive nor transferable, individuals
have privilege & rights with respect to use rates but not responsibility for maintenance of the asset.
Common property
(Res communes)
Use rights for the resource are controlled by an identifiable management group (‘‘owners’’) &
non-members have a duty to abide by exclusion; individual members of the management group (the
co-owners) have both rights & duties with respect to use rates and maintenance of the resource.
Within the co-owners, rights to the resource are unlikely to be either exclusive or transferable; they
are often rights of equal access & use; each person has a private right to the use of a resource once
captured or taken but only a communal right to the same resource before is taken.
State property
(Res publicae)
Ownership and management is held by the nation state and or crown of behalf of its citizens; rights
are held exclusively by government that has to determine use/access rules & levels of exploitation.
Individuals have a duty to observe use/access rules determined by the control agency.
Private property
(Res private)
An individual (or household) is assigned the rights to undertake socially acceptable uses & has a duty
to refrain from socially unacceptable uses; others (‘‘non-owners’’) have a duty to respect exclusion




A public good with benefits that are strongly universal in terms of countries (covering more than one
group of countries), people (accruing to several, preferably all, population groups) and generations
(extending to both current and future generations, or at least meeting the needs of current generations
without foreclosing development options for future generations) (Kaul et al., 1999, p. 509).
Source: Hara (2003, p. 16), in Hauck and Sowman, Eds; original emphasis; Kaul et al. (1999, p. 509).
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criteria of sustainable development: ‘‘Sustain-
able development is development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own
needs’’.
Public goods are defined as those whose
main characteristics are that they are non-rival
in consumption (two or more people may
enjoy the benefits of the good at the same
time), and non-excludability (exclusion is diffi-
cult or impossible to enforce) (Stevenson, 1991;
Kaul et al., 1999). Due to the problems of
excludability (e.g., the intricacy to effectively
enforce exclusion in thousands of kilometres of
coast), public goods are supplied under open
access conditions (Stevenson, 1991). Depend-
ing on whether a public good shows both
characteristics, or just one of them, they are
subdivided into ‘‘pure’’ public goods and
‘‘impure’’ public goods. While ‘‘pure’’ public
goods are both non-excludable and non-rival-
rous, impure public goods are one or the other.
One example of a pure public good is the
traffic light regime, which we all understand in
the same way (shared meaning) and in using it
behaves accordingly (Kaul et al., 1999). An
example of an impure public good is a
common pool resource such as the ocean,
which is non-excludable, but rivalrous in con-
sumption. An impure public good which is
excludable, but not rivalrous are so called club
goods. An example is a film screening in a
cinema which is not rivalrous for the viewers
who have got access to see the film; all the
viewers can enjoy it without infringing on each
other’s consumption, but excludes those who
have not got access (Kaul et al., 1999, pp. 35
and 250).
These characteristics of non-excludability
and rivalry are referred as the dilemma asso-
ciated with the use of common pool resources.
Ostrom (in Pı́riz, 2004, p. 47) has categorized
them in relation to two near related sets of
problems: appropriation or use of resources and
the so-called provision or conservation of
resources (maintaining production capacity).
Resource appropriation deals with the distribu-
tion of potential yields such as appropriation
externalities resulting in over-fishing, with as-
signment of fishing grounds, or with technolo-
gical externalities. Conservation problems result
from resource degradation, and the aim is to
ensure resource flow and ecological ‘‘services’’.2
Problems can include: a lack of development
investment, ignorance of eco-system interrela-
tions and resource availability and spatial dis-
tribution and the ‘‘free-rider’’ problem (Pı́riz,
2004, p. 47).
How can we situate the ocean and its
resources in the discussion on property rights?
Before I respond to this question it is helpful to
obtain an understanding of what is meant by
the ocean and related property rights.
THE GLOBAL OCEAN AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS
I adopt the term global ocean due to its
ecological and geographical characteristics.
While the ocean covers about 71 percent of
the Earth’s surface, the sea constitutes a part of
an ocean or a large body of salt water partially
surrounded by land (Ocean, Encyclopædia
Britannica, 2008). The global ocean is thus
one global, interconnected body of salt water,
even though it is commonly split into several
‘‘oceans’’.
If property rights are specific relationships
between persons regarding the use of some
thing * whether corporal or incorporeal, as
Stevenson (1991, p. 50) defines it, then property
rights relating to the ocean are the relationships
between States and persons regarding its use.
Property rights are normally related to tangible
2 In ecological economics, systems ecology and the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (World Resource
Institute, 2005, Synthesis:V), ecological or environmental
‘‘services’’ is a concept used to describes:
the benefits people obtain from ecosystems. These
include provisioning services such as food and water;
regulating services such as regulation of floods,
drought, land degradation, and disease; supporting
services such as soil formation, and nutrient cycling,
and cultural services such as recreational, spiritual,
religious and other nonmaterial benefits.
This study showed that 60 percent of the 24 studied
eco system services were in the process of being depleted.
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resources or objects, ‘‘things’’, which is not the
case with the ocean. This difficulty partially
explains the shift in the conceptualization of
social relations of ocean use from property
rights to use rights.
The ocean is a corporal resource, but the
entity itself is not conducive to physical appro-
priation or clear-cut subdivisions. It is due to
the complex three-dimensional nature and the
fluidity of its resources that Christy (1992)
argues that concepts of property of the sea are
less developed, and more difficult to conceive
(than in other resource appropriation situations;
e.g., forests).
Like MacKenzie (1992), it is therefore useful
to distinguish analytically between (1) the
resource endowment; i.e., the stocks of fish
species; and (2) the supporting natural environ-
ment or aquatic habitat, both forming the
natural resource base: the global ocean. Ostrom
(1999, p. 30) makes a similar distinction between
(1) resource units (what users appropriate from
the resource system); and (2) the resource
system (i.e., the aquatic habitat). The reason
for differentiating between resources, and the
aquatic habitat in regard to property rights is
that while fish resources (i.e., the resource
endowment) are fugitive, submerged, and mo-
bile, fluctuated and shared (Pı́riz, 2004), but still
susceptible of physically appropriation, this
appropriation in regard to the aquatic habitat
is, in the same physical terms, much more
complex.
Fish, being fugitive resources, become the
fishers’ possession or property only after cap-
ture. In other words, the condition of open
access reigns for fugitive species, and this is
valid both in open access and non-open access
waters.
In open access waters ‘‘open access is better
characterized by the liberty/no right correlate’’
as Stevenson (1991), following Bromley [1991],
suggests. A user is at liberty to catch what he/she
wants. If ownership for example includes the
right to possess, to hold the object and to
exclude others from its possession, open access
demonstrates neither of these rights, the fishing
resource being res nullius, an un-owned resource
(Stevenson, 1991, p. 51). The fact that a user
at one point cannot hinder another one in a
different place to catch migratory fish stock has
historically constituted the origin of the princi-
ple of freedom or open access in fishing since to
acquire, enforce and defend exclusive rights over
migratory fish is hardly possible.
Fish resources, prior to capture, are com-
mon pool resources (cpr) (nota bene, not
Common Property Resources (CPR). Therefore,
open access in relation to this resource entails
no ex ante rights for the user, be it in open
access, private, common property or use rights.
In other words, the condition of open
access is also applicable to fugitive species in
cases where private use rights to waters exist.
The private holder of the body of water can
prohibit someone from fishing, but cannot
attach rights to mobile species swimming in
‘‘his’’ water, unless, for instance, the species are
enclosed in farms. If this is not the case,
private individual territorial fishing rights
(TPFR),3 or exclusive territorial (collective)
use rights (TURF) over a parcel of water
(aquatic habitat) does not secure its holder
ex ante rights to mobile species.
Use rights imply, according to Christy
(1992), that the control is relative rather than
absolute as the species (mobile and sedentary)
are influenced by the flow of nutrients and
pollutants that pass the site, without the use
right holder being able to do much. Although to
a lesser degree, this can also be extended to
sedentary species, the control of which is also
limited as they are not completely static and can
relocate for any number of reasons, such as if
their prey also moves or if the area becomes
polluted.
Christy (1992), not talking about ownership
of the resource, but instead of ‘‘ownership’’ as a
right of use, tries to define the resource and
what the definition might include; i.e., ‘‘a
particular stock, the prey on which the stock
feeds, control of the predators, the nutrients
which support the stock, the medium in which
the stock swims, etc.’’ (Christy, 1992, Chap. 2,
3 In Sweden, in some cases, people owning land adjoining
the coast or a lake have also the fishing rights (Pı́riz, 2004,
p. 44).
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p. 4). This shift from property rights to use
rights would thus be reasoned by
the complex three-dimensional nature of the
resource itself* the water body and its consti-
tuents. Although Christy (1992) discards the
question of ownership or property, he continues
to be imprisoned by the use of the term when
he refers to ‘‘ownership of use right’’. Also
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) as we shall see
later, use the term owner and proprietor in
relation to use rights holders, which is difficult
to disassociate from the common sense of
ownership and property.
A problem that still persists is the definition
of the resource: what is the ocean? 4 If fish
resources are as described before, res nullius;
i.e., nobody’s property, could the same be said
about the ocean itself? I suggest that not
defining one of the main resources of the planet
leaves it open to interpretation that the ocean is
nobody’s property, entailing the ‘‘tragedy of the
commons’’ * more properly of open access *
which has led to disastrous resource exhaustion
and stock collapses.
THE GLOBAL OCEAN: A COMMON
POOL RESOURCE
Is the natural resource base that is the global
ocean5 best understood as being: open access
(res nullius), common property (res communis),
public property (res publica), common pool
resource or a global public good?
Many authors have the opinion that the
ocean is common property and use this concept
interchangeably with open access. For example,
differentiating between common property and
the TURFs, Christy (1992, Chap. 2, p. 1) defines
common property resources as open access
those to which access is both free and open to a set of
users or potential users . . . If the country, province, or
community does not control access to a fishery, even
though
it may have the right to do so, the condition of common
property exists.
In Christy’s (1992) understanding of the use
of common property resources, it is equal to
open access, leading therefore to a ‘‘tragedy of
the commons’’. Referring to what Schlager and
Ostrom (1992) calls the provision problem,
Christy (1992, Chap. 2, p. 1) says:
First, there is a tendency to waste the resource
physically. No individual fisherman has an incentive
to restrain his catch in the interest of future returns, for
anything he leaves in the sea for tomorrow will be taken
by others today. Thus, fishery stocks tend to be used at,
and frequently beyond, the point of maximum sustain-
able yield.
A second consequence that results from the
condition of common property is economic
waste:
In the absence of controls on capital and labour, there
will tend to be too much effort spent on too few fish. In
over-utilized fisheries, the same, or even larger, amounts
of fish can be taken with fewer fishermen and vessels
than are actually employed. This means that the same,
or greater, total revenues could be produced with lower
total costs (Christy, 1992, Chap. 2, p. 1).
Common property, furthermore, leads to
rent dissipation as the profit the fisher obtained
from the beginning in open and free access, soon
attracts new fishers (i.e., the non-excludability
problem) that would increase cost without ob-
taining the same profit per capita as the resource
diminishes. A fourth consequence of common
property is that it leads to conflicts among fishers
who compete for resources or fishing grounds.
With these, in his words ‘‘generally damaging
consequences of common property’’, Christy
(1992) portrays a ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’
when referring in reality to open access.
Christy (1992, Chap. 2, p. 1) is aware that he
diverges from other definitions of common
property, and for him common property
relates specifically to the conditions governing access to
the resource, not to the nature of the owners or the
nature of those who exercise jurisdiction or control over
the resource (emphasis added).
The problem with Ciriacy-Wantrup and
Bishop’s ([1975] in Christy, 1992, Chap.2, p. 1)
definition of common property (‘‘distribution of
property rights in resources in which a number
4 Although not for Christy (1992), who in order to avoid this
problem, changed to use rights.
5 That is, both the resource endowment, the stocks of fish
species and the supporting natural environment or aquatic
habitat.
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of owners are co-equal in their rights to use the
resource’’) is, according to Christy, that the
definition removes the condition of free and
open access.
Christy (1992) uses the concept of common
property to characterize the exploitation regime
or system, and not the thing or object subjected
to ownership. In his view, if nobody controls
the access, we have ‘‘common property’’ rather
than open access. Also MacKenzie (1992)
defines common property as open access in
regard to the sea when he says that a peculiarity
of both the fisheries resources as their aquatic
habitat is that they have been common property.
As we shall see in Chapter Five, Castilla (1995,
p. 157) also refers to the over-exploitation of the
Chilean Loco as a result of the ‘‘tragedy of the
commons’’. This is a clear inference to open
access conditions.
These examples show the confusion
amongst commentators about what constitutes
open access and common property. I prefer to
adopt the view of Stevenson’s (1991) and
Ostrom’s (1999) that common property does
imply property and therefore also owners, con-
trol and rules.
According to Stevenson (1991, p. 40) seven
necessary and sufficient conditions, are needed
to categorize a resource situation as common
property (Table 2.4). As seen, these conditions
or characteristics largely coincide with Haras’
(2003) description of a common property re-
gime (see Table 2.4).
Stevenson’s (1991) definition of common
property cannot be used for the global ocean as
the ocean lacks the central element of the
definition ‘‘a well-delineated group of competing
users participates in extraction or use of a jointly
held resource according to explicit or implicit
understood rules about who may take how much
of the resource’’. Could the international com-
munity be that well-delineated group of users?
Probably not. There seems to be agreement that
the group should not be excessively big (face to
face relationships among members of the group
are presupposed) (Stevenson, 1991; Ostrom,
1999; Berkes et al., 2001). This element of the
definition could perhaps apply for lakes where
there might be a well-delineated group of users.6
Stevenson’s (1991) definition of open access
seems to be more appropriate for the ocean
taken as an indivisible whole. Using this per-
spective the ocean could be defined as an
exhaustible, fugitive resource that is ‘‘open to
TABLE 2.4 Common property characteristics.
1. The resource unit has well defined borders by physical, biological, and social parameters, or by a combination of
them. This condition answers the question: What is the resource?
2. There is a well-defined group of users* the commoners*distinct from persons excluded from resource use. Simply,
’’we’’ and ’’they’’, or user and non-user, are the two groups with a relationship to the resource.
3. The well-delineated group of rights holders may, or may not, coincide with the group of users, as the rights holders
may rent their rights
4. Shared ownership: Multiple users participate in resource extraction. This means that the common property is utilised
by two or more people, excluding being own by a single person, a characteristic otherwise still associated with
private property.
5. Users share joint, non-exclusive entitlement to the in situ or uncaptured resource, prior to its capture or use. The
resource is uncaptured or fugitive. Neither the resource in situ nor the physical unit can be associated to a particular
user as its owner, the commoners having expectations to certain amounts of the resource.
6. The commoners compete for the resource and, thereby, impose negative externalities or effects on one another.
7. There are, explicit or implicit, well-understood rules among commoners regarding their rights and duties to one
another in respect of resource extraction. Of these rules, the most important is, because it distinguishes common
property from open access, the existence of methods to control who may take how much of the resource.
Source: Stevenson (1991, p. 40).
6 This defining characteristic is not always necessary as
there are common property resources situations that are
functioning effectively where the number of commoners
does not constitute a small group with face to face
relationships. This is exemplified by many agricultural
communities in Chile. For example an agricultural
community may have over 600 commoners furthermore
distributed over 30 000 hectares, (Gallardo, 2002).
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extraction by anyone, whose extraction is rival
and whose exploitation leads to negative ex-
ternalities for other users of the resource’’
(Stevenson, 1991, p. 49).
However, if open access is the absence of
property and of owners, does it mean that the
global ocean is nobody’s property? That the
ocean has largely been exploited under open
access regime is not the same as saying that it is
nobody’s property. A way of solving this pro-
blem has been to avoid talking about ownership
as Christy (1992) did, though in a different way.
Ostrom’s (1999) definition of common-pool
resource as property rights seems more suitable
for the ocean. In Ostrom’s (1999, p. 30) view a
common pool resource
refers to a natural or man-made resource system that is
sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impos-
sible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining
benefits from its use.
In other words, common pool resources are
goods that are mostly non-excludable but riv-
alrous in consumption, being an example of an
impure public good. A common pool resource
(cpr) differs from Common Property Resource
(CPR) as the later involves ownership, which is
less appropriate when referring to the ocean and
its resources (Pı́riz, 2004). In other words, the
concept of cpr helps us to avoid the complex
question of ‘‘ownership’’ in relation to the
ocean and fish resources, regardless of whether
we are talking of national or international
waters. A difference is that while in the inter-
national waters, open access reigns since it is
open to all due to its non-excludability, this is
not the case within national waters.
A common pool resource is shared or jointly
held, and as such the ocean becomes a part of
the global public goods (non-excludable but
rivalrous in consumption). It is a resource that
is not conducive to being socially divided more
than symbolically. This is perhaps captured by
the term jurisdiction used in international
agreements. The etymology of the noun juris-
diction comes from Latin juris and diction. Juris
means law and dictio, the act of saying. It has
three related meanings: ‘‘(1) the power, right, or
authority to interpret and apply the law; (2a)
the authority of a sovereign power to govern or
legislate; and (2b) the power or right to exercise
authority (control); and (3) the limits or terri-
tory within which authority may be exercised.’’
(Jurisdiction, Merriam-Webster Online Diction-
ary, 2007).
Accordingly, countries have over the ocean
the power, right, authority to legislate, interpret,
and apply the law and exercise authority or
control within the limits of national waters. The
same applies for the international community in
regard to international waters. Thus, jurisdic-
tion clearly does not imply ownership, either for
the States or its individuals, but rather tenure
rights. Tenure as a concept seems to be more
appropriate than use rights, as tenure involves,
more than using, which is more pertinent for
states that have a permanent, near perpetual,
tenure dependant of course on the maintenance
of the geopolitical status quo. Furthemore,
tenure does not imply ownership (Gallardo,
2002). Therefore instead of ‘‘ownership of use
right’’ (like in Christy, 1992), a better alternative
would perhaps be ‘‘entitlement’’ of use or
tenure rights. In the same fashion, instead of
owners and proprietors in relation to use rights
holders (like in Schlager and Ostrom, 1992), a
better alternative would be holder, concession-
ary or tenant.
Jurisdiction, tenure and use imply, just as
private or common property, not only rights but
also duties in regard to a common pool
resource. It is in relation to this that both
management issues as user rights come into
the social and institutional landscape. Let us
first examine the use rights associated with the
resource holders in regard to cpr followed by a
discussion of management, co-management and
finally with the TURF.
It is important, however, to distinguish
between the concepts of management and prop-
erty rights regime. That is, management deals
with the administration of the resources and not
their ownership. Management is about the
administration of the property or the resource;
i.e., how and under what conditions it is used/
exploited. A beach in terms of property rights is
usually a public good that can be ‘‘managed’’ or
left to default to under open access (open to all),
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or be given in concession to private interests to
be exploited commercially. The right holder of
the concession can usually, depending on the
respective legislation, sell, lease or inherit the
concession. In term of property rights, the beach
in a concession scenario is a public good, but
managed privately.
Schlager and Ostrom (1992, see Table 2.5),
distinguish between five rights associated with
fours classes of holders in relation to the resource,
which describe the positions and functions that
individuals hold within a social system. In Table
2.5 I have added the Spanish translation of right
holders (in italic) since the difference between the
English concepts of ownership and property is
problematic in Spanish as they mean more or less
for the same thing (propiedad and posesión).
These words are also synonyms in English, except
that property has Latin origin and ownership has
English origin. According to The American
Heritage † Dictionary of the English Language,
the word property is a ‘‘Middle English, from Old
French propriete, from Latin proprietās,
ownership (translation of Greek idiotēs),
from proprius, one’s own’ (Property, The
American Heritage† Dictionary of the English
Language, 2008), Ownership comes from ‘‘Mid-
dle English owen, from Old English āgen (Own-
ership, The American Heritage† Dictionary of
the English Language, 2008).
Although the described rights are indepen-
dent from each other, in regard to fisheries, they
are usually cumulative. The more complete the
right, the more inclusive of the less complete
rights. The relation is the inverse from less
to complete rights. In other words, the right to
alienate includes also by definition the right to
exclude, to manage, to withdraw and to access,
but the contrary is not the case.
Regarding the holders with less complete
rights * authorized users * they lack the
authority to plan their own harvesting rules or
to exclude others from gaining access to fishing
grounds (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992, p. 252).
Although they might be able to sell their
harvest, authorized users lack the authority to
change rules (‘‘shared understandings on pre-
scriptions that apply to more than a single
individual’’) regarding management, exclusion,
or alienation rights.
Claimants, the second class of holders, are
individuals who posses the same rights of entry
as authorized users in addition to the right to
management or plan extraction They cannot
however, limit access, nor can they alienate their
management right. Both access and extraction
rights belong to the ‘‘operational level’’ of
property rights. The other three stronger rights
belong to collective choice rights level, implying
the authority or power to change the rules.
Thus proprietors, the third class of holders,
are defined as individuals who possess manage-
ment and exclusion rights, but not the right to
alienate these rights (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992,
p. 253). The last and fourth class of holders *
the ‘‘owners’’ * hold all the former rights, by









5. Alienation: the right to sell, lease or inherit either or both
management and exclusion rights
X
4. Exclusion: the right to determine who will have an access right and
how that right may be transferred
X X
3. Management: the right to regulate internal use patterns and
transform the resource by making improvements
X X X
2. Withdrawal: the right to obtain the ‘‘products’’ of a resource X X X X
1. Access: the right to enter a defined physical property X X X X
Source: Schlager and Ostrom (1992, pp. 250252).
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which they can sell or lease these rights, or part of
them. However, Schlager and Ostrom (1992)
emphasize the point that that the power to
alienate refers only to the collective-choice rights.
Different to the proprietors, the owners can
alienate their rights. In Spanish this difference
is less clear. The translation of owner is propie-
tario or dueño (i.e., proprietor). It could also be
possessor (poseedor), which is understood as
weaker (with less rights) than propietario. How-
ever, property and the right to alienate is thus an
essential characteristic of private ownership. To
clarify, however, this is in relation to the power to
alienate the right to use the resource (i.e., a sea
area) and not about selling the resource.
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) distinguish in
an intricate way, between three sorts of action
or activities in relation to cpr: operational
activities, collective choice rights, and constitu-
tional choice. The difference between the two
first rights (withdrawal and access) constitutes a
divide in the strengths of rights’ bundles
discussed above, and belongs to the operational
level described in Table 2.6. Nevertheless, rules,
regardless of whether they are deemed opera-
tional, collective or constitutional, significantly
influence individual behaviour. What the con-
stitutional-choice actions mean, is explained in
a footnote and not very clear.7 An association
the reader gets by the term constitutional is a
level of action that takes place in a higher
sphere (regionally or nationally) like for exam-
ple fishers being able to participate in defining
law or administrative fishing measures.
According to Jentoft (2004, p. 218), opera-
tional rules structure day-to-day activities of
institutions, while constitutional rules refer to
the basic principles in which the institution is
built, defining who the members are, how the
tasks should be performed. As with Schlager
and Ostrom (1992), there is a collective choice
decision-making sphere that defines the opera-
tional rules. So all the commons commentators
reviewed agree that it is the higher level that
dictates to the lower level and not vice-versa.
However, according to Jentoft (2004) opera-
tional and constitutional rules pertain to the
regulatory pillars of institutions.
Jentoft (2004, p. 217) considers Scott’s
[1995] perception of institutions a better alter-
native of governance instruments than Ostrom’s
(1999) narrow and legalistic definition based
on a rational choice perspective as Scott’s view
on institutions is less rule-centred, stressing also
their moral and normative aspects. According
to Jentoft (2004, p. 217) it is easy in fisheries
management practices to identify Scott’s
three institutional ‘‘pillars’’: rules, norms and
knowledge.
Fisheries management institutions confer
rules of conduct; their compliance being a
source of concern for authorities. It encom-
passes how rules are established, how the rules
are seen by those who decide about the rules
and who benefits from the rules. Norms are also
morally binding and therefore influence deci-
sion making choice, not only individual rational
choice, calculations or ‘‘strategies’’. The norma-
tive aspects concern question of values and
behavioural standards involved in the institu-
tion; e.g., which means are legitimate to reach a
particular goal. The cognitive pillar refers to
situations in which fishers break the rules
also due to ignorance and therefore the invoca-
tion of either a formal penalty or moral con-
demnation does not help in this regard. This
aspect raises questions of whose knowledge has
preponderance, and how experience is inter-
preted and fed back into decision making
processes. Also important is how nature and
society are envisioned in management dis-
courses (Jentoft, 2004, pp. 217219).
Regardless of the discussion of the role of
various levels of rules, what is important is the
fishers’ participation and the strength or extent
of the control that fishers as use rights holders
can exercise over the resource; i.e., rights of
access, harvest, management, exclusion and
alienation. It is with participative approaches
7 According to these authors:
‘‘Constitutional choice-action entails devising
collective-choice rules. In establishing an organization or
changing the process by which operational rules are to be
devised within an existing organization, individuals engage
in constitutional choice actions. Fishers creating a
marketing cooperative is an example of a constitutional-
choice action’’ (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992, p. 250,
footnote 2).
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that co-management starts to develop as an
alternative to top-down approaches including
all or part of the named bundles of rights.
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Berkes et al. (2001) argue that a sound manage-
ment of fisheries involves both the protection of
the aquatic habitat and conservation of the fish
stocks, and the socio-economic objective of
sustaining or obtaining better economic benefits
from fishing. Hersoug et al. (2004, p. 70) differ-
entiates between resource management and fish-
eries management. While resource management,
more narrowly, deals with the fixing of total catch
or total effort and the distribution of quotas and
rights, fisheries management is wider, embracing
all the responsibilities related to ‘‘traffic regula-
tion’’, macro policies, credit, education, exten-
sion, etc. For Pı́riz (2004, p. 60), though, fisheries
management is keeping marine resources
in a good shape (quantitatively and qualitatively) and
the harvestable surplus allocated to resources users.
Central aspects of fisheries management are who is to
be involved in defining the management system, how
the resource and the users’ community are defined for
the purpose of taking management decisions, the scale
of the management unit, the prevailing regime of rights
and finally the degree of transfer of decision making
power, authority, administrative responsibilities and
resource partners in co-management.
Historically, top-down management has been
advocated to force fishers to follow rules
defined by authorities and whose implementa-
tion has required strong control from autho-
rities. This type of management has relied
heavily on biological parameters based on
stocks-and-species assessments, disregarding
eco-system interrelations (Pı́riz, 2004). The
shortcoming of these approaches have led to
eco-system based approaches, such as diverse
types of co-management within which we find
right-based systems and users’ participation,
e.g. TPFR or TURFs. The new paradigm views
the fishers as part of the solution instead of the
problem; governance is decentralized and man-
agement authority redirected to community or
organization level (Berkes et al., 2001). The eco-
system approach explicitly acknowledges the
complexity of eco-systems and the interconnect-
edness among components parts (Garcia et al.,
2003, Chap. 1, p. 3). As such, the approach
encompasses five elements: 1) definition and
scientific description of the eco-system (scale,
structure, extent and functioning); 2) health
state evaluation, 3) threats evaluation, 4) main-
tenance, protection, mitigation, rehabilitation,
etc, using 5) adaptive management strategies
(Garcia et al., 2003, Chap. 1, p. 3).
According to Pı́riz (2004) the eco-system
approach is not about making stocks assess-
ments for an increasing number of species, but
about maintaining biological diversity and
ensuring that the functional integrity and
dynamics of the eco-system are perfectly safe-
guarded (p. 41), and about ‘‘maintaining resi-
lience of the coastal eco-system in the front of
natural and man-made processes, and its
TABLE 2.6 Operational and collective-choice level of fishing activities.
Level Characteristics
Operational Rules related to the use of the cpr such as the specifications of fishing equipment authorized or
forbidden at particular locations within fishing ground. Of the bundle of rights associated with cpr both
access (right to enter the resource, for example through licenses) and extraction (right to capture fish in
perhaps special ground through those used by fishers to specify of types rotation) rights belong to the
operational level.
Collective-choice Specifies who may participate in changing operational rules and the level of agreement required for
their change such as for example changing the type of fishing equipment. There are collective-choice
actions that change operational rules and not vice-versa. Of the bundle of rights associated to cpr,
management, exclusion and alienation belong to the collective choice rights. The difference between
rights at an operational level and collective choice level is fundamental: in the first it is about exercising
a right; in the second about participating in the redefinitions of those rights.
Source: Schlager and Ostrom (1992, pp. 250251).
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capacity to deliver the full range of environ-
mental goods and services, including a surplus
of fish to be commercialized’’ (p. 41).
Garcia et al. (2003) have presented a sche-
matic review of fisheries management and eco-
system management (see Table 2.7) with em-
phasises on large-scale fisheries. Only some of
the criteria and its characteristics are valid for
small-scale fisheries. I have highlighted those
relating to Chilean MA or TURF in italics. As
can be seen, by the paradigm of fisheries
management, Garcia et al. (2003) seems to
portray a rather conventional fisheries manage-
ment, which differs from Pı́riz’s (2004) under-
standing of the same concept (see above).
Having presented the different definitions
and main features of both fisheries management
and eco-system management, I will now focus
on co-management and TURF. Following the
distinction made by Hersoug et al. (2004)
between resource management and fisheries
management, I have inserted TURFs within a
simple arrangement in a descending order in
Figure 2.1, which comprises fisheries manage-
ment, resource management (see Hersoug et
al.’s (2004) differentiation above), followed by
co-management (including TURF).
CO-MANAGEMENT
There seems to be consensus among scholars in
what co-management means, perhaps due
to loose definitions. According to Pı́riz (2004),
co-management refers to a situation where
capacities of both resource users and govern-
ment are jointly engaged in the management
(decision-making, implementation, monitoring
and control) of the resource use. In Berkes et al.
TABLE 2.7 Schematic comparison between fisheries and eco-system management.
Criteria Fisheries management Ecosystem management
Paradigm Sector-based. Vertically integrated.
Focusing on target resource and people.
Area-based. Holistic. Loosely cross-sectorial.
Focusing on habitats and eco-system integrity.
Governance
Objectives Not always coherent or transparent.
‘‘Optimal’’ system output. Social peace.
A desired state of the eco-system (health, integ-
rity).
Scientific input Formalized (particularly in regional
commissions). Variable impact.
Less formalized. Less operational. Often
insufficient. Stronger role of advocacy science.
Decision-making Most often top-down. Strongly influenced
by industry lobbying. Growing role of
environmental NGOs.
Highly variable. Often more participative.
Strongly influenced by environmental lobbies.
Stronger use of tribunals.





Food and Agriculture Organization of the
UN and regional fishery bodies.
United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) and the Regional Seas Conventions.
Geographical basis A process of overlapping and cascading
subdivision of the oceans for allocation of
resources and responsibilities.
A progressive consideration of larger-scale
eco-systems for more comprehensive manage-
ment, e.g. from specific areas to entire coastal
zones and Large Marine Eco-systems (LME).
Stakeholder and
political base
Narrow. Essentially fishery stakeholders.
Progressively opening to other interests.
Much broader. Society-wide. Often with support
from recreational and small-scale fisheries.
Global instruments 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, UN
Fish Stock Agreement and FAO Code of
Conduct.
Ramsar Convention, UN Conference on
Environment and Development and 1992
Agenda 21, Convention on Biological Diversity
and Jakarta Mandate.
Measures Regulation of human activity inputs
(gear, effort, capacity) or output
(removals, quotas) and trade.
Protection of specified areas and habitats,
including limitation or exclusion of extractive
human activities. Total or partial ban of some
human activities.
Source: Garcia et al. (2003; Table 2.1). With permission from Stephen A. Dembner, FAO.
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(2001, Glossary, p. 2) we find the following
inclusive description of co-management:
A partnership arrangement in which government, the
community of local resource users (fishers), external
agents (non-governmental organizations, academic, and
research institutions), and other fisheries and coastal
resource stakeholders (boat owners, fish traders, money
lenders, tourism establishments, etc.) share the respon-
sibility and authority for decision-making in the
management of a fishery.
Hara (2003, p. 19) defines co-management
as a
type of collaborative institutional and organizational
arrangement between government, user group and
stakeholders for effective management of a defined
resource.
According to Hauck and Sowman (2005, p. 3):
Co-management is a partnership arrangement primar-
ily between government and resources users, but may
also include other stakeholders, to share the responsi-
bility and authority for managing resources.
Hauck and Sowman (2005) also make clear
that co-management is a process, being alone in
stressing this aspect, connected to adaptive
management. They mean that co-management
should be a permanent forum for discussion and
action including ‘‘rule-making, criteria for ac-
cess to resources, conflict management, decision
making powers, monitoring and enforcement,
roles and responsibilities, leadership and liveli-
hood issues’’ (Hauck and Sowman, 2005, p. 3).
According to Hersoug et al. (2004) and also
Hauck and Sowman (2005), co-management is
a theoretical model proposed by social scientists
for fisheries resource management to improve
existing models. Nonetheless, co-management
as practice has preceded the theory around the
world (Jentoft, 2004, p. 113). The World Con-
vention Council defines co-management as
a partnership in which government agencies, local
communities and resource users, NGOs and other
stakeholders, share, as appropriate to each context,
the authority and responsibility for the management of
a specific territory or a set of resources (WCC, [1996], in
Hersoug et al., 2004, p. 69).
Hersoug et al. (2004) find Pinkerton’s defi-
nition of co-management useful, not being too
narrow nor too broad:
Co-management is misnamed unless it involves the
right to participate in making decisions about how,
when, where and how much fishing will occur (Hersoug
et al., 2004, p. 69).
Hersoug et al. (2004, p. 69) distinguish five
dimensions that answer five questions: What,
How, When, Where and Who. ‘‘What’’deals with
the policy areas that are included in the co-
management regime. ‘‘How’’refers to the specific
set-up of the regime, ranging from consultation
to devolved management. ‘‘When’’, refers to
when users and stakeholders are involved in the
project cycle; i.e., during planning, decision-
making, implementation or the evaluation
phase. ‘‘Where’’ refers to the level of co-manage-
ment (local, regional, national), and ‘‘Who’’
refers to the selection of user stakeholders
involved and how they should be represented.
The assumptions are that co-management
ideally leads to several concatenated benefits
(Hara, 2003, p. 23). To these belong participa-
tory democracy, broader knowledge, better
regulations, increased legitimacy, increased ad-
herence and increased proficiency. Since co-
management is relatively new, Hara (2003)
stresses that these benefits are expected results
as there still are few cases of successful manage-
ment regimes, especially regarding sustainable
development.
A defining element in co-management is then
the extent of sharing in decision-making. This is
illustrated by Hauck and Sowman (2005, p. 4) in
a typology that is reproduced in Figure 2.2.
In this co-management continuum, Hauck
and Sowman (2005) distinguish five types. The
first on is governmental driven co-management.
FIGURE 2.1 TURF within fisheries management
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The second is consultative co-management in
which resource users are consulted but govern-
ment maintains decision-making. The third one
is co-operative co-management where govern-
ment and user group share decision-making,
powers and responsibilities. The fourth type is
delegated co-management in which government
delegates considerable powers and responsibil-
ities to an organized user group. In this model
control is shifted to the fishers, and authorities
act in an advisory and supportive role rather
than directing management. Lastly, there is the
so called user group driven co-management,
being perhaps the most participative
management.
In many co-management arrangements fish-
ers might be little involved in setting the
management objectives and marginally involved
in its implementation. Furthermore, in most
developing countries co-management is very
much government initiated and remains top-
down. Paradoxically in many developing coun-
tries, user participation has been imposed as one
of the conditions for development (Hara, 2003,
p. 19), so one can wonder how participatory
participation is.
Pretty et al. (1995) has devised a typology to
characterize the grade of participation in deci-
sion making regarding development projects
in communities. This typology, presented in
Table 2.8, is useful for judging the level of
fishers’ participation. As can be seen, there are
several similarities between Pretty et al.’s (1995)
participation typology and the diverse types of
co-management regarding the level or degree of
decision-making at the association and commu-
nity level.
As suggested, there are different sorts of
eco-system based management approaches
such as co-management, community-based
management (CBRM), community-centred
co-management (CCCM). Common to many
of them is the call for a more participatory
management, involving those who are central in
solving resource degradation: the fishers. There
are also many types of participation whose
extent or degree also define the type of co-
management arrangement. Community-based
FIGURE 2.2 The co-management continuum
Source: Hauck and Sowman (2005)
Reproduced with the permission of M. Hauck.
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management (CBRM) differs from co-manage-
ment in that CBRM is more people-centred and
community-centred and therefore also more
narrow than co-management. In CBRM the
intervention of the State is minor, and limited to
give legitimacy to the CBRM as the overall
grantee of property, use and tenure rights. There
is also a community-centred co-management
(CCCM) that includes the characteristics of
both co-management and CBRM; that is:
people-centred, community oriented, resource-
base oriented and partnership based (Berkes
et al., 2001).
The reasons for the introduction of co-
management are varied. There is seldom only
one reason and commonly a number reasons
and conditions coalesce to generate the political
space to enable these interventions. These can
include: resource depletion, political demands
from donor agencies, conflict among users,
unsuccessfully centralized conventional fisheries
management. Several authors agree that co-
management starts when resource users and
stakeholders recognize a resource problem that
threatens their livelihoods (Christy, 1992;
Ostrom, 1999; Berkes et al., 2001). Many
governments view co-management as a conve-
nient and resource efficient way to devolve
themselves of management responsibility for
resources, unfortunately often when the re-
source is already overexploited, as with the
case of Loco fishery in Chile.
It is hardly surprising if co-management
initiatives fail given the problematic social and
environmental circumstances in which they
emerge. In response to this observation, Her-
soug et al. (2004, p. 71) argue that where co-
management has had some success in the South,
three conditions have been met: that the fishers
(and other stakeholders groups) are organized
at different levels, that the fishers are literate,
numerate and competent in modern fisheries
management, and that there is an organized
administration willing to delegate part of fish-
eries management (Hersoug et al. 2004, p. 71).
These conditions are not always present in
‘‘developing’’ countries.
TABLE 2.8 Participation typology.
Types Characteristics
1. Passive participation: Peoples’ opinions are not considered; they are informed about what is going to
happen or has happened, being therefore a one way communication on behalf
of the administrative or project management The shared information belongs
thus to external professionals, who do not need to listen to peoples’ reactions.
2. Participants used as a source of
information
Information is extracted from people via surveys without people being able to
influence proceedings, neither informed about the findings nor validated with
them.
3. Participants used as consultation source People are consulted and listened to by external professionals who define the
problem and the solution, but the consultation does not imply that people
participate in decision making and external agents are not obliged to consider
people’s views.
4. Materialist participation People participates supplying resources (for example, labour) in exchange for
material incentives, but when incentives disappear, so does also the activities.
5. Supportive participation (‘‘Functional’’ in
Pretty et al., 1995);
Externally initiated group formation and support to meet the needs of an
already ongoing project and process. The group tends to be dependant on
external leaders and facilitators and risks disappearing when support stops.
6. Interactive participation Group analysis of problems leading to the creation of new local organization
(or strengthen those existing) that take action to solve problems. The group is
in control of local decisions.
7. Self mobilization People act to change their situation without external influence. Although they
may require external help to perform their aims, they hold decision-making.
This kind of self- mobilisation may or may not question the status quo.
Source: Pretty et al. (1995, p. 61, Box 4.4).
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TABLE 2.9 Ideal conditions and principles for fisheries co-management arrangements and Common Property
Resource (CPR) institutions.
Ideal conditions for the success of fisheries
co-management arrangements









For the fishers distinct, well known and
understandable eco-system based physical
boundaries of the resources managed, and
whose size allows management in transpor-
tation and communication terms (i.e., with
available technology).
Clearly defined boundaries of the CPR itself.
Individuals or households who have rights to




Clearly defined individual fishers or house-
holds with rights to fish and participate in the
management area, whose number should
allow among them a relatively easy commu-
nication and decision-making.
3. Group cohesion Permanent settlement of the fisher group or
organization near the managed area.The group
is preferably homogenous sharing kinship,
ethnicity, religion, and fishing devices, as well
as a common perception of problems, solution
and results. Common customs, values and
belief help to deal with common problems.
4. Participation by those
affected (inclusivity)
in decision group
Inclusive participation of most of those
affected by the management area in the group
deciding about its arrangements. Group co-
incidence between those who collect infor-
mation on the fisheries and the one that
makes decisions about the area.
Collective-choice arrangements. Most indivi-
duals affected by the operational rules can




Motivation and readiness from fishers to
engage in terms of time, effort, and economic
means into fisheries management. Active
group or individual leadership responsibility
for the management process.
6. Leadership Local leaders pioneer the co-management
process, mobilizing the rest.
7. Empowerment Through education and training, members
become empowered, which builds commu-
nity and individuals’ social awareness,
autonomy in decision-making, and self-reli-
ance, thus balancing power relations.Empo-
werment facilitates collective action values
and responsibility for resource management
and decision-making.
8. Property rights over the
resource
Property rights (individual or collective) are
defined, addressing the legal ownership of a
resource, the necessary mechanisms (eco-
nomic, administrative, collective) and struc-
tures for use rights’ allocation, which will
optimize resources use and conservation as
well as enforcement’s procedures and means.
Congruence between appropriation and provi-
sion rules and local conditions. Appropriation
rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or
quantity of resource units are related to local
conditions and to provision rules requiring
labour, material, and/or money.
9. Appropriate local
organizations
Clearly defined and representative organiza-
tion, recognised legally, autonomy from
government and political influences.
Minimal recognition of rights to organize. The
rights of appropriators to devise their own
institutions are not challenged by external
governmental authorities
(continued)
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Berkes et al. (2001) present a longer list of
ideal conditions (17) for the success of fisheries
co-management. He distinguishes between com-
munity level conditions and individual level
conditions. Many of the descriptions seem to
be based on the idea of community-based
management, not totally suitable for the TURFs
(organization- and area-based) under study. So
in response to this, the Berkes et al. (2001) term
‘‘community’’ has been replaced with organiza-
tion. Berkes et al. (2001, Chap. 8, p. 4) also
suggest the concept ‘‘social community’’ which
is suitable for some examples of the Chilean
TURFs, meaning ‘‘a group of fishers using the
same gear type or a fisher organization’’. Even
the term ‘‘virtual community’’, meaning a ‘‘non-
geographical-based community of fishers’’ is
suitable as in many coves fishers do not necessa-
rily come from the same locality, but usually
from nearby places. Some coves with time and
due to the permanency of the TURFS are
perhaps becoming ‘‘real’’ communities.
Many of these ideal conditions coincide
with Stevenson’s (1991) conditions for common
property described above as well as with Os-
trom’s (1999) conditions for long enduring
common property institutions. The ideal insti-
tutional design factors identified by Berkes et al.
(2001) and Ostrom8 (1999), although not coin-
ciding precisely, are listed in Table 2.9. When
these conditions and characteristics are perti-
nent to the Chilean TURFs, I have denoted
them in italics.
TABLE 2.9 (Continued)
Ideal conditions for the success of fisheries
co-management arrangements









Accessible, sufficient and sustained funds to
support the co-management process in time.
11. Sense of ownership of
the co-management
process
Partnerships and partner’s active involvement
in the planning and implementation process
of the co-management help to create a sense
of ownership and commitment to the ar-
rangements.
Nested enterprises.Appropriation, provision,
monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution,
and governance activities are organized in
multiple layers of nested enterprises.
12. Accountability and
transparency
Management is fair and open as well as
answerable for the maintenance of the co-
management agreement.
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions
and appropriator behaviour, are accountable to




Availability in situ of a competent, reliable
institution (committee, or a round table)
created by the co-management agreement to
make decisions and manage conflict.
Conflict-resolution mechanisms. Appropriators
and their officials have rapid access to low-cost
local arenas to resolve conflicts among appro-




Sufficient incentives (economic, social, poli-
tical) structure that attract individuals to be
part of the initiative, so the benefits from
participating in and fulfil with management
exceed the costs of their investments.
15. Credible rules and
effective enforcement
Credible and equitable management rules.
Effective, fair, and sustained enforcement of
rules call for the participation of all partners.
The benefits of regulations comply must
exceed those of violating the rules. Avail-
ability of State support in using its police
power to support regulations.
Graduated sanctions. Appropriators who vio-
late operational rules are likely to be subjected
to graduated sanctions (depending on the
seriousness and context of the offence) by other
appropriators, by officials accountable to these
appropriators, or by both.
8 Note that Ostrom’s (1999) eight conditions refer to
common property resources (CPR) and not specifically
to common pool resources (cpr).
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TERRITORIAL USE RIGHTS FOR
FISHERIES (TURFs)
TURFs exist in various contexts, but especially
in Japan. According to Makino and Matsuda
(2005), the Japanese variation of TURF co-
management has their origin in the Japanese
early feudal period (16031700). With the
exception of some historical periods, such as
the Modernization period (18681901), and the
period after World War II Protectorate, these
historical Japanese fishery co-management re-
gimes still, with some contemporary modifica-
tions, operate today. They operated under the
principle that coastal resources (different to
land) were open access and free from taxes,
therefore the coasts were for common use and
managed by local users. Rooted in the Tang
dynasty (A.D. 618907) of China, this practice
was maintained by successive rulers. Basic
concepts in the feudal period were that
(1) coastal fishing grounds in near shore waters should
be used only by the people from local fishing commu-
nities; and
(2) offshore fishing grounds should be left open for free
access to any fishermen (Makino and Matsuda, 2005,
p. 442).
Coastal waters were seen as a prolongation
of feudal land and therefore feudal domain. The
communities in charge of coastal waters came to
constitute the basis for the subsequent Fisheries
Societies under the Meiji Fishery Law
(19011945) and of the present-day Fisheries
Cooperative Associations.
In 1886 the government enacted the Fisher-
men’s Union Regulation encouraging the estab-
lishment of local unions, this being the first
formal recognition of an organization consti-
tuted of fishers that could operate as a manage-
ment authority. Later, the 1901 Fishery Law put
fishing rights and licences in constitutional form
for the first time. By this, fishing rights were
granted to both collectives such as local fisher-
man’s unions, Fisheries Societies, and to indivi-
duals. These rights were classified into four
categories:
(1) set-net fishing rights; (2) specific fishing rights for
beach seines, boats seines, etc. (3) aquaculture rights for
oyster, pearl, etc. and (4) exclusive fishing rights
(Makino and Matsuda, 2005, p. 443).
Exclusive fishing rights, the last category,
were subdivided into traditional exclusive fishing
rights, those that could be granted to individuals
based on customary use and newer exclusive
collective rights granted to local Fisheries Asso-
ciations by the central government. Exclusive
fishing rights were area-based, including all the
resources existing in the area as well as those
passing through it, representing the Japanese
territorial use right for fisheries. After the 1910
modification of the law, these rights became de
facto property rights due to the non-revision of
the expiration period. Rights could be sold,
leased, transferred and collateralized, thus lead-
ing to concentration in the hands of few people.
Many fishers worked for absentee right owners.
The post World War II administration, in con-
junction with the Allied Occupation after 1945,
demanded a democratic reformation of the
Japanese fishing institution. After a legislative
process, based more on a personal property
rights system (the US line) and consisting of
fishing rights that prioritized fishers’ organiza-
tions (the USSR line), the Japanese government
preferred the latter and the 1949 fisheries law was
passed. Marine fisheries were classified in three
categories: (1) fishing rights for coastal marine
fisheries that in turn are classified in three:
(a) common fishing rights only for Fisheries
Cooperative Associations and (b) large-scale set
net fishing rights and c) aquaculture demarcated
fishing rights. The second category is (2) fishing
licenses for offshore and distant waters fisheries;
and (3) free fisheries (Makino and Matsuda,
2005, p. 444).
The local Fisheries Cooperative Associa-
tions that are granted common fishing rights
(category 1a) are composed of local fishers of
fishing communities. The associations estab-
lished operational regulations that stipulate
gear restrictions, as well as closures of the
fishing ground on a seasonal or area basis. Up
to the present, local fishers remain the princi-
pal decision makers. Resource management
rules set by the Fisheries Cooperative Associa-
tions are tailored to the local conditions thus
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have the opportunity to be flexible and
sensitive to changes. In this way this self-
governing resource management regime is
suitable for adaptive management (Makino
and Matsuda, 2005, p. 449). Furthermore,
because of its autonomy and localized empha-
sis this system of co-management reduces
transaction costs, especially monitoring, enfor-
cement and compliance.
Nonetheless, the exercise of full rights and
licences is restrained by a legal requirement to
consider resource conservation, which involves
the inclusion of stakeholders other than just the
resource users. Government and research agen-
cies provide administrative advice and scientific
information as well as coordination above the
local levels. Makino (2005) suggests that the
Japanese system has many advantages such as
decentralized management, adaptive manage-
ment process, use of local resources, local and
scientific knowledge, multi-scale and interlinked
management, and promotion of sustainable
resource use in an economic context.
Judging from Makino and Matsuda’s (2005)
and Makino’s (2005) accounts, the Japanese
TURFs seem to enjoy the advantages of local
independent governance of common pool re-
sources (cpr) described by Ostrom (see the Pros
of Table 2.10). Moreover, they seems to be truly
rooted both in local communities and organiza-
tions with a long tradition, which corresponds
well with the eco-system principles regarding
management delegation to grass roots level of
resource users. A possible weakness could be the
inability of local resource users to handle larger
scale common pool resources, but it is exactly
due to this disadvantage that the state and the
scientific community play a role in co-manage-
ment arrangements.
Due to their long tradition, the fishers
involved in the Japanese TURFs seem to
demonstrate all seven user attributes described
by Ostrom (1999) (Table 2.11). Some of the
resource attributes may also be consistent with
the Japanese TURFs.
Around the world, the ecological impacts of
over-fishing have been the driving force that has
stimulated the search for alternative exploita-
tion and organization formulas, like the
TURFs, especially when conventional attempts
to improve fishing communities’ wellbeing and
efforts to stop depletion have not been success-
ful (Christy, 1992). This idea is captured by
Ostrom’s first resource attribute that it is still
possible to restore the depleted resource via
organizational means (see Table 2.11).
The main reasons why the TURFs have
attracted interest are, according to Christy
(1992, Chapter One, p. 1), efficiency goals and
the welfare of small-scale fishing communities
in developing countries. Christy (1992) distin-
guishes between definitional elements of the
TURF and several conditions, natural and
social, that facilitate the development of
TURFs and their maintenance, although the
difference between the definitional elements and
the conditions is not always clear. Nonetheless,
the inter-relationships among these conditions
that both influence the creation and mainte-
nance of an efficient localized TURF are strong.
TABLE 2.10 Advantages and limitations of independent local governance of common pool resources (cpr).
Strengths Weaknesses
Use of local knowledge Some appropriators will not organise
Inclusion of trustworthy participants Some self-organised effort will fail
Reliance on dis-aggregated knowledge Local tyrannies may prevail
Better adapted rules Stagnation may occur
Lower enforcement costs Inappropriate discrimination may result from the use of identity tags
Redundancy Access to scientific information may be limited
Conflict may arise among appropriators
Appropriators may be unable to cope with larger scale common pool resources
Source: Ostrom [1999] in Pı́riz (2004, p. 59).
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None of them alone are sufficient to build an
effective TURF (Table 2.12). TURF
generally refers to a relatively small and clearly
distinguishable territory; provides rights of exclusion
and determination of kind and amount of use and
rights to extract benefits; and is relatively specific in its
ownership (Christy, 1992, Chap. 2b, p. 4).
The first definitional element of the TURF
consists of four types of rights. The right of
exclusion means the right to limit or control
access to the territory. The second is the right to
determine the amount and kind of use within
the territory. The third is the right to extract
benefits from the use of the resources within the
territory, and the fourth is the right to future
returns from the use of the territory. These
rights are quite similar to Schlager and Ostrom’s
(1992) bundles of rights.
The second element refers to the ‘‘specifi-
city’’ of the use right, meaning type (e.g.,
individual or collective) of owner (right holder)
and its efficiency in decision making. That is, it
is easier for an individual to decide than for a
group. The right-holders, the possessor of a
TURF, can be varied, including private indivi-
dual, a cooperative (in which individual rights
are constrained by joint decisions); an enter-
prise; an association or a community; a political
subdivision, such as a town or a province; or a
national government. The specificity of tenure is
also associated with its length, which may vary,
but should at least be sufficient to allow the
owner (right holder) to capture a satisfactory
return on any capital investments he/she has
made. In the case of a community held TURF,
the tenure may be perpetual.
The third definitional element of TURF is
that the extent of the territory will vary in
accordance with use, resources, and geography.
The Extended Economic Zones (EEZs) are
TURFs exercised by the states. While small-scale
fishing communities are an example of a localized
TURF, the EEZs are an example of a generalized
TURF. There is not a clear distinction in terms of
content of use rights for localized and generalized
TURFs more than the size of the territory and the
specificity of ownership. The economic incentives
of the use of external territories should be less
than those from the use of the TURF’s area, or
the non-TURF area should not diminish the
value of use of the TURF area. In other words,
the use of non-TURF territory should not
significantly diminish the value of use within
the territory. If a fisher can obtain the same or
more of a resource outside a TURF, the incentive
to be part of the TURF vanishes. According to
Christy, these elements of the definition do not
necessarily imply that the territory must fully
TABLE 2.11 Condition conducive to collective action.
Resources attributes
1. Viable improvement Resource recuperation still viable through organization or so under-utilized that
organization would imply advantages.
2. Indicators Reliable and inexpensive information about resource conditions available.
3. Predictability Calculable availability of resource quantities.
4. Spatial extent The resource area relatively small so users with the available technology and transportation
can identify its boundaries and internal microenvironment.
Users’ attributes
1. Salience Users are considerable dependent on the resource economically or else.
2. Common resource under-
standing
Users share a common resource view and how their actions mutually affect themselves and
the resource.
3. Discount rate Low discount rate in comparison to potential resource benefits.
4. Shared interests Users with higher economic and political assets are also affected by resource misuse.
5. Trusts Mutual trust among users regarding acquired compromises and reciprocate each other.
6. Autonomy Users are capacitated to internally determine access and harvesting rules without authority
intervention and revoking.
7. Organizational experience Previous organizational experience among users.
Source: Ostrom [1999] in Pı́riz (2004, p. 53).
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embrace the whole stock of fish throughout its
migratory movements. As he puts it:
A TURF is not so much resource specific as it is site
specific ( . . .) The significant element is not the degree of
enclosure of the stock, but the degree to which there is a
value associated with the territory (Christy, 1992, Chap.
2, p. 2; emphasis added).
The territory should have clear and identifi-
able boundaries to enable it to be readily defen-
sible and protected. This is one of the conditions
facilitating the creation and maintenance of
TURFs. And the territory should be under the
State’s legal and institutional protection, condi-
tional upon the following two criteria being met,
which are both typical of the ideal co-manage-
ment arrangements as described by Berkes et al.
(2001), see Table 2.9. First, there must be laws
and institutions that permit governments to
exercise the necessary authority to support the
protection and maintenance of TURFs. Second,
that government must, enjoy sufficient authority
to be able to apply the distribution of use rights
and enforce them. If there is no strong legal and
institutional protection to back TURFs, and the
area is attractive for non-holders, the chances for
success diminish. For the right-holders, the cost
to protect TURFs will be larger than the incomes,
and without the legal authority to support
protection, control efforts would not be sustain-
able. Thus, TURFs emerge traditionally where it
is relatively easy to both obtain and protect them.
Boundaries can easily be associated with physical
features such as a small island or reef, a lagoon or
a river mouth. There are also socially constructed
land boundaries where communities or indivi-
duals define marine territories along the coast
and out to a distance where activities can easily be
controlled from land. Boundaries can also be
defined with regard to artificial devices placed on
the sea surface as a fish aggregation device. In
general, the easier to identify and define a
boundary at sea, the easier to inspect and observe
the use of the territory. GPS and other techno-
logical devices have changed this situation mak-
ing it easier to control fishing activities in
increasingly large marine areas like, for example,
in the EEZ. Again, most of these elements are
quite typical for other common property or
common pool regimes as well.
The fourth definitional element, the territory
under a TURF, can be horizontal (the surface or
the bottom), or vertical (a water column). This
refers to the nature of the territory or resource.
Although TURFs are better suited for sedentary
marine resources, they might serve for migratory
resources as well. This refers to what is called
natural resource attributes (see also Ostrom in
Table 2.11). Resource attributes pertain to
another of the conditions affecting the creation
and maintenance of TURFs. ‘‘Sedentary species
can easily be put under territorial use rights*
either on the bottom or when attached to rafts.’’
(Christy, 1992, Chap. 4, p. 1) Also biomass
associated with natural or artificial reefs offers
suitable territories. Localized TURFs can also
be created for species raised in cages. TURF
being a use right, and due to the physical nature
of the marine resource base, the control of the
means of production is relative rather than an
TABLE 2.12 Definitional elements of TURF.
1. Kind of use rights Right of exclusion.
Right to determine amount and kind of use
Right to extract benefits,
Right to future returns
2. Nature of tenure ‘‘Ownership’’ specificity (communal, private, etc) of the right of use, length of tenure and security
associated with it.
3. The size The territory should be big enough so that the use of the external territory (to the TURF) is not more
beneficial than the TURFs’ own territory
4. Nature of the
territory
The territory can relate to the surface, the bottom, the water column. The TURFs are site specific
rather than resource specifics and therefore the effectiveness of a TURF can be measured by the
economic value associated to the territory.
Source: Based on Christy (1992).
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absolute. Therefore, according to Christy (1992),
there is not clear-cut distinction between open
access and TURF.
Addressing a political problem Christy
(1992) argues that the major problem associated
with the establishment of localized TURFs is
that they may require a re-distribution of wealth.
‘‘The provision of exclusive rights means that
some present users of the territory are likely to be
excluded’’ (Christy, 1992, Chap. 2, p. 4). This can
meet opposition and be politically difficult. An
effective localized territorial use right will there-
fore have a direct effect on the distribution of at
least potential wealth, since providing a value to
the use right-holder (individual or community)
deprives at the same time those excluded.
The redistribution of wealth is one of the
most important factors to be considered thor-
oughly both in the creation of new localized
TURFs, and in taking measures to protect
traditional TURFs. Thus, decisions to create
or protect localized TURFs are essentially
political in nature and in this sense perhaps
more related to equity than efficiency. TURFs
are presumed to provide a more economically
efficient use of the resources and help to
improve small-scale fishing communities’ wel-
fare, whereas individually held TURFs could in
some circumstances disadvantage communities.
One of the major advantages associated with a
localized TURF is the right to determine the
objectives of the use of the territory. TURFs
MAP 2.2 Property and fisheries management regimes
Source: (Reproduced from Berkes et al. (2001 Figure 7.2).
With permission from Bill Carman, IDRC.
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give both the opportunity and incentive to
manage the resources within the territory.
Ideally
the community would be in a position to choose
whether it wishes to extract resource rents, to increase
the income levels of its fishermen, to increase employ-
ment opportunities, or to achieve some combination of
these goals. It could also determine the kind of gear to
be used, the technological innovations to adopt, the
time and seasons of fishing, and other management
measures (Christy, 1992, Chap. 5, p. 1).
Since the ‘‘owners’’ of a TURF have an
exclusive right to future products, it is in the
fishers’ interest to secure future availability of
the resource. This refers to the assumptions
behind co-management arrangements described
previously by Hara (2003, p. 23) in the sense
that co-management leads to benefits such as
participatory democracy, broader knowledge,
better regulations, increased legitimacy, in-
creased adherence and increased proficiency. It
is believed that the motivation to secure future
availability of the resource (certainty) on part of
the fishers stimulates the prudent management
of that resource.
Christy (1992) specifies a further condition
helping the formation of TURFs: the cultural
aspect of the specific country’s property rights
tradition; an issue to which I will return in the
last chapter as it has special relevance for Chile.
Map 2.2, taken from Berkes et al. (2001),
illustrates several properties and fisheries man-
agement regimes. The example of CBRM on the
map also serves to illustrate an example of a
TURF.






3 Chile’s Coast and Fisheries Legal
and Policy Framework
INTRODUCTION
In the first part of this chapter, I examine the
coastal authorities. Given the connection be-
tween the physical location of the fishing coves
and land administration and property rights on
the coast, the second part of this chapter
highlights who is in control of Chile’s long
continental coastline.
The third part of this chapter gives an
overview of the history and organization of
Chilean fisheries as a background to the Con-
cholepas fishery and the MA discussed in
Chapter Five. Therefore Sernapesca’s structure
(Servicio Nacional de Pesca, National Fishing
Service; former Sernap) is presented as well as a
non-exhaustive list of relevant stakeholders and
institutions dealing with fishing, starting with
the Subpesca (Subsecretarı́a de Pesca, Fishing
Subsecretary), under which Sernapesca is
placed. The chapter is illustrated by tables,
figures and maps. The tables are divided into
three columns according to institutions, level in
which they are found (national, regional and
communal), and according to their functions
and missions, including the type and number of
stakeholders. Later in the study, we will find
many of these actors constituting part of the
stakeholder group within the co-management of
the MAs or Chilean TURFs. The institutional
functions and missions will be described briefly
to provide adequate background information for
the reader to access the empirical chapters. In the
table describing formal institutions, the involve-
ment of artisanal fishers is depicted in italics.
COASTAL BORDER ADMINISTRATION
Every country declares its sovereign rights over
its coast, Chile not being an exception. The
administration of the coastal border belongs to
the Ministry of National Defence, through its
Marine Subsecretary (Decree with force of Law
(DFL), No. 340, 1960), serves as a link between
the Chilean Navy and the government. The
Subsecretaries in Chile are subsumed under the
ministries.
The Marine Subsecretary is in charge of
administering the national and state public
goods located in the littoral zone of the coast
and for use of the coastal border area (see
Fig. 3.1). The areas that are regionally avail-
able for the development of MAs are, for
example, defined in consultancy with this
Subsecretary.
The Civil Code ([actualized 2000], 2006),
Art. No. 589, defines as national goods those
whose domain belongs to the whole nation. If
the use of these national goods belongs to all
of inhabitants of the nation (such as streets,
squares, bridges, roads, the adjacent sea and
its beaches), they are called national goods of
public use, or public goods. The national goods
that generally do not belong to the inhabitants
are called state goods (fiscal in Spanish).
Examples of state goods are all lands within
the national territory that do not belong to
other owners, the mines of gold, silver, etc.
in spite of the domain of corporations or
individuals (Código Civil, de lo Bienes Nacio-
nales, Tı́tutlo 2, 2006). Examining the defini-
tions of public and state goods is important
since it is around such definitions that many
problems and uncertainties exist regarding the
access to the land bordering the sea.
The function of the National Commission
for the Use of the Coastal Border is to create a
coherent national policy for the use of the
coastal border (Decreto 475, 1994). This
authority has 12 Regional commissions. In
each of the regional commissions we find,
among many stakeholders, two representatives
of the artisan fishers sector as well as two
representatives of the aquaculture sector. While
the National Commission is headed by the
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Minister of National Defence, the regional
commissions are headed by the regional
Intendants who represent the President of the
republic in each region.
Under the Marine Subsecretary is the Gen-
eral Direction of Maritime Territorial and
Merchant Marine (DIRECTEMAR), which
among other things supports the Marine Sub-
secretary in control tasks on aquaculture and
marine concessions. Under DIRECTEMAR we
find Maritime governments in each region and
also the Harbour Captaincies that perform
more or less the same function of DIRECTE-
MAR, but at regional and local level.
In order to place some of the institutional
posts named in Table 3.1 * such as for example
the Intendants which are the regional political
representatives of the President of the Republic*
a scheme presenting the structure of the Chilean
government is also presented in Fig. 3.1.
Having broadly identified the institutions
that administer the Coastal Border, we can now
proceed to provide a more detailed description
and who and what is involved in this process.
The Ministry of National Defence has jurisdic-
tion over:
a. state beach terrains, situated within a
strip of 80 meters breadth counted from
the highest line of tide water of the sea
coast,
b. the beach,
c. the bays, gulfs, interior small channel
(estrechos) and channels and,
d. the territorial sea of the Republic (Min-
isterio de Defensa Nacional, 1994, p. 3,
my emphasis).
The Coastal Border is defined as that, ‘‘strip
of land comprising the terrain of state beaches,
the beach, the bays, the gulfs, the interior small
channels and channels, and the territorial sea of
the Republic’’ (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional,
1994, p. 1; my emphasis).
According to a document from the Armada
de Chile (Navy) from 1994 called ‘‘Bases for the
Formulation of a National Oceanic Policy: a
Contribution to Development’’, the sea beach is
defined by the Civil Code in its Art. 513 as ‘‘the
extension of land that the waves bath and
de-occupies alternatively until where the highest
tide water reaches, and that have the condition of
national good of public use’’ (Armada de Chile,
1994, p. 1; my emphasis).
FIGURE 3.1 Structure of the Chilean Government. (Open access according to government policy).
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TABLE 3.1 Institutional scheme of Chilean coast administration*.
Level Organization Functions/missions
National MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
Marine Subsecretary To administer the national goods of public use and state goods of sea
bottom, portions of water, beaches and beach terrain situated in the littoral
coast and in the rivers and navigable lakes by vessels of more than 100
tonnes. It implements the National Politics of use of Coastal Border.
DIRECTEMAR (General Direction
of the Maritime Territorial and
Merchant Marine
* Maritime Governments (in each
region)
* Harbour captaincy (where
pertinent)
It looks after the fulfilment of the law and international agreements for the
protection of human life in the sea, the environment and natural resources,
and regulates the activities that develop in the aquatic realm of its
jurisdiction. It supports the undersecretary of the navy in control tasks on
aquiculture and marine concession.
National Commission of Coastal
Border
To propose to the President of the Republic actions that drive the Politics of
Use of the Coastal Border forward, propose a zone division of the same,
elaborate every two years an evaluation of the implementation of the
national politics of the use of the coastal border and propose adjustments,
formulate proposition, suggestions and opinions for the authorities in charge
of studying and approving the diverse communal and intra-communal plans
for the coherence of the use of the coastal border, propose solutions for the
discrepancies that exists regarding the best use of the coastal border, gather
the studies that diverse state administration organs perform regarding the use
of the coastal border and within its competence formulate recommenda-
tions to the state administration organs. It is composed of:
. The Minister of National Defence who heads it
. The Marine Subsecretary
. A representative of the Administrative Regional Development
Subsecretary of the Ministry of Interior
. A representative of the Fishing subsecretary of the
Ministry of Economy
. A representative of Planning and Cooperation
. A representative of Public Works, Housing and Urbanism
. A representative of Transport and Telecommunications
. A representative of the National Real Estates
. A representative of the Chilean Navy
. A representative of the National Tourism Service
. A representative of the National Environment Commission
Regional 12 Regional Commissions for the
Use of the Coastal Border
In addition to support the labour of the National Commission, the principal
aim of the Regional Commissions for the Use of the Coastal Border are like
above. It also includes receiving the solicitations from the public and
proposals for changes in the use of the coastal border that imply a
modification of the existing zone division, and there will be redirected to
the National Commission. They are composed of:
. The Regional Intendant who heads it
. Provincial Governors with territorial jurisdiction over the respective
region’s coastal border
. The Mayors of the coastal communes with jurisdiction over the
respective regions coastal border
. The Regional Ministerial Secretary of Economy
. The Regional Ministerial Secretary of Planning and Cooperation
. The Regional Ministerial Secretary of Public Works, Housing and
Urbanism
. The Regional Ministerial Secretary of National Real Estate
. A representative of the Chilean Navy
(continued)
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In the Civil Code (2006), Second Book, Title
III: Of National Goods, Art. 594 contains the
definition of a beach as the extension of land
that the waves bath and de-occupies alterna-
tively until where the highest tide water reaches
(Código Civil de la República de Chile, 2006).
The condition of national good of public use for
the beaches is otherwise established in Art. No.
589 of the Civil Code where the sovereign rights
of the nation are highlighted (Código Civil de la
República de Chile, 2006), as already seen
above. However, continuing with the Navy
document, it specifies what happens when we
are not dealing with state goods, but with
private property:
In those cases where private property reaches the line of
the beach, the ‘‘beach terrain’’ does not exists, by which
the use and enjoyment of the 80 meters strip breadth
measured from the beach line, is regulated by the norms
generated by the Right, forcing the proprietor to give
right of way to access to the beach (Armada de Chile,
1994, p. 1; my emphasis).
The document deals with ‘‘the [private]
property that extends to the coast border and
that has its origin in historical rights prior to the
republican period, and that includes in the
description of its borders, expressions such as
‘to the sea’ or to the Pacific Ocean’’ (Armada de
Chile, 1994, p. 1).
The 1995 Supreme Decree (M) N8 002, Art.
18, no. 38, section 38, that approved the new
‘‘Rules of Marine Concessions’’, dictates the
following:
The terrains of private property that according to their
titles, limits with beach terrain sectors or with the
beach coast line or the Border of river or lakes, are not
beach terrains. In those titles of private property that
specifies as border the sea, the Pacific Ocean, the
marine, the beach, the harbour, the bay, the river, the
lake, the coast, etc., it should be understood that this
border refers to the beach line (Harlowe, J., Ministerio
de Defensa, through González, S., Pers. Comm. via
email 2006-09-13).
The spaces considered as the coastal Border
are, as the norm recognizes, a limited resource
permitting multiple uses being ‘‘in some cases’’,
exclusive and excluding (Ministerio de Defensa
Nacional, 1994, Letter e). The state guarantees
some exceptions for the common good like bath
places (balneario), coastal settlements, and mar-
itime terminals as well as areas especially apt for
aquaculture and in specific cases, eco-systems or
habitats of special ecological and scientific
interest (Armada de Chile, 1994, p. 2).
No definition of a bath place (balneario) is
given in this Navy document, but it should
correspond logically to the beaches that are apt
and used for bathing. Not all beaches are there-
fore bath places (balneario), but people use them
anyway, and in this respect, many beaches
(unsuitable for bathing) are located within pri-
vate properties, being therefore inaccessible to
the public. This contradicts ‘‘the norms gener-
ated by the Right, forcing the proprietor to give
right of way to access to the beach’’ (Armada de
Chile, 1994, p. 1). These norms do not always
TABLE 3.1 (Continued)
Level Organization Functions/missions
. The Maritime Governors of the regions
. The regional director of Harbour Works
. The regional director of the National Tourism Service
. The regional director of Sernapesca
. The regional director of National Environment Commission
. The corresponding Zone fishing director
. 2 representatives of the Regional Council
. 2 representative of the artisan fisher sector
. 2 representative of the aquaculture sector
. 2 representative of the tourism sector
. Representatives of the other sectors designated by the regional
Intendant
*Sources: Cerda, G., Sernapesca; Lira, S. Subsecretaria de Marina; Elissetche, J., Sernapesca; Bolbarán, D., Subpesca.
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work in practice, or they are interpreted in a very
restricted way.
The National Commission for the Coastal
Border reserves the right to propose the pre-
ferential use of the seaborder, for example, ‘‘the
regularization of existent human settlements and
artisan fishing coves’’ and ‘‘areas of public use
for recreation’’ (Ministerio de Defensa Nacio-
nal, 1994, IV. Objetivos Especı́ficos, No. 5,
Letra c and d; my emphasis). The politics of
the seaborder establishes also that best use is
based on the respect of ‘‘the rights of indivi-
duals and their interests, these be in agreement
with the necessity of the community and the
country’’ (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional,
1994, IV. Letra g).
Regarding application to access to beaches,
the Ministry of Real State’s webpage advises that
‘‘the beaches are a national good of public use,
that belong to the whole nation, and therefore,
its equal use and free access to these goods is
a right that correspond to all its inhabitants’’
(Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales, 2006).
The Ministry of Real Estates has the mis-
sion to ‘‘recognize, administer and handle the
state patrimony, the regularization of the real
small property and the superior control over the
national estates of public use . . .’’. The access to
the beaches is generally pedestrian and accord-
ing the Art. 13 Law Decree N8 1939 of 1977
from the Ministry of Real Estates
the owners of lands adjacent with sea beaches, rivers or
lakes, should facilitate for free the access to these, for
purposes of tourism and fishing when it does not exist
other thoroughfare or public ways to this effect
(Martı́nez, C., Oficina Bienes Nacionales, Pers.
Comm. via email 2006-08-28).
The application to obtain the access can be
done
any time that an individual is limited in access to a
beach * and always when it does not exist other
thoroughfare or public ways to this effect * can apply
in a written form to the Regional Intendent to fix the
free access directly o through the Provincial Governor
or communal authorities. (Ministerio de Bienes Nacio-
nales, 2006).
Nonetheless, even though this right of
access is secured by law, it deals with access by
foot, and not for vehicle access. This is a
considerable limitation given that many beaches
are remote from the main road. The Civil Code
(2006), actualized 2000 (Second Book, Title IV:
On the Occupation of National Goods), how-
ever, continues to regulate both the rights and
duties of fishers and owners of land adjacent to
the beaches. It declares in Art. 612 that these
can make of the sea beaches the necessary use for
fishing, building huts, landing their boats and imple-
ments, and the catch, drying their snares, etc.; yet,
keeping from making any use of the buildings or
constructions existing there without the permission of
their owners, or limiting the legitimate use of other
fishers (Código Civil de Chile, 2006).
Furthermore, it defines the area of allowable
activity in more precise terms. Art. 613 estab-
lishes that ‘‘they also can for the stated activities
make use of the continuing land up to a distance
of eight meters from the beach . . .’’(Código Civil
de Chile, 2006; my emphasis). Art. 614 further-
more states the responsibilities of the owners of
the land:
The owners of the land neighbouring the beach cannot
raise enclosures, nor buildings, constructions or farms
within the said eight meters, but leave sufficient and
comfortable spaces for the fishing activities. In the
contrary case the fisher can go to the local authorities
who will decide on a convenient solution (Código Civil
de Chile, 2006).
The three articles referred to be above were
adopted in the Constitution of 1925.
Figs. 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the configuration
of the coastal border adjacent to private and state
goods. Both figures suggest the big difference
between property rights of the coast under the
two property regimes. Adjacent to the sea (a
national good) (see Fig. 3.3), the beach terrain,
starting after the sea beach, consists of 80 meters,
which is classified as a state good, under the
administration of the Marine Subsecretary. After
the 80 meters, land is still considered to be a state
good, but it is under the administration of the
Real Estate Ministry.
Adjacent to private property (Fig. 3.2), the
sea as a national good of public use corresponds
only to the beach sea, reaching up to the highest
tide water line, being usually up to 8 meters; the
rest is considered to be to private property.
Consequently, where land is under private
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ownership, property rights strongly restrict
public activities in the beach terrain. What
then are the property regimes dominating the
Chilean coasts? This is the issue of the next
section.
PROPERTY REGIMES ALONG THE
CHILEAN COAST
Artisan fisheries are land based, and the ques-
tion of coastal land ownership is central for the
development of MAs. Land access for artisan
fishers varies along the Chilean coast depending
on whether land where the fishing coves are
situated is state or private. When land is private,
in the rural areas, land access might be con-
tested and it is normally difficult for artisnal
fishers to negotiate over space for settlement or
infrastructure. Land use change over time also
affects the possibility of resolving land access
around fishing coves. The cove of El Quisco, for
example, is located in what today is an urban
middle class holiday resort and as we shall see
(Chapter Seven) access to the cove is not longer
a problem. Nonetheless, before El Quisco be-
came a modern summer resort, the fishers faced
more than one time problems with the local
Yacht Club, disputing the land. Although these
tensions belong to the past, for the fishers it
meant that they were forced to abandon their
living places in the cove and settle in less
attractive and distant places, dislocating women
from the cove’s fishing activities (Vildósola and
Rossón, 1997).
A study (Caballol et al., 2006) from the
Ministery of Real State that measured the
length of the continental Chilean coast and
Administration: Marine Subsecretary
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mapped tenure distribution, showed that 56
percent is state property and that 44 percent
of the coast is in private hands. This is a
proportional distribution that appears, at least
superficially, to be quite even (see Table 3.2).
However, if we analyse the regional dis-
tribution of state and private property, we get a
different picture. State property dominates only
in three regions, these being in the two
extremes of the country: the desert (Regions I
of Tarapacá and II of Antofagasta) and the
extreme south (Region XI of Aisén) (see
Picture 3.1). It is also in these Regions that
there is State land available, which in the future
can be subjected to rent, concession, sale, etc.
The situation is the inverse in the remainder of
the Regions. Between Regions IV of Coquimbo
and Region X of Los Lagos * where most of
the country’s population lives * the lowest
percent in private hands is 88 represented to
Region IV, where Puerto Oscuro is situated.
According to the study, the results regarding
the length of the continental coast (18.771
kilometer) are approximate, being neither offi-
cial nor exact. The total does not include the
coast of the islands of Tierra del Fuego and
Navarino in the Antarctic that together have
3,326 kilometer of coast. The length of the coast
of the more than 10,000 islands of Chile is
unknown (Mártinez, C. Bienes Nacionales;
Pers. Comm. via email 2006-08-25).
Given the reigning property regime of the
Chilean coasts, the situation of the beaches is
congruent with the predominating character of
private property of the coast. The study from
Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales that includes
only the beaches between Regions I of Tarapacá
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FIGURE 3.3 Coastal border in front of state property
Source: courtesy and permission from Farias, B., Oficina Borde Costero, Subsecretarı́a de Marina,
Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. My translation.
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beaches. Of these beaches only 30 are juxtaposed
with state lands, corresponding to only 5.3
percent of the total. Of these 562 beaches, 35
would have a problem regarding public access
(Caballol et al., 2006). There is no definition of a
beach given in the study, but it is unlikely to be
the same as above (Art. 594, Civil Code) because
in that case the beaches would be very difficult to
quantify. According to a letter from Martı́nez,
one of the authors of the report, following
DIRECTEMAR (Dirección General de Terri-
torio Marı́timo y Marina Mercante), they con-
sidered beaches that were appropriate for
bathing and sunbathing. Due to these very
specific characteristics considered in the study,
thousands of beaches remain excluded, and
many others remain unknown. Furthermore,
DIRECTEMAR divide the beaches into two
types: Apt beaches meaning that they can be
utilized for bathing and sunbathing. They must
meet ‘‘natural’’ and ‘‘acquired’’ conditions. Nat-
ural conditions: having a flat bottom and soft
slope, clean, without rests of submarine con-
structions or shipwrecks, healthy waters, soft
waves, scarce streams and without rocks. Ac-
quired conditions: responsible concessionary,
security system of first aid, and counts with
lifeguards. Not apt beaches which can be utilized
only for sunbathing (Martinez, Bienes Nacio-
nales, Pers. Comm. via email 2006-08-28).
It is uncertain what the study considers as
problematic regarding access to the beaches. In
Region IV, in the case of Agua Dulce (Canela
commune, Region IV), the public has no access.
Probably, this beach is not considered apt either
for bathing or sunbathing, and this might
TABLE 3.2 Total length (km) of the continental coast and property regimens by regions (percent) in Chile.
Regions Coast’s Total
Private State (Km)
Length (Km) Km % Disposable1 Assigned 2 Other 3 Total %
I 501 53 11 325 103 20 448 89
II 831 225 27 531 66 9 606 73
III 621 353 57 210 31 27 268 43
IV 520 460 88 0 45 15 60 12
V 335 335 100 0 0 0 0 0
VI 115 115 100 0 0 0 0 0
VII 180 177 98 0 0 3 3 2
VIII 567 561 99 0 6 0 6 1
IX 112 104 93 0 5 3 8 7
X 1,551 1,448 93 46 57 0 103 7
XI 6,429 726 11 680 5,023 0 5,703 89
XII 7,009 3,606 51 126 3,277 0 3,403 49
Total 18,771 8,163 43 1,918 8,613 77 10,608 57
Source: Caballol et al. (2006): Diagnóstico de la situación de la propiedad y acceso a playas de mar, lagos y rios a nivel nacional, Informe
final, Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales.
1 State available.
2 State assigned (ex. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, CONAF, etc.).
3 Other (free access, rented, etc.).
Picture 3.1 Map of Chile and its regions
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explain why it is not included on the list.
Therefore this beach is probably not counted
as having problems of access. Puerto Oscuro,
being suitable for bathing and sunbathing due
to its natural conditions, should fall outside the
definitions of ‘‘apt beach’’ of DIRECTEMAR
as it lacks the acquired conditions (i.e., respon-
sible concessionary, security system of first aid,
and counts with lifeguards).
Now, if we examine the situation of the
lakes and rivers in terms of property rights,
there is an extremely high presence of private
property. Of the 69 navigable lakes and 10
navigable rivers (from Region VI of Libertador
General Bernardo O’Higgins to Region XI of
Aisén) all, except two lakes, are surrounded by
private property. These are the famous San
Rafael Lacunae in Region XI of Aisén, and its
adjacent lands form the National Park of the
same name, and Lake Conguillı́o in IX of
Araucanı́a is within the Conguillı́o National
Park. This Region also has the 15.5 ha Lago
Calafquén and the 5.3 ha Lake Colico, both of
which are state-owned.
So, what can we conclude? The distribution
of land tenure makes the administration and
control of all Chilean coasts by the State rather
weak. State property in vast areas of the country
is the exception and private property is much
more extensive. The consequence is that vast
private property holdings pose restrictions on
the rights of others to access beach areas that
belong to the whole nation. This land tenure
structure was substantially established under the
colonialist system of Mercedes de tierra (land
grants) granted by the Spanish Crown to its
conquerors and colonisers. This legacy left
behind large private landed properties that the
agrarian reform of the 1960s and 1970s did not
affect considerably; and if it did, Pinochets
‘‘contra’’ agrarian reform partially changed
land tenure structure again. In this regard, the
first (1855) and second (1925) Constitutions
continued to privilege the rights that the land-
lords inherited from colonial times. In 1925 for
the first time certain concepts about the social
function of the land were introduced (CIDA,
1966, p. 11). In this respect the Constitution of
1925 says that
the exercise of right to property is subject to the
limitations or rules that demand the maintenance or
progress of the social order and, in such sense, the law
will be able to impose on it obligations or servitude of
public usefulness in favour of the interests of the State
and of the public health (CIDA, 1966, p. 11).
As CIDA indicates, the legal property
regime in Chile was characterized, until 1925,
by an almost total freedom in the possession
and usufruct of property for those who had the
monopoly of the land in the country. Art. 582 of
the Chilean Civil Code, Title II: Of Dominance,
still today defines the right to property as ‘‘the
dominance on a corporal thing to enjoy and
have it arbitrarily, not being against the law or
other persons rights’’ (Código Civil de la
República de Chile, 2006). Art. 10 of the
Chilean Constitution reaffirms this right, indi-
cating that it
assures all the inhabitants of the Republic the inviol-
ability of all the properties, without any distinction
and that nobody can be deprived of its property or
part of it or from the right that he may have to it, but
by virtue of a judicial judgement or of expropriation
by cause of public usefulness qualified by a law
(CIDA, 1966, p. 11).
This right, presently slightly reformulated, is
not affected by the Constitution of 1981 dic-
tated during the Pinochet era and is described in
Art. 24, Chapter III: About the Constitutional
Rights and Obligations (Constitución de Chile
[1981], Art. 24, Cap. III, 2006). Obviously, the
general interest highlighted in law is only
extended up to where it does not endanger the
existing large landed private properties. So, not
only the coastal land of the sea and its beaches
are under private property, but also those of the
lakes and rivers. It seems that there is no study
available that analyses how property concentra-
tion looks like along the Chilean coasts. How-
ever, it is known that Chile, in spite of the
agrarian reform, is among the countries with the
highest land concentration. The coasts are not
an exception and it is within this context that
the MAs are developing in Chile. Let us now
proceed with an overview of the institutional
structure of Chilean fisheries and related
organizations.
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THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
FISHERIES
Chilean fisheries have gone though important
changes in response to internationalization of
production and consumption systems. Industrial
and artisanal fishing are the two main fishing
sectors. Aquaculture is included in the industrial
sector. Since the mid 1970s with the introduction
of a neo-liberal export policy both industrial
and artisanal fishing have increased consider-
ably. During the 1980s, fisheries were the fastest
growing sector in Chile (Castilla et al., 2007,
p. 28), and although Chile is a relatively small
nation, it occupies an important place in world-
wide landing statistics. Neo-liberal policies re-
sulted in a re-structuring and adaptation of the
fishing sector in accordance with globalization
requirements. Similar to other parts of the
world, Chile’s export policy re-channelled fish-
eries supply from local and regional market to
international markets.
As Kay (2002) argues, from 1975 Chile was
the first country to thoroughly implement neo-
liberal economic and social policy. Before this
period, Chile had a relatively closed economy,
and agriculture including forestry constituted
less than 5 percent of the total export value.
Until the military coup of 1973, Chile had an
inward-looking development that combined
import substitution, high level of protection
for domestic industry with an extensive public
sector. Currently Chile is regarded as one of
the most successful cases of non-traditional
agro-export (Kay, 2002). During the 1990s
the agricultural sector contributed 30 percent
towards total export value.
The new policy internationalized the econ-
omy and protection of national enterprises was
reduced. Among the measures to support the
new outward-looking development was the
unilateral reduction of tariffs, which is currently
at 10 percent, with plans to reduce it by a further
2 percent (to 8 percent). Non-tariff restrictions
were eliminated and exchange rates were unified
and the rate devaluated (Galleguillos and
Moraga, 1999). Prior to 1975, two hundred
firms exported 200 products to 50 countries. In
1998, around 6,000 firms exported more than
3,800 products to 172 countries and the value
of export grew from US$5 billion in 1970 to
about US$19 billion in 1998 (Galleguillos and
Moraga, 1999). Continuous integration of Chi-
lean production into international markets has
been secured by international agreements and
the expansion of foreign capital is also sanc-
tioned by the post Pinochet governments, led by
the centre-left coalition Partido por la Demo-
cracia (PPD). The free trade treaty between
Chile and EU, which started to operate in
February 2003, allows European investors to
buy 100 percent of Chilean companies along
with their respective fish licences and quotas,
necessary to operate in Chilean territorial
waters. In this way the EU secured access to
resources such as pelagic1 fish of central and
north Chile, as well as demersal2 fish from
southern Chile. The Protocol of Fish Investment
(PIP) allows European interests to buy coastal
land to build related fisheries and industrial
infrastructure. Before 1991 foreign interests were
allowed to buy land only within 5 kilometer from
the coast. The Chilean free trade agreement with
the USA leads to the same process, strengthen-
ing the traditional model based on export of
primary products and raw materials; a role
assigned a long time ago to southern countries.
In 1998, Chile’s four major export products were:
copper, 37 percent; cellulose, 5 percent; grapes, 4
percent and fishmeal, 2 percent (Galleguillos
and Moraga, 1999). During 1994 and 2004 fish
exports made up 10.5 percent average of export
total value (see Table 3.4, Chapter Four).
The 1991 General Law of Fishing and
Aquaculture (LPA N8 430) gives national fish
patrimony to big international companies to the
disadvantage of small and medium fishers, the
environment and national food sovereignty
(Cárdenas et al., 2003). Fishing export has
resulted in over exploitation of marine
resources, and makes fish less available for the
poor. It is usual that export based development
tends to narrow production to fewer species
(Hersoug et al., 2004).
1 Living and feeding in the open sea.
2 Sinking to or lying on the bottom; living on or near the
bottom and feeding on benthic organisms.
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The case of salmon farming in Chile illus-
trates how international capital places produc-
tion abroad, taking advantage of distant social
and ecological factors, and thereby exporting
environmental problems. In 2003 and 2004
Chile was second only to Norway in salmon
production. An indication of the enormous
growth in this enterprise is provided by an
increase from 487 tonnes in 2003 to 569 tonnes
in 2004, corresponding to a 17 percent increase
in one year (Subpesca, 2004, 2005a).
Pernicious environmental and human effects
of salmon farming in Chile have been reported
from Scandinavia. Chile and Norway have some
things in common. Both are rich in coastal
resources. But while Norway has several fish
companies in Chile, Chile has none in Norway
(Löfgren, 2001). Norwegian companies control
at least 20 percent of Chilean salmon industry
(Ecoceanos News, 2003-07-01, in Dagbladet,
2003-06-28).
Norwegian capital in Chile accesses not only
markets that it cannot reach from Norway *
e.g., the EU-market (Norway is outside EU) as
well USA and Japan * but it also secures the
availability of cheap salmon feed, which is
the largest production cost for commercial
aquaculture (Naylor et al., 2000). Every kilo-
gram of salmon requires an input of 3 kilograms
of wild fish, meaning that every kilogram of
salmon demands more fish protein than it
produces (Löfgren, 2001). Many aquaculture
systems use 25 times more fish protein in the
form of fish meal to feed the farmed species
(Naylor et al., 2000, p. 1018). The increased
world aquaculture production from 10 million
tonnes in 1987 to 29 million tonnes in 1997
explains the patterns of fish capture in the
oceans. ‘‘Between 1986 and 1994, four of the
top five, and eight of the top 20 captures species
were used for feed production for the aqua-
culture and livestock industry’’. One species
used for feed production is the jack mackerel
(Trachurus murphyi) * a principal commercial
fish in Chile. The system of Maximum Limit of
Capture in the 1991 Fishing Law (LPA)3
assigned to the fish industry 98 percent of the
Jack mackerel quota during the ensuing 10
years (Cardenas et al., 2003).
What is fish feed for industry is food for
people. Salmon is now nourished in Chile with
Caballa or Chub mackerel (Scomber japonicus).
To eat fish in Chile, one of the leading producers
of marine animal protein, is becoming an ex-
pensive luxury beyond the means of the poor.
Chilean consumption of fish is one of the lowest
in the world with around 7 kilograms per capita/
year, which can be compared with 22 in Peru, 40
in Spain and 70 kilograms in Japan (Chile
Cientı́fico, 2006). This low consumption is not
only cultural, such as preference for red meat and
poultry, but also a product of market mechan-
isms such as price and marketing. Nonetheless,
farming carnivorous species not only demands
large inputs of wild fish for feed, they also reduce
fish supply through habitat modification, wild
seedstock collection and other ecological impacts
such as waste disposal and pathogen invasions.
Aquaculture presents a paradox as a possible
solution to the shortfall in ocean harvests as
fisheries deteriorate, and aquaculture is also a
contributing factor to the collapse of the same
fisheries stocks worldwide (Naylor et al., 2000).
Another rationale for Norwegian invest-
ment in Chile is the cheap, largely unorganized
(due to the long repression under Pinochet) and
unskilled labour force. Chilean labourers that
work for Mainstream earn one-eighth of their
counterparts’ income in Norway (Ecoceanos
News, 2003). Norwegian companies have been
accused of adopting double environmental and
labour standards; one for Chile, one for Norway.
Mainstream is a Chilean filial of the Norwegian
Cermaq, which is 80 percent owned by the
Norwegian State (Ecoceanos News, 2003).
Mainstream is one of the five most important
salmon producing companies in the world. In
2007 (TV Nacional) there was a total of 5,000
salmon workers employed in aquaculture in
Chile. International companies have been criti-
cized by the Chilean Labour Inspection because
they do not allow workers to organize, and
attempts to collectivize usually result in sack-
ings. The companies are also well-known for
only offering casual working conditions with
very little security.3 Ley de Pesca y Acuicultura (LPA) 430/1991.
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INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF
FISHING AUTHORITIES
The history of Chilean fishery regulation is
rather recent. The first national fishing legisla-
tion dates from the 1930s, after recognizing that
fishers lack appropriate extraction and commer-
cialization techniques. The lack of information
on fish stocks made appropriate investments
and policy decisions difficult. Artisanal fishing
was not even mentioned in the 1930s fisheries
legislation (Meltzoff et al., 2002, p. 97).
Until 1978 fishing was handled by the
Division of Fishing Protection under the Na-
tional Agricultural and Cattle Service (SAG),
which in turn was the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Agriculture. From 1978 onwards fishing was
handled by Ministry of Economy, Fomenting
and Reconstruction.4 Under this Ministry, a
discrete fisheries authority was established, the
Fishing Subsecretary (Subpesca). This shift
reflects the State’s interest in the fishing sector
in the new era of economic liberalization. From
1975 the fishing sector had an importance never
held before, and therefore needed an agency of
its own to administer its affairs.
From 1991, when the Fishing and
Aquaculture Law (LPA) was promulgated,
Sernapesca restructured in order to respond to
technological and normative, changes, espe-
cially its increasing integration into the interna-
tional arena.
The Fishing Subsecretary (Subpesca) has
authority over the management of all fisheries,
i.e., industrial and offshore and artisanal and
inshore. Under Subpesca comes Sernapesca. It
has an executive role, being in charge of law
enforcement and statistics. In regard to MAs,
Sernapesca also produces statistics, supervises
the provision of areas to the artisanal fishing
organizations and supports the implementation
of the administrative measures through coordi-
nating action with other public institutions
(including, Subpesca, CORFO, SERCOTEC,
Gobiernos Regionales, Fondo de Fomento
para la Pesca Artesanal) (Sernapesca, 2007c).
It is also the role of Sernapesca to control and
inspect the studies and management plans,
according to the general fishing law and more
specifically, the rules of the MEABRs (this is
discussed more in Chapter Five).
In 2007, the Subpesca employed 156
employees of which 63 were permanent and 93
non-permanent staff (Bolborán, D., Subpesca,
Pers. Comm. via email 2007-05-04). Sernapesca
has 566 employees of whom 351 are permanent
staff and 215 non-permanent (Villagra, C., Ser-
napesca, Pers. Comm. via email 2007-05-02).
Sernapesca (see Fig. 3.4) consists of a
Centralized Directorate with 13 Regional
Directorates, 45 Provincial Offices and one
Institutional Coordination Office in Santiago.
The Regional Intendencias are authorized to
create the Regional Fish Councils whose princi-
pal objectives are the identification of regional
problems affecting the fishing sector, the ela-
boration of proposals of solutions and technical
reports. The legislation also establishes the
creation of five macro zone based organs called
Zone Fishing Councils (Consejos Zonales de
Pesca) (Sernapesca, 2007c).
As indicated in Table 3.3, under Subpesca
the National Fishing Council, headed by Fish-
ing Subsecretary, has a democratizing role,
integrating the fishing stakeholders at a
national level. Among the members of the
National Fishing Council are four artisanal
fishers representing the macro zones and one
representing the national level, as selected by
fishing organizations and/or federations. These
representatives are not specified in the 1991
LPA, and in 2005 these positions were vacant,
leaving these perspectives unrepresented in the
Council (Supreme Decree, Nr 56, Subpesca,
2005-01-27). The procedure to fill these posts is
quite bureaucratically onerous and it seems
that the fishers’ bodies did not succeeded in
fulfilling these formal requirements.
The National Fishing Council is then orga-
nized into five Fishing Councils organized by
geographical zones incorporating more than one
region. Their role is to decentralize fishing
administration and foster the participation of
regional and local stakeholders, and to set rules at
the zone level. Artisanal fishers also have a
representative on each of the Zone Fishing4 Law decree N8 2442.
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Councils. Artisanal fishers also have representa-
tives in the Fomentation Fund for Artisanal
Fishing (FFPA) * the body in charge of promot-
ing sustainable development of artisanal fishing.
Lastly, there is the Regional Fishing Coun-
cils that seems to exist only in certain regions.
The existence of these Regional Councils is
seemingly discretionary upon the decision of
the Regional Intendants * the regional repre-
sentatives of the President of the Republic.
Wherever they are in place, artisanal fishers
have two representatives. Giving participation to
artisanal fishers is probably not only a demo-
cratic initiative but also a way to acknowledge
the economic importance of the sector within
the national context. Artisanal fishers are re-
presented in formal structures, but how much
their voice is heard in practice remains to be
studied. However, through their own organiza-
tions like the National Confederation of Fishers
(CONAPACH), among others, fishers have also
been active in the formulation of the fishing law.
According to CONAPACH (2001), the
national leaders of this organization partici-
pated in the redaction commissions of the 1991
LPA, with extensive discussions at grass-root
level. One important goal that fishers succeeded
in advocating was the five marine miles for
artisanal fishers, the priority of coastal commu-
nities to obtain concessions of land, sea bottom
and MAs. Artisanal fishers achieved as well
representation on the zonal, regional and na-
tional fishing councils, discussed above.
FISHING RESEARCH AND RELATED
STAKEHOLDERS
Regarding research, there is principally Instituto
de Fomento Pesquero (IFOP) (Fishing Foment
Institute) and Fondo de Investigación Pesquero
(FIP) (Fishing Research Fund) (see Table 3.4).
IFOP is a semi-governmental body that was
created in 1964. IFOP provides the technical
and scientific knowledge that underpins the
regulation of fisheries and aquaculture and the
conservation of water resources and eco-sys-
tems. It is also in charge of export statistics for
these areas. It has been important in the
development of MAs, performing the first
benthic resource evaluation and management
project that informed the basis of the present
ESBA studies (Estudio de Situación Base) and
the Management and Exploitation Plans
(PMEA) (discussed more in Chapter Five).
FIGURE 3.4 Structure of National Fishing Service
Source: Sernapesca (2007c). Permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
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TABLE 3.3 Institutional scheme of Chilean fisheries administration*
Level Organization Functions/missions
National MINISTERY OF ECONOMY
Fishing Subsecretary
(Legislative role)
To promote sustainable development of fishing and aquaculture
activities, policy making and applying norms that increase the sector’s
social and economicbenefit for the well-being of the present and future
generations of the country. It heads the five Zone Fishing Councils
National National Fishing Council To facilitate the participation of the fishing stakeholders at national
level. It is composed of:
. The Fishing subsecretary
. The Director of DIRECTEMAR
. The Director of Sernapesca
. The Executive Director of IFOP
. 7 Representatives nominated by the President in accordance
with the 3/5 of the Senate.
. Representative of the enterprise sector representing four macro-
zones, 1 representative of small scale industrial ship-owners
and 1 from the aquaculture sector designated by their respective
organizations.
. Representatives of the enterprise labour sector, designated by
the labour organization.
. Representatives of the artisanal fishing sector representing four
macro-zones and one representing the national level, desig-





5 Zone Fishing Councils:
* I & II, seated in Iquique
* II & IV, seated in
Coquimbo
* V to IX seated in
Talcahuano
* X & XI, seated in Puerto
Montt
* XII, seated in Punta Arenas
Created with the aim of decentralizing the administrative measures of
authority and make effective the participation of the fishing
stakeholders at the zone level in matters related with fishing activities
and aquaculture. They have a consultative or resolute character.
Their aim is to generate fishing norms at the zone level, involving the
regions that are part of the zone. They are integrated by:
. Zone Director from Fishing Subsecretary who heads it and a
Regional Director of Sernapesca of the respective zone.2
. The Marine Governor of the Region that seats the Zone council
. IFOP’s Zonal council.
. A Regional Ministerial Secretary of Planning and Cooperation
from the respective zone proposed to the President by the
Ministry of Economy.
. 2 representatives from universities or professional institutes
from the zone directly linked to the sea science proposed to the
President by the rectors of the universities or professional
institutes from the respective zone.
. 4 counsellors representing the guilt organization of ship-own-
ers, small-ship-owners, processing plants, and titular of con-
cessions/authorizations of aquiculture of the zone.
. 4 counsellors representing the guilt vessel official’s organization,
crew, industrial labour and artisanal fishers elected by the guilt
associations, union federation and firm or cooperative unions.
. A representative of all the juridical non-commercial instances
working with the environment or preservation of natural




Controls fishing aquaculture, sanitary and environmental norms, as well
as international agreements that regulate the activity with the aim to
conserve the hydro-biological resources and to secure sustainable
development.
Sernapesca holds the national register of artisanal fishers and the boats,
according to regions, province, communes and localities and categories
of fishers and fisheries. It heads:
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TABLE 3.3 (Continued)
Level Organization Functions/missions
. The 13 Regional Fishing Councils.
. It heads and acts as Executive Secretary of the Fomentation
Fund for Artisanal Fishing (FFPA)
National Fomentation Fund for Artisa-
nal Fishing (FFPA)
The mission of FFPA is to promote the sustainable development of the
artisanal fishing sector, and support the efforts of artisanal fishing
organizations that seek to improve the living and working conditions
of its members, respecting the resources and the environment
through the co-financing of projects carried out by the organizations
themselves. The adjudication of funds is done through public
auctions and cover the following areas:
. Development of infrastructure for artisanal fishing.
. Capacitating and technical assistance directed to the artisanal
fisher and their organizations.
. Repopulation of hydro-biological resources that are exported
by artisanal fisher and artificial cultivators.
. Commercialization of artisanal fishing product and adminis-
tration of the production centre.
. It has regional representation through the Regional Fishing
Directions. It is compost of:
. IFOPs Executive director
. The National director of harbour works;
. A representative of the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation
. A representative of Fishing Subsecretary
. 3 representatives of the artisanal fishers among which should
be represented the artisanal fishers themselves, the divers,




5 Zone Fishing Directions The functions of these directions are the same as above (Sernapesca),
but at a zone level.
Regional 13 Regional Fishing Direc-
tions
The functions of the 13 regional directions are the same above
(Sernapesca), but at regional level.
Provincial and Communal
Fishing Offices
The functions of these offices are the same as above (Sernapesca), but
at a Provincial and Communal level.
Regional (Regional Fishing Councils) The Fishing Law allows the Regional Intendancy (regional
representatives of the President of the), to form Regional fishing
Councils when a region has significant fishing and aquaculture
activities. Their aim is to identify problems affecting the regional
fishing sector, elaborating proposal of solution and technical
reports, being headed by each Regional Director of Sernapesca.
They should consist of:
. The Regional director of Sernapesca, who chairs it.
. 4 institutional representatives, one from the university or
institute related to the fishing activity.
. A representative of the fishing enterprise sector.
. 4 representatives of the labour sector, two of which must come
from the artisanal fishing sector.
Regional Committee of Regional
Assignation:
. Fishing Committee of
Regional Assignation
Under the Committee of Regional Assignation (CAR) are the Fishing
Committee of Regional Assignation (CAR-Pesca) which distributes
development funds in different areas. The CARs are under the
Regional Intendancy (whose Intendant represents the President of the
Republic in each region). CAR-Pesca has representatives from
Sernapesca and from all sector organizations with investment funds
(like CORFO), and the investment advisors.
(continued)
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FIP finances most of the management
oriented fishing and aquaculture research (Mor-
eno et al., 2007). According to Reyes (1990),
although not referring to this institution speci-
fically, at the end of the 1990s, only 48 million
pesos were destined for research of the Con-
cholepas concholepas species, which is less in
value than many individually, registered illegal
capture of the species.
In 2005, among the 14 research projects that
received financing from FIP, only one deals with
Concholepas concholepas reproduction (FIP Pro-
jecto No. 2005-32). This grant was for 30 millions
pesos (FIP, Concurso No. 5, 2005), corresponding
to about US$54,000.5 There is also a second
project aiming to study the exploitation criteria of
secondary benthic resources in the MAs (FIP
Proyecto No. 2005-42) for a similar grant
amount. Of the 14 successful projects that
received grants, seven were adjudicated by
universities, five by IFOP and two were mixed
between one university and IFOP and one
between a university and a consultancy firm
(FIP, Concurso No. 5, 2005). There are several
consultancy firms working with fishing activ-
ities, particularly with artisanal fishing organi-
zations after the emergence of the MAs in the
1990s. They get access to funds from bodies
such as FFPA and Sercotec (see Table 3.3).
The following chapter offers an overview of
the main fishing sectors also serves as a back-
ground to Chapter Five which deals with the
fisheries of the Locos and hence with the MAs.
TABLE 3.4 Fishing related research organizations (private and public)*
Level Organization Functions/missions
National IFOP (Instituto de Fomento Pesquero;
Fishing Foment Institute)
Elaborates and provides the technical antecedents and scientific bases
for the regulation of fisheries an aquaculture and the conservation of
the hydro-biological resources and their eco-systems.
FIP (Fondo de Investigación Pesquero;
Fishing Research Fund)
Finance fishing and aquaculture research projects, consist of eight
experts and headed by the fishing Subsecretary.
Universities, institutes** Univ. Arturo Pratt, Univ. Austral de Chile, Univ. Católica del Norte,
Univ. Católica de la SSMA Concepción, Univ. Católica de Valparaı́so,
Univ. de Concepción, Univ. Nacional Andrés Bello.
Private organizations working within the fishing
sector
Consult firms** Alvarez y Asociados Ltda, BIOCEAN, BIOMAR Estudios Ltda.,
BITECMA Ltda., Depto. de Pastoral Obrera, Estudios Marinos Ltda.,
FUNCAP, Fundación OCAC, Mares Chile Ltda., Promar Pacı́fico Ltda.,
SODEPAR Ltda.
*Sources: Cerda, G., Sernapesca; Lira, S. Subsecretaria de Marina; Elissetche, J., Sernapesca; Bolbarán, D., Subpesca.
**Sernaspesca (2007c).
5 Average rate 559.76 pesos per US$1, year 2005 (Banco




CORFO, Sercotec, Fosis, DOP (Direction of
Harbour Works), Conicyt and international funds
Diverse institutions support with financing the
development of fishing activities, among others.
*Sources: Cerda, G., Sernapesca; Lira, S. Subsecretaria de Marina; Elissetche, J., Sernapesca; Bolbarán, D., Subpesca.
1. See comments above regarding this group not been part of the National Fishing Council in the 1991 LPA, but that was apparently
incorporated later on.
2. Sernapesca’s home page specifies that it is the Zone Director from Sernapesca who heads the Zone Fishing Councils. According to
Bolbarán this will be the case if the modifications of the LPA are accepted (Bolbarán, D., Sernapesca).
Chapter 3: Chile’s Coast and Fisheries Legal and Policy Framework 69
4 Industrial and Artisanal Fishing
Landing in Chile
INTRODUCTION
The long coastline and rich Ocean make Chile a
prominent fishing nation. The Chilean Exclu-
sive Economic Zone (EEZ) is 2.4 million km2 of
ocean, three times larger than the country’s area
(Fundación Mar de Chile, 2008). Of the 200
nautical miles of Chilean EEZ, the major part
(195 miles) is reserved for industrial fishing,
while artisanal fishing has a mere 5 miles (LPA,
1991, Art. 3 and 4). If there are any artisanal
fishing activities in an area, industrial fishing
might still be allowed within the 5 marine miles
reserved for artisanal fishing, with the exception
of the strip of one territorial marine mile (LPA,
1991, Art. 47). However, this exception does not
embrace aquaculture whose activities take place
‘‘in the sea beach area, state beach terrain,
portions of water and bottom, and rocks, within
and outside the bays, and in the rivers and lakes
that are navigable by vessels of more than 100
tonnes of gross register . . . ’’ (LPA, 1991, Tı́tulo
VI de la acuicultura, Parráfo, 1, Art. 67).
This arrangement leads to tensions between
industrial and artisanal sectors, and artisanal
fishers feel discriminated against. CONAPACH
(Confederación de Pescadores Artesanales de
Chile), one of the two national fisher confed-
erations, representing half of the country’s
artisanal fisher organizations, asserts that in
Regions III and IV (see Map 1.1 for regions),
industrial fishing is allowed within the 5 miles
because artisanal fishing does not fill the
capture quotas. On the other hand, artisanal
fishers cannot fish in the waters reserved for
industrial fishing although certain pelagic spe-
cies can only be fished further out than 5 miles.
Another point of complaint is that industrial
vessels can fish in the whole marine territory
while artisanal fishers are limited to the region
where they are registered. Furthermore, salmon
aquaculture is authorized within the reserved
5-mile zone, affecting artisanal fishing through
contamination (CONAPACH, 2007a). On 29th
January 2008 CONAPACH (2008), in colla-
boration with the NGOs Greenpeace and
Ecoceanos, a public campaign was launched in
Valparaiso to eliminate trawling in Chilean
coastal waters. Around 1,000 fishers partici-
pated at the launch implying that Subpesca
favours industrial fishing.
According to the 1991 Fishing Law (LPA),
industrial fishing is ‘‘that extractive fishery that
is realized by industrial ship-owners, utilizing
fishing boats in conformity with this law’’ (Art.
2:31). Industrial boats are above 22.5 meters
lopsided, and weigh 100 tonnes.
In spite of the fact that artisanal fishing
seems to have many disadvantages, such as low
education level, low capacity level, little diversi-
fication, commercialization problems and low
aggregated value, this sector has not only been
able to improve its production but also its
capacity to adapt to new market demands,
new laws and management policies.
Between 1977 and 1987, artisanal landings
increased by 478 percent while labour increased
by 278 percent. In other terms, this meant an
increase from 17,182 fishers in 1975 to 47,800 in
1987. Between 1980 and 1987 artisanal exports
increased from US$57.1 million to US$154
million, thereby constituting an increase of
269.7 percent (Arrizaga et al., 1989, p. 295).
According to the 1991 Fishing Law, artisa-
nal fishing is ‘‘extractive fishing activity realized
by particular individuals that in a personal,
direct and habitual way work as artisanal fish-
ers’’, as well as ‘‘the extractive fishing activity
that is realized by juridical persons only if these
are composed of particular individuals regis-
tered as artisanal fishers’’ (Art. 2:29).
After 1994, when Chile reached its maximum
historical number of landings (extractive and
aquaculture) with 8 million tonnes, occupying
the fourth place in the world, landings began to
decline. In 1995 Chile landed around 7 million
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tonnes, occupying a third place globally, behind
China and Peru. In 1998 landings dropped quite
significantly to 3.8 million tonnes. As can be seen
in Table 4.1, in 1999 landings increased again to
reach 5.5 million tonnes and thereafter oscillates
at around 4.5 to 5.5 million tonnes, occupying a
seventh place in the world between 1999 and
2003. In 2004, the national landing went up to
6.0 million tonnes decreasing in 2005 to 4.9
million tonnes (Subpesca, 2005a).
In terms of export value, Chile occupies a
rather privileged position with US$2.5 million
in 2004 (see Table 4.2), which represents 3.4
percent of the world total value (Subpesca,
2005a). In spite of decreasing landings, export
value has not decreased, reaching US$3 million
in 2005 (Subpesca, 2005a), corresponding to a
historical maximum in the sector. Its value has
maintained its increasing trend from 1998, with
the exception of 2001. Thus, while the volume of
fish export declined in the period between 1994
and 2004, the value during the same period
increased. The average export price per tonne
has more than doubled.
According to Subpesca (2005a, p. 2), from
2004 to 2005, export volume increased by 21
TABLE 4.1 World fishing landings (extractive fishing and aquaculture) 19992003 (tonnes).
Place Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
1 China 47,499,759 49,635,826 51,005,810 53,426,645 55,687,878
2 Peru 8,439,122 10,666,450 7,995,998 8,780,782 6,111,342
3 Japan 6,625,691 6,400,758 6,148,084 5,878,500 6,036,834
4 Indonesia 4,952,185 5,157,834 5,385,862 5,537,639 5,960,930
5 India 5,686,964 5,668,632 5,936,931 5,932,542 5,913,334
6 USA 5,309,964 5,216,045 5,461,055 5,482,095 5,533,020
7 Chile 5,585,877 4,972,376 4,663,027 5,132,798 4,563,441
8 Filipinas 2,924,305 3,000,339 3,172,377 3,372,093 3,620,756
9 Thailand 3,646,079 3,735,550 3,547,992 3,463,912 3,590,452
10 Russia 4,238,532 4,104,502 3,746,673 3,389,221 3,429,141
Other 43,071,766 43,833,622 45,445,623 45,475,501 45,850,912
Total 137,980,244 142,391,934 142,509,432 145,871,728 146,298,040
Source: Subpesca (2004). Permission from Bolbarán, D., Subpesca.
TABLE 4.2 Total value, volume and average price export US$/t of Chilean export, fish sector and its










% export value fishing
sector of National Total
1993 9,198 1,232 951 1,172 12.7
1994 11,604 1,602 853 1,366 11.8
1995 16,136 1,792 994 1,782 11.0
1996 16,627 1,520 1,165 1,772 10.7
1997 17,870 1,351 1,385 1,873 10.5
1998 16,323 932 1,796 1,674 10.3
1999 17,162 1,071 1,664 1,784 10.4
2000 19,210 1,052 1,781 1,875 9.8
2001 18,272 1,141 1,630 1,861 10.2
2002 18,180 1,212 1,616 1,959 10.8
2003 21,524 1,293 1,737 2,246 10.4
2004 32,025 1,312 1,965 2,579 8.1
Average 19932004 10.5%
Source: Subpesca (2004). Permission from Bolbarán, D., Subpesca.
(1) It differs from the series of previous years in that it includes the re-expeditions from the Port Free Zona Franca, acquires goods in harbour
by transport means of non-residents and reparations and export of services (Subpesca, 2004).
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percent from 1.3 million to around 1.6 millions
tonnes. Although between 1995 and 2005, the
fishing export value increased by 70 percent,
its part of the total national export value did
not change radically because during the same
period the total export value increased by 250
percent, induced principally by the high copper
prices in the world market.
In the context of the national Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP) (see Table 4.3), the fish and
aquiculture sector has increased slightly in its
importance from 2.4 percent in 1994 to almost
3.2 percent in 2004 (Subpesca, 2004), and then
it fell to 2.9 percent in 2005 (Subpesca, 2005a).
As can be seen in Table 4.4, of the total
national landing figures divided by type of
resources, fish represent 86 percent of the total
in 2004 with 5.1 million tonnes, followed by
seaweed and shellfish, respectively. During this
period, seaweed, shellfish and the category
‘‘Other species’’ (see Table 4.4) have increased
constantly, while fish and crustacean figures
fluctuate. Most of fish landings are destined
to become fishmeal, which in 1998 made up
the fourth major export product of Chile
(Galleguillos and Moraga, 1999).
Industrial landing figures are constantly
higher than the artisanal figures. In 2004, of a
total of 6 million tonnes making up the national
landing figures, 71.9 percent (4.3 million tonnes)
were attributed to industrial landings and 28.1
percent (1.6 million tonnes) to artisanal land-
ings (see Table 4.5).
Artisanal fish landings encompass a wide
variety in types of resources. This can be
explained by the fact that ‘‘artisan fishers are
the sole harvesters of benthic resources and
dredging and trawling are banned in inshore
waters’’ (Moreno et al., 2007).
TABLE 4.3 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), national,









1994 599,280 24,628,535 2.43
1995 744,048 26,005,439 2.86
1996 764,083 31,237,289 2.45
1997 734,339 33,300,693 2.21
1998 699,370 34,376,598 2.03
1999 761,681 34,115,042 2.23
2000 850,736 35,646,492 2.39
2001 983,324 36,850,288 2.67
2002 1,189,672 37,655,139 3.16
2003 1,086,993 39,060,131 2.78
2004 1,318,848 41,427,296 3.18
Source: Subpesca (2004). Permission from Bolbarán, D., Subpesca.
TABLE 4.4 National (industrial and artisanal) landing figures by group of resources (tonnes), years 19902004.
Year Seaweed Fish Shellfish Crustacean Other spp* Total
1990 228,861 5,043,170 105,718 26,713 19,785 5,424,247
1991 159,586 5,829,724 122,094 28,676 26,006 6,166,086
1992 126,566 6,303,609 134,609 30,213 33,368 6,628,365
1993 155,757 5,863,550 109,836 26,200 35,503 6,190,846
1994 182,542 7,660,140 104,817 30,826 42,718 8,021,043
1995 299,221 7,411,357 90,607 30,971 58,086 7,890,242
1996 322,027 6,725,734 96,106 32,615 56,197 7,232,679
1997 281,606 5,904,582 93,269 37,327 48,751 6,365,535
1998 265,881 3,362,315 109,225 39,407 47,403 3,824,231
1999 261,481 5,117,917 110,402 38,870 58,468 5,587,138
2000 280,847 4,486,158 110,050 37,311 57,897 4,972,263
2001 299,791 4,150,966 138,368 26,109 48,199 4,663,433
2002 315,668 4,620,502 111,270 23,812 61,489 5,132,741
2003 349,008 3,970,747 145,466 19,096 44,000 4,528,317
2004** 410,850 5,176,071 355,691 20,486 50,545 6,013,643
Source: Subpesca (2004). Permission from Bolbarán, D., Subpesca.
*erizo (Loxechinus albus, White sea urchin), piure (Pyura chilensis, Chilean pyurid, red sea squiert) and pepino de mar (Athyonidium
chilensis, Chilean sea cucumber).
**Preliminary estimation: Sernapesca 2005a. Permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
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Fish is the only resource category where
industrial fishing landings surpass those of
artisanal fishing. The industrial fishing catch
was 19.2 percent (995 thousand tonnes of 5.1
million tonnes; see Table 4.4 and Table 4.5) of
the total landing in 2004. Proportionally, artisa-
nal fishing made up 95 percent of the seaweed,
67.7 percent of the shellfish and 72.4 percent of
the crustaceans of the total landings in 2004.
Artisanally fished species make up the entire
category of ‘‘Other species’’. The Sea urchin is
counted within this category constituting one of
the species of highest export value, reaching
US$62 million in 2005 (Subpesca, 2005a).
Table 4.5 shows that for artisanal fishing
fish landings is predominant at 58.82 percent,
followed by seaweed at 23.08 percent, and
shellfish at 14.2 percent. The artisanal fishing
sector has steadily increased its percentage of
the national landings, from 11 percent in 1994
to 28 percent in 2004, with an average of 16.1
percent for the period 19902004. In 2005, it
was estimated that this percentage decreased to
24.5 percent of the national landings after
several years of increase. Furthermore, it was
estimated that the major increase as a propor-
tion of the national landing figures is repre-
sented by a growth in aquaculture from 11.6
percent in 2004 to 14.5 percent in 2005.
Table 4.6 shows the distribution of artisanal
landings, by resource and regions, indicating
that the south of Chile has the largest propor-
tion of landings with 59 percent of the total,
represented by Region VIII of Bı́o-Bı́o with 41.5
percent and by Region X of Los Lagos with 17.5
percent. Region IV of Coquimbo occupies the
third place of the total of artisanal landing with
9.3 percent.
EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRIAL AND
ARTISANAL FISHING SECTORS
In spite of the big difference in landing volume
between industrial and artisanal fishing, the
number of fishers working in each of the sectors
does not vary considerably. In 2005 the com-
bined industrial and artisanal fishing sector
directly employed around 126,000 people, which
represented 2 percent of the employed labour
force nationally. While industrial fishing em-
ployed 55 percent (68,703) (see Table 4.7) of the
total occupied labour force within fishing,
artisanal fishing employed 45 percent, with
around 57,000 persons (see Table 4.8). Gender
TABLE 4.5 Artisanal landing by group of resources (tonnes) and years (19902004).
Year Seaweed Fish Shellfish Crustacean Other spp* Total % National Landing
1990 190,844 284,251 101,866 9,273 19,785 606,019 11.2
1991 101,907 275,278 112,968 9,115 26,006 525,274 8.5
1992 78,759 295,048 124,763 7,717 33,368 539,655 8.1
1993 107,109 450,798 99,475 8,494 35,305 701,181 11.3
1994 116,755 621,427 88,652 9,361 42,718 878,913 11.0
1995 250,038 418,973 74,634 9,402 58,086 811,133 10.3
1996 216,815 610,314 77,456 8,742 56,197 969,524 13.4
1997 178,839 458,103 69,171 9,083 48,751 763,947 12.0
1998 197,495 290,835 75,833 11,060 47,403 622,626 16.3
1999 230,203 668,867 66,694 13,647 58,466 1,037,877 18.6
2000 247,376 595,675 61,093 18,560 57,896 980,600 19.7
2001 234,253 636,566 76,514 19,258 48,199 1,014,790 21.8
2002 244,020 825,012 47,294 17,532 61,489 1,195,347 23.3
2003 309,065 800,150 65,387 13,262 43,998 1,231,862 27.2
2004** 390,557 995,345 240,855 14,829 50,544 1,692,130 28.1
Average 19902004 16.1
Source: Subpesca (2004). Permission from Bolbarán, D., Subpesca.
*erizo (Loxechinus albus, White sea urchin), piure (Pyura chilensis, Chilean pyurid, red sea squiert) and pepino de mar (Athyonidium
chilensis, Chilean sea cucumber).
**Preliminary estimation: Sernapesca 2005a. Permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
Chapter 4: Industrial and Artisanal Fishing Landing in Chile 73
distribution between the two sectors differed
considerably. While women represented 39 per-
cent of the employed labour in the industrial
sector, they only represented 7.5 percent of the
labour force in artisanal fishing in 2005 (see
Tables 4.7 and 4.9). Nonetheless, Subpesca lacks
statistics for women in many regions and there-
fore the figures regarding gender distribution
are approximations (i.e., 42,033 and 26,669
respectively) (Bolbarán, D., Subpesca, Pers.
Comm. via email 2007-08-23). In the Gender
Distribution column, the totals below in brack-
ets correspond to the sum of the given numbers
for the regions where some data exists. Further-
more, the column Total in the industrial fishing
employment has been highlighted in italics
because the regional total given by Subpesca
did not coincide with the regional data.
According to the Fishing Subsecretary (Sub-
pesca, 2005a), the number of people employed
in industrial fishing increased from 64,447
in 2004 to 68,703 in 2005, which amounts to an
TABLE 4.6 Artisanal landing by group of resource and regions, 2004 (tonnes).
Region Seaweed Fish Shellfish Crustacean Other spp* Total
I 68 151,859 1,816 51 1,856 155,650
II 63,699 48,893 11,046 13 4,617 128,268
III 69,564 71,294 5,088 215 940 147,101
IV 83,594 37,637 34,758 1,404 241 157,634
V 15,718 17,505 6,605 492 12 40,332
VI 2,262 925 4 7 3 3,201
VII 10 6,437 132 13 20 6,612
VIII 20,598 540,876 140,983 242 252 702,951
IX 0 553 0 0 0 553
X 129,580 111,101 36,089 5,111 14,004 295,885
XI 2,788 5,286 891 588 6,085 15,638
XII 2,696 2,979 3,443 6,693 22,514 38,325
Total 390,577 995,345 240,855 14,829 50,544 1,692,150
Source: Sernapesca (2005a). Permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
*erizo (Loxechinus albus, White sea urchin), piure (Pyura chilensis, Chilean pyurid, red sea squiert) and pepino de mar (Athyonidium
chilensis, Chilean sea cucumber).
TABLE 4.7 Industrial fishing employment 2004.
Gender Distribution
Regions Factories Boats Aquaculture Total Men Women Total
I 2,116 1.511 111 3,738 2,457 1,048 3,505
II 500 295  546 437 109 546
III 624 157 1,502 2,251 0
IV 1,811 126 2,074 3,935 0
V 916 104 589 1,619 0
VI    0
VII 18   18 0
VIII 7,891 982 5,680 14,771 9,319 5,452 14,771
IX 3  97 100 0,00
X 20,494 202 13,875 34,471 17,043 17,428 34,471
XI 2,212 179 754 3,241 0
XII 2,762 336 40 3,177 0
RM 741   741 0
Total 40,088 3,892 24, 722 68,703 42,033 26,669 68,702
[29,256] [26,669]
Source: Subpesca (2005a); Bolbarán, D., Subpesca. Permission from Bolbarán, D., Subpesca.
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additional 4,226 people or a 6.6 percent increase.
Whilst men represented 61 percent women
represented 39 percent, maintaining the same
proportion in both 2004 and 2005. Most
workers were employed in factories (60 per-
cent), then fish farms (27.7 percent), and finally
those who worked on boats (6.3 percent).
These are regarded as approximate figures.
The largest regional employment concentra-
tion was in Region X of Los Lagos, which
contained 7.1 percent of all labour, with an equal
gender distribution (49.4 percent men and 50.6
percent women). The high labour concentration
in this region was due to the presence of salmon
farming which alone employed about 5,000
people, representing 16.5 percent of the total of
the regional fishing labour force at the time.
THE ARTISANAL FISHERS
The 1991 Fishing Law distinguishes between
artisanal ship-owners, artisanal fishers and
shellfish divers/shore sea-weed collectors. A
person can belong to more than one category
only if the activity is exercised in the same
region. An artisanal fisher is ‘‘the person that
acts as a patron or crew in an artisanal boat
independent of the payment form’’ (LPA, 1991,
Art. 2:29). And ‘‘an artisanal ship-owner is that
artisanal fisher in whose name are registered up
to two artisanal boats whose tonnage together
does not exceed the 50 tonnes.’’ (LPA, 1991,
Art. 2:29). ‘‘A shellfish diver is a person who
undertakes extractive activity of mollusks, crus-
taceous, echinoderms and shellfish in general
with or without utilizing an artisanal boat’’
(LPA, 1991, Art. 2:29). The shore seaweed
collector is that ‘‘artisanal fisher that recollects
and cuts seaweed with or without the use of
an artisanal boat’’ (LPA, 1991, Art. 2:29). The
















Source: courtesy of Villagra, C., Sernapesca. Permission from Lillo,
D., Sernapesca.
TABLE 4.9 Artisanal fishers, by category, region and gender 2005.
Shore seaweed
Collector Boat owner Shellfish Divers Fisher Total
Region Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Total
I 266 57 534 20 520 1 1,500 21 2,146 77 2,223
II 598 115 533 20 729 2 1,309 10 2,483 127 2,610
III 629 121 405 9 521 2 1,352 26 2,187 140 2,327
IV 683 200 980 15 1,258 5 2,423 29 3,980 226 4,206
V 184 63 852 12 566 3 3,452 37 3,871 101 3,972
VI 371 130 59 2 115 2 239 7 689 136 825
VII 132 58 313 6 138  1,229 19 1,398 77 1,475
VIII 605 454 2,109 125 2,051 2 9,032 399 10,825 831 11,656
IX 60 41 156 1 42 1 436 34 530 77 607
X 1,111 1,010 4,461 96 5,529 26 11,402 936 16,080 1,931 18,011
XI  2 925 45 807 7 2,260 254 2,528 260 2,788
XII 16 14 819 69 872  3,444 105 3,929 122 4,051
Sub-Total 4,655 2,265 12,146 420 13,148 51 38,078 1,877 50,646 4,105
Total 6,920 12,566 13,199 39,955 54,751 54,751
Source: Sernapesca (2005a). Permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
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measurements of an artisanal boat are maximum
18 meters lopsidedness and up to 50 tonnes.
The number of artisanal fishers has in-
creased constantly since the export boom of
the Loco and other species. Sernapesca does not
have systematized data about the number of
fishers prior to 1993 (Villagra, C., Sernapesca,
Pers. Comm. via email 2007-04-25). However,
according to Arrizaga et al. (1989, p. 295) in
1975 there were 17,182 fishers, which increased
to 47,800 in 1987, an increase of 178 percent.
As can be seen in Table 4.8, from 1993 to
2005, artisanal fishers increased with 82 percent
from 31,327 to 57,013, which amounts to an
average of 4.8 percent yearly. The number of
fishers for 1987 (47,800), given by Arrizaga et al.
(1989, p. 295), is incongruent with the 31,327 for
1993 in Table 4.8, given the scale of the deficit
discrepancy. The 1993 systematized register of
Sernapesca should be cognizant that 1993 was
the year when the territorial use rights in fisheries
(TURFs) were introduced in Chile for the
management of benthic resources, enabled under
the new Fishing Law of 1991 (more about that in
Chapter Five). Furthermore, and as can be seen
from the examined period (19932005), 2001
marks a quite abrupt decrease in number with
reference to 2000. From 2002 all the categories
steadily increases again. According to Serna-
pesca, the fall registered in the 2001 figures is not
real, but rather a reflection that from the begin-
ning the registers were regional, but in 2001 the
registration was standardized nationally and it
took some time to complete the national register
(Villagra, C., Sernapesca, Pers. Comm. via email
2007-05-02). Also Tables 4.8 and 4.9 differ in the
total number of fishers, although both consider
the same year as a source.
According to Sernapesca’s statistics (2005a),
those who have increased most from 1993 to
2005 are the fishers (77.4 percent). In second
place we find shore seaweed collectors at 61.1
percent. The third group are boat owners at 33.4
percent. The group that showed the slowest
growth rate were the divers, who increased to
23.6 percent. However, from 1975 and up to
2005, the increase in the number of fishers is
significant at 231.8 percent. According to CON-
APACH (2001), the real number of fishers is
around 60,000. The official figure is an under-
estimate, given that many fishers do not for-
mally register with Sernapesca.
Table 4.9 breaks up artisanal fishers in 2005
by vocational category and has a regional
distribution and gender breakdown, although
this is incongruent with the artisanal fisher
numbers presented in Table 4.8 for the same
year. Of a total of 54,751 fishers, 72.3 percent
(39,955) were fishers, 24 percent (13,199) shell-
fish divers, 23 percent (12,566) boat owners, and
12.6 percent (6,920) shore seaweed collectors.
In contrast to the gender distribution in
industrial fishing, (see disaggregated data in
Table 4.9) women represented 7.5 percent
(4,105) of the artisanal workforce. The workforce
was primarily made up of shore seaweed collec-
tors who comprised 55.2 percent (2,265), with
fishers representing only 4.9 percent (1,877).
Among boats owners, women represented only
3.5 percent. The category where women had least
representation was diving, with 0.4 percent.
Similarly to industrial fishing labour, arti-
sanal fishers are unevenly distributed along the
coastline, with the majority located in the south
(see Table 4.9). The largest number of artisanal
fishers were in Region X of Los Lagos with 32.9
percent (18,011) next largest was Region VIII
del Bı́o-Bı́o with 19.8 percent (10,825 fishers).
Region IV of Coquimbo comprised 7.7 percent
(4,206) of the total. Of these, 5.3 percent (226)
were women with the vast majority (200) being
shore seaweed collectors. Lastly, Region V of
Valparaı́so had 7.3 percent (3,972) of the total
number of fishers. Of this number, 2.5 percent
(101) were women made up mostly of shore
seaweed collectors, 62.4 percent (63).
Table 4.10 shows the regional distribution of
registered fishers designated by gender in the
national artisanal register in 2004. This table
shows that the major representation of regis-
tered women fishers is in the southern regions.
THE BOATS
While small scale boats in 2004 numbered over
14.000 units, authorized industrial boats consti-
tuted a total of 326 boats, of which only 217 were
in operation using the TAC (Total Allowable
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Catch Limit) per ship owner (Subpesca, 2004).
This is a reduction of 33.4 percent compared to
the capacity in 2001. The main reason for this
reduction can be attributed to the 1991 Fishing
Law and the TAC per boat owner from 2001
onwards with the aim to reduce over-fishing
(Subpesca, 2004).
Table 4.11 shows the distribution of the
number of artisanal fishing boats by regions,
type of boat and disaggregated by gender.1 The
majority of artisanal boats, 63.4 percent
(13,776), belong to the type ‘‘motor boat’’.
The 2005 statistics, which include disaggregated
data by gender, shows that participation of
women in the general boat ownership category
of artisanal fishers was 3.3 percent (455).2
Fig. 4.1 overleaf shows the geographical dis-
tribution of boats according to regions.
THE FISHING COVES
The term caleta or cove (small bay) is used in
Chile to designate the places where artisanal
fishing activities take place and where fishers
berth their boats. Although harbour, bay and
cove are synonymous, I reserve the Chilean
usage of the term cove to refer to the places
artisanal fishers use for their operations. The
caletas are also referred to as hamlets.
Many coves are rural. The living conditions
in the rural coves are usually humble since many
fishers reside elsewhere. Thus, fishers often live in
simple huts, without electricity, running water,
and with minimal utensils and implements.
Alcohol consumption among some fishers in
their free time is high, perhaps due to the absence
of family, the lack of recreational options and
their general isolation. Women and children
usually join their fisher relatives during the
summer months when the children are on vaca-
tion. Historically, the fishing produce was picked
and transported directly from the coves. Trans-
porters acted as intermediaries between the fish-
ers and companies. The introduction of MAs
have in many instances changed the conditions
described above. The fishing organizations now
sell directly to the firms. Since fishers have been
organized through MAs, there is not only major
internal control and rules, but also the bonds
among union members have become tighter
(more about this in the empirical chapters).
This stricter working environment may have
also reduced alcohol consumption.
Furthermore, the availability of cellular
phones has radically reduced the fishers’ isola-
tion, improving communication with families
and the world beyond. According to my own
observations in El Quisco it is not unusual for a
family to have three cellular phones.
The official list of permanent coves was
established in 1998,3 and modified in 2004.4 The
TABLE 4.10 Fishers - enrolement in the Artisanal
Register 2004.
Region Women % of women Men Total
I 74 3.37 2,124 2,198
II 124 4.73 2,495 2,619
III 129 5.63 2,162 2,291
IV 224 5.32 3,989 4,213
V 92 2.32 3,875 3,967
VI 136 16.41 693 829
VII 77 5.24 1,393 1,470
VIII 564 5.07 10,569 11,133
IX 73 12.50 511 584
X 1,860 10.46 15,930 17,790
XI 249 8.81 2,577 2,826
XII 112 2.83 3,843 3,955
Total 3,714 6.89 50,161 53,875
Source: Subpesca (2004). Permission from Bolbarán, D., Subpesca.
1 The Supreme Decree nr 388, 1995, (Sernapesca 2005a:7)
defines Boat as a vessel without complete cover, with or
without motor of propulsion. Little launch: vessel with
complete cover and propulsion motor with a total length
up to 12 meters. Middle launch: vessel with complete
cover and propulsion motor with a total length of more
than 12 meters and up to 15 meters. Big launch: vessel
with complete cover and propulsion motor, with a length
of more than 15 meters and up to 18 meters.
2 Of the total number of boats, most are in Region X of Los
Lagos with 45 percent (4,823), Region VIII del Bı́o-Bı́o
with 18.3 percent (2,521), and Region IV of Coquimbo
with 7.9 percent (1,088). In this Region, 1.5 percent (16)
of the boats have women as owners. Region V of
Valparaı́so has 6.7 percent (917) of the total of artisanal
boats with 1.2 percent (11) having women as owners.
3 Supreme decree (Marina) nr. 240, in Sernapesca
(2005a:56).
4 Supreme decree (Marina) nr. 337, in Sernapesca
(2005a:56).
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sectors of temporary use for anchoring or of
sporadic fishing activities were now called
anchoress. Table 4.12 shows that along the
Chilean coasts there is a total of 559 coves, of
which 81 percent are permanent and 19 percent
are designated for temporary use. Of the total of
453 permanent coves, 76 percent are located in
rural environs and 24 percent are considered
urban. Of the non-permanent coves 98 percent
(103) are in rural settings and 2 percent (2) are
located in urban areas. Of the total of 558 coves,
the majority at 80 percent are rural coves.
THE ARTISANAL FISHING
ORGANIZATIONS
After the instauration of the dictatorship in
Chile in 1973, most cooperatives and labour
organizations were dissolved. Fishing organiza-
tions had been organized nationally since 1965
through FENAPACH (Federación Nacional de
Pescadores Artesanales de Chile) (CONA-
PACH, 2001). FENAPACH held nine national
congresses before it ceased to operate nationally
after the 1973 coup d’état. After this, until 1985,
activities were minor and localized. However,
TABLE 4.11 Artisanal fishing boats May 2005.
Paddle/mailing Boat Motor Boat Little launch Middle launch Big launch
Region Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women
I 71 4 396 19 42 0 42 0 33 2
II 66 4 469 16 46 0 19 1 6 0
III 29 0 349 7 21 0 29 1 14 3
IV 115 2 898 13 12 0 26 0 21 1
V 38 0 802 8 28 0 38 1 31 2
VI 21 1 48 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
VII 29 1 292 6 0 0 8 0 18 0
VIII 516 31 1,311 47 159 10 104 3 294 46
IX 74 1 50 0 38 0 9 0 0 0
X 121 6 2,540 51 1,757 25 223 9 81 10
XI 48 5 902 38 66 2 23 2 7 0
XII 38 3 459 17 336 38 84 14 24 4
Sub total 1,166 58 8,16 223 2,505 75 605 31 529 68
Total 1,224 8,739 2,580 636 597
Great Total 13,776
Source: Sernapesca (2005a). Permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
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FIGURE 4.1 Artisanal boats 2005.
Source: Sernapesca (2005a). Permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
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in 1985, still under Pinochet rule, new efforts to
reorganize nationally were started. In 1985 a
national commission for the support of
the artisanal fishers gathered fishing profes-
sionals and scientists, which in 1986 led to the
10th national congress where the National
Council of Artisanal Fishers was born. In
1990, in the post Pinochet era of democratic
reform, the council became CONAPACH. In
2006, this federation affiliated 346 fishing
organizations (Olivares, CONAPACH, Pers.
Comm. via email 2006-11-03), or 50 percent of
the total of artisanal fishing organizations that
existed in 2005. The rest of the organizations
are affiliated under CONFEPACH, which is the
other national confederation of artisanal fishers
(Table 4.13).
The relationship between the two national
confederations has been tense lately because
CONAPACH was allocated all five artisanal
fishers representative places on the National
Fishing Council (CONAPACH, 2007b).
As seen with CONAPACH (2007a), not all
the fishers are registered with Sernapesca.
Furthermore, of those registered, not all are
organized in a collective. Considering the num-
ber of registered fishers in 2005 in Table 4.8 and
CONAPACHs data regarding the number of
artisanal fishers, estimated to around 60,000,
the number of unregistered fishers at the time
would be around 3,000. Furthermore, the num-
ber of organized fishers in 2005 was 42,091
(see Table 4.14), which amounts to 77 percent
of the total of 54.751 registered fishers in the
2005 Sernapesca Artisanal Fishers Register
(see Table 4.9). This means, then, that around
23 percent of the registered fishers did not
belong to any organization (more about this in
Chapter Five). This figure will be larger if we
consider data from Table 4.8 or CONAPACH’s
calculations regarding that the total number of
artisanal fishers are ca 60,000.
As can be seen in Table 4.14 there were 687
artisanal fishing organizations in 2005 of which
35 were regional federations containing regio-
nal fishing organizations. Therefore the total
number of individual fishing organizations was
652. Of these, 77.4 percent were unions, 18.3
percent were guild associations and 4.4 percent
were cooperatives. The majority of the fishing
organizations in the country correspond to
unions in all of the regions, with the exception
of Region IV of Coquimbo, where guild asso-
ciations predominate.5
TABLE 4.12 Artisanal fishing coves 2005.
Permanent coves Anchoress
Regions Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total No of coves
I 12 9 3 3 3 0 15
II 18 12 6 8 8 0 26
III 22 19 3 17 17 0 39
IV 31 22 9 3 3 0 34
V 33 8 25 2 2 0 35
VI 5 1 4 1 1 0 6
VII 13 8 5 4 3 1 17
VIII 75 54 21 7 6 1 82
IX 9 6 3 3 3 0 12
X 206 182 24 14 14 0 220
XI 19 15 4 37 37 0 56
XII 11 7 4 6 6 0 17
Total 454 343 111 105 103 2 559
Source: Sernapesca (2005a). Permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
5 The biggest number of organizations is in Region X of Los
Lagos, with 301 organizations followed by Region VIII del
Bı́o-Bı́o, with 78 organizations. Region IV has the third
largest number of the total of organizations (8.2 percent or
54 of 652). It also has the second largest number of
organized fishers (7,498), representing 17.8 percent of all
the organized fishers in the country (42,091).
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TABLE 4.14 Types of organizations of artisanal fishers 2005.







I 22 2 2 1 27 2,748
II 28 1 0 2 31 1,691
III 19 3 0 2 24 1,615
IV 18 29 4 3 54 7,498
V 37 7 3 2 49 4,275
VI 16 0 0 2 18 794
VII 21 3 0 1 25 995
VIII 53 19 4 2 78 6,913
IX 7 2 0 1 10 924
X 240 38 12 11 301 11,405
XI 32 13 0 7 52 1,932
XII 12 2 3 1 18 1,301
Total 505 119 28 35 687 42,091
Source: Sernapesca (2005a). Permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
TABLE 4.13 Fisher organizations*
Level Organization** Functions/missions
National CONAPACH (1986) (Confederación Nacional de
Pescadores Artesanales de Chile; Chilean National
Confederation of Artisanal Fishers)
To defend the rights of its members and improve the
life quality of the fishing communities in Chile. It
represents coastal communities both during the
process of legislative discussions or in front of the
institutions that regulate the sector’s activities. It also
supports the strengthening of artisanal fishing and
performs a constant professional, intellectual and
cultural improvement CONAPACH affiliates 346
fishing organizations.
CONFEPACH (Confederación Nacional de
Federaciones de Pescadores Artesanales, National
Confederation of Artisanal Fishing Federations)
No information obtained.
Regional 35 Regional Federations To represent and coordinate the communal and
regional interests of its member organizations. For ex.
FEPEMACH (Federación de Pescadores Artesanales y
Buzos Mariscadores de la Provincia del Choapa,
Region IV). In spite of its geographical name (Choapa
province), it considers coves from the whole region.
It embraces 21 fishers and divers organizations and




505 unions, 28 cooperatives, 119 guilt associations To represent the interest of its members.
*Built with various contacts: Cerda, G., Sernapesca; Lira, S., Subsecretaria de Marina; Elissetche, J., Sernapesca; Bolbarán, D., Subpesca.
**It does not include the organization of the industrial sector, such as Sonapesca (Sociedad Nacional de Pesca), Asipes (Asociación de
Industriales Pesqueros del Bio-Bio), SalmonChile (Asociación de la Industria del Salmón).
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Unions, guild associations and cooperatives
are the different ways to organize as a non-
profit collective and all of them have their own
legal regulation. In order to establish a MA,
fishers are required to be organized as a
collective and the fisher organizations can opt
for any of the aforementioned legal forms in
order to represent the interest of their members.
For example, according to the Decree Law
2.757, Art. 1 of 1979 (Ministerio de Economı́a,
Chile), guild associations are
those organizations legally constituted in accordance to
this law, that gather natural or juridical persons or
both, with the aim to promote a rationalization,
development and protection of the activities that are
common to them, in accordance to their profession,
occupation or production branch or service and of
those connected to the said common activities.
Guild association rules demand at least 25
members. Unions are defined according to the
Labour Code, (art. 216, c). ‘‘Independent work-
ers union is the one that gather workers that are
not depending on any employer’’.
To organize under any of these collective
forms is cheap or without cost and the process is
done at the Labour Inspection of the Labour
Direction (Ministery of Labour and Social
Prevision). If fishers, instead, choose to organize
as a firm of limited liability (Ltda.), as profit
organization, it is more costly, since legal advice
and support is required. However, to be a non-
profit organization is problematic for fishing
organizations. Non-profit organizations can
develop activities that generate profit with the
restrictive condition that the profits of these
activities be invested back into the formally and
legally articulated objectives and statutes of the
organization. Simply put, this means that non-
profit organizations cannot divide any profit
earned among the members. The solution to this
problem is to divide the profit as benefits to
the members through committees within the
organizations which, for example, form mutual
funds to pay hospitalizations, help widows,
distribute food baskets, purchase Christmas
presents, and celebrate special days.
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5 Loco Fishery and the
Management Areas
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents a history of Concholepas
fishery and the implementation in the 1990s of
TURF as a response to resource depletion. This
is done in chronological order and accompanied
by several tables that give a yearly tally of Loco
landings in relation to exploitation regimes.
Also the prelude to the advent of TURF is
described, then the transition to its incorpora-
tion into the 1991 Fishing Law (LPA), and
finally its formal evolution into co-management
in practice. Then the legal framework that
enables the establishment of MAs is discussed.
The chapter finishes with an overview of the
expansion of MAs in Chile and a presentation
of export statistics and prices from 1987 on-
wards, disaggregated into different exploitation
regimes.
First, some key biological aspects of the
Loco fishery are introduced, followed by a
description of the people involved in artisanal
fishing, which is the activity that has the most
severe impact on Loco populations (perhaps
except for the more indirect anthropogenic
effects influencing El Niño/La Niña cycles and
related global climate change).
BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE LOCO
Although Locos are also called False abalone,
the shellfish Concholepas concholepas belongs to
the Muricidae family and their biology is
different from the Halotidae abalone (Dauphin
et al., 2003). Both abalones and Locos are
mollusca (phylum) and gastropeda (class). How-
ever, while Locos are carnivorous and not
cultivated commercially in captivity (Geaghan
and Castilla, 1988), abalones are herbivorous
and possible to cultivate.1
The maturation of Locos is slow and, thus
far, it has not reproduced in captivity. There
seems to be a lack of enough knowledge of the
larvae (Castilla, 1988). Locos change from
herbivorous to carnivorous through their life
cycle and this poses a problem for breeding
(Paillaman, A., Sernapesca, Pers. Comm. via
email 2007-03-29). IFOP is conducting experi-
mental research in this area and progress have
been made, but many problems remain, such as
the substitution of Locos’ natural diet for an
artificial one (FONDEF, 2007).
Locos are restricted to the influences of the
Humboldt and Sub-Antarctic sea currents (In-
stituto del Mar del Perú, 2004; Moreno et al.,
2007). Loco is described in the following way:
Medium sized, oval in profile, flattened, spire very
short, aperture enormous and open. Sculpture of axial
lamellae and spiral cords. Columella excavated. Outer
lip dentate with a blunt tooth. Operculum elongate with
lateral nucleus, much too small to close aperture.
Concholepas represents an extreme in the trend to limpet-
like features seen in other muricid genera, such as Purpura.
Only a single species is known (Bioscience, 2007).
The bathymetric (underwater depth) range
inhabited by Locos extends from the inter-tidal
zone to depths of 3040 meters (Dubois et al.,
1980). The inter-tidal zone or littoral zone is the
area between tide marks which are uncovered at
low tide and submerged at high tide. The sub-
tidal area is seaward of the intertidal zone.
The spawning or massive reproduction of
Locos in Chile varies according to latitude. In
central Chile the spawning (called maicillos or
flor de Loco) period occurs in the sub-tidal areas
1 Abalones are cultured in Japan, China, Taiwan, USA, Mexico, South Africa, Australia and Chile, among others. In 1998,
Asia (principally China and Taiwan), cultivated 75 percent of the world production of cultured abalone. In 2001 Chile
produced 73,000 tonnes of cultivated Red Abalon (Haliotius rufescens) (Subpesca, 2005c). There are more than 130
species of abalone, all belonging to the genus Haliotis and around 25 species are commercially exploited (Ponce et al.,
2003).
82
during summer and the beginning of autumn
(January  May in the Southern Hemisphere)
(Oliva and Castilla, 1990, p. 280). This step is
followed by capsule deposition and development
(from February to July). The capsules are at-
tached to the rocky substrate in the inter-tidal and
sub-tidal areas (Geaghan and Castilla, 1988,
p. 5961). After their metamorphosis, the larvae
stay in plankton for between two and four months
before settling in the rocky inter-tidal zone
between August and November. The settlement
of juveniles in the inter-tidal zone makes them
vulnerable to human and non-human predators.2
As they mature Locos move from the inter-tidal
to sub-tidal areas after a year (Castilla, 1988,
p. 62). After more than three years (Tobella,
1975, p. 188) Locos in the sub-tidal area can
measure up to 16 cm (Castilla, 1983, p. 40).
Humans are part of the Loco eco-system as
predators (Moreno et al., 1987). The effects of
human impacts are not limited to artisanal fish-
ing in the sub-tidal area. Free divers (resuello), as
well as shore shellfish gatherers (mariscadores de
orillas) collect juveniles in the inter-tidal zone
(Oliva and Castilla, 1990, p. 273). More generally,
recreational activities in the rocky inter-tidal area
have a negative impact on the fauna and flora,
especially during the summer months. As Ad-
dessi (1994) points out (for California), diverse
human activities such as tide pooling, food
collection, research, educational field trips, sea-
side strolling, photography and fishing affect
biota, involving for example, tramping, turning
over of the rocks and intensive collection of
certain species, reduce populations and disturb
benthic communities.
In Chile, humans are the principal predators
of Locos (Castilla and Durán, 1985). The
presence of Locos is critical in coastal benthic
eco-system, constituting it a keystone species
(Castilla, 1995, p. 158). As human harvest stops,
the population increases considerably, which
can led to the decrease of a competitive mussel
(Perumytilus purpuratus).
Locos readily consume the competitive dominant
mussel in the mid-intertidal zone and in doing so they
change the entire ecological scene by permitting the use
of primary space by other species of sessile invertebrates
and algae (Castilla and Durán, 1985, p. 398).
Or in other words, ‘‘the removal of the
herbivores diminished the grazing pressure on
intertidal algae which flourished in their ab-
sence’’ (Addessi, 1994, p. 787).
Moreno et al. (1987, p. 55) reported the
same from the Mehuı́n Research Reserve where
the increase in Loco size also diminished the
quantity of the mussel. So where mussels are
abundant it is because humankind is extracting
their natural predators. It has been estimated
that human harvest reduces Loco density in the
inter-tidal area from 4.3 to 1.5 per square meter
(Geaghan and Castilla, 1988, p. 62).
Not only are species inter-related but eco-
logical zones also interact and overlap. Moreno
et al. (1987) are critical towards the concept of
MAs in that they consider it to be too narrowly
focussed and describe it as a mono-species
fishing administrative measure for benthic re-
sources. The present legislation seems to over-
look the ecological interdependence of species,
as well as the interactions between the inter-
tidal and sub-tidal rocky communities. Loco
production in MAs is also largely affected by
oceanographic processes on a scale that is not
controllable in the limited sized MAs (Stotz,
1997, p. 67).
A sustainable harvest of Locos should prob-
ably be in accordance with the spatial and
temporal variability of abundance and reproduc-
tion of Locos, their prey and their predators.
Moreover, in order to reach an increment and/or
conservation of production, exploitation should
be restricted only to MAs (Stotz, 1997, p. 67),
which is the situation today, but illegal extrac-
tion outside and inside the MAs seems to
continue. I shall return to this issue.
2 Among the other Loco predators we find: birds such as,
gaviota or Larus dominicanus Lichtenstein, the pilpilen or
Haematopus ater Vieillot and Oudart; fish such as,
Sicyases sanguineus Müller and Troschel (pejesapo) and
Pimclotopon maculates (pejeperro); asteroids such as, the
sea star Heliaster helianthus (Lamarck) (Castilla, 1983, p.
40); crustaceans such as, Homalasis plana (jaiva mora),
cancer coronatus (jaiba reina), Rhynchocineters typus
Milde Edwards (camarón), and mammals such as,
chungungo or chinchimén (Lontra felina), and Otaria
flavences (Castilla and Cancino, 1979), seals or lobo
marino (IFOP, 2000).
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MODUS OPERANDI OF THE LOCO
HARVEST
Traditionally the Loco harvest, at least in
Central and Northern Chile, was performed
from open wooden boats of 520 meters length
(eslora), with an exterior motor (1550 HP).
The fishing lasted one day, depending on
weather conditions, in the sub-tidal areas sel-
dom exceeding the 5-mile offshore limit (Payne
and Castilla, 1994, p. 10). There were three crew
members: the patron or boatman, an auxiliary
and the diver. The auxiliary, called a ‘‘telegra-
pher’’, takes care of the air compressor, the life
rope and the hoses. The air compressor has one
air exit for the diver. He lifts and sinks the bag,
helped by the patron. The diver harvests Locos
using a rubber suit. Diving is between 2 to 6
hours each trip, and although the result varies,
between 200 and 400 Locos are taken in one day
(Castilla, 1983). The diver pulls out Locos one
by one with a kind of short pike (chope), and
gathers between 40 and 100 Locos in his waist
bag. When the bag is full, he gives a signal to the
‘‘telegrapher’’ by drawing the rope. The ‘‘tele-
grapher’’ lifts the bag and sends a replacement
to the diver (Castilla, 1983).
The only artisan fishing activity that re-
quires some type of formalized training is
diving. Formally, every diver must pass a course
containing theoretical and practical compo-
nents. The course is run by the Maritime
Government and includes learning the essential
techniques of decompression (Vildósola and
Rosson, 1997).
HISTORY OF THE LOCO FISHERY
In evolutionary history, Concholepas conchole-
pas existed in Australia, New Zealand, North
America and Europe in the Miocene epoch, but
only in South America after the Pliocene and
the Pleistocene epochs (Stuardo, 1979).
The harvesting of Locos for food among
coastal inhabitants in Northern Chile and
South of Peru can be traced back 6,000 years.
Colonial chronicles describe Loco as the name
given to the species by Mapuche folk. The
Chilean colonial scientist Molina gives the
mollusc its first scientific name, Murex Loco in
1782. Later the name Concholepas was assigned
by Brugiere (1789) (Reyes, 1986). In 1801
Lamarck added the name Concholepas to
Bruguiere’s Concholepas, which combined
became the Loco’s scientific name, Concholepas
concholepas.
The modern known history of the Loco
fishery is short, not more than six decades.
The earliest record that Sernapesca has of Locos
landings is from the 1950s (Donoso, E. Serna-
pesca, Pers. Comm. via email 2007-04-19).
These data were inherited from SAG, the pre-
cursor of Sernapesca (prior to 1978). Informa-
tion on landings prior to the 1960s in the
literature is rare. However, we know that in
1926, 67 tonnes of Locos were landed (Reyes,
1986). Furthermore, during the 1940s Loco
landings were between 1,000 and 2,000 tonnes
per year (Reyes, 1986).
The scientific literature on Locos does not
begin before the late 1970s (Castilla, 1988). In
1977, 40 specialists held a symposium about
Loco biology (Reyes, 1986). Export records are
in the hands of the National Toll Service, but it
is IFOP that keeps statistics. IFOP (created in
1964) started with export data for Loco in 1987
(Ortego M., I., IFOP, Pers. Comm. via email,
2006-09-13).
Fig. 5.1, shows the dramatic landing in-
crease and decrease associated with the export
of the species since mid 1970s. The Chilean
situation is parallel to that of Peru (see Fig. 5.2)
where the Concholepas concholepas (locally
called Chanque or Tolina) also is one of the
major molluscs of economic importance. In
Peru, the high demand from international
markets during the 1980s increased harvests
considerably, leading to a dramatic landing
decrease to a mere 128 tonnes in 2004, from
8,000 tonnes in 1990. The Peruvian Govern-
ment reacted by declaring the species under the
regime of recuperation in the south of the
country where the species is exploited (Instituto
del Mar del Perú, 2007). The minimum size for
extraction in Peru is 8 cm. Peruvian fluctuations
and Asian market demands bear a striking
parallel to the Chilean case.
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Peruvian export reached 76 percent of the
Chilean export volume in 2005, and 54 percent
in 2006 (Montoya, 2007). According to Mon-
toya (2007) the Peruvian exports may include
landings from Chile, meaning that there is
possibly illegal trafficking. The species are
comparably scarce in Peru and live only in the
south (Montoya, M., Sernapesca, Pers. Comm.
via email 2007-04-02).
Castilla (1995) distinguishes four periods up
to 1990 in the history of Loco fisheries. Castilla et
al. (2007) up to year 2000 divide the same history
in two big phases and several periods. I refer
below to Castilla’s first and second periodization.
FROM DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND
CONSUMPTION TO PRODUCTION FOR
EXPORT
FIRST PERIOD (19601974): PRODUCTION FOR
THE DOMESTIC MARKET
Before the Loco export boom in the 1970s, the
species was exploited for the national market
FIGURE 5.2 Loco landing in Peru 19532004 in relation to the El Niño and La Niña sea currents
Source: Instituto del Mar del Perú (2007).
FIGURE 5.1 Loco landing in Chile 19502005 (tonnes)
Source: Courtesy and permission of Donoso, E., Sernapesca Biólogo Marino, Depto. SIEP.
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(19601974; see Table 5.1) (Castilla, 1995).
Extraction was performed under open access
regime, without any regulatory control. During
this period Loco landings per year were about
4,000 tonnes. Consumption was mainly during
summer and the prices were low and afford-
able. Up to the beginning of the 1970s, Locos
and other benthic species, were relatively easily
gathered by summer visitors during low tides
(based on personal memories). The number of
registered fishers in 1975 was 17,000 (Castilla
et al., 2007) jumping to 57,000 fishers in 2005.
Of the 2005 total, over 13,000 fishers were
registered as divers (Sernapesca, 2005a; see
Table 4.9).
SECOND PERIOD (19751980): PRODUCTION
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET
A dramatic change occurred during this period
(see Table 5.1) as a result of the implementation
of the neo-liberal economic policy that enabled
export, mainly to Asian markets. At this time,
fishing still occurred under open access. Credits
programs were launched which encouraged
investment in new boats and processing plants,
stimulating the capacity to satisfy the growing
demand (Meltzoff et al., 2002; Castilla et al.,
2007; Moreno et al., 2007). A favourable
exchange rate, introduced in 1974/75, changed
the national currency from escudos to pesos and
had the effect of stimulating export. Loco land-
ings increased dramatically from around 10,000
tonnes to 25,000 in five years. It was during this
period that the historical maximum catch was
reached. Even mining workers went into fishing
attracted by the high prices of Locos.
In 1976 export to Japan was 48 tonnes for a
total value of US$62,000. In 1977 export
increased to 2,368 tonnes for a total value of
US$6 million (Reyes, 1986). During the early
1980s, the Region IV Director of Sernapesca,
visiting Japan, learnt that Chilean Locos were
processed there and then re-exported to Taiwan
and Hong Kong for a price per unit of almost
100 times higher than that received in Chile.
However, to add value for these markets can
become complicated. Abalone, for example, is
processed in a special, secret and ceremonial
form (Gordon and Cook, 2000, p. 568).
From 25,000 tonnes in 1980, landing figures
fell in 1981 to 17,400 tonnes. This fall led
authorities to think that Locos export was under
threat, although overexploitation was never
verified (Castilla, 1995). I will return to this issue
later. Due to this probable overexploitation,
restrictions were introduced. Although it is not
clear whether the Chilean fisheries administra-
tion were following international trends in fish-
ing management, the measures adopted mirrored
an adaptive management, part of the eco-system
approach.
THIRD PERIOD (19811992): FROM LIMITING
REPRODUCTIVE SEASON TO TOTAL CLOSURE
During this period (see Table 5.2), three differ-
ent regulations were sequentially introduced. All
of these were aimed at controlling access, but
they had little effect. These measures were: (1)
Reproductive seasons or seasonal closing (1981
1984); (2) Global quota (19851989); and (3)
Total closure (19901992).
TABLE 5.1 Loco landing years 19701980 (tonnes).
Open Access
Socialist government Military Junta
Extraction for domestic market Extraction for domestic/external market
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
3,758 4,962 6,712 5,367 6,076 9,590 10,012 14,161 12,252 16,571 24,856
Sernapesca, Desembarque Loco 19751992, courtesy A. Carrère L., Encargado Reg. Artesanal Dirección Nacional, Sernapesca.
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REPRODUCTIVE SEASONS (19811984)
The first extraction closing measure was in
place between 1981 and 1984 in the northern
part of country and involved several seasonal
closings during several months. The first action
was to allow the recuperation of the species
affected during 1982 and 1983 by an El Niño
event, rather than by overexploitation (Reyes,
1986). According to Reyes (1986), however,
after 1985 global quota restriction measures
were adopted in direct response to concerns
over unsustainable fishing practices.
As landings diminished, perhaps partly
because of it, the external value of Locos
continued to increase. A record sale was reached
in 1982 when 5,950 net tonnes3 of Locos were
exported at a value of US$26 million (Reyes,
1986). Between 1982 and 1984, average total
landings per year were 16,00018,000 tonnes
with an export value of US$1825 million
(Castilla, 1995, p. 156). A new drastic landings
decrease from 11,000 tonnes in 1985, to 6,000 in
1986 induced authorities to change from a
seasonal ban to a global quota as a regulatory
measure (Geaghan and Castilla, 1988, p. 58).
GLOBAL QUOTA (19851989)
From September 1985, the government intro-
duced a global (meaning for the whole country)
quota consisting of 4,000 tonnes per year,
initially to 1987 and then it was subsequently
prolonged to 1989. The Loco fishery was closed
nationally with the exception of the southern
Regions X, XI and XII because there it was
believed to be under-exploited (Geaghan and
Castilla, 1988, p. 58). The global quota for the
southern Regions of Chiloé (Region X) and
Aisén (Region XI) was 4,000 tonnes per year,
but the quota was exceeded in 1985 and 1986. In
1986 the quota for five months of fishing was
finished in less than 30 days. In 1987 closure was
lifted and harvest was officially allowed during
45 days, and during this time 21,000 tonnes of
Loco were extracted. Also during this year, one
million units of illegally caught Locos were
confiscated by authorities (Reyes, 1990; Meltz-
off et al., 2002).4
These events were covered by the mass
media as the Loco ‘‘fever’’ or Loco ‘‘war’’
(Meltzoff et al., 2002). Thousands of divers
arrived in the south and with them, the money,
alcohol and prostitution also flourished (Diario
Llanquihue, 2002). That year artisanal fishers
reached 47,800 (Arrizaga et al., 1989), com-
pared with 17,000 in 1975. Export value reached
US$42 million in 1987, which was a new record
high. As detailed in Table 5.5, the US$42
million is the actual export value, equating
a net export quantity of around 4,000 tonnes,
TABLE 5.2 Loco landings years 19811992 (tonnes).
Controlled Access through diverse regulatory measures
Military Junta
Democratic centre * left
coalition gov.
Reproductive seasons
(seasonal ban/closing) Global quota (4,000 M.T. per) Total closure
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
17,471 20,097 15,990 18,359 11,103 6,369 21,236 11,180 0 227 218 5
Source: based on Sernapesca (Desembarque Loco 19751992, courtesy. Carrère, A, Sernapesca.
3 One tonne of Locos in shell gives ca a third in net tonnes.
4 It is uncertain what state the one million Locos units were
in and therefore one should be cautious converting it to a
weight metric. Loco catch are variously measured in
different states (in shell, frozen without shell, canned
without shell). We know that around four Locos in shell
make one kilo of Locos and one tonne of Locos in shell is
equivalent to around a third in net tonnes. If we suppose
that half a million of the confiscated Locos were in shell
and half without, then the first half would mean around
125 tonnes Locos, and the second around 41.6 net tonnes.
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and not 21,000 tonnes which was the quantity
harvested that year.
In 1988, the take quota was 5,000 tonnes
and for only 15 days, but in less than a week
11,000 tonnes were extracted (Geaghan and
Castilla, 1988).5 The official opening was de-
layed one and half months and the fishers were
not given advanced notice of this delay and in
anticipation of the season opening fishers had
already illegally stored Locos on mesh bags. As
a consequence of the delay much of the catch
was spoiled. This method of underwater storage
is called apozamiento, and the law defines it as
‘‘the accumulation of hydrological benthic
resources in their own life environment, be it
that they are confined or free, those who have
been removed and moved from their natural
habitat.’’ (LPA, 1991, Titulo I: Art. 2, p. 6).
Article 49 ‘‘forbids the apozamiento ( . . .) along
the whole coast of the country, in periods that
corresponds to their ban.’’
During this ‘‘Loco war’’ period, the species
was smuggled for export, even canned as
strawberries (Meltzoff et al., 2002). Table 5.5
shows that the 1988 export was around 4,000
net tonnes, about the same as the year before,
but at a lower price (US$34 million). This net
export amount seems to be more congruent
with the gross landing for that year (11,000
tonnes) if we also take away the national
consumption which, at least before the export
period, was around 4,000 tonnes. National
consumption reduced from almost 12,000
tonnes in shell in 1980, to 2,000 tonnes in
1988 (Reyes, 1990).
The aim of the global quota policy was to
control the exploitation of Locos. Clearly, it did
not work (Castilla, 1995). Fishers responded by
poaching, harvesting in advance of the ban and
hiding the illicitly caught Locos in underwater
storages (Geaghan and Castilla, 1988). The
official quotas were filled too quickly and,
more often than not, were exceeded. The re-
sponse to this unacceptable situation was total
closure.
TOTAL CLOSURE (19901992)
The third implemented control measure
(Castillas et al.’s (2007) fourth period) was total
closure. According to Castilla et al. (2007,
p. 29), the total closure started in 1989 (see Table
5.2), but according to Meltzoff et al. (2002) total
closure was declared in 1988. While Sernapesca
registers zero landings for 1989 (see Table 5.2),
Table 5.5 shows that 1,206 tonnes were exported.
This apparent anomaly can be explained by
harvests being saved until the following year.
The attraction of high prices abroad and
the possibility of illegal fishing asserted pressure
on the closure and it ultimately failed. It
is estimated that 5,0007,000 tonnes were illeg-
ally taken during 19901992 (Castilla, 1995).
Table 5.5 shows that the exported quantities
during these three years of closure were con-
gruent with Sernapesca’s registered landings.
State tax losses were great. Because of the
ban (with only illegal fishing), no stock evalua-
tion was undertaken (Meltzoff et al., 2002;
Castilla et al., 2007). According to Stotz
(1997), in Region IV for the ban period 1989
1992, estimations from fishers suggest that
between 279 and 1,379 tonnes were illegally
extracted as a way to compensate for the losses
of income that the ban caused on those
dependant on the resource.
As detailed in Table 5.2, in spite of the three
year ban there were still some landings: 227
tonnes in 1990, 218 tonnes in 1991 and 5 tonnes
in 1992. According to Table 5.5, 16.1 tonnes
were exported in 1992, although there were only
5 tonnes landed. The majority of the landings
for the period 19901992 were due to illegal
harvest. It has been estimated that around 90
percent of the capture during this time was
illegal (Carrere, A., Sernapesca, Pers. Comm.
via email 2006-09-12).
PRELUDE TO THE TERRITORIAL USE
RIGHTS FOR FISHERIES (TURFS)
Castilla et al. (2007) sums up the Locos fishery
policy, emphasizing the regulations since the
late 1980s, which is the period setting the
context for the establishment of Management
5 Also according to Geaghan and Castilla (1988), the quota
was of 5,000 tonnes, but according to Sernapesca, the
quota was of 4,000 tonnes (see Table 5.2).
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Areas (MAs) (see Table 5.3). They distinguish
two main time periods: a pre-policy period
(effectively an open access regime, although formal
regulations existed) and a policy period (TURF or
MEABR), with the total ban (closed) period in
between. Within each of the two main periods
they distinguish three phases (see Table 5.3
below), which roughly coincides with the four
phases described above.
The early phase in the policy period began in
1988 with informal MAs regulated by fishers
themselves, including an experimental no-take
zone. These applications were initiated in central
Chile by marine ecologists such as Dr. Castilla
and his colleagues together with fisher organiza-
tions under the name ‘‘Natural Shellfish Re-
stockning or Repopulation via Rotational
Exploited Areas’’ (Castilla et al., 2007, p. 29).
According to Oliva and Castilla (1990,
p. 283), ‘‘natural repopulation consists in allow-
ing the growth and development of the popula-
tion in a given system naturally’’. It is called
repopulation by management when the popula-
tion is managed for its recuperation. The rota-
tion of areas is another form of repopulation by
management. Repopulation means for the fisher
that he evolves from being a collector into a
cultivator (Oliva and Castilla, 1990, p. 273).
These informal MAs were based on univer-
sity protection experiments. The first of the
experimental no-take zones was established in
the university area of Las Cruces, between 1982
and 1988. The approach of restrictions and
rotation of extraction areas for relatively small
fisheries showed positive results. The results
from Mehuı́n, another scientific station in
southern Chile, showed similar results. After
six years of protection Locos showed a popula-
tion distribution with the maximum range of
sizes (Moreno et al., 1987, p. 52).
Two coves near Las Cruces will follow this
example. As the official rules for the second
regime MEABR were not ready until 1995, the
first area established in Quintay (Region V) in
1988 functioned in accordance with the Benthic
Extraction Regime; another regulatory measure
being trialled for inclusion in the 1991 LPA (see
Table 5.4). Also other fisher organizations in
Region V like El Quisco in 1991, and in Region
IV, like Puerto Oscuro * the case-study sites in
this study * decided to protect some Loco areas.
These two areas also operated under the Benthic
Extraction Regime (Sernapesca, 2005b).
Both research and fishers’ protected areas
showed many advantages in comparison with
the regime of open access (Castilla et al., 1993,
p. 4). Within the experimental no-take zone of
Las Cruces, the population increased tenfold,
showing larger sizes in comparison with neigh-
bouring sites (Castilla et al., 2007). Further-
more, in the case of the El Quisco MA, not only
were the economic results superior in compar-
ison with open access sites, but the catch per
unit effort (number of Loco caught per hour
diving) was also greater. Diver searching and
travelling time was also reduced significantly.
However, Castilla et al. (1993) warned about
the generalization of these experiences for use in
other places as there may be differences in
population genetics along the long Chilean
coast, a position shared with Stotz (1997),
Meltzoff et al. (2002) and Moreno et al. (2007).
In Region IV, six coves, in collaboration with Dr.
Stotz from the regional Universidad Católica
del Norte, Coquimbo, put aside Loco areas
for conservation in September 1989 after the























* Based on Castilla et al. (2007) and Sernapesca (2007d).
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experience from Las Cruces and Mehuı́n (Stotz,
1997, p. 73). These coves subsequently reinforced
the previous experience by showing positive
trends in terms of population density and
recuperation of shell sizes (Stotz, 1997, p. 70).
In 1993 there were 183 fishing coves parti-
cipating in the precursor form of the MA
system, and the first cove that formally estab-
lished an MA in 1998 was Los Vilos from
Region IV (Godoy, C., Sernapesca, Pers.
Comm. via email 2007-06-11 and 2007-06-21);
a key region regarding the development of MAs
(Meltzoff et al., 2002). These successful experi-
ences in natural resource restocking served as
the underpinning basis for the integration of the
TURF concept in the 1991 LPAvia the AMERB
(in Spanish) or MEABR (in English) regulation.
THE INTRODUCTION OF TERRITORIAL
USE RIGHTS IN FISHERIES (TURFs) IN
CHILE (1991)
While the new Fishing Law was under develop-
ment, including new regulatory measurements
for the use of benthic resources such as Locos,
the total ban period that had started in 1988 and
run up to 1992 was extended, starting from June
1993; MAs excluded. The 1993 ban in its turn
has been extended still through December 2008
(Sernapesca, 2007d). It still allows for certain
experimentation, though, outside the MAs.
In 1993, a new phase was commenced with
the introduction of TURF. This move can be
seen as the overlapping of two phases. These
were the Benthic Extraction Regime (1993
1997), and the Management Area and Exploita-
tion of Benthic Resources (MEABR or just
MAs). The Benthic Extraction Regime and the
MEABR are two of the five measures (or
prohibitions) contained in Article 48 (letters d
and e, respectively) of the fishing law, which
otherwise has 172 articles (LPA, 1991).
LPA (1991) Article 48, under Title IV on
Artisan Fishing, paragraph 1 deals with ‘‘access
regime and attributions for the conservation of
hydrological resources’’ as the 5 miles of marine
coast and the interior waters reserved for artisan
fishing. The others measures or prohibitions in
Article 48 (LPA, 1991) are: extractive bans on
species in certain areas, creation of marine
reserves, and installation of seeds collectors in
natural banks of hydrological resources.
When government LPA (1991) declared
Locos open to exploitation it became possible
to apply a Benthic Extraction Regime (Castilla
et al., 1993, p. 5) as a means to stop open access
(Castilla, 1995). Between 1991 and 1997, fisher
organizations could also apply to formally
establish MAs via the MEABR regulatory
measure (Castilla et al., 2007, p. 30). The LPA
(1991) changed the procedure of fisher’s regis-
tration. Regarding access it establishes:
The access regime for exploitation of benthic hydro-
logical resources for the artisan fishing is of fishing
liberty. However, to exercise fishing extracting activities,
TABLE 5.4 Loco landing years 19932005 (tonnes).
Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs)
Democratic centre-left coalition government
Benthic Extraction Regime
(Global regional quotas: 5 and 9 days in 1993,
and 30 days in 1994)
Management Area and Exploitation of Benthic Resources
(Exclusive rights over a portion of water to artisan fishing organizations)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
8,574 8,111 2,670 2,541 3,154 2,564 2,294 1,274 828 1,622 2,963 3,601 3,270
Total 19932005: 43,466 tonnes
Build with data from SERNAP 19931997; 19952005: Anuario Estadı́stico de Pesca, courtesy of J. Elissetche, Sernapesca
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artisan fishers and their boats must previously inscribe
in the artisan register held by the Service (LPA, Art. 49).
A general register has been in place since the
first Fishing Law from the 1930s, but the
requirement to be registered only in one region
was first introduced in the 1991 LPA (Art.51: d).
With this change, migration, widely practiced
before, came to an end and with that the
possibility to fish freely in any fishery. According
to Moreno et al. (2007, p. 46) there is in a strict
sense no open access fisheries in Chile, given that
access is restricted even in non-regulated fish-
eries. The requirement that artisan fishers have
to register regionally is, on one hand, a way to
limit entry to fisheries, and on the other, a means
of confining fishers to one locality (Meltzoff et
al., 2002). In the case of several endangered
fisheries such as the sea urchin, fisher organiza-
tions in agreement with government have volun-
tarily closed the fisheries (i.e., the fisher
registers) (Moreno, C., Universidad Austral de
Chile, Pers. Comm. via email 2007-09-16).
Despite the 5 marine miles reserved for
artisan fishers (see Chapter Four), the State
reserves, the right to impose bans, marine
reserves, and definitions of MAs, (Asociación
Chilena de Pesquerı́as, s.a), as already seen in
Article 48, Title IV on Artisan Fishing (LPA,
1991). It is Art. 48, letter d, that states that within
the 5 marine miles, measures like the MEABR
regime can be established, to which artisan fish-
ing organizations can legally opt (LPA, 1991).
THE BENTHIC EXTRACTION REGIME (19931997)
The first measure, the Benthic Extraction Re-
gime (LPA, Art. 48, letter e), was in effect from
1993 to 1997 (see Table 5.4). It gave a global
regional quota that was proportionally divided
between divers and which was administered
through an allocation of tickets corresponding
to a predetermined quota of Locos to be
harvested upon the lifting of the ban. For
example, three experimental openings were
allowed in 1993 and 1994 (Castilla, 1995). In
1993, the ban was lifted twice: five and nine
days in January and July, respectively, in which
over 8,500 tonnes were extracted by around
10,000 divers (Payne and Castilla, 1994, p. 11).
In 1994 the ban was lifted during 30 days in
August (Castilla et al., 1993) showing similar
results in terms of landings.
The control of this system was expensive and
complicated since it demanded the control of
landing places, processing plants and restau-
rants. The measure was not watertight. Indivi-
dual quota tickets were easy to re-use and they
started to be transferred illegally, and there
was also the possibility of counterfeiting them
(Paillaman, A., Sernapesca, Pers. Comm. via
email 2006-09-05). This measure did not work as
(Sernap, Dic. 2005b) the Loco population con-
tinued to fall (Paillaman, A., Sernapesca, Pers.
Comm. via email 2006-09-08). Although the
measure was not meant to be transitory, it proved
to be so in practice (Montoya, M., Sernapesca,
Pers. Comm. via email 2007-05-02). This regime
gave room for MEABR to develop, and although
its rules did not achieve formal approval until
1995 (No 355/95),6 the regime had informally
been operating in parallel with the Benthic
Extraction Regime since the early 1990s. In order
to keep track of landings in relation to exploita-
tion regimes, below I briefly highlight some key
data regarding the MA rules and further on in
the book I present a section detailing the MA
legal framework more extensively.
THE MEABRS (1995)
LPA (1991) Article 48d prescribes the rules of
MAs. The rules deals with the conditions of
MAs and contain 24 articles in six titles: (I)
General dispositions; (II) Establishment of the
management areas and exploitation of benthic
resources; (III) Juridical subjects targeted; (IV)
On the application and procedure; (V) Technical
term of references of the management and
exploitation projects; (VI) Of the execute in-
stitutions and Final Title (Subpesca, 1995,
Reglamento MEABR). Sernapesca describes
the concept of a MA
as a limited geographical coastal zone given in use in an
exclusive form by the National Fishing Service (Serna-
6 According to Castilla et al. (2007, p. 30), the decree of the
MEABR was approved in 1997, which seems to be a
mistake.
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pesca) to an artisan fishing organization, legally con-
stituted, with the purpose to perform controlled
exploitation of the benthic resources present in the
area through a management plan within the 5 marine
miles reserved for artisan fishing or in terrestrial and
interior waters (Sernapesca, 2007a).
In 1997 there were already 206 formally
established MAs. Of these, 93 were managed by
unions or associations in collaboration with
university experts. Sernapesca and private con-
sultants supported the remaining MAs (Castilla
et al., 2007, p. 31).
From 1995, when the MA regime starts,
landings are reduced considerably from 8,000
tonnes in 1994 to less than 3,000 tonnes in 1995,
never surpassing the pre-export period quantity
of 4,000 tonnes, including year 2006 (see
Table 5.4). The landings under the MAs, regime
are the result of the total ban outside the MAs,
on one hand, and on the other, the natural
repopulation of Locos supported through MAs.
Under this regime harvesting of Locos has
become the exclusive right of those organized
through MEABR regulations, by TURFs in
co-management with the state and research
organizations, including universities and
consultants. However, a consequence of when
rights become exclusive is that others become
excluded. This perspective is discussed further
in Chapter Eight.
THE MANAGEMENT AREA LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The MEABR regulation is one of the five
measures or prohibitions contained in Article
48 of the 1991 Fishing Law. This formal
measure enables the establishment of MAs in
practice. The essential aims of the MEABR
measure are first to regulate the extraction
regime through suitable access and sustainable
exploitation of the resources, and second, to
obtain local knowledge about the population
dynamics of benthic marine invertebrates in
regulated areas (Sernapesca, 2007a).
According to the MEABR regulation (Sub-
pesca, 1995), a MA is defined as ‘‘that geogra-
phical zone given by the National Fishing
Service to an artisan fishing organization, for
the execution of a project of management and
with the purpose of exploiting benthic
resources’’ (Subpesca, 1995, Reglamento Sobre
AMERB, N. 355).7 The general objective of the
management areas are to:
. Contribute to the conservation of benthic
resources,
. Contribute to the sustainability of artisan
economic activity,
. Maintain or increase biological produc-
tivity of benthic resources,
. Increase knowledge of the functioning of
benthic eco-system, generating useful
information for management, and
. Promote a participative management
(Sernapesca. 2005b).
The LPA (1991, Art. 14, Titulo I Disposi-
ciones generales) defines conservation as ‘‘pre-
sent and future, rational, efficacious and efficient
use of natural resources and their environment’’.
To apply for and get approval to establish a
MA is a complicated procedure, especially when
considering those targeted by the measure.
Generally, artisan fishers are humble people
with little formal education. Due to the Chilean
bureaucratic and political system, every su-
preme decree connected with the establishment
of a MA is required to be signed by the
President of the Republic, beside the involve-
ment of the the Ministry of Economy (through
Subpesca) and of the Ministry of Defence,
(through the Marine Subsecretary).
Subpesca aims to promote the sustainable
development of fishing, define policy and apply
regulations. The Marine Subsecretary is in
charge of administering the national goods of
public use and state goods on the littoral coast,
and in rivers and lakes. In other words, amongst
the regulatory state institutions the fisheries
responsibility is divided so that Subpesca
has the normative and policy role, IFOP is
in charge of investigation and assessments, and
7 The same rules define the mentioned management plan as
a ‘‘compendium of norms and group of actions that allow
the administration of a fishery based on the actualized
bio-fishing, economic and social knowledge that exist
about it’’ (Subpesca, 1995, Reglamento Sobre AMERB,
N. 355, Art. 34: Titulo I: Disposiciones generales).
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the Sernapesca has a revenue collection role
(See Chapter Three for more details concerning
the institutional arrangements for the Chilean
Fisheries).
The process of establishing a MA consists of
two main components: the formalized steps and
the other more concerned with coordination
at the fisher organization level. Let us first
discuss the latter.
SELECTION AND PROPOSITION OF A MARINE SEABED
OR AREA
The sea sectors or areas available for the
development of MAs are established regionally
through a supreme decree from the Ministry of
Economy. This process is informed by work
undertaken by Subpesca and the Marine
Subsecretary in consultation with the respective
Zone Fishing Councils8 in charge of imple-
menting participation of fishing stakeholders.
When the decree is signed by the President and
by Minister of Economy, and after the Repub-
lic General Auditory has been notified, it is
published by Subpesca in the Official Diary of
the Nation. Once the decree has been pub-
lished, Sernapesca can apply with the Marine
Subsecretary to formally establish the MA (see
Fig. 5.3).
APPLICATION PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN A
MANAGEMENT AREA
For the applicant fisher organization, the pro-
cess to establish a MA involves three clear steps:
(1) a proposal of Base Situation Study (ESBA);
(2) the execution of the same (ESBA) and (3)
the formulation of a management and exploita-
tion plan project for the area (PMEA in
Spanish) (see Fig. 5.4A and B). When the
project is approved by Subpesca * according
to the official process described above *
Sernapesca write an agreement with the appli-
cant organization, which gives exclusive rights
to the organization to manage the benthic
resources of the area (Sernapesca, 2007a). The
agreement is in effect for four years, renewable
by the same procedure. This right cannot be
alienated, rented or other rights be constituted
to benefit of third parties.
The first benthic resource evaluation and
management project in the country was per-
formed by IFOP between 1991 and 1994,
thereby establishing the conceptual and meth-
odological basis for the present Base Situation
Study (ESBA) format and the management
and exploitation plans (PMEA) (Godoy,
Sernapesca, Pers. Comm. via email 2007-06-
11). This evaluation included 13 fishing coves
from the Choapa province in Region IV. The
ESBA and the MEABR regulations require
that the fishing organizations present the
following to Sernapesca:
. Copy of the organization statutes
. Certificate of the juridical personality of
the organization that certify the number
of members
. List of members
. Proposal of ESBA related to the area
under application
. Copy of the contract of technical assis-
tance (Subpesca, 1995, Reglamento
MEABRs 1995, Article 9, Title IV).
The list of members must include informa-
tion such as names, identification card number,
and the inscription number in the register of
artisan fishers. It must also contain the fisher’s
classification in the National Register of Artisan
fishers. To register as a fisher, a person has to,
among other things, provide evidence of a place
of residence. A further condition is that a fisher
cannot be registered in two regions simulta-
neously (LPA, 1991, Titulo IV, Art. 51d, Del
Registro de Pescadores Artesanales). A fisher
can be a member of more than one organization,
only if it is not the same type. That is, a fisher
cannot, for instance, be a member of two unions,
but he can be a member of a union and a
cooperative.
In 1997, important aspects of the formal
MA arrangements were modified through Act
19.492, which enabled the prolongation of the
registeration of MAs, through agreement
between Sernapesca and the relevant fisher8 These are organized according to five macro zones.
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organization, from two to four years (LPA,
1991, Art. 48, Letter d). It also imposed a tax on
MAs to the value of 1 UTM (Unidad Tributaria
or tax) per hectare or fraction of hectare to
be paid after the renewal of the first agreement
of use:
After the fourth such assessment, syndicates [fisher
organizations] are required to pay an annual fee to the
FIGURE 5.3 Procedure Decree of Disposable Areas for the Execution of Management and Exploitation of Benthic
Resources Project
Source: Sernapesca (2007a), permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
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government [owning] the seabed for the right to
maintain the management area. This fee is fixed per
hectare of seabed, and as such is not related to catch
and revenue obtained from the management area
(Gelcich et al., 2005, p. 308; my parenthesis).
Understandably, fishers were critical to-
wards this tax imposition (Stotz, 1997, p. 81)
particularly because it was a flat tax which took
no account of the variability in the productivity
of different areas along the coast. As Stotz
(1997) notes, this legislative action differs from
similar taxes such as those on land which vary
according to land quality and aptitudes. How-
ever, in November 2004, after pressure being
exerted by fishers, the tax of MAs was reduced
to 25 UTM per ha or fraction of ha (through
the modification of art. 48d, LPA, 1991). At the
same time, and less positive for the fishers, the
payment of the first tax was now due in
the second year after the agreement has been
signed between the parties (Sernapesca, 2005b,
p. 3).
In this process, the applicant fisher organi-
zation is partially responsible for the financing
of the required base line study (ESBA) of the
claimed area. The study establishes the resource
quotas and a management plan and the fishers
organizations ‘‘are also required to contract
external consultants to undertake yearly
FIGURE 5.4 Procedure application of managementx and exploitation area project
Source: Sernapesca (2007a), permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
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follow-up assessment of stocks in the manage-
ment area, and to determine changes in the total
allowable catches’’ (Gelcich et al., 2005, p. 308).
The fishers of the applicant fisher organization
can actively participate in the stock assessments
and other key activities with scientists preparing
the ESBA. The period of recollection of the
species is defined through common agreement
between the regional fishing authorities (Serna-
pesca) and the fishers themselves, and is subject
to an annual evaluation.
When Sernapesca receives the ESBA propo-
sition it has 15 days to revise it and if it fulfils
the requirements, it is remitted to Subpesca for
processing within 45 days. It can within this
timeframe make a decision of approval, mod-
ification or rejection. In the latter case, the
organization has 30 days to reformulate the
proposition, which it then presents to Subpesca
for its consideration and decision within 30
days. The proposition is approved and the
technical report is forwarded to the applicant
fisher organization through Sernapesca. After
this, the applicant fishing organization has 120
days to deliver to Subpesca, together with the
results of the process just described, the propo-
sition containing the management plan and
plan for exploitation of the area (PMEA) (see
Fig. 5.4A). PMEAs are described in more detail
in the next section.
THE MANAGEMENT PLAN AND EXPLOITATION OF
AREA (PMEA)
When the fishing organization delivers the
PMEA, Subpesca has 60 days to decide whether
to approve or reject the application and is then
responsible for publishing its decision in the
Official Diary (Sernapesca, 2007a). Thus, the
official procedure to get a MA takes almost a
year.
According to LPA (1991), the PMEA pre-
sented by the fishing organization must contain
the following:
. Description of geographical localization
and included species
. Bio-fishery background of the species and
its exploitation strategy
. Conservation measures and access regime
. Production and market information
. Research requirements for conservation
and management purposes (LPA, Art. 9:
Titulo II: De los Planes de Manejo)
Fisher organizations are required to present
the proposed MA area on a map from SHOA
(Servicio Hidrográfico y Oceanográfico de la
Armada) or IGM (Instituto Geográfico Mili-
tar). Subpesca then defines the geographical
coordinates. Although not mandatory, Sub-
pesca usually verifies the coordinates with the
assistance of SHOA.
If it is deemed that the MA application
requires modifications, the applicant fishing
organization is requested to change its applica-
tion and reinitiate the whole procedure from the
beginning. When two or more artisan fishing
organizations apply for the same area or when
areas overlap, the one that is situated nearest to
the proposed MA area will be given precedence.
In case there is more than one fishing organiza-
tion in the same place, and both are interested
in establishing a MA, priority is given to the one
with most members. If both are equal in
numbers, the oldest will be favoured (LPA,
1991, Art. 48, Letter d). These prioritizing
criteria regulate, at least in theory, possible
conflicts among fishing organizations.
The MA must present annual follow-up
reports to Subpesca, revised by supports orga-
nizations. The report may be postponed by 90
days. Failure to deliver the annual report is
considered a serious breach of MA obligations.
The annual follow-up or assessment report
should include:
. Principal and secondary purpose of the
follow-up (i.e., description of the benthic
community of the area with focus on the
principal ecological and economic species
relevant for the equilibrium of the benthic
community, direct quantification of the
principal species, characterization, identi-
fication and distribution of the strata
present at the sea bottom).
. Study methodology
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. Information about landings and manage-
ment realized
. Assessment of principal species and of the
benthic community
. Analysis of the general performance of
the area
. Management actions planned for the
coming year
. Programme of activities and chronogram
(Reglamento MAs, Art. 19 bis).
There are several reasons for an organiza-
tion to loose their MA:
(a) Non approved use
(b) Failure to pay the tax
(c) When members of the organization in-
troduce exotic species, and if the organi-
zation fails to exclude them within the
five days after the respective judicial
veredict has been executed
(d) Extraction during ban periods
(e) To capture species under the minimum
size or with forbidden techniques (Aso-
ciación Chilena de Pesquerı́as, s.a. p. 14)
EXPANSION AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE MANAGEMENT AREA:
INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS AND
MULTIPLE INTEREST
By May 2000, 20 percent (or 96) of the registered
fishing organizations in the country had applied
for 103 MAs. In 2001, Subpesca (2001) had
expectations that Chile could be pioneering in
this area. However, according to Meltzoff et al.
(2002, p. 86), the Government has been slow in
the implementation. Between the promulgation
of the LPA in 1991 and the active implementation
of the MAs, a decade passed during which fishing
organizations partly lost faith in the process. It
was not until 1999 that government started to
push to formalize the establishment of a MA in
every cove as a panacea to solve the problem of
the illegal harvesting of Locos. The ban on Locos
fishing outside of MAs became a major incentive
for fishing organizations to obtain a MA, as this
was the only way to legally access Loco fisheries.
The delay in Government action to imple-
ment MAs was due to their hesitation to give
sea tenure to the fishing organizations (Meltzoff
et al., 2002, p. 9394). This intransigence can be
linked back to problems inherent in co-manage-
ment applications, where several organizations
with varying degrees of power and economic
interests are influential. I will return to this issue
in the last chapter.
Until 1995, the Government could lay the
blame for the delay of MA implementation on
the lack of MA regulations. This issue was
resolved in 1995, but LPA (1991) still contained
articles like 5 and 6, which that tended to
protract the MA application process. Articles
5 and 6 dealt with the referred need of the
decree that designated the regional areas avail-
able for carrying on a MA, but the legal details
of this decree were not ready until 1998, making
MAs ineffective. It was not until 1998 that a
MA decree was delivered to individual fishing
organizations, and not until January 1999 that
the first MA (Chanavayita in Region I) had
succeeded in passing all the formal stages
(Meltzoff et al., 2002, p. 94). Since May 2000,
the number of MAs has expanded constantly.
By 2005 there were 472 operational MAs
involving 11,301 divers (Montoya. M., Serna-
pesca, Pers. Comm. via email 2007-05-02). By
June 2006, the total number of decrees passed to
the establishment of MAs had increased to 599,
distributed to nearly every fishing cove in Chile.
Of these 559 MAs, 365 have had their Manage-
ment Plan approved; the step prior to the
formal adoption of a MA (Sernapesca, 2006c).
The 599 MAs occupy a total of 101,898 ha
(Sernapesca, 2006c).
Some coves might hold more than one MA.
The number of MAs does not match the
number of artisan fishing organizations either
as some organizations have more than one MA.
The total number of organizations involved in
the 559 MAs in 2006 is around 320, which
amounts to an average of 1.87 MA per
organization. The 320 organizations linked to
the 559 MAs with decrees correspond to
around 50 percent of the total of 652 registered
artisan fishing organizations. These 320 fishing
organizations were made up of approximately
17,000 members, or 41 percent of the total
number of organized fishers (i.e., 42.000) in
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Chile (see Figure 4.14, Chapter Four). Almost
half of the artisanal fishing organizations in the
country, and around 40 percent of its members
are organized in MAs. So in 2005, 17,000
(amounting to one-third) of registered fishers
were participating in TURF regimes out of a
potential 55,000 listed fishers in the Artisan
Fishermen Register (see Table 4.9).
Since it is tricky to count the total number of
organizations and its members, this issue de-
serves a methodological note. For example, a
fishing organization involved in three MAs
might have 90 members in one, 46 in the second
and 67 in the third. In cases of this kind I took
the highest number of members, taking for
granted that only part of the total membership
of 90 are involved in other MAs. Further, the
status of MAs vary (e.g., some MAs listed as left
without effect, negated, expired, desisted, quit,
etc.), making, it also complex to decide whether
to discount its members from the total for a
region or not, when their number is still included
in the list. In some cases there was no data
available regarding the number of members of
the MAs. I did not include these cases. In spite
of these complications, I thought it worthwhile
not only to determine the percentage of organi-
zations involved in the MAs in proportion to the
total number of registered organizations but
also to identify the actual number of fishers
involved in MAs. That is, to roughly indentify
the number of the members in MAs and to
compare it to the total number of members in
the registered organizations, and the number of
fishers in the Artisan Fishermen Register. This
revealed that 23 percent of fishers registered
with Sernapesca do not belong to any organiza-
tion. The implication of this is that these fishers
are unable to obtain a MA given that fishers
have to be affiliated with a fisher union, guild
association or cooperative to be eligible as an
applicant. Thus, according to Meltzoff et al.
(2002), these fishers have no say in co-manage-
ment and tend to disrespect restrictions and
therefore probably continue with illegal harvest.
This data could help toward finding out about
the probable number of illegal Loco fishers,
considering that these fishers are operating
outside of the organizations representing the
collective interests of the fishers, and therefore
not within the regulatory regimes of MAs.
MAs are geographically unevenly spread.
Fig. 5.5 shows the number of functioning MAs
(with managing plans in place in the table) in
2005 in the south of Chile (Regions X of Los
Lagos and VIII of Bı́o-Bı́o) and in Region IV of
Coquimbo.
Fig. 5.6 shows that the sea surface area of
MAs in Region VIII of Bı́o-Bı́o is 26,000
ha (or 26.3 percent of the total), Region X of
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FIGURE 5.5 Number of management areas by regions, 2005
Source: Sernapesca (2005a); permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
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Los Lagos is 22,000 ha (21.6 percent), and
Region XI of Aysén is 15,000 ha (14.8 percent).
Region IV of Coquimbo comes in fourth place
and is 14,000 ha (13.5 percent), and Region V of
Valparaı́so is 5,000 ha (4.8 percent).
If we analyse the relationship between sea
surface area/number of MAs (Fig. 5.7), we can
observe that the highest average sea hectares per
MA is in Regions I, VIII, XI and IV. This is
partially due to the presence of some large MAs
like in Region I of Tarapacá (Arica); Region IV
of Coquimbo (Los Choros); Region VIII of Bı́o-
Bı́o (Weste Isla Mocha, Norte Rı́o Paicavı́, Isla
Mocha Sector Quechol Sur and Sur Rı́o Paicavı́);
and Region XI of Aysén. (El Enjambre, Puerto
Aysén sector B and Puerto Melinka sector A).
By March 2007 there had been an increase to
664 MAs (with decree) of which 327 had fulfilled
the requirements for the entire application pro-
cedure, and now being in a position to apply for a
management plan. Of these, 60 percent are
situated within Regions IV, VIII and X (Godoy,
C., Sernapesca, Pers. Comm. via email 2007-06-
11 and 2007-06-21). Map 5.1, from the Marine
Subsecretary, shows the distribution of MAs by
region (called AMERBs) in Chile in 2007. The
numbers given in this diagram do not correspond
completely with Sernapesca’s data.
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FIGURE 5.6 Surface (ha) occupied by the MAs classified by regions, 2005
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FIGURE 5.7 Relation surface/number of MAs classified by regions, 2005
Source: Sernapesca (2005a), permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
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MAP 5.1 Management and Exploitation Area for Benthic Resources (MEABRs). in Chile 2007
Source: Courtesy and permission from Alarcón J. C., Subsecretarı́a de Marina.
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LOCO EXPORT AND REVENUES
(19872005)
Table 5.5 below shows export statistics from
1987 to 2005, including net tonnes quantity,
total value in millions of US$ and price per net/
tonnes. I have added the exploitation regimes.
The table shows how, after the introduction of
MAs, export goes down, especially after 1997
and up to 2003. In spite of that, and although
the prices fluctuate constantly after 1993, all the
yearly net tonnes prices are above the levels
prior to 1993. While the average was 10.136
US$/net tonnes between 1987 and 1992, the
average between 1995 and 2005 was of 18.056
US$/net tonnes; i.e., an increase of 78 percent.
According to experts from Sernapesca many
variables might have intervene in the 1993
record net price per tonne. This issue deserves
a closer view. As already suggested, during 1992
the Loco fishery was under an extractive ban; a
ban that had started in 1988. The export figures
registered in 1992 (16.1 net tonnes) are based on
the auction of remnant stocks of refinement
plants. Therefore, the quality of the product in
1992 was below the quality of the catch in 1993,
when Loco extractive activities were legally
opened again after five years of ban (1988
1993) and three years (19901992) of scarce
export. Thus in 1993, 17 million units (around
8,000 tonnes) of fresh, big and high quality
Locos are put on the market at the same time as
there is a great demand and high expectations
from Taiwanese and Japanese markets leading
to the registered high prices. Another factor that
drove up the prices was the collective negotia-
tions of an organized force of fishers. However,
the over-supply produced during the same year
(part of which was sold the following year), in
addition to the extracted volume in 1994 (28
million units, or 8,000 tonnes), generated an
over-supply, which led to a subsequent fall in
prices and widespread disillusionment amongst
fishers (Rivas, D., Sernapescal, Pers. Comm. via
email 2007-04-31; Montoya, M., Sernapesca,
Pers. Comm. via email 2007-05-02).
The principal destination of Loco export
continues to be Asia with 85.3 percent of the
TABLE 5.5 Export Loco years 19872005 (net tonnes) (1993 marks the start of the TURFs).
Exploitation regimes Years Quantity Net T. Price US$/net t. Value US$
Global quota 1987 3,948.9 10,796.3 42,633,509.1
1988 4,008.0 8,578.9 34,384,231.2
1989 1,206.1 8,216.2 9,909,558.8
Total closure 1990 132.6 10,608.4 1,406,673.8
1991 210.2 11,559.1 2,429,722.8
1992 16.1 11,060.0 178,066.0
TURFs
Benthic Extraction Regime 1993 2,392.7 26,603.9 63,655,151.5
1994 1,622.8 14,037.3 22,779,730.4
Management Areas and Exploitation of Benthic (MEABRs) 1995 1,777.7 13,555.2 24,097,079.0
1996 837.8 18,401.2 15,416,525.4
1997 1,015.0 21,401.6 21,722,624.0
1998 764.7 18,626.7 14,243,837.5
1999 663.6 22,503.5 14,933,322.6
2000 386.4 24,044.0 9,290,601.6
2001 287.8 18,803.1 5,411,532.2
2002 372.2 20,776.8 7,733,125.0
2003 845.8 14,787.0 12,506,844.6
2004 1,124.3 14,145.4 15,903,673.2
2005 916.7 15,600.3 14,300,795.0
Total 22,529.4 16,005.5* 332,936,603.8
* Average price US$/ton for 19872005.
Source: Based in IFOP 2005, which is based on toll information, courtesy of Ortego, M.I., IFOP.
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total (or 832 of a total of 975 tonnes). The six
principal countries where Locos were exported
in 2006 were in decreasing order: Taiwan
(Formosa), Japan, Hong Kong, USA, Canada
and China (Montoya, 2007). In USA and
Canada, the product is largely consumed by
ethnic Asian communities (Ponce et al., 2003).
The Loco export for 2006 was 975 tonnes,
which represents an increase of 6.4 percent in
relation to 2005. The average price per tonne
was US$16,200, representing a minor increase
of 1.1 percent on 2005 prices (Montoya, Sub-
pesca, 2007).
POST MANAGEMENT AREA ILLEGAL HARVESTING
A recurrent issue during all the examined phases
of the Loco fishery’s history has been illegal
fishing. However, there is no doubt that illegal
fishing is continuing in spite of continued
expansion of MAs. Indications to this effect
come both from fishers and experts. Violations
of LPA (1991) and confiscated catch demon-
strate that this is the case. Formally recorded
infractions, however, may be a gross under-
estimate of the real extent of illicit fishing. It is
difficult to know how large the illegal Loco
harvest is, how organized it is * for instance,
the traffic to Peru and fishers’ illegal harvest
for local consumption. If illegal trafficking of
Locos is occurring in Chile, then there are
parallels with the Abalone situation in South
Africa. This links to a broader issue of the
impact of international markets on local fish-
eries production and relatedly threatened mar-
ine species. Meltzoff et al. (2002, p. 94) estimate
that during the 1990s the illegal Locos catch was
as high or perhaps double that of the legal catch.
A point made in this chapter is that another
clue to the extent of illegal harvest is the
proportion of fishers operating outside the
MAs. This is estimated at 23 percent, meaning
that around 12,260 of the registered fishers at
Sernapesca are not organized in any collective,
and therefore are not part of the MA system. It
should be noted however, that not all of these
fishers are divers. Furthermore, it is quite
probable that illegal harvests are also under-
taken outside of the MAs by some fishers
formally involved in MAs.
There are apparently no systematic studies
that approach the illegal harvest of Locos after
(or before for that matter) the introduction of
the MAs in Chile. Sernapesca does have
nationally systematized data on the issue.
Due to my request, for the purposes of this
research, data for 2006 was gathered from the
regions, which included data on infractions
and confiscated catch only up until May.
Sernapesca also provided the same information
TABLE 5.6 Loco infractions and confiscations year
2000.














Source: Godoy, C., Sernapesca.
TABLE 5.7 Loco infractions and confiscations up to
May 2006.














Source: Godoy, C., Sernapesca.
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for the entire 2000 (Godoy, C., Sernapesca,
Pers. Comm. via email 2007-06-11). From this
scarce information it is difficult to draw any
firm conclusions.
In 2000 (Table 5.6), 133 infractions were
reported amounting to around 10 tonnes of
illegal Locos, which corresponds to 0.8 percent
of the total of 1,274 tonnes landed that year (see
Table 5.4). Up to May 2006 (see Table 5.7), there
were 105 infractions and over 4 tonnes of
confiscated Locos, which may mean that the
total confiscations during 2007 could be similar
to that of 2000. If this is the case it could indicate
that the number of infractions is relatively
constant, but as discussed above this is likely
to be a fraction of the real extent of illicit catch.







6 Puerto Oscuro: The Seascape
of Conflict
INTRODUCTION
Before I start with this chapter I need to
introduce here a methodological note. The
information about the MA Puerto Oscuro is
based on semi-structured and open interviews
with two key informers. The first is Mariano
Castillo, the oldest and most experienced fisher,
born 1934, being the only one living in Puerto
Oscuro all year round since the 1960s. Due to
age, he finished diving in 1983. I interviewed
him several times during 2001 and 2003 (Jan-
uary). The second informant is Leonardo
Ocares (35 years old in 2001) in his capacity
as President of the Puerto Oscuro fisher guild
association whom I interviewed early in January
2001 in Puerto Oscuro. I interviewed Mr. Ocares
again in Los Vilos in 2007. He was then also
President of the regional federation of fisher-
men (Federación de Pescadores Artesanales y
Buzos Mariscadores de la Provincia del
Choapa, IV Region (FEPEMACH)).
Part of the rest of the interviews were
performed by Field Assistant Javiera Espinoza
V., a university geography student who also
collected demographic data from Puerto Oscuro
and from the lawsuit. She interviewed several
informers and municipal, marine and judicial
authorities in Los Vilos and Canela during 2005
(see Chapter One for methodological details).
PUERTO OSCURO: MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS,
MULTIPLE CLAIMS
Puerto Oscuro * situated in the commune of
Canela, Choapa province, Region IV of Co-
quimbo, around 280 kilometers north of San-
tiago, the capital of Chile (see Map 6.1) * is a
small natural harbour which functioned com-
mercially up to the 1920s. As the ships became
larger they could not berth in the harbour which
was then closed. From that moment the fishing
activities developed. During the 1950s, the cove
was used to store oil and material for the
construction of the Pan-American Highway.
The access road to the cove * originally a
mule track * which passes through the private
property Puerto Oscuro, dates back to the 1800s
and was broadened up during the time of the
construction of the Pan America Highway.
The landed property, Puerto Oscuro, which
surrounds the cove, probably derives its name
from the harbour. The harbour has been defined
as strategically important by the responsible
authority, the Marine Subsecretary, and is some-
times used for military exercises. The fishing
cove where the MA under study is located is also
part of Puerto Oscuro. Puerto Oscuro is also a
public beach * one of the few in the commune,
and to add further to the complication of the
cultural landscape, Puerto Oscuro nestles several
summer houses whose inhabitants, at least dur-
ing summer, form a community. Thus, Puerto
Oscuro, as a seascape, hosts various seasonal
and sedentary stakeholders and resource users;
all with their own relationship to the place, and
all with their own claims. Thus the wide range of
stakeholders include: proprietors, claimants,
state authorities,1 researchers, consultant firms
and resource users i.e., the fishers, their organi-
zation and families.
Fishers have a direct and dependant rela-
tionship to the coastal border and to support
their livelihoods need to work in the cove all
year round. The summer house owners use the
area for recreation and bathing, mostly during
summer. This usage also applies to the general
public. Although sporadically, the Chilean navy
also uses the harbour and therefore has a stake
in the area. The owners of the adjacent landed
property Puerto Oscuro mostly use the cove for
1 For example: Sernapesca, Subpesca, Corporación de
Fomento (CORFO), Servicio de Cooperación Tecnica
(SERCOTEC), Gobiernos Regionales, Fondo de Fomento
para la Pesca Artesanal, (FFPA), etc.
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recreation, but also as a source of potential
business, as well as having summer houses on
the high parts of the properties. Of these five key
groups with a fairly direct relationship with
Puerto Oscuro, let us concentrate on three: the
fishers, the summer house owners and the
property owners, focussing on their mutual
relationships and property rights.
THE PUERTO OSCURO LANDED PROPERTY
Due to its origin as a colonial property, the
private property holding Puerto Oscuro belongs
to those properties whose borders reach to the
sea. In the historical tenure documents of the
landed property or fundo,2 it is mentioned that
the property stretches to the Pacific Ocean and
includes a natural harbour. These specifications
are also given for the fundo El Totoral from which
Puerto Oscuro was detached as property through
inheritance * dating back to 1679 * and up to
19293 when it become the property of the
family Echavarrı́a with which4 there is presently
MAP 6.1 Region 1V of Coquimbo
2 The concepts latifundium, hacienda or fundo as specified
in Chapter One, denote a large landed estate.
Minifundium refers to small landed estates.
3 Illapel’s RP, 1929, no. 70, folio 75, Venta fundo de Lorenz
a Echavarrı́a, in Gallardo, G., 2002.
4 Illapel’s RP, 1964, no. 73, folio 67, Herencia fundo hijos
Echavarrı́a, in Gallardo, G., 2002.
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a lawsuit. The details of the lawsuit will be
discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
José A. Echavarrı́a T. bought the fundo in
1929 and it was then inherited by his five children
in 1964 (Gallardo, 2002). The fundo was expro-
priated in 1972 under the Allende government
according to the 3rd Article of the Law 16,640 of
the Agrarian Reform, which dealt with estates
that were considered to be badly run.5
In 1974, during the Pinochet government,
the five heirs requested the Corporation of
Agarian Reform (CORA) to review the expro-
priation and to exclude a part of the fundo from
it. CORA approved the petition, and returned
approximately 2,700 ha, including 33 HRB
(basic irrigated hectare) located along the coast,
west of the Pan-American Highway. The bor-
ders of Puerto Oscuro today are
The El Totoral fundo to the north, the Angostura
community to the south, the Pan-American Highway to
the east, and the Pacific Ocean to the west. (emphasis
added) (CORA, Consejo de Secretarı́a, CHC/COW/
amb. A/C no. 1,773. Courtesy of J. A. Echavarrı́a E., in
Gallardo, 2002).
During the 2000s, the remaining sons of T.
Echavarrı́a and their children decided to divide
the 2,700 hectares among them. They all live in
Santiago and visit the reserve mostly during
vacations. Conflict emerged between the heirs
that appropriated the part of the property
embracing the cove and certain summer house
owners. All of the five family branches are
involved in the lawsuit (as the lawful property
owners). This legal action, which began in 2004,
has not yet (2008), been resolved and it has
meant that the property has yet to be formally
(de jure) divided amongst the family branches,
although there is de facto use of different parts
of the property by family members.
THE FISHERS
The 15 local fishers, with the exception of one
(Castillo), live in the high part of the area mainly
along the east side of the main road (Panamer-
ican Highway), in lands that until recently
belonged to the Sociedad Britto, Cortés y Co.
Ldt. This society, bought by local peasants
(comuneros), is situated in the part of the fundo
that was not given back by Pinochet to the
Echavarrı́a family (Gallardo, 2002). When a
property has not been legally divided between
the inheritors it is legally called ‘‘succession’’ in
Chile, referring to the owners of the still
undivided property. Some fishers have houses
in the west side of the road in lands belonging to
the Echavarrı́a family reserve (see Picture 6.1).
There are 15 households in total, and in
13 there is one person or more who had fishing
as occupation during 2005. Several of these
fishers also had other occupations, and others,
especially the elderly, received some form
of government economic assistance. The 15
households had a total of 64 inhabitants, one
with 13 people, including grandchildren and
compadres (information compiled with the help
of school pupils from Puerto Oscuro by
H. Soto, local school teacher. Soto was inter-
viewed by J. Espinoza, Field Assistant, Pers.
Comm. via email 2005-10-20).
Since the 15 households are located both
within the property Sociedad Britto, Cortés
y Co. Ldt (the peasant’s society) and the
Echavarrı́a reserve, in order to provide them
with some land tenure security, the Municipality
of Canela, after intense negotiations, bought
17.5 ha from Britto, Cortés y Co. Ldt. in
September 2003 for 27 million pesos (R. Cuevas
Municip. Secretary, Phone interviewed by J.
Espinoza, Field Assistant, Pers. Comm. with
J. Espinoza, via email 2006-09-14) or
US$39,000,6 so the fishers could build subsi-
dized permanent houses (C. Narvaez, Municip.
de Canela, Pers. Comm. via email 2006-08-16).
In consequence the fishers had to leave the old
dwellings. I have no information about whether
they get any indemnification for the buildings
they have been asked to vacate. According to the
plans, the solution accommodates 20 families,
but during 2006, 30 families were applying for
5 The expropriation agreement was published in the Diario
Oficial 15 de mayo de, 1972 (CORA, Consejo de
Secretarı́a, CHC/COW/amb. A/C no. 3,551, 12 de Julio
de, 1972. Courtesy of J. A. Echavarrı́a E, in Gallardo,
2002).
6 Average of 688.94 pesos per US$, year 2002 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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subsidies (R. Cuevas, Municip. de Canela,
Secretary, phone interviewed by J. Espinoza,
Field Assistant, Pers. Comm. via with J. Espi-
noza, via email 2006-09-14).
THE COTTAGE OWNERS
The cove has around 35 summer houses of
diverse standards. At the beginning of the
1960s, families that spent summer in Puerto
Oscuro were very few and all of them had
good relationships with the owner of the
landed property, who died in the 1960s.
According to the family that has the oldest
summer house in the cove, their house was
built with permission from the property owner.
In the mid 1960s there were only three summer
houses in the cove (G. Galleguillos, Puerto
Oscuro summer house owner, interviewed by J.
Espinoza, Field Assistant, Pers. Comm. with
Espinoza via email 2006-09-01). The owners of
the Puerto Oscuro property claim that the
summer houses have been built there without
their permission. Their view was that the old
owner only agreed to allow the erection of
summer tents, not the construction of summer
houses (Picture 6.2).
The cove is supplied with water through
simple and uncovered pipes, from a little lagoon
belonging to the reserve and from which they
have the permission to extract water from the
Puerto Oscuro property, but when ‘‘things get
hot’’, the land owners have in the past stopped
PICTURE 6.1 Puerto Oscuro at the Panamerican high way. Permission from Chuck Herring, Digital Globe.
PICTURE 6.2 Puerto Oscuro cove with summer houses. Permission from Skullybones.
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access to this water supply. In accordance with
summer house rules that were established not to
contaminate the sea, the houses have their own
septic toilets to dispose of wastewater.
THE CONFLICT, THE LAWSUIT
To understand the conflict and the ongoing
lawsuit we must turn to the summer resorts
sector in Chile, which has grown in response to
the burgeoning demands of the swelling middle
and upper-class that has led to an increase in the
value of coastal land, and relatedly, the prospect
of gaining profit from it (see Chapter Three)
(Picture 6.3).
The dispute between fishers and summer
house owners and the land owners of Puerto
Oscuro has been long and acrimonious. One of
the owners of the reserve has been particularly
active. The problems grew in the 1990s. This was
at the same time that the issue of the succession
started to be dealt with by the Puerto Oscuro
property family owners.
The unresolved lawsuit is between Puerto
Oscuro property owners, the five family
branches * the succession Echavarrı́a * and
those who have summer houses in the cove, and
not with the fishers, although among the 31
persons there are four fishers who own houses.
Some of the summer house owners are not part
of the lawsuit. However, there is obviously a
latent conflict with the fishers and, as a result,
the fishers have not been able to develop an
appropriate infrastructure to support their fish-
ing activities. To settle there is out of question.
When the fisher association tried to build upon
an existing unfinished house fundament * that
was started by one of the heirs of the reserve
long ago * a social club with a toilet for the
fishers with economic help of the Municipality,
one of the owners pulled down the construction
(Interview with H. Jorquera, former mayor of
the commune (19901992), interviewed by J.
Espinoza Pers. Comm. with J. Espinoza via
email 2005-09-29). From this it becomes evident
that there is a conflict between the fishers and
the property owners. There have been several
fishing infrastructure projects over the past
years that have not come to fruition, predomi-
nately due to the opposition of the property
owners. Among these projects, mentioned by an
IFOP study, are the endowment of potable
water for the cove (1997); implementation,
PICTURE 6.3 The Puerto Oscuro cove. Permission from Chuck Herring, Digital Globe.
110 Part III: Seascapes of Conflict, Seascapes of Confidence: The Case Studies
operation and administration of a boat dragger
(huinche) (1997); construction of boxes and
store house (1997); cleaning of the ravine
(1999); implementation of an electric generator
for the association’s centre (1999); and capacity
building in diving security (2000) (IFOP, 2000).
Lastly, a net meshes and trawl line project
(1999) did not come off either because the
Marine Subsecretary did not give permission.
There are some provisional shelters where
the fishers can put their equipment as well as a
sanctuary of Virgin Mary where they commend
themselves before going to sea. Hence, the
fishers in the cove do not have the possibility
to develop a basic harbour infrastructure or
services such as electricity, potable water or
sewage. They do, however, possess a radio
system that enables them to communicate
with the outside world, which was financed in
1995 by Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regio-
nal (FNDR) (IFOP, 2000), from the Subsecre-
tarı́a de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo
(SUBDERE); a descentralized program of
public investment (SUBDERE, 2008, Minis-
terio del Interior).
Access to the cove for the fishers, dating
back from the time of the harbour, has not been
a problem recently, since it has been a regulated
as right of way (paso de servidumbre), which is
not the case of the cove Puerto Manso and the
Agua Dulce beach. There is a document from
the Ministry of Real Estate from 1985 that
establishes the right of access of 3 kilometer to
the cove within the property of the reserve for
the purpose of artisanal fishing. This right of
way was granted after the fishers contacted
the Ministerio de Bienes Nacionales (MBN,
(Secretarı́a Regional Ministerial IV Region
Coquimbo, La Serena, exp. no. 850357-21-LS).
The fishers are responsible for maintaining the
access road, which is usually in poor condition.
The Municipality annually repairs the road in
summer after the winter rains. The owners of
the fundo also help with financing for this
purpose.
Those involved in the lawsuit from the
Puerto Oscuro reserve are 17 persons, represent-
ing the five family branches. They state in their
claim that the houses occupy, ‘‘a piece of [land]
of an area of approximately 1.5 ha, correspond-
ing to 370 meters north and 40 meters from east
to west running parallel to the coast of the
referred cove’’ (Juzgado Civil de Los Vilos,
2004, Papel de Juicio 7.020, Materia: Juicio
Sumario Precario, folios 1618; my parenthesis;
see Picture 6.1, Picture 6.2 and Map 6.2). The
lawsuit contains 91 folios and three maps. The
concept precario refers to those lawsuits invol-
ving land problems in Chile.
The succession family have requested that
the 31 summer house residents vacate their
houses. To support their case they have pre-
sented a copy of a map that delineates the water
marks of the highest and lowest tide according
to the map of DIRINMAR-16 (scale 1:750)
from the General Direction of Maritime Terri-
tory and Merchant Marine.7 Datum Ingenierı́a
Asociados, the company that drew up the map
supporting the case, was contracted and paid by
the succession family. This mapping of the
relationship between the tidal zones, beach areas
and summer house locations was signed off by
the responsible authority in December 2003 and
it furthermore directed that this mapping inter-
pretation be registered and communicated to the
different affected parties of the lawsuit (DGTM
y MM, No. 12.000/34 vrs. L.PYA 17/03, in
Juzgado Civil de Los Vilos, 2004, Papel de Juicio
7.020 . . . folios 1 (the map) and 15. Signed by the
Vice-Admiral R. Codina D).
It is probably because of the formalized
status of this decision that the reserve owners
decided to go to trial. The map determines the
high tide water mark and it shows that the
houses are constructed just in the landward
margin of the line, and therefore in the private
property of the reserve (see Map 6.2).
The summer house owners, through their
representatives, dispute the placement of the
high-water mark on the map and argue that the
summer houses are built on the state controlled
beach area of public use belonging to Bienes
Nacionales (Real State Office). That is, in the
space between the sea and the high tide water
7 Dirección General del Territorio Maritimo y Marina
Mercante (DGTM and MM).
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mark (Juzgado Civil de Los Vilos, 2004, Papel
de Juicio 7.020 . . . folio 62).
As part of the lawsuit, a legal assistant from
Los Vilos visited the Puerto Oscuro cove in
October and November 2004 to verify whether
the summer house residents (36 in total) were
actually in their houses. This task was called a
personal search and resulted in the following
finding, ‘‘without being found’’ (Juzgado Civil
de Los Vilos, 2004, Papel de Juicio 7.020 . . .
folios 1216). However, it is not clear whether
it is a legally accepted practice to leave written
citations at a place where the persons do not
formally or permanently reside. Some of those
referred to in the citations were absent and some
are deceased (Juzgado Civil de Los Vilos, 2004,
Papel de Juicio 7.020 . . . folio 86). The way that
these citations were delivered is being used as
part of the challenge by the summer house
representatives. They are arguing that the noti-
fication is not juridically valid with reference to
Articles 59 and 60 of the Civil Code.
The plaintiffs have started a new legal action
against the summer house owners. They re-
quested in January of 2005 that the Navy
investigate whether the houses comply with the
general order of urbanization and construction.
They have also requested an investigation in to
whether the summer houses are complying with
relevant taxation legislation. During February
2005 the local authorities notified the owners
that they had to regularize the properties. If
summer house owners did not approach the
municipality in order to regularize the situation
(an uneasy legal process), after a while, the case
would be sent to the Judge in Los Vilos, who
apparently has the right to order the summer
houses to be demolished. The owners of the
MAP 6.2 Map depicting the high-water mark in the cove Puerto Oscuro
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summer houses had four days to get guidance
from the Municipality, but at the time none of
them made act of appearance at the Municipal-
ity. The Director of Construction of the Munici-
pality thus advised the Mayor in June of 2005
that none of the summer houses owners received
the required permission to build and therefore
have contravened planning laws and are subject
to fines (Registros de partes de la Municipalidad
No. 76819, in Juzgado Civil de Los Vilos, 2004,
Papel de Juicio 7.020 . . . folio 89).
According to the Director of Construction,
no such legal action has yet been taken against
the summer house owners (Narvaez, C., Mu-
nicip. de Canela, Pers. Comm. via email 2006-
08-17). It is not clear whether rules can be
validly applied for houses built before the rules
were in effect. It is not certain either whether
the plaintiff * the Echavarrı́a sucession *
complies with the relevant regulations them-
selves. They have built several houses within
the property during the same period. Further-
more, it is questionable whether the Munici-
pality can regulate the construction of houses
built on lands whose ownership is contested
and is subject to an ongoing legal process.
The summer house owners also add other
arguments, among them that the DIRINMAR
map delivered to the case is a copy of the
original, which is why it is not possible to certify
its authenticity (Juzgado Civil de Los Vilos,
2004, Papel de Juicio 7.020 . . . folio 63).
In January of 2005, the summer house
owners requested that the Marine Subsecretary
grant them a land concession of one hectare
corresponding to the land where their houses
are located. They argued that they have invested
around US$1 million in total in their properties
(Carta Leonardo Rafo a Tomás Puig, Sub-
secretario de Marina, 26 de enero 2005, in
Juzgado Civil de Los Vilos, Papel de Juicio
7.020 . . . folio 80). Divided by the 35 houses
existing there (sometimes they refer to 37
houses), US$1 million would mean 28,000
dollar per house (18 million Chilean pesos).
For some reason the quantity is given in dollars;
perhaps another sign of market forces acting on
coastal areas.
Another document from 2002 addressed to
the Los Vilos harbour Captain, signed by Sui,
as President of the group, says that the summer
house owners act as a juridical person since
October 2000 under the name Centro Recrea-
cional Caleta Puerto Oscuro. However, Sui
does not appear among those involved in the
lawsuit. In the 2002 document, the group gives
power of attorney to a lawyer (a different
lawyer to the one representing them in the
lawsuit initiated in 2004) to represent them
(Carta al Capitan de Puerto Los Vilos, de N.
Sui, 2002, in Juzgado Civil de Los Vilos, Papel
de Juicio, 2004 . . . folio 70).
The lawsuit consists of copious amounts of
documents representing myriad arguments,
which for my purposes are unnecessary to
describe it in detail. Sufficient to say that the
arguments contained within the lawsuit reflect
the transformation of Puerto Oscuro into a
seascape of conflict, where the social relation-
ships of those who have a significant emotional,
social and economic relation to the place have
been severely infected. Emotional, because of
the personal attachment to Puerto Oscuro’s
scenic beauty and natural values; social, reflect-
ing the regular patterns of interaction by the
same people every summer, and economic
because of the investment in their summer
houses. Of course the aspirations of the summer
house owners mix with and further complicate
the plans of the fishers and the future develop-
ment of their MA. The lawsuit continues and
the outcome is unknown.
UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES
Clearly, there is considerable misunderstanding
of the rule relating to use of the 80 meters of
beach area controlled by the State. By law, the
sea beach zone is the State controlled zone
which stretches up to the high tide mark (80
meters), provided that the beach is not within
private property in which case the law is on the
side of the owners of the property and the 80
meters (valid for State property) becomes re-
duced to 8 meters.
Many questions arise in case the summer
houses owners lose the court case. Will the
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summer house owners leave willingly? Would
the authorities use force to evict them and
destroy their houses? Which authority would
be responsible for handling the eviction, the
navy that controls the coast or the police that
control the land? Can the houses be destroyed
without any compensation? Most probably
things will continue as now even in case the
property owners win, given the conditions
established for these cases by the Civil Code.
The Civil Code considers different situa-
tions and solutions when a person constructs a
dwelling on land that they do not legally own
(Código Civil de Chile, 2000, Art. 669). One
case is when a person builds without the
knowledge of the owner. In this case, the owner
of the land is able to assume legal ownership of
that building, with compensation for the house
builder negotiated between the two parties. In
this case, as part of the legal settlement, the
building owner is required to pay a rental price
to the landowner for the land for the period
of occupation (by the building). The second
situation considered by the Civil Code is when
someone has built ‘‘with the science and
patience’’ (explicit knowledge) of the landholder
and in this scenario the landholder is obliged to
pay the other party the value of the building as
compensation in order to evacuate the other
party from his land (Código Civil de Chile,
2000, Art. 669).
It is difficult to say whether the people that
have built their cottages in Puerto Oscuro
correspond to the first or the second case. In
any case, the cottage owners have to be paid
either a negotiated compensation (in the first
case) or the value of their properties (in the
second). A key question is whether the five
family branches would be prepared to pay
whatever the outcome when it is only one
branch that has aspirations to keep the cove.
In other words, considering that the reserve has
now been divided by a de facto arrangement,
and that one of the five family branches will
have exclusive claim on the land adjacent to
the harbour * the most valuable part * will
all of the family branches agree to act collec-
tively to pay any required compensation?
Furthermore, will they be able to manage it
economically?
However, for the fishers it seems to be quite
clear that the reserve owners cannot restrict
them from developing their activities on the
beach and ‘‘of the continuing land up to a
distance of eight meters from the beach’’, and
that this also implies to building huts in this
zone for fishing support purposes (Código Civil
de Chile, 2000, Art. 612 and 613). It is unclear
whether the huts (cabañas) are for residential
purposes or just to shelter.
Nonetheless, rules and praxis may be two
different things. So, despite the existence of
these rules since the establishment of the
Constitution in 1925, they offered no protec-
tion to the fishers when they, in conjunction
with the local Municipality, tried to construct
a hut which was subsequently damaged by one
of the property owners. If the local authorities
are not clear about what the Constitution
guarantees, what can be expected from people
in far more humble circumstances? If autho-
rities give fishers exclusive use rights to a
portion of the sea for their MA, then why
do the authorities abandon the needs of fishers
on land?
The reserve owners cannot directly hinder
fishing activities as this would go against the
spirit and intent of the LPA, particularly since
the formalization of MAs. But to allow the
petitions of the fishers (see the list of un-
materialized projects above) would mean to
improve facilities and services that would also
benefit the summer houses owners; the same
buildings that the property owners want to
eradicate. It would also give further permanency
to the fishing activities when they consider that
the land adjacent to the beach, and the bay,
belong to the Echavarrı́a family.
The ‘‘regulation of existent human settle-
ments and artisanal fishing coves’’ belongs,
‘‘except in some circumstances’’, to the National
Commission for the Coastal Board (Ministerio
de Defensa Nacional, 1994, Decreto 475, Polı́-
tica Uso de Borde Costero, Tı́tulo IV, Objetivos
Especı́ficos, No. 5, letra c). According to Sergio
Lira Arias, Navy Captain, Chief of Maritime
Business, Marine Subsecretary, the coves within
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private properties (these are the exceptions) are
not under this jurisdiction. Moreover, that they
fall within the responsibility of regional autho-
rities, this being the case of Puerto Oscuro. He
indicates furthermore that the State controls
only 20 percent of the territory in the coastal
border, the rest being in private hands, (Lira, S.,
Marine Subsecretary, Pers. Comm. via email
2006-11-17). This is contradicted by informa-
tion on property regimes of the coastal border
coming from the Ministry of Real Estates,
which estimates around 56 percent to be state
controlled (Caballol, et al., 2006).
With the implementation the MAs it is
reasonable to expect that the fishers would be
informed about their rights on land, particu-
larly given that the fishers are poorly educated
and have relatively low levels of literacy.
Furthermore, the applicable laws are difficult
to understand as they involve many exceptions
and subtleties and require nuanced and expert
interpretations. It is rather apparent that with-
out the direct and active support of the
authorities, given the open and active hostility
the fishers have experienced from the reserve
owners, they would hardly dare to take any
further initiative to realize their rights, let alone
try and establish support infrastructure.
Fishers and the property owners will con-
tinue to share Puerto Oscuro as a common
seascape for their activities in the foreseeable
future. If, in addition, the owners of the property
win the lawsuit against the summer house own-
ers, it is likely to weaken the fishers psychologi-
cally, making their situation even more
precarious. These are not the best conditions
for the continued development of a policy that
tries to protect the environment and secure the
livelihood of those living off artisanal fishing,
which is the aim of the fishing policy. This
conflict allows an examination of the way the
Constitution and other legal rights are influ-
enced by differing class interests (and associated
power and influence) when being translated into
practice. More specifically, whose priorities
count within a neo-liberal economy and export
market oriented policy?
THE MANAGEMENT AREA PUERTO
OSCURO
PUERTO OSCURO: THE TIMES PRIOR TO THE
MANAGEMENT AREA
Despite Canela posessing approximately 60
kilometers of coast, some suitable caletas or
coves for fishing and a rich variety of edible
marine species, fishing as an occupation is
marginal.8 Besides Puerto Oscuro (30 mem-
bers), there are two other MAs in Canela
commune: Puerto Manso (29 members) and
Huentelauquén (39 members) (Sernapesca,
2006c). Like Puerto Oscuro, these two MAs
are also situated within private properties. In
Canela, the first MA to be formed was Huente-
lauquén (December 1998), the second Puerto
Oscuro (July 1999) and the third Puerto Manso
(July 2000) (Sernapesca, 2006c). However, in the
Official Newspaper of the Republic it is stated
that both the Puerto Oscuro and Huentelau-
quén MAs were established even earlier as the
notice was published on the 20th of February
1998. The ESBA study to support the establish-
ment of the Puerto Oscuro MA was performed
as early as between 1993 and 1994 (IFOP, 2000).
Before the introduction of the MAs in the
late 1990s, the number of fishers in the com-
mune varied. It increased when the ban on the
Loco were lifted. During the 1980s, fishers
numbered, between 30 and 50 (based on my
own observations). According to CONAF
(1981, p. 44), they totalled around 80. With
few exceptions, these fishers were originally
from other localities like Los Vilos * 60 kilo-
meters south of Puerto Oscuro * and Tongoy
* 160 kilometer north of Puerto Oscuro.
The fish produce was either sold locally by
the fishers themselves in the cove area or in Los
Vilos to intermediary merchants for transport
8 That the commune’s inhabitants are more for the land than
the sea is due to the agro-pastoral tradition from the
colonial time that predominates in the commune
composed mainly of agricultural communities that own
their land in common. Furthermore, except for two
communities (Angostura de Gálvez and Huentelauquén)
situated on the coast, all the agricultural communities (21)
are located in the interior of the commune (Gallardo,
2002).
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to the markets of the capital. After the intro-
duction of the MAs the intermediaries have
generally been substituted by export firms that
buy directly from the MAs. As is becoming
more apparent as this book addresses the range
of different issues affecting coastal settlement,
the social conditions of the fishers in these coves
were and are still precarious.
Fishing is also a marginal occupation
throughout Region IV of Coquimbo in spite of
the 440 kilometers of coastline. The artisanal
fishers (3,133) represented only 2.8 percent of
the labour force of Region IV in 1980. This
figure includes around 1,000 seaweed collectors
and 600 cove workers helping with fishing
activities called auxiliaries (CONAF, 1981,
p. 44). Discounting the auxiliaries, artisanal
fishers amounted to 2,533 people. In 2004, the
total number employed in fishing was 7,341. Of
this total, 3,128 corresponded to the industrial
sector and 4,213 to the artisanal sector (Sub-
pesca, 2004). According to Ocares (semi-struc-
tured interview, 2007-01-14), artisanal fishers
presently [2008] number around 4,500, while in
1993, before the implementation of the MAs,
they were 2,000. Sernapesca has allowed the
registration of new fishers. Most probably,
newcomers have been integrated in the existing
fishing organization by means of family and
friendship links.
Being the President of FEPEMACH, Leo-
nardo Ocares also represents and coordinates
the regional interests of FEPEMACHs’ member
organizations. In spite of its geographical name
(Choapa province), the federation covers the
whole Region, embracing 21 fishers and divers
organizations, reaching around 1,600 members;
including their family members, this totals
approximately 6,000 persons (FEPEMACH,
2006).
According to Mariano Castillo (semi-struc-
tured interview, 2001-01-10), between the 1930s
and up to the 1960s, the most important
exploited fish resources were the Congrio or
Red kingklip (Genypterus Chilensis; (see Picture
6.4, Subpesca, 2005c, permission from Bol-
barán, D., Subpesca, Pers. Comm. via email
2008-04-08); the Erizo or Urchin (Loxechinus
Albus); and the Champa, also called Chasca
(Agar-agar, Gelidium sp). Approximately 20
boats were active at that time. From the 1970s
and up to the middle of the 1980s, the main
exploited resource was the Loco.
In Puerto Oscuro, as in other coves, the
Locos also diminished considerably during the
1980s as a consequence of the export boom and
MAs, and other management measures were
implemented. Castillo (semi-structured inter-
view, 2001-01-10) describes that during the
1960s, and at the beginning of the 1970s, if
fishers extracted 2,000 Locos it was considered a
bad day trip for one boat with three crews.
When it was good, they harvested 3,0003,500
Locos. There were between 10 and 15 active
boats during the 1970s. Although of humble
origin, the fishers themselves differ in their
assets and activities. Some of them own their
artisanal or motorized boats and other gear for
fishing; others do not.
Calculating 10 boats per day and at 3,000
Locos per boat, they would have had the
capacity to harvest a total of 30,000 Locos
daily. In contrast in 2001, if fishers harvested
200300 Locos ‘‘they considered themselves
happy’’. It is worth noting, however, that the
price of Locos was much lower before the
export boom in the middle of the 1970s, being
approximately 200 pesos per Loco. Mr. Castillo
(semi-structured interviews, 2001-01-10)
believes that the principal reason for the Locos
decline was the local exploitation system, they
practiced during the open access period. In this
system, the boat owner received 67 percent of
the large Locos, and the diver 33 percent. The
small sized Locos were not counted and were
kept by the divers. This, according to
Mr. Castillo (semi-structured interviews, 2001-
01-10), was the principal reason behind
resource depletion. The system encouraged the
extraction of juvenile Locos.
Although there had been a legal minimum
size regulation in place since 1965, the fishers
either did not know about it, or ignored it. In the
PICTURE 6.4 Congrio
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local system described above, the harvest of
small Locos was in fact an explicit part of the
agreement, and therefore a relied on source of
income for their diving efforts. This situation
characterizes the ‘‘tragedy’’ of open access that
operated in a de facto way until stock exhaustion
started to be evident nationally. Although the
fishers, as years passed, must have become aware
of the fact that juvenile harvesting endangered
Locos reproduction, the rationale was probably
something like: ‘‘If I don’t harvest the available
Locos, somebody else will do it anyway’’.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE MANAGEMENT AREA
In order to establish the MA at Puerto Oscuro
the fishers organized as a guild association (see
Chapter Four), which is most common organiza-
tional form in the region. Of a total of 51 regional
artisanal fisher organizations, 29 are guilds,
18 unions and four cooperatives. When they
formed the Guild Association of fishers, divers
and shore collectors of Puerto Oscuro cove,9 they
were 27 members. The rules demand a minimum
of 25 members to establish an association
(Decreto Ley. 2.757 de 1979, Texto actualizado,
Art. 3, Asociaciones gremiales, Ministerio de
Economı́a, Chile). If someone withdraws from
the association, they have to be substituted
(Ocares, semi-structured interview, 2001-01-10).
In the 2006 list of Sernapesca, the association
appears with 30 members, which probably means
that Sernapesca counted three old non-active
fishers. In 2005 there were 25 fishers according to
the data collected in this research.
The 25 fishers originate from and live in
different places. Fifteen fishers are local. Of the
10 non-local, six are from Los Vilos, three
from the close-by agricultural community of
Angostura, and one from Canela, the com-
mune capital. Seven fishers own a boat. As can
be seen in Table 6.1, a boat owner or another
fisher can belong to different categories (such
as, boat owner, captain, fisher, diver, shore
seaweed collector, or assistant diver).
The years before the MA (up to 1997),
Puerto Oscuro fishers functioned in accordance
with the Benthic Extraction Regime. This re-
gime was in place prior to the establishment of
MAs (see Chapter Five). According to IFOP
(2000, p. 2), as early as 1999, 55 percent of the
total extraction of Locos of the Region of
Coquimbo came from established MAs.
The Puerto Oscuro MA consists of 627
hectares.10 There are seven benthic species
targeted for extraction (see corresponding
pictures in Chapter Four). Locos and Lapas
or Chilean limpet are considered most impor-
tant (Fissurella Spp). Erizo (sea Urchin) the
second most important fish is followed by
Piure or Chilean pyurid, Red sea squiert (Pyura
Chilensis), Jaiba marmola or Rock crab (Can-
cer Edwardsi) Picoroco or Giant barnacle
(Austromegaba-lanus Psittacus) and Seaweeds
(IFOP, 2000).
Since the Puerto Oscuro MA was estab-
lished, fishers normally harvest during spring
and summer (November  January). They use
six or seven boats. The incomes are divided
equally among the members, except for 20
percent that goes to the fisher association. Just
after the establishment of the MA, the associa-
tion received, together with seven other regional
coves, a state subsidy of 30 million pesos or US
$71,397 (1994 value)11 to pay the Base Situation
Study (ESBA) performed by IFOP between
1993 and 1994 (IFOP, 2000). This subsidy
covered 70 percent of the study cost and MA
application process. The other 30 percent had to
be covered by the fishing organizations.
After the MAs had been operating for three
years (in 2003), the fisher organization, as
required, has to continue contracting a uni-
versity or other consultants for the technical
9 In Spanish: Asociación Gremial de Pescadores
Artesanales, Buzos Mariscadores y Recolectores de
Orilla de Caletas Puerto Oscuro.
10 According to the Subpesca its precise coordinates are
Vertex A (South Latitude 318 23’ 16,06’’ and West
Longitude 71 8 36’ 56,79’’ to Vertex I (South Latitude 318
25’ 11,71’’ and West Longitude 718 53’ 52,05’’)
(Subpesca Ministerio de Economı́a, Fomento y
Reconstrucción, Stgo, 10 Septiembre de 2002, Modifica
Decreto Supremo No. 10 de 1998, Decreto. Exento
No. 726).
11 Average of 420.18 pesos per US$1, year 1994 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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support to regularly evaluate the fish resources.
These costs were paid for from regional funds
in the first two years. In this adaptive manage-
ment approach, the association decides the time
for the harvest, but the capture quota to be
harvested per year is decided together with the
consultants. The actual harvest data is then
required to be reported to Sernapesca. The
costs to support this work are estimated at
around 4 million pesos or US$6,299 (2001
value),12 yearly. After four years of operation,
MAs are subject to taxes (patent), which are
calculated on a per hectare basis at one UTM
(Unidad Tributaria or Tributary Unit) per
hectare (27,000 pesos in 2001). In taxes, the
627 hectares required payment of 16,929
million pesos, or US$26,662 (2001 value).13
With these costs, the fishers did not consider
the MA profitable (Ocares, semi-structured
interview, 2001-01-10). Actually these tax
obligations were considered to be a huge
problem and highly unfair. Of the 627 hectares
that make up the Puerto Oscuro MA, only a
small proportion is economically exploitable.
TABLE 6.1 Fishers in Puerto Oscuro according to occupation type and origin, 2005.
No Name Boat Owner Fisher Diver Seaweed collector Diver auxiliary Origin
Non-local fishers*
1 A.A.L. x x Canela
2 E.B.M. x A.de G.***
3 M.M.O. x X A.de G.
4 J.O.Z. x x x A.de G.
5 L.D.O. x Los Vilos
6 J.B.M. X Los Vilos
7 R.A.G. x x Los Vilos
8 J.A.B. x x Los Vilos
9 E.C.H. x x Los Vilos
10 R.S.G. x Los Vilos
Local fishers**
11 E.C.C. x x x X P.O.****
12 J.O.J. X P.O.
13 O.V.V. X P.O.
14 J.C.V. x X P.O.
15 F.C.V. x P.O.
16 C.C.C. x X P.O.
17 M.L.V. x X P.O.
18 C.C.V. x P.O.
19 J.R.R. x P.O.
20 F.R.C. x P.O.
21 V.R.R. x P.O.
22 M.V.I. x P.O.
23 M.C.C. x x x P.O.
24 H.A.B. x P.O.
25 J.H.S. x x X P.O.
Total 7 7 6 13 9
* Source: Contreras E., Sea Mayor, Los Vilos, 2005-09-30, Interviewed by Espinoza, J., Field Assistant, Pers. Comm. via email 2005-10-12.
** Source: Information compiled by by Soto H., local school teacher, Soto was interviewed by Espinoza, J., Field Assistant, 2005-09-29, Pers.
Comm. via email 2005-10-20.
*** A. de G.Angostura de Gálvez.
**** P OPuerto Oscuro.
12 Average of 634.94 pesos per US$1, year 2001 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
13 Average of 634.94 pesos per US$1, year 2001 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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At a national level, fishers argued that they
should pay according to production (per unit)
or per productive hectare, rather than on the
basis of the entire area of the MA.
The advocacy of the fishers was partially
successful and the Government heared the call
and taxes were reduced in 2004, so the tax costs
for the Puerto Oscuro MA were less that year.
However, the structure of the tax system was
not reformed and taxes continued to be based
on overall MA areas, regardless of its produc-
tive capacity. The only concession made by
Government was a reduction in the UTM rate
from one UTM per hectare to 0.25 UTM per
hectare (Paillaman, A., Sernapesca, Pers.
Comm. via email 2006-08-17). Clearly taxes of
this magnitude, when considered with other
operational costs (including those associated
with the engagement of ‘‘experts’’ to assist
with monitoring and reporting) imposed a
considerable burden on the MAs to the point
where their viability was questioned and their
survival threatened.
An ESBA study from IFOP (2000, p. 3, 39)
confirms the claims of the fishers that only part
of Puerto Oscuro is productive for fishing.
According to IFOP, the geography of the MA
limits its productive potential due to large areas
of slopes and cliffs with winds from the south
and east for the major part of the year, causing
turbulences and strong waves such that the
potential for extraction is limited. Furthermore,
the high incidence of unsuitable conditions
situated below the 25-meters deep, are not
accessible for diving extraction (IFOP, 2000, p.
81). The area that is suitable for extraction
comprises around 166 hectares or only 25
percent of the total MA area.
PRODUCTION AND PROJECTIONS
In 2000, the study year, the Loco abundance in
Puerto Oscuro (size 213 cm) was 220,432
(IFOP, 2000). Of this only 36 percent conforms
to the extractable minimum size (10 cm);
however, the actual allowable catch is far less
than this so as to allow recuperation. With a
growing stock, the economic situation of the
association should improve, which should
place it in a better position to afford taxes
and other expenses associated with the MA in
the future.
Table 6.2 below shows the planned capture
quotas up to 2007 according to the Puerto
Oscuro Proposition of Management Plan and
Exploitation of the MA (PMEA, see Chapter
Five). As can be seen, already in the second
year (2001), the estimated quota increased by
73.5 percent relative to 2000. From there, the
planned quota stabilizes at around 30,000
Locos per year up to 2007. Extracted quantities
differ from planned, though. In order to show
the discrepancies I introduced an extra column
(in Italics) in both Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 for
years with available information, both from
Mr. Ocares (semi-structured interview, 2007-01-
14), IFOP or both.
Table 6.3 below shows the harvest of the
principal three species of Puerto Oscuro’s MA
between 1997 and 2001. Since they are given in
tonnes, I have converted the tonnes in units of
Locos (four Locos in shell per kilo) in order to
allow a comparison with Table 6.2.
PRODUCTION BETWEEN 1997 AND 1999
For the three years for which data exists for
Puerto Oscuro, prior to becoming a MA,
Sernapesca (2007b) registered (see Table 6.3)
an extraction of 6.3 tonnes of Locos in 1997,
corresponding to around 25,000 Locos. In 1998,
extraction was 4 tonnes of Locos, corresponding
to around 16,000 units of Locos. In 1999,
extraction was 3.5 tonnes, or around 14,000
Locos (Sernapesca, 2007b).
However, according to IFOP (2000), in 1997
the Loco catch was 9 tonnes, or around 36,000 in
shell units; 2 tonnes in 1998, and 5 tonnes in
1996 (IFOP, 2000). The IFOP landing data does
not agree with Sernapesca’s data (Table 6.3).
Ocares’s (semi-structured interview, 2007-01-14)
opinion seems to confirm the high result
(9 tonnes) for 1997 given by IFOP. Nonetheless,
this incongruence between the data shows
that although both Sernapesca and IFOP are
credible institutions, the data they generate are
not always reliable.
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According to Sernapesca (2007b), the
extraction of Lapas by Puerto Oscuro fishers
was 41.0 tonnes in 1997, 23.8 tonnes in 1998
and 41.0 tonnes in 1999. IFOP in its turn gives
over 18 tonnes per year of Lapas landing in
Puerto Oscuro and this was more than double
previous to 1996, while the contrary occurred in
the rest of the country (IFOP, 2000, p. 48). As
seen, IFOPs results are lower than those given
by Sernapesca.
PRODUCTION BETWEEN 2000 AND 2001
In 2000 the fishers harvested Locos for first time
from Puerto Oscuro as a MA, and the entire
harvest went for export. It was recorded that
TABLE 6.2 Planned capture quotas of Locos for the MA Puerto Oscuro, 20002007.
Year
IFOPs planned capture quotas
(units of Locos)










Source: IFOP (2000); Ocares, President of the Puerto Oscuro fisher association, semi-structured interview,
2007-01-14.







to IPOF prior to the MA and projections
in tonnes (shell units) and units
Loco 2001 7,3 29,200 29,135
2000 1,3 5,200 16,787
1999 3,5 14,000
1998 4,0 16,000 2 8,000
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extraction was 1.3 tonnes (5,200 units) or
approximately one-third of the 16,787 Locos of
the capture quota proposed in the Puerto
Oscuro PMEA (see Table 6.2 above) (Serna-
pesca, 2007b).
In 2001, during 10 days, 7.3 tonnes, (29,300
units) were extracted. This is a little more than
that prescribed. According to Mr. Ocares (semi-
structured interview, 2001-01-10), when needed,
they employ extra labour during extraction
days. An auxiliary that helps with the harvest
obtained, in 2001, 70,000 pesos or US$110
monthly, and a diver twice as much. The entire
harvest was exported.
When 10 units of Locos without shell make
a kilogram, it is considered a good result
(Ocares, semi-structured interview, 2001-01-10).
In 2001 the revenue was 1,200 pesos per unit, or
US$1.8 (2001 value).14 Thus, the 29,300 Locos
should have given gross of around 35.1 million
of pesos, or US$55,375 (rates as above). Keep-
ing the same values as above, the 5,200 Locos
landed in 2000 should have given around 6.2
million pesos or US$9,827.
Regarding Lapas, in 2000 and 2001 26.6 and
15.7 tonnes, respectively were extracted (Serna-
pesca, 2007b). The programmed quotas for
those years were 3 and 4 tonnes, respectively
(IFOP, 2000, Anexos, Table 19), which is much
less than what was actually landed. The kilo-
gram price for Lapas with shell in 2001 was
2,000 pesos or US$3.10.15 This means that for
the Lapas harvest in 2000 the association
received 53.2 million pesos or US$83,787 (rates
as above). In 2001, they should have got 31.4
million pesos or US$49,453 (keeping the prices
and conversion rates as above). Although the
result for the Loco harvest was less than
expected, the Lapas harvest generated more
than expected and therefore, to some extent,
this balanced the overall from the MA.
GROSS AND NET INCOMES
Income from the Loco harvest was around
150,000 pesos per fisher annually, which allows
them to survive economically for two months
(Ocares, semi-structured interview, 2001-01-10).
My calculation based on the prices above for
2000 and 2001, and on the registers of Serna-
pesca (2007b), gives a higher income from the
MA (considering only Locos and Lapas),
although incomes are highly variable due to a
number of factors, as discussed below.
Costs to fishers are composed of variable
and fixed costs, in addition to the collective
expenses of taxes and research. The variable
costs consist of the expense incurred whilst
undertaking operations, or on number of trips.
This includes such expenses as fuel, oil, techni-
cal maintenance of equipment, in addition to
the cost of opportunity of the labour force such
as salary or and/or share of the crew. The fixed
cost consists of the depreciation of capital
goods, technical maintenance of equipment
(boat, motor and compressor), administration
of salary payments and of the social quotas paid
by the members to the organization and also to
the cost of opportunity of inverted capital,
which corresponds to the interest (IFOP, 2000).
According to IFOP’s projections, the added
gross income for both Locos and Lapas should
have been in the order of 16 and 27 million
pesos for 2000 and 2001, respectively. The net
benefits (discounting variable and fixed costs)
should have been around 11 and 21 million
pesos in 2000 and 2001, respectively. The net
benefits per individual member per year there-
fore should have been around 445,000 and
859,000 pesos 2000 and 2001, respectively.
This translates into a monthly income of
37,083 and 71,583 pesos. IFOP’s costs do not
include tax payments (which the association
started paying in 2003), nor research (that they
started paying in 2002).
Since the percentage for the fixed and variable
costs varies in IFOP’s calculations for 2000 (31.2
percent) and 2001 (22.2 percent) but remains
stable in their calculations from 2002 to 2007 of
around 20 percent, I use the latter percentage in
my calculations, being more representative of a
14 Average of 634.94 pesos per US$1, year 2001 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
15 Average of 634.94 pesos per US$1, year 2001 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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normal year. To be consistent, this percentage
should be discounted for eachyear from the gross
incomes. This agrees with the 20 percent that the
association declared they should reserve from
their income to cover the costs of the MA.
Thus, with reference to Sernapesca’s regis-
tered harvest for Locos and Lapas in 2000 and
2001, the association would have received a
gross income of 59 and 66 million pesos,
respectively (see Table 6.4). After having dis-
counted by 20 percent for costs every year, this
gives an average net income of 47 and 53 million
pesos for 2000 and 2001, respectively. The total
income generated in 2000 by the association
divided by the 25 fisher members would mean
1.8 million pesos per year and fisher, or 157,410
pesos per month. For 2001, it would be an
average gross income of 2.1 million pesos, or
176,225 pesos per month per fisher. These
incomes can be compared with the minimum
salary in Chile, which was 105,500 pesos or
US$166 in July 200116. Note that I am only
considering the income derived from for the two
main targeted species.
PRODUCTION AFTER 2001
In 2007, Ocares (semi-structured interview,
2007-01-14) seemed to be less optimistic about
their MA. Ocares declares that after 2001,
1720,000 Locos were extracted per year, which
is below IFOP’s projected quota (Table 6.2).
According to him, in 2002 only 7,000 Locos
were extracted due to scarcity. In 2003, Locos
were still too scarce to meet quota targets. Some
fishers think that the scarcity of Locos is due to
wastes from the Los Pelambres copper mine in
Los Vilos (around 60 kilometers south from
Puerto Oscuro) which pollutes the water, affect-
ing the reproductive performance of Locos
negatively (Mr. Ocares, semi-structured inter-
view, 2001-01-10). I will return to this issue as
Mr. Ocares raised it again in 2007.
Not only harvest is lower than projections,
but also the prices. The average price for Locos
between 2002 and 2004 was 700 pesos (or
US$1.5) per unit, and 700 pesos per kilogram
for Lapa. From 2004 to 2006 the price per Loco
lowered to 520 pesos (US$1) per Loco in 2006.
This year (in 2007) 4,200 Locos were extracted,
yielding only 2.2 million pesos; this apparently
puts the MA in economic predicament as we
shall see below.
Table 6.5 shows Loco landing statistics. I
have compared these results with IFOP’s projec-
tions for recent years.
Sernapesca’s regional register for 2006 is not
complete. But Mr. Ocares (semi-structered
interview, 2007-01-14) declared that the total
catch for 2007 was 4,220 Locos. In general, the












Locos (units) 5200 6,200,000 9,764.70 29,300 35,100,000 55,280,81
Lapas (tonnes) 26,6 53,200,000 83,787.44 15,7 31,400,000 49,453.49
Total gross Income 59,400,000 93,552.15 66,500,000 104,734,31
Cost 20.5% (fix, variables,
taxes, consultancy)
12,177,000 19,178 13,632,500 21,471
Net Income 47,223,000 74,374 52, 867,500 83,264
Net Income 25 fishers/year 1,888,920,00 2,974,96 2,114,700,00 3,330,55
Net income fisher/month 157,410,00 247,91 176,225,00 277,55
* pesos converted average rate of 634.94 pesos per US$1 in 2001 (Banco Central de Chile 2003).
16 Average of 634.94 pesos per US$1, year 2001 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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results are considerably below the projected
ones. The total (actually extracted) 58,498 units
of Locos for these five years correspond to 39.2
percent of IFOP’s projected amount. The 22.4
tonnes of the previous five years (19972001)
diminished to 18.3 tonnes during the period
20022007.
In contrast to the Locos division between
projected and actual catch, Lapas statistics from
Coquimbo’s regional Sernapesca, presented in
Table 6.6, show that the landings during the last
five years are close to those projected.
PROBLEMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS: MR. OCARES’
PERCEPTIONS
From 2001 to 2007 the perceptions have
obviously changed. In 2001 the fishers, accord-
ing to Ocares (semi-structured interview, 2007-
01-14), were of the view that the MA was
performing well as 60 percent of the area had
been repopulated since its establishment in
1998. The optimal scenario for the association,
he then advised, was to rehabilitate the
population level of Locos to that in the
1970s. Reflecting back to the accounts given
above in terms of real catch and considering
the Locos extraction experience in the 1970s
where it was claimed that a reasonable day
catch per boat was between 3,000 and 3,500
Locos, Ocares and the fishers expectations
seem unrealistic. Such halcyon days of Locos
fishing may never return.
In reality, Ocares says, the Locos population
started to diminish as from 1997 and this was
when the economic sustainability of the MAs
became less viable. In fact, 1997 was the last
year in Puerto Oscuro that was ‘‘good’’ for Loco
extraction. According to Cerda (Sernapesca,
Pers. Comm. via email 2007-07-03 and 2007-
07-04), Puerto Oscuro is not alone regarding
unfulfilled harvest expectations. Apparently
there are also other MAs with more scarce
populations of Locos in the region.
TABLE 6.5 Loco landing according to regional Sernapesca-Coquimbo on the beach (tonnes and units) for
Puerto Oscuro, 20022006.
Year> Tonnes Units according Sernapesca Harvest according to IFOPs projections in units
2006 1,1 (Jan.Oct.) 4,287 29,967
2005 3,0 11,390 29,791
2004 9,1 27,450 29,745
2003 1,0 3,000 29,729
2002 4,1 12,371 29,205
Total 18,3 58,498 148,437
Source: Cerda, G., Sernapesca-Coquimbo, Pers. Comm. via email 2007-07-03.
TABLE 6.6 Lapas landings according to regional Sernapesca-Coquimbo on the
beach (in tonnes) for Puerto Oscuro, 20022006.
Year Tonnes in shell IFOP projections (tonnes in shell)







Source: Cerda, G., Sernapesca-Coquimbo, Pers. Comm. via email 2007-07-03.
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Regional fishers’ perceptions of why Locos
are diminishing includes climatic, land-based
environmental problems and social issues. The
fishers believe, according to Mr. Ocares, that the
periodical influence of El Niño or La Niña,
affects the species, perhaps explaining its dete-
rioration in number and growth. The most
recent El Niño event began in the spring months
of 1997 (the fishers explicitly make the link with
the last ‘‘good year’’ for Loco harvest). El Niño
events are considered to have a direct impact on
marine species. When El Niño occurs,
the cool nutrient-rich sea water normally found along
the coast of Peru is replaced by warmer water depleted
of nutrients, resulting in a dramatic reduction in marine
fish and plant life . . .In contrast to El Niño, La Niña
(female child) refers to an anomaly of unusually cold
sea surface temperatures found in the eastern tropical
Pacific. La Niña occurs roughly half as often as El Niño
(Department of Atmospheric Sciences (DAS) Univer-
sity of Illinois, 2007).
The last La Niña years were 19951996. El
Niño
initially referred to a weak, warm current appearing
annually around Christmas time along the coast of
Ecuador and Peru and lasting only a few weeks to a
month or more. Every three to seven years, an El Niño
event may last for many months, having significant
economic and atmospheric consequences worldwide.
During the past forty years, ten of these major
El Niño events have been recorded, the worst of
which occurred in 19971998. Previous to this, the
El Niño event in 19821983 was the strongest. Some
of the El Niño events have persisted more than one
year (Department of Atmospheric Sciences (DAS)
University of Illinois, 2007).
There is also an increasing exploitation
of diverse types of weeds also demanded by
the international markets that might be chan-
ging the habitat of benthic species, amongst
them, Loco. There are different opinions as to
whether it has a negative or positive influence
on Loco populations. Those who argue this
position assert the (now harvested) weeds pro-
vide refuge for Locos and therefore increased
protection from its predators (Ocares, semi-
structured interview, 2007-01-14).
A third factor argued as negative by Ocares
are the externalities generated from mining
activities in the region, namely both the tailings
generated by the Pelambres Copper Mine at the
head of the catchment, which flow into the
Choapa River, and the activities of the port
facility used for shipping the extracted minerals.
The port commenced operations in 1997; i.e.,
the last ‘‘good year’’ for Loco harvest. Ocares
says that the Los Pelambres mine pays five
fisher organizations in two coves near the
shipping port 200 million pesos annually to
mitigate the problems that this mine ‘‘might’’
cause. This corresponds to US$371,457,17 or 40
million pesos per organization. It would be
roughly equivalent to one of Puerto Oscuro’s
best years of income from Loco harvest.
Another factor that may also have increased
the resource pressure, thereby providing a
partial explanation why MAs have not per-
formed well, is that they attracted more people
into fishing. From 1993, the number of fishers in
Region IV more than doubled (Ocares, semi-
structered interview, 2007-01-14).
Nonetheless, and in spite of the despon-
dency caused by the problems referred to above,
a note of confidence and faith in local capability
to ensure the positive future of the MA ı́s still
apparent in Ocares’ statements. This is no more
evident than in his following response where he
explained that if MAs have partially worked it is
because many fishers are engaged in the in-
itiative and are willing to actively contribute
towards making it work. Several organizations
of the regional federation pioneered the MAs.
This is confirmed by Sernapesca: the first
organizations in the country to have their
ESBA accepted (in April 1998) were those of
Los Vilos (Godoy, C., Sernapesca, Pers. Comm.
via email 2007-06-21). At least 16 fisher orga-
nizations in Region IV were successful in getting
their ESBA accepted during 1998.
By way of providing further support for his
argument, Ocares advises that the federation
has participated in the formulation of MA rules,
and was also active in the discussions and
formulation of the 1991 LPA. The federation
was also the prime mover of the initiative to
17 This is 538 pesos per US$1 (Diario El Mercurio, 2007-02-
28).
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reduce the tax obligations of the MAs from 1
UT/ha to 0.25 UT/ha (FEPEMACH, 2006).
Among the other advantages of MAs,
Ocares commented in the 2007 interview, in-
dividual members can now apply for loans for
the education of the children or for comple-
menting the household economy. The Guild
Association of fishers, divers and shore collec-
tors of Puerto Oscuro cove negotiated a volun-
tary life and death insurance for its members
that they pay individually. In 2006, a life
insurance cost 300 pesos monthly (less than
US$1). A life insurance to cover the eventuality
of death costs 500 pesos a year. The association
can also borrow money collectively. In 2006 the
association borrowed 12 million pesos from the
Banco del Estado to pay a consultancy to
monitor Locos stocks. As suggested before,
not only the harvest of the Locos (4,220 units)
was much below the planned quota for that
year, but the prices were also low * dealing the
association a double blow. The loan to pay the
consultancy is a clear signal of economic
difficulties.
ON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE MANAGEMENT
AREAS AND THE HISTORICAL AREAS
During the rest of the year, fishers work in the
historical areas. Ocares acknowledged during
the 2001 interview that association fishers
probably extracted Locos from the historical
areas. To my knowledge, they sold this illicit
catch at half price, although it is unlawful and in
spite of having their own MA. This showed a
lack of management awareness of the connec-
tion between the stock recuperation in the
historical areas and the MA. I did not consider
this attitude surprising given that only three
years had passed between the establishment of
the MA in 1998 and the year of my first
interview with Ocares in 2001. After all, old
customs and practices do not change over a
night.
Ocares was in 2001 of the opinion that
fishers were more aware compared to previously
and that stricter vigilance was not needed within
the MA, and nobody extracted Locos out of self
interest. He said ‘‘It is like having your own plot
of land: you take care of what is yours’’.
Another fisher, listening to our conversation,
added: ‘‘Of all the bad things, it is the best we
have’’.
It seems, then, that the fishing of Locos in
the historical areas still continues. The illicit
fishing activities are perhaps understandable
given that the MA is under-performing econom-
ically. According to Ocares, after the MA
implementation it has been the historical areas
that have suffered the negative impact as both
members and non-members of the MAs use
them for illegal extraction of Loco and other
benthic species. The resources there, he says, are
scarce and of ‘‘bad quality’’ * meaning too
small to get a good price. These areas are not
actively managed by the State and so there is
little risk of getting caught and punished, so
fishers take resources that are not only banned
but also catch that does not comply with legal
size limits. In trying to protect the benthic
resources, Ocares argues that the state has
forgotten the fishers, implying that fishers are
forced to continue to rely on catch from the
historical areas to meet subsistence needs.
Ocares (semi-structured interview, 2007-01-
14) told me that the fishers of the region decided
to patrol the entire regional coast themselves,
even outside of MAs. The initiative was declared
unconstitutional and national authorities
stopped it. The federation is of the opinion
that historical areas should be converted from
open access areas into areas of limited access
(ALA or áreas de acceso limitado (AAL)) and
their administration allocated to the existing
fishing organizations according to historical
use. This way every organization would, in
addition to their MA, also exploit and take
care of areas designated AAL, thereby prevent-
ing exploitation from ‘‘outsiders’’.
This would lead to a regulation of open access
areas according to the existing norm (in MAs)
for the exploitation of benthic resources, allow-
ing regulatory control and monitoring by
accountable association members of harvest,
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timing, amount and size. This information is
not available today (Ocares, semi-structured
interview, 2007-01-14) as there is a formal ban
on fishing in these areas.
What the fishers argue is that the ban does
not work in the historical areas, and should be
redesignated under another form, which in
practice would mean an extension of MAs. An
obvious, but vital question that emerges from
this aspiration is how MA fishers would manage
to limit access and effectively control and
monitor harvest of benthic species in even larger
areas (than the current MAs).
PRODUCTION IN THE HISTORICAL AREAS
The most important commercial fin fish is the
Congrio or Red kingklip (Genypterus Chilensis).
The catch for this species is on average around
200 kilograms of Congrio per night per boat. In
2002 the price per kilogram of Congrio was
around 800 pesos or US$1.20.18 Only half of the
days of the year do weather conditions allow
fishing. Using Congrio as an example, a rough
estimate of income from the historical areas of
seven boats fishing together is about 1,400
kilograms in one night. In 182 days
(half of the year) this would total 254,000
kilograms, which would give an income of
20,384.000 pesos. Divided by 25, the fishers
would get 815,360 pesos or a monthly income of
around 68,000 pesos.
If we now add this income to that derived
from the MA (176,000 pesos monthly per fisher)
it totals around 244,000 pesos monthly, or
US$354 (same rate as above). This is slightly
above the June 2002 of 111,200 pesos or US$161
(same rate as above). These estimates do not
consider other incomes coming from the
historical areas.
Castillo (semi-structured interviews,
2001-01-10) told me that before he finished
diving in 1983, he used to fish principally for
Congrio using a trawl line. During the 1960s
1970s, he alone could catch 80100 kilograms
Congrio in one night (compared with 200
kilograms presently per night and boat). The
principal reason, according to him, for the
reduction of Congrio is industrial fishing which
removes Congrio’s food, i.e. the Langostino or
Squat lobster (Pleuroncodes Monodonz).
According to Castillo (semi-structured inter-
views, 2001-01-10), Langostinos (see Picture
6.5, Subpesca, 2005c, permission from Bol-
barán, D., Subpesca, Pers. Comm. via email
2008-04-08) are now extremely rare.
In 1989, a visiting consultant showed a video
that portrayed how seaweed was harvested in
Korea. This specialist gathered 150 fishers from
the region, but few took interest. The idea was
to involve at least five coves in order to collect
seaweeds commercially. It was possible to get a
subsidy of 50 million pesos to develop seaweed
cultivation for the five coves, but it was not
possible for Puerto Oscuro to be part of the
project due to its role as a strategic army
harbour (Castillo, open interview, January
2003). In IFOPs’ study (2000), this project
appears as capacity building in the cultivation
of the seaweed Pelillo (Gracilaria spp)
financed by CIID-Canada in 199495 (see
Picture 6.6, Subpesca, 2005c, permission from
Bolbarán, D., Subpesca, Pers. Comm. via email
2008-04-08).
Since 1994, after he finished diving, Castillo
collected shore seaweed. During summer he also
PICTURE 6.5 Langostinos
PICTURE 6.6 Pelillo
18 Average of 688.94 pesos per US$1, year 2002 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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cuts seaweed from the rocks on the coast, which
does not require any diving. During one month
he gathers around 1,500 kilos and obtains 40
pesos per kilo, which provides an income of
around 60,000 pesos monthly,19 or US$9420
from this activity. The seaweed is collected
once a month by one of several buyers. This
activity is risk free and much better than diving,
he says. He manages somehow economically,
with seaweed collection as his main income
generating activity, although he also needs other
income sources to survive (Castillo, open inter-
view, January 2003).
FUTURE PLANS
Ocares declared in 2007 that 14 organizations
with around 450 fishers from the Choapa and
Limarı́ province are planning a project sup-
ported by CORFO and together with the
University of Los Lagos, in southern Chile,
aimed at strengthening MAs and improving
their yields.
The project includes the repopulation of
MAs with 40,000 Locos from southern Chile
and the cultivation of mussels for the same
purpose. This ambitious project also aims to
establish a coordination centre for the region,
as well as a research and experimentation
centre where fishers can also be hired. To
support these initiatives they have applied for
1,200 million pesos for two years from
CORFO. The cost of the third year will be
financed by the organizations themselves and
regional funds.
CONCLUSIONS
It is not easy to draw any definitive conclusions
regarding the effect of the Puerto Oscuro MA,
even after revising 10 years of production.
There are both positive and less positive trends.
Among the positive is that the MA is already in
place and functioning, and this is a major
achievement as it demands a great deal of
initiative, commitment and organization. Insti-
tutionally, fishers’ regional representatives have
learned to participate in policy making on
matters that affect their concerns, as it is clear
to see from Ocares accounts; he himself was
first the President of the MA Puerto Oscuro
and has even become President of one of the
regional fishing confederations. This engage-
ment in matters of importance and relevance to
the fishers themselves has had an empowering
effect and has enabled them to develop the
confidence and competencies to act effectively
as stakeholders and resource user group. They
negotiate internally about resource manage-
ment, when and how much to harvest in
coordinated actions allowing efficient planning,
thus demanding less time and energy. The fisher
organizations negotiate as collectives with the
buyers, obtaining better prices. Thus they do
not only hold sea tenure in common, but also
management, harvests and economic results are
common concerns.
As a collective, the MA can also design
development projects and apply for financing
both at central and regional levels, and also
concerns be taken more seriously as the MAs
also form regional federations and national
confederations. As such, they can also exercise
pressure in policy making matters at varying
scales leading to better opportunities to influ-
ence outcomes of decisions that have a bearing
on their interests.
The benefits of Loco fishing in MAs are not
filling expectations, while the Lapas catch seems
to be more closely aligned with landing projec-
tions. A more comprehensive study over a
longer period of time and including a more
expansive range of resources would enable more
definitive conclusions.
The connection between the MA and the
historical areas is currently problematic.
Although effectively managing the MA, some
fishers continue to extract Locos illegally from
outside the MA. As the historical areas and
the MAs are interconnected ecologically, to
take care of one but not the other might lead
to a vicious circle. This problem can be related
to their insecure economic situation as well as
19 Minimum wage January 2000 was 100,000 pesos or
US$157 (CEDOC- INE, 2005b; Trincado, INE, Pers.
Comm. via email 2005-08-12)).
20 Average of 634.94 per US$1, year 2001(Banco Central
de Chile 2003).
Chapter 6: Puerto Oscuro: The Seascape of Conflict 127
to the dilemma of common pool resources to
which I return in the last chapter. The taxes
are still a problem that could be easily resolved
by harmonizing rates payable with real produc-
tion. This would improve the economic
situation of the MAs, which in turn could
perhaps diminish the pressure on the historical
areas. However, so far these conclusions do not
consider the problem of the access to land,
which we have already discussed.
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7 El Quisco: The Seascape of Hope
SECTION 1: THE LOCATION:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the results and analysis of
field research in El Quisco. Every tool or exercise
is presented in the form of a table that includes
its purpose, participants and other basic data;
which is then followed by a corresponding
analysis (see methodology Chapter One). The
pictures and figures show either the direct
flipcharts of every tool produced by the partici-
pants or a redrawing of it. The chapter is divided
into three main sections and 12 sub-sections.
Sub-section two displays the results of the
village maps as perceived by participating men
and women. Section three develops a historic
profile of the fishing village. This is followed by
sub-section four, which presents reasons for the
introduction of the El Quisco MA, followed by
how the fishers perceive the concept of sustain-
able development (issues assessed with the help
of the stepping stones and drawing concept
tools, respectively). The fifth sub-section deals
with the institutional arrangement of the Un-
ion. It is complemented with the Venn diagram
tool that illustrates the institutional linkages
between the Union and the surrounding actors,
including an evaluation of their role in relation
to the Union. An assessment of the committee
structure of the Union is also considered.
Sub-section six shows the graphic results of
several tools, focusing on fishing, both inside
and outside the MA generated by the seasonal
calendar tool, among others. This section starts
with the Union’s labour distribution and boat
infrastructure, also discussing social differentia-
tion among fishers in terms of fishing assets.
The seasonal calendar tool is divided into
several tables and diagrams, dealing with avail-
ability of resources, labour distribution and
economic assessment of both production
spheres: inside and outside the MA. Use of
the sea transect tool enabled the generation of
data about fishers’ perception of resources,
predators and so on. This presentation is
followed by an illustration of the production
and commercialisation of one day of harvest.
This issue was assessed using a system flow
analysis tool showing the linkages between
different land and sea based economic activities,
and their market links. These data are comple-
mented by the daily calendar of a diver to
illustrate what a working day looks like.
The next sub-section treats the fishing
activity in the historical areas. An interview
with an experienced fisher, which was not
included in the seasonal calendar, was per-
formed separately to assess the fishing species
of the historical areas. As well, the daily
calendar of a historical area fisher is included.
Sub-section seven presents data collected on
fishing incomes. This is complemented with an
analysis of the actual production during the last
years according to Sernapesca’s statistics, and
prospects of production and income as antici-
pated in the Management Plan (PMEA) of the
Union calculated by BITECMA for the period
20012010.
Using the impact analysis tool mens’ and
womens’ perceptions of the effects the MA has
had in their lives is presented in sub-section eight.
An evaluation on the impact of the MAwould be
incomplete if not followed by an analysis of the
problems that the fishers perceive (sub-section
nine, using the problem-tree tool). While men’s
problems focused on the MA, women’s were
centred on their personal lives, including the
household situation and family. Women’s pro-
blems are complemented with the results of an
open interview with the women’s group. In
addition, their seasonal calendar regarding ill-
ness and related expenses is also included here.
Furthermore, the daily calendar of a woman is
presented. Sub-section 10 deals in its turn with
an analysis of mens’ and womens’ proposed
solutions to their respective problems. This was
done with the help of the solution-tree tool.
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Sub-section 11 includes the participants’
evaluation of the methodology. The opinions
of both men and women are displayed in the
form of three tables: what participants liked,
what participants did not like and what partici-
pants learnt. The 12th and last sub-section is the
conclusions.
THE LOCATION
El Quisco is situated around 150 km from the
capital city of Santiago, in the Region V of
Valparaiso (see Picture 7.1). El Quisco has
undergone significant changes during the last
five decades to the extent that a village and a
fishing cove are now also a summer middle- and
upper middle-class hub. The population and the
number of houses have increased. In 1970, there
were 2,217 inhabitants in the entire commune
(INE, Muñoz, Pers. Comm. via email 2007-10-
09), including El Quisco, Isla Negra (famous
because the Nobel Prize winner, Pablo Neruda
had one of his residences there * a popular
tourist attraction), and El Totoral. In 1992 the
commune’s population reached 6,097 inhabi-
tants (INE, 2002). There were 8,273 houses, but
only 1,829 were permanently occupied. The
remaining were seasonally occupied, belonging
mainly to people residing in Santiago. During
summers, the population * seasonal and tour-
ists * exceeds 200,000 persons (Vildósola and
Rosson, 1997, p. 183184). In 2002 there were
9,467 inhabitants (INE, 2002); i.e., an increase
of 55.3 percent compared to 1992. The residen-
tial population has increased 327 percent since
1970.
Becoming a summer resort has resulted in
major social differentiation for El Quisco, while
improving the town’s infrastructure. For the
fishers it meant, on the one hand, a threat to
their activities that soon developed into a struggle
over physical space; an event that would have a
significant connotation for them as a collective.
On the other hand, the summer and weekend
guests also meant an economic boost: more
demand for their products, and job opportu-
nities; i.e., as care takers of the summer houses,
principality the women. Otherwise, in terms of
stable job opportunities, labour demand is low
with the exception of some construction teams
and those related to increasing bureaucratic posts
around the Municipally, health care and schools.
Social differentiation and house segregation
were raised by the fishers and their wives in the
results using village maps tools. This can also be
seen in the women’s problem-tree and solution-
tree tools.
The aim of the village maps was to obtain
fishers’ and womens’ general perception of
places, resources and city structure and to see
whether there was a gender difference in these
perspectives. The mens’ map (see Pictures 7.2A
and 7.2B) clearly distinguishes between the
well-off summer residences, which they have
PICTURE 7.1 Location of El Quisco
TABLE 7.1 Men’s village map (Mapa del Pueblo).
Purpose: To obtain a perception of the distribution of
places, resources and city structure in general.
Participants: Luis Pizarro, Guillermo Alvarez and Silvio
Crovetto.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre. Date: July 19th,
2001. Duration: ca three hours.
Process and Several steps were required to draw the final
Comments: version. The participants particularly enjoyed
drawing the map; it caused a lot of amuse-
ment and comments from onlookers.
Facilitator: Rosson, A.
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coloured pink, from the poblaciones or settle-
ments where they live, which they have coloured
black. In comparison with the women’s map (see
Pictures 7.3A and 7.3B), the men’s map is more
detailed. Football and other sports activities are
delineated, as well as churches. Paradoxically,
the cove with its boats and the Union Social
Centre is more visible in the women’s map than
in the men’s map. In contrast, the site where the
yacht club is situated, neighbouring the cove, is
more visible in the mens’ map, as is the coastline.
The prominence of the yacht club is probably
due to it being a conflict zone for the fishers.
The womens’ map clearly distinguishes (see
Pictures 7.3A and 7.3B) the unpaved roads
(pink) that lead to the poorer places of the
village and which get muddy during winter and
where they live (poblaciones or settlements),
from the main paved road near the beach that
leads to the well-off summer residences and
apartments. Like the men, the women make an
obvious distinction between these well-off
houses and their own poblaciones. The cove
with its boats and the Union Social Centre is
more visible in the women’s map than in the
men’s (Table 7.2).
ANALYSIS OF VILLAGE MAP TOOLS
Both men and women depicted the typical small
town, but highlighted class difference by house
segregation as a significant issue. They repre-
sented their own living places in the more
distant and higher parts of town with many
equal small houses close to each other, circum-
scribed by small boxes, which men coloured
PICTURE 7.2 (A) Men’s village map, (B) Legend
(simbologia)
PICTURE 7.3 (A) Women’s village map, (B) Legend
(simbologia)
TABLE 7.2 Women’s village map (Mapa del Pueblo).
Purpose: To obtain a perception of the distribution of
places, resources and city structure in
general.
Participants: Flora Marin and Johanna Bianchi.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre. Date: July 20th,
2001. Duration: One and a half-hour.
Process and Easy. The participants enjoyed the activity
Comments: much.
Facilitator: The Author.
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black and women yellow. This in contrast to
many large individual and dispersed summer
houses (coloured in vivid pink by men and red
and grey by women), many of which are
surrounded by trees and modern apartment
buildings near the beach and the city centre.
In both maps, the higher the place, the smaller
and more alike are the houses. Now that we
have presented representations of the village we
proceed to give the historical background to the
cove as described by the fishers.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EL
QUISCO FISHING COVE
The historical profile shows that the history of
the cove as a fishing place is not long. In 1940
there were only two fishers. According to
another source, there were six fishers in 1935
(Vildósola and Rosson, 1997). The number of
fishers grew slowly and in 1952 there were eight
independent divers. The fishers built their living
place close to the cove and catch was used for
both home consumption and sale. They mainly
fished Locos and Sea Urchins. In 1953, the first
motor boat, a Penta 8 HP appeared. In 1955,
the number of fishers had increased to between
15 and 20 and the number of artisan boats to
10. In 1997 there were 36 boats of which seven
were launches, which are larger and more
modern, as well as, 20 artisan boats (Vildósola
and Rosson, 1997) (Table 7.3A).
As the number of fishers increased, the
social landscape also changed. The transition
to a summer resort hub brought new stake-
holders with new interests, economic power and
influence, and the current struggle over the cove
space began. As the prices for the property lots
near the sea increased, so did the pressure on
fishers to leave the places where they had built
their modest shelters, forcing them to settle in
more distant places; a concern stressed by men
and women in the village maps. This displace-
ment implies that women became dissociated
from the sea and from fish processing activities.
The land where they lived had been lent to
them by a landowner, whom later started selling
parts of it (the Union bears the name of the
landowner: Narciso Aguirre). The group that
bought the lot to build the yacht club tried to
remove the fishing activities. This resulted in a
conflict over the space and subsequently to the
fishers organising a Union to defend their rights
to the cove.
As the historical profile (Table 7.3B) shows,
the Union was formed in 1957, consisting then
of 26 members and four 14-year-old youths. The
Union received the status of a legal entity two
years later (1959) (Vildósola and Rosson, 1997).
With the development of the area, the presence
of the authorities also became visible and the
fishers discovered that they needed permission
via a license to fish. The problems with the
yacht club calmed down, according to one
testimony cited by Vildósola and Rosson
(1997), at least for the time during the socialist
government of Allende (19701973), when some
of those active (mostly right-wing supporters) in
the Yacht Club left the country.
In 1966, the Union had around 60 members,
and in 1969 they started building a social centre
which was just 25 square meters. It also
operated as an eating place and shelter for the
fishers. It was named ‘‘La Fritanga’’ (where
things get fried). This collective initiative proved
to be a good investment as the centre also
became a popular restaurant for summer and
week-end guests. It also meant a loss of privacy
for the fishers in their own centre, though. As
we shall see later, the economic contribution of
the restaurant is still vital for the Union.
As the interest in the restaurant as a source
of income increased, its concession, first
granted to a fisher, was soon given to a non-
fisher. It was shown later that the Union could
TABLE 7.3A Historical profile, men (Perfil Histórico).
Purpose: To grasp the history of the people of the Union/
fishing cove and their most important moments.
Participants: Mario Andrade, Rafel Pizarro, Victor Mella and
Manuel Alvarez.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre.
Date: July 20th21st, 2001.
Duration: Three hours one day and one hour of
presentation for the other participants, further
complemented during the following day.
Facilitator: Rosson, A. first day, Rosson and the author, the
second day.
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not collect rent due to the rules regarding places
with only rights of use. As a solution to the
problem, the concessionary of the restaurant
paid in kind (i.e., natura, or by bartering work).
The first contract was written and the social
centre (restaurant) was given as a concession for
five years; and renewed several times, adding up
to 17 years in total.
According to the data derived from the
historical profile, in the first agreement, the
Union got an electric boat dragger (huinche),
which greatly increased the efficiency of their
work. Until then, they dragged the boats from
the sea manually and with horses. In 1973, the
production was still aimed at the domestic
Chilean market.
The next renegotiation of the contract oc-
cured in 1975. The second piece of work-
payment in kind agreed upon was infrastructure
improvements. The Union got a fishing-shop;
sheds to store their equipment and importantly,
due to sanitary reasons, public toilets. In the next
year the Union started with the exploitation and
commercialisation of Locos according to legal
TABLE 7.3B Reproduction of the historical profile.
1940 Two divers with diving suit (escafandra).
1949 Read tides (fish and shellfish died).
1952 Eight independent divers. Extracting Locos and Sea Urchins for self consumption and sale.
1953 First Penta 8 HP motor boat.
195057 Struggle with the Yacht Club over cove space.
1955 Between 15 and 20 fishers with 10 small artisan boat.
1957 The Union formed with 26 members and four youths (14 years old) whom paid half quota.
1958 Earthquake.
1965 The construction of a social centre starts, which later became a popular restaurant.
The Union reached 60 members.
1969 Two fishers died in ‘‘bad weather’’.
1970 The social centre (restaurant) was given in concession to a private, non-fisher administrator.
For the concession he paid in natura: an electric boat dragger (huinche).
1973 Production still for the internal market.
1975 Second contract for the restaurant. Payment in natura: fishing shop, sheds and public toilets.
1975 Exploitation and commercialization of Loco according to the legal measurement (10 cm).
Better price (750 pesos/unit, sold on beach).
1976 Storm: one diver and two fishers died.
1979 Earthquake.
1980 Third contract in natura payment: enlargement of the social centre (kitchen,
personnel’s toilet) and Union’s office.
1983 Earthquake: Japanese experts visited the zone and measured a land elevation of 4 meters.
1987 Official national ban of Loco.
1987 The Union starts to sell Locos directly to exporting firms (930 pesos/unit).
198893 Self-imposed ban of Zone A (La Puntilla).
1990 Fourth contract: renegotiation of contract. Rent payment in cash (40 millions pesos: 10 for the Welfare
committee, six for Recreation committee and 24 for the Union: labour, construction, water, telephone,
contributions, etc.).
1991 Legal procedure to obtain La Puntilla MA started.
1992 Boom of Fly Jumbo Squid (Jibia o Calamar Rojo, Dosicus giga) They started to fish it.
1993 Individual harvest in Zone A (La Puntilla). The ban is lifted twice. The diver Manuel Alvarez
[President of the Union during my field-work] extracted 1500 Locos in 1 1/2 hour after five years of
self-imposed ban.
1994 By Union decision: no harvest undertaken due to low price of Locos (680 pesos/unit).
1995 Official rules for the MA are delivered.
19??96 Official ban of Loco the whole year in the rest of the country.
1997 By Union decision: common harvest of the MA (Zone A).
1997 Two new MAs were integrated in the Union (Zone B and C).
1999 ESBA performance.
2001 70,000 Locos available for extraction in the MA.
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stipulated measurement (10 cm), something that
gives a better price (750 pesos/unit sold on the
beach).1
The third contract for the restaurant, bro-
kered in 1980, led to an enlargement of the
Union’s office in the form of a kitchen and staff
toilet. Ironically, at this point the restaurant had
become fashionable with prices too high for
fishers. Furthermore, it is likely that a self-
chosen class exclusion contributes to their
alienation from the restaurant. That is, not
only are prices too high, but social class also
manifests itself in attitudes and dress code.
Nevertheless, the restaurant became a lucrative
business and the Union strengthened its nego-
tiation position. All in all, the infrastructure the
Union received from leasing the restaurant was
worth 26 million pesos or US$66,000 (1995
value).2 The restaurant and the terrace includ-
ing their equipment were valued in the same
year at 150 million pesos or US$377,000 (Vil-
dósola and Rosson, 1997).
In 1990, the time came to renegotiate the
fourth contract. This time the Union demanded
payment in cash as they had discovered a new
law permitting them to rent out the restaurant.
The Union ended the contract with the former
administrator who wanted to pay 4 million
pesos or US$13,119 (value 1990),3 which the
fishers did not accept. The Union auctioned the
administration publicly for a minimum price of
8 million pesos (US$26,238). Finally, an out-
sider was granted the concession for 17.5
million annually or US$57,395 per year (Rosson
BITECMA, Pers. Comm. via email 2005-09-28).
According to the information generated from
the historical profile, it was 40 million pesos. As
this sum (40 millions) in the exercise seems to be
incorrect, it is difficult to say, how the seventeen
and a half million (about which Rosson in-
forms) were divided among the committees of
the Union.
The fishers started building a new social
centre in 1993 as a result of the improved
economy of the Union. In 1993 * the same
year the Union started the legal procedure to
obtain their MA * the struggle over the
contested space at the cove was revived. This
time liberal democracy had returned to Chile
after Pinochet’s withdrawal. With this new
situation, the political colour of those engaged
in the struggle from the yacht club side changed.
Judging from those who were involved, it was
no longer people with right-wing sympathies.
The new event started in 1988 when the national
Direction of Port Work presented a proposal of
a port infrastructure for El Quisco, including
the construction of a pier * an old dream
among fishers * aimed at supporting sea
operations and therefore also the harvesting.4
Also there was no infrastructure to lift larger
boats. The plans did start to take form until
1995 after the Union got support from the
government (Vildósola and Rosson, 1997).
Because of the magnitude of the new plans,
few in the commune remained indifferent. The
local newspapers ran the story that the Union
wanted to construct a maritime complex the
costs of which were estimated at around 300
million pesos or US$7.5 million (1995 value).5 It
was proposed that the complex would include a
refrigerated plant, a repair dock, a crane to lift
boats, a wave-breaker, a protected embarkation
pier, a terrace, access roads, open recreational
spaces and toilets. In response to the proposal,
social division emerged in the community (in-
cluding summer residents), dividing the opi-
nions into for and against factions. Amongst
those opposing the development was the yacht
club. The President of the yacht club claimed
that they had solicited the space for the club,
something that was denied by the Municipality
in February 1994 as the area plan prohibited any
construction on the coast. The club members
demanded a public explanation from the Mayor1 I do not convert this price to US$ since conversion is not
very reliable due to the fact that in 1975 the national
currency was changed from escudos to pesos.
2 Average 396.77 pesos per US$, year 1995 (Banco Central
de Chile 2003).
3 Average of 304.90 pesos per US$, year 1990 (Banco
Central de Chile 2004).
4 The need for such a pier obeyed the geographical and
hydrological conditions of the cove, which is too open
and exposed to winds, often hindering fishing activities.
5 Average of 396.77 pesos per US$, year 1995 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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of the commune who responded by stating that
it was highly unlikely that the club members
were unaware that the area plan had been
modified in October of the same year. The new
regulations did allow the construction of addi-
tional buildings on the coast line, where both the
Union and the yacht club have their facilities. At
the end of 1995, a new discontented group
appeared: the ‘‘Committee of recuperation of
El Quisco’’, presided over by an ex-foreign
affairs minister (during Aylwin’s government,
19901994) and senator of the Republic * a
social-democrat who has his summer residence
in El Quisco. The committee’s primary objective
was to obstruct the progress of the marina plans.
A zone deputy, belonging to the same political
party as the ex-minister, intervened supporting
the fishers’ cause and declared in the local
newspaper that to obstruct the fishers’ right to
modernisation was an act of egoism. Further-
more, commenting on the ex-foreign affairs
minister’s involvement he said, ‘‘I think that
persons that only live seasonally in El Quisco
should refrain from giving opinions and inter-
fere in internal problems that only affect those
who live here permanently’’ (Vildósola and
Rosson, 1997, p. 177). This comment reflects
the divide and ambivalence of the natives
against the ‘‘outsiders’’.
Finally, in February 1998, the Minister of
Public Works, Ricardo Lagos, later to be
President of the Republic (20002006), opened
the new pier. The area covers 1,000 metres
squared with a head 26 meters long, 7 meters
wide and 3 meters deep (Vildósola and Rosson,
1997). Although not all the planned facilities
materialised, the positive balance was this time
in favour of the fishers who emerged strength-
ened from this struggle, securing their right to
the physical landscape of the cove. In addition
to the pier, they had also realised an old dream.
Picture 7.4 shows the pier infrastructure ‘‘over-
seen’’ by the fishers’ own religious symbol, Saint
Peter, who stands in a boat. Behind Saint Peter
the names of those fishers who have lost their
lives on the sea are engraved.
The historical profile tends to understate
some types of events, such as those related to
tragedies, which occupy a special place: two
fishers died in 1969 due to ‘‘bad weather’’, and
one diver and two fishers died in 1976. Trage-
dies also include the earthquakes of 1958, 1979
and 1983. According to the fishers, the ‘‘1983’’
earthquake resulted in an elevation of land by
four meters affecting the cove and the harvest.
This view was also supported by visiting
Japanese experts. The ‘‘1983’’ earthquake actu-
ally occurred in 1985. According to Oliva and
Castilla (1990, p. 391), in central Chile the
earthquake’s effect caused an elevation of the
coast, which probably diminished the density of
the Locos population in the inter-tidal zone. The
effects in the sub-tidal area seemed to be less.
Fishers also mentioned some significant
changes in the sea conditions that have forced
them to modify their fishing strategy. For
example, in 1949 there were ‘‘red tides’’ or ‘‘red
waters’’ (toxic algal bloom), causing the death
of fish and shellfish. In 1992, there was a boom
of Fly jumbo squid (Jibia or Calamar rojo,
Dosidicus giga, see Picture 7.5) due to a
maritime trend, enabling them to fish this
suddenly abundant species, which had not
been exploited before.
PICTURE 7.4 San Pedro, fishers’ saint, watching the
pier and the bay
PICTURE 7.5 Jibia
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ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL PROFILE
An analysis of the history derived from data
from the historical profile tool (see Table 7.3B)
reflects both the process of El Quisco becoming
an urban village and the development of artisan
fishing activities in the cove, including key issues
such as the establishment and consolidation of
the Union, the struggle with the yacht club, the
exploitation of different species, and the devel-
opment and attainment of the three zones of
their MA.
The analysis of the historical profile shows a
formation process of the fishers’ cultural-and-
class identity. During the initial years this
cultural identity and social cohesion started to
form around sustenance activities, demanding
trust and collaboration. Loss of lives and
tragedy related to weather conditions have
been a painful way to strengthen bonds. Then
a class identity was shaped and the development
of negotiation power was stimulated due to the
arrival of a wealthy social group that not only
contests the fishers’ rights to their living place,
but also their right to the cove.
The transformation of El Quisco * from a
village into an urban centre * initially a threat
to the fishers, paradoxically ultimately favoured
their struggle over the seascape. Then they won
the right to keep their social identity as fishers,
which enabled them to continue with their
activities, which now leads us into the next
phase of fishing of benthic resources: the MA.
FROM EXTINCTION TO SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
Like the rest of the country, the fishers of El
Quisco cove have been fishing Loco and other
benthic resources under open access, which has
commonly led to unsustainable resource ex-
traction trends. Around 1975, concern amongst
the fishers over overexploitation of Locos
started to emerge. The export had started
only one year before. Over-fishing is one of
the most important of the six stepping stones
that precede the introduction of the self-
regulation system of the species (later mani-
festing in an MA) according to the PRA
stepping stones tool (see Table 7.4B). By
1975, the fishers had already started to extract
and commercialise Locos according to the legal
measurement (10 cm). This was perhaps their
first step towards a more sustainable fishery
(Table 7.4A).
Thus, due to overexploitation, the Union
initiated the self-imposed-ban of Locos in Zone
A (La Puntilla) around 1987. This was one year
before the government started the ban, so they
were pioneers in this respect (that was in 1988
and not in 1987, as in the exercise). The
government ban was in effect from 1989 to
1992 in north and central Chile (IFOP, 2000,
p. 42). Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago
had been experimenting with a no-take zone
near El Quisco, and these experiences inspired
the self-imposed ban in El Quisco (see Chapter
Five), which was undertaken in close collabora-
tion with Dr. Castilla and his team.
During the first self-imposed ban in 1988,
the fishers, instead of selling to intermediaries,
started selling Locos directly to exporting
firms, at a price of 930 pesos/unit or US$3.8
(value 1988)6, which at the time was considered
to be a very good price. The ban situation soon
changed the commercialisation scenario, not
only for the fishers but also for the buyers. The
bans and buyers competition encouraged both
exporting firms and fishers to fix the commer-
cialisation of Locos by establishing direct
TABLE 7.4A Stepping stones, men (Hitos).
Purpose: To understand the reasons for the
introduction of the MA.
Participants: Patricio Alvarez, Guillermo Alvarez,
J. Campos. Enrique Leal, J.C. Valencia,
Mario Luis Castro and Ricardo Moraga.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre. Date: July 18th,
2001.
Duration: One and a half-hour in addition to
another one and a half-hour of reciprocal
Presentations with the group working with
the drawing concepts exercise.
Process and Easy and effective. For more comments,
Comments: see description.
Facilitator: The Author.
6 Average of 245 pesos per US$, year 1988 (Banco Central
de Chile 2004).
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trading relations. The legal procedure to obtain
the La Puntilla MA started in 1991, which
was the same year that the new LPA was
promulgated.
In 1993, a first harvest was performed after
five years of the self-imposed ban or no-take of
Locos in Zone A (La Puntilla; Picture 7.6).
Locos were harvested by individual groups,
following a traditional approach of three crew
per boat. This first experience gave a rich
harvest and good economic results (see Picture
7.7). In 1994 the Union decided not to harvest
Locos due to the low market price (680 pesos/
unit of Loco or US$1.6, value 1994,7 compared
with 930 pesos/unit in 1988, or US$3.8). In 1995
on a national level the official rules for MAs in
Chile were formalised (see Chapter Five).
In 1997, four years after the first harvest of
the new management regime, the Union decided
to harvest the area (Zone A) in common instead
of individually (more about this below). Two
new zones were integrated into the MA (Zones
B and C). In 1999, the ESBA was performed for
Zone A in collaboration with BITECMA, the
consultants working with the Union. The ESBA
for the three areas cost around 34 million pesos
or US$67,000 (value 1999)8, of which 70
percent was subsidised by the state. The rest
was paid by the Union. Fifteen percent was in
the form of material and collaborative support
(in kind) and 15 percent in cash (Rosson,
BITECMA, Pers. Comm. via email 2005-09-
28). The annual follow-up costs are approxi-
mately 1.5 million pesos or US$2,362 (value
2001)9 per area. The cost depends on whether
and how much the Union collaborates in the
follow-up activities.
In 2001, the year of my field-work, the
Union had, according to BITECMA’s planning,
intended to extract 70,000 units of Locos from
the MAs, although they had planned a harvest
TABLE 7.4B Reproduction of men’s stepping stones.
I Overexploitation of the Loco. 1975
II Self-ban introduced by the fishers/divers
themselves in Zone A (La Puntilla) in
connection with the Universidad Católica de
Chile of Santiago.
1987
III Official government ban of the Loco. 1992
IV Individual harvest in Zone A (La Puntilla).
Auto-ban yields good economic results.
1993
V Common harvest in Zone A (La Puntilla) led
and decided on by the Union.
1997
VI Extension of management areas to Zones B
and C.
1997
PICTURE 7.6 The MA El Quisco, zone A
Source: BITECMA, courtesy and permission by A Rosson.
7 Average of 420.18 pesos per US$, year 1994 (Banco
Central de Chile 2004).
8 Average of 508.78 pesos per US$, year 1999 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
9 Average of 634.94 pesos per US$, year 2001 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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of only 32,000 Locos. Nonetheless, the 70,000
units would mean, in theory, approx. 60 million
pesos or US$95,000 US$ (value 2001),10 I will
return to this issue later.
ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS FOR THE INTRODUCTION
OF THE MANAGEMENT AREA
We have seen, through the stepping stones data,
how the El Quisco MA was created as an answer
to resource depletion. This exercise did not
specifically consider the factor behind the
transition from an individual to a common
harvest during the second time the Union
harvested Locos within an MA framework. It
is not difficult to imagine the experience of
around 100 people trying to collect as many
Locos as possible in competition with each
other. This individualised harvesting contrasts
with the experience during the preceding several
years that fishers had been taking care of the
area and the resource in common. This new
division of labour of common harvest thus
becomes more congruent with the collective
nurturing of the species as well as with collective
arrangements for commercialisation. Competi-
tion is then substituted with collaboration and
the weakest and the strongest, the young
and old, the most skilled and less skilled divers
and fishers, all get their share. What is impor-
tant to realise is that the fishers are related and
many of them would have been competing with
members of their own family. Eliminating
competition during harvest diminishes rivalry
among fishers and converts the extraction days
into a collective event. The ‘‘free-riders’’ phe-
nomenon is avoided by rewarding every diver
per extracted unit, ‘‘since all the divers do not
realise the same effort in extracting the Locos’’
(Reglamento Interno para el Cuidado, Admin-
istración y Explotación de los Recursos Objeti-
vos de las Areas de Manejo, s.a., Letra b.5;
hereinafter Reglamento Interno).
With successful harvest experiences, the
Union felt encouraged to go further and
decided to integrate, by application to Serna-
pesca, two new zones as management areas.
These enlargements would not prosper, though.
From the first self-imposed ban in 1987/88 to
the incorporation of the two new areas in 1997,
one decade has passed in which they have had
two positive harvests. The time span for the
fishers is long but they continue to fish outside
the protected areas for their livelihood, includ-
ing for benthic species when permitted. None-
theless, the time span for the Locos population
is not so long, given its slow reproductive rate. It
is only when the resource becomes ready for
exploitation that one can meaningfully assess
the results. Only then can the social negotiation
process start and agreements be reached within
a group consisting of almost 100 persons.
The next PRA tool (drawing concepts) deals
with the concept of sustainable development. It
allows differentiating between two main issues
that may help us understand the transition from
an individual to a common harvest in the MA.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: FISHERS’ PERCEPTIONS
Sustainable development is one of the main
reasons for the introduction of a MA, both in
order to preserve the species and protect the
economic livelihood of artisan fishers. One of
my research questions was whether the fishers
understood this concept, using the drawing
concepts tool. To perform this (Table 7.5B),
the fishers used the Chilean hake (Merluza or
PICTURE 7.7 Loco harvest
(picture reproduction of a borrowed picture with permission
from the Union, July 2001)
10 Average of 634.94 pesos per US$, year 2001 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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Merluccius gayi gayi) as an example. This
species is captured outside the MA * where
most of the fishers’ individual income actually
comes from (Table 7.5A).
The first main issue possible to differentiate
in the Drawing Concepts tool (Table 7.5B)
relating more directly to the concept of sustain-
able development, is the protection of the
resource (Item I) and to administer it with
social sense (Item V), taking into consideration
the time span to ensure that the present
exploitation safeguards the survival of resources
for future generations (Item VI).
The second issue is more related to an ideal
situation for the fishers and would help reach
sustainability. Item II is concerned with sub-
stituting the present fishing policy from autho-
rities of regional shared quotas with one of
sharing quotas among Unions, which is the
fishers’ ambition. There are 37 fishing coves
(Montoya, 2004), and 49 fishing organizations
in the region (Sernapesca, 2005a) which com-
pete with each other, creating rivalry. According
to Item IV, quotas to the fishers organizations
would mean saving on equipment like fishhooks
and a more controlled extraction, which would
mean better prices for the resource. Thus,
according to Item III, defined quotas for
Unions would eliminate competition among
them, which would then help to diminish
rivalry.
ANALYSIS OF THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
CONCEPT
The key factors such as protecting the species
and competition are intimately related to each
other. That data suggests that creating condi-
tions of competition, which fosters rivalry
amongst different stakeholders, is not a viable
or sustainable appropriation strategy in this
case. Furthermore, it is clear that such an
approach results in unsustainable exploitation
of resources by nurturing uncooperative fishing
behaviour, leading eventually and inevitably to
the tragedy of open access. This supports the
idea about the substitution of individual harvest
with a common one in the MA. Reducing all
ideas to seven items in this exercise, the fishers
were able to point out several key issues that
form part of the concept of sustainable devel-
opment applied to a resource that is fished
outside their MA.
It was difficult in the beginning for the
fishers to make concrete such an abstract
concept as sustainable development, but as
discussion progressed, they agreed on what the
concept meant for them. When the exercise was
finished they also felt quite proud that they
could formulate a concept on paper that
seemed, at the beginning, extremely abstract.
As the fishers together analysed the results of
the stepping Stones and drawing Concepts
tools, there was a clear agreement about the
TABLE 7.5A Men’s drawing concepts (Dibujando
Conceptos).
Purpose: To understand how fishers perceive the
concept of sustainable development,
referring to an ideal or wanted scenario.
Participants: Victor Mella, Eduardo Gonzalez, Patricio
Aranda, Manuel Bravo, Silvio Corvetto and
Eduardo Pizarro.
Place: The Union Social Centre. Date: July 18th,
2001.
Duration: One and a half-hour in addition to another
one and a half-hour of reciprocal presenta-
tions with the group working with the
stepping stones tool.
Process and For more, see description in the text.
comments:
Facilitator: Rosson, A.
TABLE 7.5B Reproduction of the men’s drawing
concepts: sustainable development.
I To protect the exploited resource, for ex. Merluza
(Merluccius gayi gayi), Chilean hake.
II Official share of quotas to the Unions instead of
regional quotas.
III Sharing quotas to the Unions would eliminate rivalry
with other fishing unions.
IV Know how to manage the new quotas:
(a) less need of fishhooks;
(b) rational and controlled extraction;
(c) the less the extraction quantities, the higher the
prices, and thus more income.
V Management with social sense (present and immediate
future).
VI To leave the resource so it is inheritable for future
generations.
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reasons for the introduction of the self-imposed
ban, which was due to overexploitation, validat-
ing the result of their respective tools. The
drawing concepts’ group also helped the step-
ping stones’ group to fill in some details and the
years.
We have now considered both the reasons
for the introduction of the MA and fishers’
perceptions of sustainable development, so in
the following section the focus will be on the
institutional analysis of the Union.
THE UNION, GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS AND
INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES
In order to explore the internal organization
and division of labour of the Union, a diagram
of the Union was made (see Table 7.6 and
Fig. 7.1). In drawing the diagram the partici-
pants demonstrated good knowledge about the
Union’s committees, as well as their responsi-
bilities and powers. The performance of the
committees and of other organizations that have
a relationship with the Union was examined
using the Venn diagram tool (see Table 7.7,
Picture 7.8 and Fig. 7.2). The Venn diagram was
arranged similarly to the scale used in the
Chilean education system; i.e., from one to
seven: the higher the rating the more important
the influence and closeness of the organizations/
institutions/groups to the Union as judged by
fishers.
The Union has a traditional structure con-
sisting of the membership at the base, and a
board of three elected members: the President,
the Treasurer and the Secretary. The Union has
92 members plus 20 passive members. The
Union is regulated through rules of member-
ship, committees, members’ rights and duties
and disciplinary procedures.
The first document ‘‘Estatutos del Sindi-
cato de Trabajadores Independientes ‘‘Narciso
Aguirre de Pescadores Artesanales de la Comuna
de El Quisco’’ (1998, hereinafter Estatutos) deals
with the statutes of Union, and is composed
of 50 Articles divided into the following nine
titles: (1) Goals and principles; (2) Assembly;
(3) Board; (4) President, Secretary and Treasurer;
(5) Members; (6) Commissions; (7) Patrimony of
the Union; (8) Censure; and (9) Sanctions
(Estatutos, 1998).
The second document ‘‘Reglamento In-
terno’’ (s.a.) consists of three titles regulating
(1) Vigilance; (2) Transects or follow-up; and (3)
Extraction. It also has two other titles consist-
ing of: (1) Sharing of money; and (2) Discount-
ing for faults. The third and last document
‘‘Reglamento de Sanciones’’ deals specifically
with the Sanctions, determining the amount for
faults and other sanctions. The key elements of
these documents follow below.
UNION ORGANIZATION AND GOVERNANCE
ARRANGEMENTS
The management of the MA is distributed
between six committees. The most important is
the steering bodies of the Management Area
Committee and the Board. They are responsible
for general aspects related to the commerciali-
sation of the Union’s fishing operations, in
addition to the control, functioning and mon-
itoring of the MA. Of special importance is the
Disciplinary Committee. This committee man-
ages breaches of rules, and punishment includes
different fines for disobeying rules like not
attending meetings, drinking alcohol within
the cove or using bad language in the cove,
amongst other punishable offences.
To become a Union member, a fisher has to
apply; then a special commission prepares and
presents it and decision is taken by the whole
membership. All of the membership of the
TABLE 7.6 Diagram of the union (Diagrama del
Sindicato).
Purpose: To understand how the Union and its parts are
organized and its functions. Only men.
Participants: Victor Mella, Eduardo Gonzalez, Patricio
Aranda, Manuel Bravo, Silvio Corvetto and
Eduardo Pizarro.
Place: The Union Social Centre. Date: July 22nd,
2001.
Duration: One and a half-hour.
Process: Expedite.
Comments: For comments see the description.
Facilitator: The Author.
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Union gather monthly.11 Every member has to
pay a monthly fee (corresponding to 5.6
percent of a national official minimum salary)
and a one-off ‘‘incorporation quota’’ of half a
million Chilean pesos or US$1,172 (value
1998).12 The latter can be paid over a year
(Estatutos, 1998, Art. 29). If a member does
not pay the fees for more than six months, the
membership is withdrawn.
New members can enjoy the social benefits
of the Union from the first day, but get access
to the commercial benefits only after two years
of membership (Estatutos, 1998, Art. 2, letra I).
Two years of membership are also necessary for
a fisher to be able to participate in the harvest.
Before fishing commences every year, the Union
undertakes a survey along the same transects to
count the species together, under the super-
vision of the engaged consultants. Cooperation
is firmly regulated by the Union rules. All the
members must assist and collaborate according
to a strict schedule and those who leave their
allocated activities before the day is over or
come late are considered to be absent. Those
that are absent without justification lose 50
percent of their income that day.
Loss or damage to fishing equipment or the
boats are compensated for by the MA. The
owners are otherwise not entitled to any extra
share for the use of their belongings in the harvest
(Estatutos, 1998). In contrast, the divers receive
an additional share for every unit they harvest.
The amount for that extrabenefit is decided on by
the assembly.
All members with two years of membership
must participate in monitoring and enforcement






One meeting /monthly, 96 members + ca. 20 passive members
Recreation
Includes: two family recreation trips, one trip to thermal
baths for members, San Pedro's celebration (fishers’
saint), Christmas celebration, distribution of two family














FIGURE 7.1 Reproduction of the diagram of the union, men
11 According to the statutes ‘‘It might belong to this Union
those independent workers that exercise the Union’s base
occupation and that accomplish the requirements
demanded by the statutes of the organization’’
(Estatutos, Art. 28).
12 Average of 426.29 pesos per US$, year 1998 (Banco
Central de Chile 2004).
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whole year, with two men allocated per zone
during 14 hours of the day between 05:00 and
19:00 hrs. The other two zones, B and C, have
been excluded and the other is not in operation
(Rosson, BITECMA, Pers. Comm. via email
2007-07-30). All eligible members must partici-
pate in eight shifts of patrol duty each year in
Zone A.
If a person does not complete his duties, or
arrange a substitute, he is fined 20,000 pesos or
US$31.5 (value 2001)13 every time he is absent.
The money from the fines is used to cover the cost
of the MA and fine’s money is withdrawn from
the individual share from Locos extraction. After
being absent five times from the patrol duty the
member loses his right to participate in Locos
extraction and thereby the related income.
The internal and external relationships of
the Union and the MA was explored with the
Venn Diagram tool. Discounting the commit-
tees of the Union and three other related
sections, participants referred to 16 different
actors including consultancy firm, cooperation
institutions, government, local political admin-
istration, civil, educational, commercial and
religious organizations, displaying a broad and
varied net of relationships with the external
world. The varied number of committees and
related sections illustrate the specialised internal
division of labour of the MA.
INTERNAL STRUCTURE
All the committees (marked with bold line) were
placed within the Union’s circle in Fig. 7.2. Of
the six committees the Management Area
Committee gets the highest rating (7) regarding
importance and performance in the Venn Dia-
gram. The Management Area Committee is
followed by the body that administers the
toilets, restaurant and fish shop, which also
scored the highest rating (7). Its rating is
reflected in the economic importance it has for
the Union. The majority of yearly Union
income is derived from the activities it has
responsibility for. The finance committee, which
operates on a two-year term and independently
from the Board renders accounts directly to the
Union membership, received the second highest
rating of 6.7.
Highly appreciated is also the Recreation
Committee (rating 6) which is responsible for
organising the celebration of important dates
with common MA funds, such as the fishers’ day
of San Pedro (Saint Peter) and the Christmas
celebration. Both celebrations have an impor-
tant role for the cohesion of the group, especially
PICTURE 7.8 Venn diagram
TABLE 7.7 Men’s Venn diagram (Diagrama Venn).
Purpose: Venn Diagram reflects the degree of importance/performance/influence and nearness of the existing
institutions and other instances in relation to the Union, including the Union’s committees.
Participants: Victor Erices, Orlando Mella, Enrique Leal and Silvio Corvetto.
Place: The Union Social Centre. Date: July 21st22nd, 2001.
Duration: One and a half-hours plus an extra hour the following day.
Process: Without problems.
Comments: The diagram was made in two steps/days. In the first day the institutions/organizations were identified and placed
in relation to the Union. On the second day, their degree of nearness and significance of the different components
in relation to the Union was decided according to the scale from 1 to 7 referred in tool number 5.
Facilitator: The Author.
13 Average of 643 pesos per US$, year 2001 (Banco Central
de Chile 2003).
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the San Pedro’s day celebration, which strength-
ens their collective identity as fishers.
The committee also finances two short vaca-
tion trips: one for the families and one for the
fishers. The latter is spent at thermal baths. The
committee is also in charge of the distribution of
two food baskets during the year. Further, the
Welfare Committee (rating 6) handles mutual aid
and technical education, pension to the retired,
economic help for those ill, grants for the funerals
and a pension during one year for widows, and
food basket for members with economic troubles.
The Pier Committee, responsible for the pier,
tourist trips and fishing issues, received a rating
of 5, and is also responsible for generating
economic benefits for the Union through boat
tourism. The Members Tourism Enterprise
which is in control of the two boats of the Union
and also received a rating of 5, is related to the
Pier Committee. One of the boats was specially
bought for tourism purposes (BITECMA, 1999,
ESBA-study). There is also the Coves Inspectors
Committee and the closely related the Cove’s
Auxiliars, which both received a rating of 4.
Amongst the rest of the bodies closely related to
the Union, we find the Women’s handicraft
group, getting a rating of 5. We have, lastly,
external buyers consisting of commercial firms
that buy their products (degree 5).
There are also other resource persons sup-
porting the Union such as Rosson (a marine
technologist) from BITECMA; an accountant,
a cleaning auxiliary, a controller of Maritime
Destination and a Secretary (Vildósola and
Rosson, 1997).
EXTERNAL INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES
Amongst the external institutions and other
organizations of importance, we find the ‘‘co-
operation’’ institutions headed by the Universi-
dad Católica de Chile (Santiago), which
received the highest rating followed by SERCO










































































FIGURE 7.2 Reproduction of Venn diagram
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Técnica (CORFO)/Technical Cooperation
Service), which also got a high rating (6.5).
SERCOTEC from Region V co-financed the
ESBA with the Union. The ESBA study was
undertaken by BITECMA, the consulting firm
that has been working with the university and
the Union in the development of the MA
(BITECMA received a rating of 6).
Of the authorities, the Government, Mari-
time Governance and Sernapesca received rat-
ings of 5.5 with the Police getting an even higher
rating of 6. Local politicians represented by the
municipality seem not to enjoy high popularity,
obtaining the second lowest rating of all the
institutions mapped in the Venn diagram. The
Neighbours Junta,14 a civil society based in-
stitution, received the lowest rating of 1. An-
other civil society based group called Peace &
Citizenship was highly valued, receiving a rating
of 6. Finally, we have the Stadium and Health
centre, both of which received a rating of 5. The
Fishers also seem to be satisfied with the school
as it received a rating of 6. The Church belongs
to the institutions and organizations that were
rated the most important with seven.
ANALYSIS OF THE ORGANIZATION AND
INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES
As seen above, the internal organization of the
Union and the MA is regulated formally. This is
contrary to the lack of written contracts regard-
ing their reciprocal labour relations and share of
fish landings, which have traditionally been in
the form of oral agreements. This illustrates the
traditional trust that exists among fishers, which
is still in effect in the historical areas. However,
with the arrival of the MAs oral agreements
have been substituted by more formal and
written arrangements. A well institutionalised
system of punishment also standardises penal-
ties, which is central within a small-sized com-
munity dominated by near family relationships,
placing this way the Union beyond familiar or
compadrazgo links. Within this context, faults
are not disregarded and the penalties in order to
be effective are targeted against a vulnerable
part of the members: their private economy.
We can draw the conclusion from the Venn
Diagram data that there is internal and mutual
trust and confidence regarding the Union and
its committees, and therefore also about the
functioning of the MA. Whether this implies
that they were also satisfied with the Board was
not under evaluation. Nonetheless, if the Union
is working well, it might be taken as a proxy
indicator (own speculation) as a good evalua-
tion of the Board as it has the main responsi-
bility for the Union’s functioning.
Regarding the question of the external lin-
kages with the outside world, the collaboration
institutions specifically enjoy high respect from
fishers, which is illustrative of their good rela-
tionship over time. Also, the external social and
political relationships with both governmental
institutions and other service bodies like school
and heath, seem quite unproblematic and with-
out major problems. Local administration
through the Municipality seems not to enjoy
the same popularity among fishers; an issue that
it is not considered in this study.
Since the aim of the Venn diagram tool was
to grasp the institutional linkages of importance
for the Union and their MA perceived by the
fishers, this analysis excludes the former con-
flicts with the Union’s neighbour, the Yacht
Club, whose members mostly live seasonally in
El Quisco; a problem that otherwise was ana-
lysed using the historical profile tool. Now that
we have an idea of how the Union and the MA
of El Quisco is structured, let us consider the
fishers’ main livelihood activity: fishing. How-
ever, before discussing fishing in the next section,
let us first examine the way Union labour and
boat infrastructure is managed.
SECTION 2: FISHING
SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION AND BOAT
INFRASTRUCTURE
Social differentiation is above all given by being
a member or not of the Union. Among those
who are members, differentiation is determined
14 They have as a function to ‘‘promote the integration,
participation and development of the neighbours of a
locality’’ (Decreto nr. 58 de 1997, Juntas de Vecinos,
Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile 2008).
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by the ownership of a boat and diving equip-
ment. Boats are privately owned with the own-
ership ratio being one boat for every fourth
fisher. The total number of boats in 1997 was
36. Seven were launches of up to 18 tonnes and
20 were artisan boats (BITECMA, 1999). The
large boats are used to fish big species like
swordfish, tuna and sharks. Before the acquisi-
tion of large boats only one swordfish (between
180 and 250 kilos) could be carried per trip. The
pomfret fish (see 7.14) boom around mid 1990s
led fishers to acquire new carbon fibre boats
that weigh less and are faster (Vildósola and
Rosson, 1997). Labour categories amongst the
fishers constitute other differentiation factors.
The direct producers are the fishers and the
divers, followed by the auxiliaries, which are not
members of the Union. Among these categories,
we find different types of specialisation which are
interchangeable, perhaps with the exception of
the diving activity. A diver can be a fisher, but a
fisher is not always a diver. Table 7.8 displays the
categories of fishers. Of the 92 active members, 84
are fishers and 41 are divers. BITECMA’s (2007)
follow-up study reports that of 87 members, 57
are fishers and 30 are divers.
Among the fishers we have the following
specialisations (I use the local Spanish names
here): the calador places the fishing device, the
bogador paddles to place the fishing device in
order, the desenmallador separates the fish from
the nets, the adujador handles the equipment in
the boat and the timotel steers the boat. These
specialisations are not fixed; fishers can alter-
nate roles, which means that an experienced
fisher can handle several activities.
We have, then, the divers (see Chapter Five)
as well as the telegrafista. There are also divers
that dive alone just off the shore without special
equipment. The fishers who posses neither a boat
nor diving equipment, have the weakest eco-
nomic position, and normally assist both the
diver and the patron of the boat in the fishing
activity. However, this role can also be per-
formed by a boat owner. In the historical areas,
boat owners get a larger share of the landing. For
example, in a crew of four persons, the landing is
divided into six parts, and the owner of the boat
and the crew get three parts (Paillaman, Serna-
pesca, Pers. Comm. via email 2007-08-09). In the
MA the divers get an extra share regardless of
whether he is the owner of the equipment or not.
Last in the hierarchy come the auxiliaries
who assist in fishing activities on land. They
vary in the type of work they undertake and the
payment they receive. There are 17 auxiliaries in
El Quisco. They are divided into three cate-
gories: The encarnadores put the bait on the
hook and sort out the trawl line. They get paid
in cash and in 1995 they received 1,000 pesos per
basket or US$2.5 (value 1995).15 There are also
the Tiradores who take care of the electric boat
dragger (huinche) and put the boat to sea, often
getting paid in fish. Lastly, within the category
of auxiliaries, there are the cargadores or lifters
that transport the diving suits and fishing
equipment to the boats. They also place the
harvest in the transport tracks and clean the fish
for customers from whom they get tips, whereas
from the fishers they get paid in fish (Vildósola
and Rosson, 1997).
To assess the distribution of the fishing
activities during the year and their economic
importance, the seasonal calendar tool was used
embracing both fishing activities outside the MA
TABLE 7.8 Fishing labour force in the El Quisco cove.
Categories of members Categories of non-members/auxiliars
Fisher-boat owner Encarnadores (put the bait in the hook); get paid in cash.





Lifter/fish cleaners, get paid in species from fishers and
get tips from customers.
15 Average of 396.77 pesos per US$, year 1995 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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and inside it, the amount of labour and main
benthic resources fished in the MA (see Picture
7.9). Also the main species fished in the historical
areas are displayed, based on an open interview.
In order to make the seasonal calendar data
understandable, the different items are separated
and represented as tables. Neither rain nor sun
distribution is represented as they are depicted in
the calendar (see Picture 7.9) (Table 7.9).
FISHING IN THE MANAGEMENT AREA
The operation of the MA requires coordination
and cooperation between members as well as
allocation of responsibility according to specia-
lised division of labour. The seasonal calendar
shows that in 2000 the estimation of the numbers
of species that are ready for extraction occurred
in June, and extraction in November. As seen in
Table 7.10 the number of members of the Union
that engage monthly varies in number. The
months of most activity are those corresponding
to the follow-ups and harvests. Those days, of
the total of 92 fishers, it is possible to see that 32
dive and 59 perform the rest of the activities,
some staying ashore, administering the whole
process. During other months, the number of
divers and fishers is less (Picture 7.10).
PICTURE 7.9 Men’s seasonal calendar
TABLE 7.9 Seasonal calendar, men (Calendarios anuales por temporadas de actividades).
Purpose: To explore monthly and seasonal distribution of activities, their relation to household
economy, demand of labour (mainly in the MA).
Participants: Orlando Mella, Luis Eduardo Pizarro, Patricio Alvarez and Rafael Pizarro.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre. Date: July 19th20th, 2001.
Duration: Six hours.
Process and comments: This exercise took the most time to do as it involved economic evaluation of several activities, both
inside and outside the MA. For more comments, see description in the text.
Facilitator: The Author.
TABLE 7.10 Reproduction of total monthly labour distribution during 2001 in the MA
(from men’s seasonal calendar).
Jan. Feb. March Apr. May Jun. Jul. Augt. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
No of divers working per month 14 14 14 14 7 32 7 32 7 7 32 7
No of fishers working per month 28 28 28 28 14 59 14 59 14 14 59 14
PICTURE 7.10 El Quisco cove
Permission from Chuck Herring, Digital Globe
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In order represent the sea spatial distribu-
tion of the species and the modus operandi of the
fishing activity in the MA, the fishers performed
sea transects.
MODUS OPERANDI OF THE LOCO HARVEST WITHIN
THE MANAGEMENT AREA
Several drawings needed to be undertaken to
represent the Loco harvest through transects.
The first transect (A) (Picture 7.12) was made
twice in table form, but in my view, it was not
clear enough. J. C. Campos, a young fisher in the
group, suggested that it was easier to represent
and understand the harvest through another
drawing. He was happy to show his drawing
skills and this became transect B (Picture 7.13A
and 7.13B), which clearly represented the lines
the fishers follow under the surface, and in
relation to the beach. His more experienced
fellow fishers helped him with the necessary
specifications. He told me that soon after
becoming a member he went to extract Locos
on his own and was penalised by the Union and
required to pay fines. After these initial trans-
gressions, he reformed his behaviour. Campos’
experience provides evidence that the penalty
system is being enforced. The fishers obviously
enjoyed showing off their deep knowledge about
the aquatic world. They felt proud to help me in
my ignorance. Picture 7.11 shows the camarad-
erie between some fishers as they cooperated to
finish the drawings (Table 7.11A).
To harvest (See Picture 7.12 of transect A),
the boat with two crew members and the diver
follows first a transect of 30 meters from east to
the west (from the beach to the open sea). Then
they follow the next 30 meters, and so forth. The
further the distance from the beach, the deeper,
the last transect not being deeper than 2530
meters.
To dive, divers do not use oxygen tubes (see
Picture 7.13A of transect B) but depend on the
oxygen from a hooka diving hose that gives
them air controlled by the telegrafista (diver’s
assistant). The other crew is the patron whose
role it is to manage the boat. Trust among these
three crew members is central. According to
the official national fishing rules, the diver
should not dive deeper than 20 meters but
they dive up to 30 meters as can be seen in
transect A (see Picture 7.12 and Table 7.11B).
The small black dots in Picture 7.13A
represent Locos in the rocks at the sea bottom.
PICTURE 7.11 Campos drawing the transect
TABLE 7.11A Sea transect tool (Transectas del Mar).
Purpose: To represent the sea spatial
distribution of the species and how the
fishers/divers obtain the Loco. Only men.
Participants: Orlando Mella, J.C. Campos and
G. Ricardo Moraga.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre.
Date: July 19th20th, 2001.
Duration: Six hours in two days.
Process and See comments on the description in the text.
comments:
Facilitator: The Author.
PICTURE 7.12 Sea transect A
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Also the predators of Locos are specified (see
Picture 7.13B). A reflection about the fishers’
and divers’ list of predators is whether they are
aware of the fact that to eliminate predators of
Locos endangers the ecological interactions that
are vital for the continued well-being of the
marine environment. They have learned, with
the help of marine science experts, about the
risks posed to the ecology (and hence re-
sources), but how extensive their knowledge
and consciousness is, unclear (Table 7.12A).
The day of a diver harvesting Locos within
the MA consists of two stages: one at sea and
one on land with a total of eight working hours
(Table 7.12B). The following descriptions pro-
vide an insight into a regular day of a diver
harvesting Locos: The harvest starts relatively
late in the day, around 9 a.m. and after 20
minutes the diver has extracted the first 100 units
of Locos. Up to 1 p.m. he has completed 1,000
units, spending a total of five hours in the water,
returning to the cove early in the afternoon.
After the harvest he goes home and relaxes,
returning to the cove at 4 p.m. when he meets the
rest of the fishers to discuss the harvest and the
economic results. Compared to the work load of
a fisher, it seems that a diver has less in terms of
working hours, but on the other hand, perhaps
not in effort since he spends many hours diving
under the sea in cold water.
Let us now turn to the system and see
how it is organised during one of the days
when the collective harvest is performed within
the MA. To illustrate this important event, the
participants completed a system flow diagram
that covered the whole process from harvest-
ing to commercialisation. This tool permits an
appreciation of the complexities of linkages
and relationships between the diver and the
crew, between the fishers themselves, the union
and the export firms.
HARVESTING THE FRUITS OF THE MANAGEMENT
AREA AND COMMERCIALISATION PROCESS
The harvest has roughly three phases (see
Pictures 7.14A and 7.14B). The process starts
with an evaluation of the number of Loco units
per kilogram the MA can yield, referred to
above as a follow-up study. Once this is done,
the MA offers the potential product to different
speculators by phone; a responsibility that is
taken care of by the Board in consultation with
the MA committee. Once the buyer with the
best price bid is identified, the harvest day is
decided on in agreement with the buyer. The
practical details are then organised, the division
of labour decided upon and the whole Union is
mobilised (Table 7.13).
The second phase is the fishing. At sea, the
resource is extracted according to transects
assigned in advance. Locos are measured on the
boat to judge whether they fulfil the legal
measurement of 10 cm/shell. The crew counts
how much of the resource the diver has extracted,
followed by the writing of the activity report,
specifying the place, the time and the names of
the crew in addition to the registration of the
number of the resource units that were extracted.
TABLE 7.11B Reproduction of the sea transect A, men. (from East to West)
Distance/Quantity Type of sea bottom Species Time in minutes Deep in meters
Transect distance: 030 m. Left side














Diver, Orlando Mella Two crews: Ricardo







* the first design specified 90 U (units of Loco), which in the second version by confusion, were converted into 900 because the U was
understood as it was a 0 (see picture above).
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The third phase is quality and activity
control on shore by specially designated mem-
bers. This consists of activities relating to: size
control, counting, selecting and weighting. The
shells that do not fulfil the legal size requirement
are thrown back into the sea. The retained shells
are put in units of 100 in baskets and then loaded
onto a truck which waits to transport them to
the factory. There, the Locos are processed and
selected according to three different qualities.
This quality sorting process determines the final
price. Then the Locos are canned or frozen
and exported. The Commission distributes the
profits among the divers and crew. Many rules
PICTURE 7.13 (A) Sea transect B: Loco Extraction and Predators
(drawing by and permission to reproduce from J.C. Campos), (B) Predators
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are in place such that these steps are undertaken
efficiently and effectively.
In 2001, during the time of my research, the
Union harvested the product during 12 days
where a similar process is repeated: September
(one day), October (five days), November (four
days,) and December (two days) (Sernapesca,
2007b). In this year, as we shall see, they
succeeded in harvesting more than 25 tonnes
of (in shell) Locos.
FISHING IN THE HISTORICAL AREAS
In the historical areas, the nine most important
species that are fished are presented in Table
7.14. The equipment to fish fin fish varies
depending on the species being fished, going
from the use of harpoon for swordfish, for
example, to trawl line, hand line, and net,
amongst others. The depth is counted in brazas
(fathoms) corresponding to 1.67 meters. The
deepest fishing is up to 180 brazas, where they
find the merluza or Chilean hake. The number
of fishers per boat also varies depending on the
boat and the fish and in the case of the
swordfish for example, the crew is between
five and eight persons (Vildósola and Rosson,
1997). The fishing of large species is done at
open sea (within the five nautical miles aimed
for artisan fisheries) and takes several days.
Fishers can also work with what they call
selective fishing in other regions, which means
TABLE 7.12A Daily calendar of a diver (Calendario del dia de un buzo).
Purpose: To see the distribution of activities during the day for a diver when they extract Locos in the MA.
Participants: Anonymous (see comments below).
Place: At home. Date: July 18th, 2001.
Process and
comments:
When the facilitator explained the purpose of the exercise, a diver and a fisher decided to do the
calendar at home as it was quite late. The calendars were delivered the next day. It was only afterwards
that I discovered that they had not given their names and therefore this and the following fisher’s
calendar are anonymous.
Facilitator: Rosson, A.
TABLE 7.12B Reproduction of the daily calendar of
a diver during Loco harvest in the MA.
Time Activities
07:00 Get up.
08:00 Walk to the cove.
08:30 Fix the diving implements, fix the boat, leave
to the sea.
09:00 Start diving.
09:20 First extraction: 100 units of Loco.
13:00 Complete extraction: 1000 units of Loco.
13:30 Back to the cove, store the implements, sell
the product.
14:30 Lunch at home.
13:30 Rest or siesta.
16:00 Back to the cove to know the results and
commentaries.
18:00 Back home, tea and sandwiches, watch TV,
and spend time with the family.
23:00 Go to bed.
TABLE 7.13 Men’s system flow diagram (Diagrama Flujo de Sistema).
Purpose: To represent in a diagram how the production and trade systems work; and to understand the complexities of
linkage and relationships at different levels. The different steps were numbered and then complemented in the
following sheet with an explanation.
Participants: Rubén Marchant and Guillermo Alvarez and some others who, while observing the
process, interfered vividly giving ideas and suggestions.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre. Date: July 22nd, 2001.
Duration: (four hours in three steps (drawing the first draft, drawing final version and last, writing the explanation of the
steps and symbols).
Process and Easy. They enjoyed very much drawing the flow. Many laughs. The result gave them pride and satisfaction.
comments:
Facilitator: Rosson, A.
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PICTURE 7.14 (A) System Flow Diagram (B) Explanation of System Flow Diagram
TABLE 7.14 Most common fished species in El Quisco (Interview with Silvio Corveta, July 19th, 2001).
Specie (Spanish, Latin and English) Device
Deep (*:1 braza
(fathom)1.67 m.
Merluza-Merluccius gayi gayi Chilean hake or
southern pacific hake
Bottom trawl line half water
(Espinel fondo medio agua)
Summer:4080 brazas*
Winter:80q80 brazas
Congrio-Genypterus chilensis Blacodes and
maculates Red, golden an d black kingklip
Bottom trawl line (Espinel fondo) Summer: 5090 brazas
Bottom hand line (Lı́nea de mano fondo Winter:20 to 60 brazas
Albacora o pez espada Xiphias gladius-Sword-
fish
Half water surface net (Red media agua
de la superficie)
520 brazas in the
surface
Hand harpoon surface down (Arpon de
Mano superficie hacia abajo)
Corvina-Cilus gilberti Southern grunt Bottom net and surface down (Red fondo
y superficie hacia abajo)
510 brazas and
Surface
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that they are away for these periods. For
instance, with Chilean hake and the pomfret
fishing.
Artisan fishing is for the local and regional
market and is sold on the beach to intermedi-
aries, restaurant people and individual consu-
mers. In these sales the fishers get cash in hand
for their catch. A day in the life of a fisher
when he fishes in the historical areas is
presented below. The exercise was done with
the help of the daily calendar tool (see Table
7.15A).
Similarly to the diver, the day of a fisher in
the historical areas consists of two phases: one
at sea and one on that land, which together
add up to more than 12 hours (Table 7.15B).
The day of a fisher starts much earlier and is
also longer. The fishers leave at around 6 a.m.,
arriving at the fishing destination approxi-
mately half an hour later. It takes about an
hour to spread the trawl line and then they
leave it for about two and a half hours, after
which they lift up the line and the fish,
spending in total about five hours at sea.
TABLE 7.14 (Continued)
Specie (Spanish, Latin and English) Device
Deep (*:1 braza
(fathom)1.67 m.
Sierra-Thyrsites atun-Snoek Or barracuta Botton half water net (Red media
agua de la superficie)
520 brazas
Hand line surface and by motor
(Lı́nea de mano superficie y a motor)
13 brazas
Cojinoba del Norte-Seriolella violacea Palm
ruff
Bottom net (Red fondo) 3050 brazas
Palometa or Dorado-Paroma signata-Yellowtail Net surface down (Red superficies
hacia abajo)
130 brazas
Hand line, surface down (Linea de
mano superficie hacia abajo)
Reineta-Brama australis-Pomfret or smallscale
Pomfret
Half water trawl line (Espinel
media agua)
520 brazas
Hand line, surface down (Linea
de mano superficie hacia abajo)
120 brazas
Jurel-Trachurus symetricus Jack mackerel Bottom half water surface net (Red fondo
media agua superficie)
205 brazas
Hand line surface (Linea de mano
superficie)
120 brazas
Source: http://www.sernapesca.cl/areas/pequerias/iconografias/peces.html, 2005-05-23, permission from Lillo, D., Sernapesca.
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Returning at 11 a.m. to the cove, they eat
breakfast and proceed to sell the product.
During the rest of the time up to around
6 p.m. they repair their equipment and prepare
the new fishhooks for the next fishing day. The
fishers go back home around 6 p.m.
Let us examine in the next section the ques-
tion of the fishing income both in the historical
areas and the MA according to the seasonal
calendar followed by an analysis of the actual
results, according to Sernapesca’s statistics dur-
ing the last few years.
AVAILABILITY OF LOCOS AND LAPAS
According to the seasonal calendar undertaken
by fishers, the allowable quota of Locos at that
time was 32,000 but due to low market prices
the Union planned to extract only 16,000 units
(sees Table 7.16). Something similar happened
with the Erizo (Sea Urchin), which I did not
reproduce in a table or figure since there was no
harvest due to their low price.16 These non-
harvest decisions show how the common man-
agement allows a more economically rational
exploitation of target species, which they hoped
will result in a better price.
Sernapesca’s recorded landing for 2001 was
25.4 tonnes of Locos (Sernapesca, 2007b; see
Table 7.19), or around 100,000 units, while
BITECMA’s expected result was 60,421 units
(BITECMA, 1999; see Table 7.19). These
figures do not agree with those of the seasonal
calendar when they reported an availability of
32,000 units. There may be many reasons for
this. What is sure is that the variation between
the real harvests and those expected are con-
siderable, as can be seen in Table 7.19. However,
this shows that planning for marine resources is
far from reliable. I will return to this issue both
below and in the last chapter.
The register of export prices seems to
confirm the low prices that fishers referred to
in 2001, as compared to 2000.17 It is reasonable
to expect that fluctuations of export prices
should influence fishers’ harvest decisions.
Apparently, the decision to harvest all the
allowable Locos during 2001 and 2002, contrary
to the first decision of harvesting only half in
2001, was a good decision as prices rose in 2002
(US$20,776 net/t.) and dropped abruptly again
in 2003 (US$14,787 net/t.).
The harvest of 2001 was the second most
successful in the history of the MA up until
2006. It was only surpassed by the 2002 harvest
of 33.2 tonnes Locos (Sernapesca, 2007b)
(around 132,000 units), while BITECMA’s
expected results were 66,207 units.
Regarding the second most important re-
source, the Lapas (Fisurella spp. or Chilean
TABLE 7.15B Reproduction of the daily calendar of
a fisher in the historical areas.
Time Activities
56:00 Get up and walk to the cove.
66:30 Leave the cove and arrive to the fishing area.
6:307:30 Calando the boat, spreading the trawl line.
7:308:00 Trawl line reposes.
810:00 Lift the trawl line.
10:00 Order all the material or the trawl line used/
finish.
1011:00 Back to the cove.
1118.00 Breakfast, sell the product, fixing material,
baiting fishhook.
18:3019 Back to home, eat.
19:3022 Spending time with family, watching TV.
22:00 Go to bed.
16 This is 250 pesos or US$0.39 instead of the normal 500
pesos or US$0.79, which the fishers considered to be a
reasonable price.
17 So, for example, while the export price for one net tonne
of Locos year 2001 was of US$18,803, in 2000 it was of
U$24,044 (Ortego, IFOP 2006; see Table 5.5 in Chapter
Five).
TABLE 7.15A Daily calendar of a fisher (Calendario
del Dı́a).
Purpose: To see the distribution of activities during the
day for a fisher in a normal working day in
the historical areas.
Participants: Anonymous.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre. Date: July 19th,
2001.
Duration: One hour.
Process and: See comments in Table 7.15.
comments
Facilitator: Rosson, A.
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limpet), as the Locos, it is also counted on one
occasion, and harvested on another (Table
7.17). The Almejas (Venus antiqua or Chilean
littleneck) are harvested constantly through
the year. According to the seasonal calendar
developed by the fishers, the allowable quota of
Lapas in 2001 was 1,650 kilograms, while
BITECMAs was 2 tonnes. The results were
apparently better than anticipated as Serna-
pesca registered a landing of 4 tonnes for 2001
(see Table 7.19).
ECONOMY: FISHING INCOMES IN THE
MANAGEMENT AREAS AND THE
HISTORICAL AREAS
The fishers spend most working time in the
historical areas, and the highest proportion of
income also comes from there. With the excep-
tion of two summer months and the specific
months when the Loco or the Lapas are
harvested, income from both outside and inside
the MA is quite constant, as is shown in
the seasonal calendar data (see Picture 7.9,
and Table 7.10). In 2001 the total income
outside the MA for all the fishers was approxi-
mately 31.5 million pesos or around US$0.5
million, which would give an average of 3.5
million pesos or US$5.400/year per capita (92
members). It corresponds to a monthly income
of around 285,000 pesos or US$449 per capita
(Table 7.18).
The total sum inside the MA for all the
fishers during the year, according to the income
distribution in the seasonal calendar, is 19
million pesos or US$31,000 which would give
an average per capita of 212,000 pesos or
US$335/year (Table 7.18). This corresponds to
a monthly income of around 18,000 pesos or
US$28 per capita in 2001.
Both averages inside and outside the MA
would give a yearly income of a little above 3.5
TABLE 7.16 Reproduction of the availability and extraction of Locos (per unit) year 2001 in the MA, men.
(from the seasonal calendar)
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Availability of Locos: units 32,000
Extraction of Locos: units due to low prices) 16,000
TABLE 7.17 Reproduction of the availability and extraction of Lapas and Almejas (kilo), year 2001
(from the men’s seasonal calendar).
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Availability Lapas 1650
Extraction Lapas 1650
Extraction Almejas 420 620 750 520 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
TABLE 7.18 Reproduction of the income from the seasonal calendar, men total monthly income inside and
outside the MA for the union’s members 2001 (in US$).
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Income
outside MA
143,436 143,436 20,932 20,932 20,932 20,932 20,932 20,932 20,932 20,932 20,932 20,932
Total yearly income outside MA::US$500,000
Income MA 435 586 709 492 284 284 284 318 284 284 23,738 284
Total yearly income within MA: US$30,842
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million pesos or US$5,728 per fisher, which
would give a monthly income of 303,000 pesos
or US$477.18 However, this calculation does not
consider the taxes the union has to pay to the
Treasury, of 1 UTM (Unidad Tributaria) per
hectare, which in 2001 was around 27,000 pesos.
This meant in total 4 and a half million pesos or
slightly over US$7,000 for their 168 hectares.19
In 2004 these taxes were reduced to 0.25 UTM
per hectare, resulting in a considerable reduc-
tion of this expense. The calculations of the
income earned inside the MA specified above do
not consider either the consultancy costs for the
annual follow-up, which costs approximately 1.5
million pesos or US$2,300 for one zone. On the
other hand, nor do the calculations consider
other incomes such as those coming from the
concession of the restaurant (17 million pesos or
US$57,000 per year), or from the fish shop;
which provides the largest income for the Union
(Vildósola and Rosson, 1997). The fish-shop is
operated on a commercial basis and does not
stock the fishers’ own products.
As evident in Table 7.18 there is a big
difference between fishing income earned outside
and inside the MA. The MA yields only 6.2
percent of the total income, based on the data
generated from the seasonal calendar. None-
theless, in the MA, a few days labour harvesting
Loco gave 15 million pesos or US$24,000,
excluding the cost of the eight days of vigilance
per member/year. The 15 million pesos calculated
by the fishers for 2001 corresponds to 77 percent
of all the yearly income from the MA, high-
lighting the economic importance of Locos as a
resource for their livelihoods in comparison to
other benthic resources from the MA (see Table
7.18; November month). Nonetheless, according
to new calculations based in Sernapesca’s statis-
tics, the actual income earned in 2001 was
considerably more than the projected revenue.
According to Gelcich et al. (2006b), in El
Quisco, benthic resources represent 15 percent of
the Union’s landing, which is a higher proportion
than identified in the seasonal calendar exercise.
Gelcich et al.’s (2006b) study confirms that their
main source of income is from fin fish, algae
gathering and other non-fishing activities; con-
firming that fishers’ livelihoods are diversified in
terms of fishing and related activities. Women’s
economic activities can also be added to this to
ascertain a household perspective (see problem-
tree and solution for women).
REAL AND PROGRAMMED LANDINGS 19972006
Let us now turn to the real landings and
incomes derived from Locos harvesting based
on the official registers of Sernapesca for El
Quisco up until 2006 (Tables 7.19, 7.20 and
7.21). To Sernapesca’s landings, in Table 7.19 I
have added the prospected results up to 2010
according to BITECMAs calculations at an
exploitation rate of 20 percent of the available
resources (BITECMA also did a calculation
based on a 30 percent exploitation rate). These
projections only show expected results from
Zone A of the MA, but according to Rosson
(BITECMA, Pers. Comm. via email 2007-07-
39), this is not a problem since, of the other two
obtained MAs zones, one has been left without
control and the other is not working.
Since Sernapesca’s landing statistics for the
MA from 1997 to 2006 are given in ‘‘in shell’’
tonnes and BITECMAs projections are in units,
in order to enable a meaningful comparison, I
have converted Sernapescas tonnes (in shell) to
units (in shell). I also converted the latter to net
tonnes (average four Locos in shell per kilo).
INCOMES IN RELATION TO LANDINGS 19972006
Table 7.20 displays the gross income from Locos
landings for the period 19972000, which are the
last two pre-MA years and the first two years of
the operation of the MA. I distinguish between
the two periods because during this initial period
the cost for the MA varied making it difficult to
deduce net income. Therefore, the calculation of
the income for the first period is in gross terms.
When the MA became established, costs stabi-
18 Minimum salary in Chile in December 2001 was
105,500 pesos (CEDOC-INE 2005b) or US$166.These
calculations are based on the market yearly average rate
of 634.94 pesos per US$, year 2001 (Banco Central de
Chile 2003).
19 Average rate of 634.94 pesos per US$, year 2001 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
Chapter 7: El Quisco: The Seascape of Hope 155
TABLE 7.19 Sernapesca’s registered harvest on the beach (in tonnes) in El Quisco, 19972006 and BITECMAs
projections for the MA.
Specie Year Total tonnes
Approx. equivalence
of tonnes to shell
units
Approx. equivalence






Loco 2006 3,0 12,000 1,1 67,715
2005 1,4 5,600 0,5 67,715
2004 1,4 5,600 0,5 67,715
2003 3,5 14,000 1,3 69,184
2002 33,2 132,800 12,0 66,207
2001 25,4 101,600 9,2 60,421
2000 5,4 21,600 2,0 51,624
1999 11,2 44,800 4,1 38,607
Pre-MA period
1998 3,5 14,000 1,3
1997 21,0 84,000 7,6
Total 19972006 109,0 436,000 39,4
Total (whole period) 19992006 338,000
(69% of 489,188)
489,188























2. BITECMA (1999), Tabla 23 and Tabla 29: Matriz de Proyección Anual del Stock de Concholepas concholepas.
TABLE 7.20 Gross income from Locos landing in El Quisco 19972000.
Pesos (millions) US$ (thousand)
Year Total MA Yearly per fisher Monthly per fisher Total MA Yearly per fisher Monthly per fisher
1997 68,199 741,299 61,774 162,645 1.767 0.1473
1998 11,145 121,141 10,095 24,213 0.263 0.0219
1999 45,790 497,717 41,476 90,000 0.978 0.0815
2000 25,471 276,858 23,071 47,213 0.513 0.0428
Total 150,605 1,637.015 136,416 324,071 3.521 0.2934
Average 37,651 409,253.75 333,329 81,018 0.880 0.073
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lised. Real and projected gross and net incomes
as well as costs have been systematically esti-
mated by BITECMA (Table 7.21).
In describing the income for the first period
(19972000), I give in the text (not in the tables)
both the yearly and monthly per capita income
for the fishers and at points to illustrate its
relative importance I compare this to the
minimum salary for that year. Table 7.20 and
Table 7.21 specify the total and average income
for the MA and the average yearly and monthly
per capita income per period.
As stated in Table 7.19, in 1997 * a pre
official MA year * the MA produced 21 tonnes
Locos (around 84,000 units). This was the third
largest harvest since the MA was established,
and the 1997 harvest was according to the date
generated from the historical profile, the second
best harvest after the self-imposed ban.
The 84,000 units of Locos in 1997 equates to
around 7.6 net tonnes (average 11 net Locos per
kilo). Considering that the export price that year
was US$21,000 net/t. (Table 5.5, Chapter Five),
the 7.6 tonnes from El Quisco should have
generated around US$163,000, or 68 million
pesos (Table 7.20).20 Per fisher this translates to a
yearly gross income of 741,000 pesos which in
monthly terms amounts to 61,000 pesos. The
minimum salary in Chile that year was of around
72,000 pesos for the period JuneDecember
(CEDOC-INE, 2005a) (see Table 7.19).
In 1998 * a pre official MA year * the MA
produced only 3.5 tonnes Locos (approximately
14,000 units or 1.3 net tonnes). The export price
that year was only US$18,626 net/tonnes, which
would give a gross income of 11 million pesos or
US$24,213 (value 1998).21 This is a tremendous
difference compared with the 68 million pesos
from the previous year.
The harvest increased in 1999 * the first
official MA year * to 11.2 tonnes (or around
44,800 units or four net tonnes). This result
surpasses the projected harvest from BI-
TECMA that estimated a catch of 38,607 units,
at a 20 percent exploitation rate. Since the
export price was US$22,503 per net tonne, it
gave a gross income of US$90,000, which means
around 46 million pesos.22 Per fisher this means
a yearly gross income of 497,000 pesos or 41,000
pesos monthly.
In 2000, landing was even lower than 1999,
reaching 5.4 tonnes (21,600 units or 2 net
tonnes). According to BITECMAs projected
results that year, there should had been 51,624
units, which is more than double the actual
harvest. The export price went up this year to
24,000 US$ net/tonne, which up until then was
the second highest price since 1987 when prices
started to be systematised by IFOP. The two net
tonnes gave a gross income of US$47,000 or
25 million pesos.23 Per fisher means a yearly gross
income of 276,000 pesos or 23,000 pesos monthly.
The total gross income for the four year
period 19972000 was 150 million pesos (Table
7.20), which give an average of 37 million per
year. These results are far from satisfactory.
REAL AND PROJECTED INCOMES 20012010
In 2001 and 2002, the harvests reached record
levels. During 2001, the 25.4 tonnes (or 101,600
units) translated to 9.2 net tonnes. Unfortu-
nately for the Union, the prices went down from
US$24,000 per net tonne to 18.8. The 9.2 net
tonnes gave 119 million pesos or US$187,00024
(Table 7.21). Discounting the 28.7 million pesos
or US$45,000 25 of this total for the cost of the
MA, according to the projections for 20012010
from BITECMA, the remaining benefits are
90.2 million pesos, which give a yearly income
per member of 981,000 pesos or 82,000 monthly.
The minimum salary in Chile that year was of
105,500 pesos for the period JuneDecember
(CEDOC-INE, 2005b).
20 Average rate 419.31 pesos per US$, year 1997 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003). BITECMAs ESBA-study from
1999 gives for this year 13,940 million pesos for the
diverse cost of the MA.
21 Average rate 460.29 pesos per US$, year 1998 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
22 Average rate 508.78 pesos per US$, year 1999 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
23 Average rate of 539.49 pesos per US$, year 2000 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
24 Average rate 634.94 pesos per US$, year 2001 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003)
25 Average rate 634, 94 pesos per US$, year 2001 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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In 2002, the MA achieved its highest land-
ing ever, with 33.2 tonnes or 132,800 units,
translating to 12 net tonnes. The prices this time
went up from US$18,800 to US$20,700 per net
tonne, which should have given US$251,000 26
or 173 million pesos. Discounting the 28.7
million from this total for the cost of the MA,
the remaining benefits are 144 million pesos,
which give a yearly income of 1.6 million pesos
or 131,000 pesos monthly per capita. The
minimum salary that year in Chile was
112,200 pesos for the period JuneDecember
(CEDOC-INE, 2005b). Of the three years
(1997, 2001 and 2002) when Loco landings
were high, only the 2002 income barely sur-
passes the minimum salary. During the follow-
ing years the harvests were (Table 7.20) quite
low again and so were also the export prices
(See Table 5.5, Chapter Five).
In terms of Lapas (Table 7.19) the total of 26
tonnes for the period 19992006 is in accord with
the projected average predicted by BITECMA.
Taking, to simplify, the same price calculated for
Puerto Oscuro (Chapter Six) valid for 2001 of
2,000 pesos per kilo, the 26 tonnes of Lapas
would have generated an income of 52 million
pesos or an average of 6.5 million per year
equalling an average 70,000 pesos per member.
If we consider BITECMAs total net income
for the period 20012010 counting Locos and
Lapas, the picture looks different (Table 7.21) in
terms of projected economic results. Actual
incomes achieved are not as high as projected
as can be seen in Table 7.21. Per fisher this
means a yearly net income of 276,000 pesos or
23,000 pesos monthly.
In Table 7.21, I subtracted the cost of the
MAs based on the same amount estimated by
BITECMA (fix, variables, consultancy and
taxes) which amounts to between 28 and 33
million pesos per year during 20012010. There-
fore Table 7.21 displays both BITECMA’s
projected net incomes and real net income based
on Sernapesca’s landing statistics. Since BITEC-
MA’s projection in the ESBA study is only from
1999 to 2008, in order to complement it, I used
additional data regarding harvest projections
and incomes for 20012010 from BITECMA.
As seen in Table 7.21, the costs for the MA
year 2001 and 2002 were 81 and 61.5 percent of
the projected incomes, respectively. Thereafter,
although these costs increase, the yearly percen-
tage in relation to the total incomes stabilises at
around 53 percent. Please note, that with the
exception of the Lapas, the calculated incomes do
not include other MA resources and therefore
these calculations do not reflect real total income.
ANALYSIS OF INCOME AND PRODUCTION
BITECMA has estimated a net total income for
the period 20012010 of 254 million pesos for
the MA, and a yearly average of 25.4 million
pesos. Now, the real net income from the MA
(for the first five the years 20012005) was in
fact 172.5 million pesos or US$248,000. The
yearly average was 34.5 million pesos or
US$49,000 (375,000 pesos yearly per fisher or
31,000 pesos monthly). That is, only in half of
period (20012005) did the MA actually pro-
vided 68 percent (172.5 of 254 programmed
million) of BITECMAs expected results of 10
years (20012010).27
If we now consider production in term of
units for the period 20012006, corresponding
to half of the period, we can see in Table 7.19
that the total actual average results (271,600
units of Locos) corresponds to 68 percent of the
expected 398,957 units for that period according
to BITECMAs projections. In this way, we can
say that although the MA provided 32 percent
less than expected in terms of production, the
economic returns were as expected, which for
half of the period should have been 127.1
million pesos instead of the actual 172.5 million
pesos. These results are better than those of the
period described first (19972000). Nonetheless
in terms of per capita incomes for both periods,
the economic benefits are far too low for a
viable fishers’ livelihood.
26 Average rate 688.94 pesos per US$, year 2002 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
27 I would also suspect that given tax were reduced in 2004,
and the calculation was done by BITECMA in 1999, the
Union ’saved’ at least three million pesos per year (after
2004).
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Production results do not vary significantly
if we view the entire period (19992006), start-
ing from BITECMA’s first year of projections,
as the total actual result (338,000 units of
Locos) corresponds to 69 percent of the
489,180 pesos projected by BITECMA for that
period (see Table 7.19). In light of these reflec-
tions on income and production results of the
MA, have they succeeded or failed? The answer
will depend on what we consider. If we consider
production, the actual outcomes are around 32
percent below BITECMA’s estimations. On the
other hand incomes are higher than expected.
At first glance this should be positive; more
income has been generated by the Union with
less than anticipated work and production
efforts. If the fishers did not lose income due
to lower production, we can perhaps say that
this was because market prices compensated.
However, such positive market trends cannot be
relied on, as they are to a large degree outside
the influence of the fishers and their union.
According to the 2007 BITECMAs follow-
up study, the MA faces problems of commercia-
lisation and organization of the extractions.
‘‘Given that the organization seeks equity before
better outcomes, the efficiency of the extraction
work has been hindered’’ (Rosson, BITECMA,
2007). As no further explanations are given it is
difficult to understand how the ‘‘problem’’ has
been defined here. All one can say is that
BITECMA believes that the Union trades off
equity in outcomes for efficiency, but no elabora-
tion of the basis for this appraisal has been given.
SECTION 3: ACHIEVEMENTS,
CHALLENGES AND WAYS FORWARD IN
THE EL QUISCO MANAGEMENT AREA
FISHERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACTS OF THE
MANAGEMENT AREAS
One of my research questions is: How do men
and women in the fishing communities perceive
the MA and its impact? Considering both the
perspective of fishers/divers and women, I
assessed the question with the Impact Analysis
tool. Both men and women raised six impact
elements. It is worth noting that the Impact
Analysis was made in 2001. I start with the men.
Conservation of the species is the first impact
of the MA that the men mention (Table 7.22 and
Fig. 7.3). Economic welfare is a second impact of
the MA, and closely related to that, social
welfare. Fishers connected social welfare with
three other elements: tranquillity, organization,
and comradeship between members as a result of
disappearing rivalry. This leads to what they
called ‘‘organised solidarity’’ (i.e., through the
union, in my own interpretation). All their
identified impacts are components of the con-
cept of sustainable development (see Section
four and Chapter Two).
WOMEN’S PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPACTS
OF THE MANAGEMENT AREAS
As did the men, women placed resource protec-
tion first in their impact analysis of the MA
(Table 7.23 and Fig. 7.4). This was followed
(similarly to the men) by economic reasoning.
That is, better availability of food during winter,
which is in line with the fifth element (major
economic income), which should allow a better
income distribution through the year (connected
to this was the fifth element). As the third element
the women pointed out food security and inte-
gration between the union’s members, and in
fourth place was that ‘‘One learns how to defend
own rights’’ (Fig. 7.4), an organizational capacity
in the form of the union and the MA. After that
came ‘‘major economic income’’ (fifth element;
Fig. 7.4) which ‘‘enables economic compro-
TABLE 7.22 Mens’ impact analysis (Análisis de
impacto).
Purpose: To evaluate the impacts of the MA from the
perspective of fishers/divers.
Participants: Silvio Corvetto, Luis Pizarro, Victor Erices,
Juan Campos, Orlando Mella Guillermo
Alvarez and Ruben Marchant.
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mises’’ (i.e., plan for the future, apply for loans,
etc.), which is the sixth element.
ANALYSIS
The men concluded in both the stepping
stones and drawing concepts tools that the
reason for the introduction of the MA was
overexploitation of Locos, and that the
intention of sustainable development was to
protect the resource.
TABLE 7.23 Women’s impact analysis (Análisis de
impacto).
Purpose: To evaluate the impacts of the MA from the
perspective of women.
Participants: Adela Gallardo and Salomé Aranda.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre. Date: July 24th,
2001.
Duration: One hour.
Process and Easy, in addition to a clear agreement between
comments: the two participants.
Facilitator: Rosson, A.
4. One learns how 
to defend own rights
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FIGURE 7.4 Reproduction of women’s impact analysis
6. They have an inheritance to 
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4. Tranquillity, major organization and 









2. Economic  
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FIGURE 7.3 Reproduction of men’s impact analysis
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Although the question was what the impacts
of the MA had been so far, men and women did
not differ much between actually experienced
and anticipated impacts of the MA. Regarding
the men, of the six elements they mention, with
the exception of economic and social welfare
which both can be considered as expected
results, the rest seems to be impacts already
achieved by the MA. Regarding the women, of
the six named impacts, at least the first four
seem to deal with things they have already
actually experienced, while the last two ones
are more of expected results given that the MA
succeeds. Of the rest of the six impacts named by
the women, three are of economic character,
compared to only one such mentioned by the
men. Except for the environmental element, the
women raised the integration between fishers
and the acquisition of new skills in exercising
their rights. This tool also shows that the women
understood the ecological importance of the
MA, illustrating that they are not marginalised
from the main purpose of the process. The
women’s emphasis on economic matters might
be explained by the fact that they run household
economy. Women are also more immediately
preoccupied with the future of the children,
especially the cost of higher education.
Although an analysis of the impact of the
MA shows a general satisfaction with the MA
both on part of men and women, there is still
some frustration. The women are particularly
concerned about the future. To address these
issues the problem-tree tool was utilised. It
consists of problem identification, related
causes and effects and who is affected.
CHALLENGES
With the introduction of the MA a new form of
illegal harvest has entered the scene: stealing
from the stocks within the MAs. Since the areas
have long periods where a no-take regulation
prevails, Locos become big, concentrated and
easily harvested, making stealing profitable. This
issue might account for the lower production of
Locos in some years in El Quisco. According to
the last follow-up study (BITECMA, 2007), the
Union, despite enacting a surveillance regime,
has not been able to stop the theft.
The main challenge of the MA of El Quisco
(and the Union) is poaching of Locos. The
exercise did not seek to obtain information on
whether the fishers of the MA also harvest
Locos outside the MA under ban or whether
they did it before the introduction of the MA.
The unsolved illegal harvest under the ban was
one of the reasons for the introduction of the
MAs country-wide. According to an expert
(that I have done anonymous, 2007), the reason
why two zones within the MAs have not proved
bountiful might be due to the interest in having
some sectors free from the MA regime for
clandestine exploitation. This is speculative,
but the MA fishers might be continuing to
harvest Locos in the historical areas, yet com-
plaining about theft from their own MA.
Illegal harvest of Locos in the country seems
to continue in spite of the MAs although there are
no studies of this problem at a national scale. The
level of organization and size of illegal fishing and
traffic remain unknown (see Chapter Five).
MEN’S PROBLEM PERCEPTIONS
Clandestine extraction of Locos by outsiders,
symbolised by a man wearing a black capuchin
(the thieve) was a big concern in the problem-tree
exercise (Table 7.24, Picture 7.15 and Fig. 7.5).
Theft is the main reason for the vigilance system
of the MA.
Theft is also problematic because even
though fishers discover the thieves in the MA
and report the offences to the local police, they
cannot intervene due to jurisdictional bound-
aries (cause 2b, Fig. 7.5). The police, who are
locally based, have jurisdiction over land while
Maritime Governance, which is located in the
regional capital, has jurisdiction over the sea
(San Antonio).
This institutional problem of divided jur-
isdictions means that the police cannot inter-
vene directly in activities occurring in the sea
but must inform the Maritime Governance,
although this usually happens when it is too
late. The fishers see this difficulty as a lack of
connection between Maritime Governance and
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the legal apparatus (cause 2a). Similarly, in
causes, they blame the lack of legal sanctions
for Locos poaching and complain that there is a
lack of appreciation of the extent and impact of
this problem. In their view, Locos poaching is a
problem primarily because it puts additional
stress on the Locos reproduction (1a), that is, an
action that threatens the extractive viability of
Locos (1b), which they aim to protect through
the MA for their own benefit.
The problem of Locos poaching has several
consequences. The first is economic loss for the
MA. Secondly, it means that the largest shells
are lost. It also means effort for each of them in
trying to compensate means extra work. They
have to invest in patrolling and the equipment
and fuel to support it (e.g., man power, motor-
cycle, fuel, cellular phone). They also feel
frustrated. In asking who was affected by Locos
poaching, the fishers answered that it was the
members of the Union (and the Union itself)
and their families, the export companies and the
domestic market.
It was clear that the fishers were very aware
of the problem, and that it was something they
had thought about and discussed. There was
consensus regarding the issues and their order
of importance. Non-participating fishers
around the participants nodded their approval
to the different elements that were raised. For
me now, it is easier to understand the concern
over the reservoir of Locos in situ, on the sea
bottom, since it constitutes an accumulated
treasure, never seen by the fishers before,
especially given the bumper harvest results of
Sernapesca’s landings statistics obtained during
2001 and 2002. It is also against this back-
ground that the results of the solution-tree tool
can be contextualised and better understood
(Picture 7.16).
WOMEN’S PROBLEMS PERCEPTIONS
Women’s problems are different from men’s.
They have no connection with the MA but
deal with their own situation mainly as house-
PICTURE 7.15 Men’s problem-tree PICTURE 7.16 Finishing problem-tree
TABLE 7.24 Men’s problem-tree (Árbol de Problemas).
Purpose: To analyze how the fishers perceive the main problems connected with the MA.
Participants: Roberto Olivares, Fernando Romo and Francisco Aranda.
Place: Outside the Union’s Social Centre, where they work near the boats.
Date: July 23th, 2001. Duration: One and a half-hour.
Process and
comments:
By this day, the storm was over and fishing activities had started again. Therefore this exercise was done in an
open space outside the social centre while the fishers were working. Thus, I drew the flip chart myself,
following the instruction of the fishers.
Facilitator: The Author.
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wives or house-keepers (dueñas de casa) (Table
7.25, Picture 7.17 and Fig. 7.6). The main
problem suggested by the women was the lack
of stable job opportunities and the shortage of
economic means with which to complement the
economy of the household. They explained that
the lack of jobs was connected with the lack of
private initiatives, rather than with Government
initiatives, although, having said that, expecta-
tions were placed on local politicians and the
State when they identified the causes of the
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FIGURE 7.5 Reproduction of men’s problem-tree
TABLE 7.25 Women’s problem-tree (Árbol de
Problemas).
Purpose: To analyze what the women perceives as
main problems in their life.
Participants: Joanna Bianchi, Norma Sagredo and Lorena
Leal.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre.
Date: July 24th, 2001.
Duration: One and a half-hour.
Process and
comments:
Similar to how it was with men, there was
clarity and consensus about the main pro-
blems they confront as women.
Facilitator: The Author.
PICTURE 7.17 Women’s problem-tree
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problem. As a cause, they identified the lack
of a gender consciousness and gender specific
strategy among local politicians. They also
pointed out that the area does not attract
capital, that is, that the investment in tourism
infrastructure is low.
The effect of the lack of job opportunities
meant that women’s contribution to the house-
hold economy was unstable and this made it
difficult to plan for the future, especially the
possibility for children to study at a higher level.
Job scarcity also meant a limitation of their
decision-making role about economic matters
and dependence on their husbands. Further-
more, the lack of jobs affects the marital
relationship and the family in general as there
is not enough income. This may lead to separa-
tions and other social problems.
Who then becomes affected by the lack of
jobs for women? The answer is the family,
principally children (as it limits their future
education), and the marital and family relation-
ship. This is congruent with what the effects
were in the problem-tree described above.
Through complementary open interviews
with the women, they stated that they work
mainly during the summer (DecemberFebru-
ary) as home-maids in the summer houses and
apartments for which they get a salary of 60,000
pesos a month or US$95.28 To look after the
summer houses during the rest of the year
women get 20,000 pesos a month or US$31.5.
Economically, the worst months are JuneAu-
gust. During July, the Union supports the
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FIGURE 7.6 Reproduction of women’s problem-tree
28 Average rate of 643 pesos per US$, year 2001 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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families with the first food basket. During the
non-summer months, women also work with
handicraft (such as leather, shells, ceramic,
sewing). Among other problems the women
mentioned were that the family lose the right
to economic support for the children if the
family owns its house. There is no health
insurance for fishers and their families and no
pensions available for retired fishers. When a
fisher dies, the Union supports the widow and
her family for one year. After that, they have to
manage for themselves.
Children’s education is another big concern.
There is no technical high school in the locality.
The nearest high school is in the next village. To
send children to that school costs 1,000 pesos or
US$1.6 in transport and lunch has to be paid
for, too. Family costs to send two children to the
neighbouring town would be approximately
200,000 pesos or US$31529 per year without
counting food, school materials and uniform,
things that parents also have to pay for. It is
noteworthy to compare this cost with the
minimum salary in Chile, which was 105,500
pesos or US$166 in July 2001.
The health situation was also assessed
among women by developing a seasonal calen-
dar of the most common illness and expenses.
The data generated from this exercise clearly
shows that most expenses are incurred during the
summer months in the form of sun protection
and medicine for diarrhoea. As can be seen in
Table 7.26B, these costs for a family are near the
minimum salary in Chile. Also important are
expenses to treat influenzas and colds during
winter and allergies during spring (Table 7.26A
and Table 7.26B). Lastly, information about the
women’s situation was complemented by devel-
oping a daily calendar (Table 7.27A and 7.27B).
Compared to the working day of a diver or fisher,
women’s working day often finishes near mid-
night, although a long break is usually taken
after lunch.





lotions & colds Allergies
Jan.Feb. 15,76 31,52 39,41 0 0
Mar.Apr. 0 0 0 0 0
MaySep. 0 0 0 78,81 0
Oct.Dec. 0 0 0 0 47,29
TABLE 7.26A Women’s seasonal calendar, yearly illness and related expenses.
Purpose: To see the seasonal distribution of illness and related expenses in the household economy.
Participants: Raquel Cisternas, Adela Gallardo and Lorena Leal.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre, Date: July 20th, 2001. Duration: One hour.
Process and comments: Expedite.
Facilitator: The Author.
TABLE 7.27A Women’s daily calendar (Calendario del Dı́a).
Purpose: To see the distribution of activities during the day in a normal working day.
Participants: Veronica Diaz, Norma Sagrado y Salomé Aranda.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre. Date: July 20th, 2001. Duration: One and a half-hour.
Process and comments: Expedite.
Facilitator: The Author.
29 Average rate of 634.94 pesos per US$ for 2001 (Banco
Central de Chile 2003).
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WAYS FORWARD
The solutions to the main problems as seen by
men and women were raised in the problem-tree
exercise. The next tool is the solution-tree. It
deals with solutions, their implications, effects
and who should be given the responsibility for
the action aimed to solve the problem
(see Table 7.28). This tool was used by both
men and women.
FISHERS’ PERCEPTION OF THE SOLUTION TO THEIR
MAIN PROBLEM
As a solution to Loco poaching (Fig. 7.7), fishers
suggested that specific laws that protect the
MAs and its resources be established. It was
proposed that these laws would include: the
application of costly fines, authorisation of
judges to impose sanctions, the possibility to
withdraw the fishing equipment of the thieves
and finally, time in jail based on the severity of
the crime.
It was believed that the implications of such
a solution would mean less theft and increased
tranquility in the MA, and a better economic
situation, as well improved social welfare. It
would furthermore strengthen the MA and the
Union as a valid alternative form of production
and organization and increase respect for arti-
san fisher organizations.
The effects of the problem solution in the
form of the creation of specific laws would
mean a larger exploitable stock, less need for
extra work outside the MA when the economic
losses in the MA diminish. They considered
it the responsibility of the Union and the
Maritime Governance together with the local
police and the court in charge of implementing
this solution.
TABLE 7.27B Reproduction of women’s daily calendar.
Time Activities
77:30 Get up to do house duties, personal hygiene.
7:30*8 Breakfast for the children before school.
810:30 Clean the house, the backyard, throw away the garbage.
10:30*13 Buy food, lunch preparation, lunch, wash dishes, the kitchen, laundry.
14*16 Rest (watch TV: news, soap opera; siesta).
19*20 Preparation of tea and sandwiches when the children come from school.
20*21 Help children change school clothes, more cleaning, help children with homework.
21*22 Supper, prepare the children for bed.
22:3023 End of the working day, spend time with the husband and elderly children.
TABLE 7.28 Men’s solution-tree (Árbol de Solución).
Purpose: To analyze the possible solutions for the problems identified in the Problem-Tree.
Participants: Rafael Pizarro, Jose Cisternas and Salvador Silva.
Place: Outside the Union’s Social Centre, in their labour place near the boats. Date: July 24th, 2001.
Duration: One hour.
Process and comments: See comments in Problem-Tree. Facilitator: The Author.
PICTURE 7.18 Men’s solution-tree
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WOMEN’S PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOLUTION TO
THEIR MAIN PROBLEMS
The results of the women’s solution-tree (see Fig.
7.8) exercise were similar to the items developed
in the preceding problem-tree. The proposed
solution to the shortage of jobs for women was
the creation of private and public salaried occu-
pations, in addition to an economic initiative
which supports the diversification of employment
opportunities to avoid dependency on just one
or two sources of jobs (Table 7.29) (Picture 7.19).
The implications of such a solution would
mean a better life and include better opportu-
nities to plan the future including their children’s
education. It would also mean improvement in
their social and economic welfare due to a more
stable household income, which would lead to
family stability as well as to independence for
them as women, which could imply increased
decision power. When economic problems de-
crease, family problems do, too. The economic
situation seems to be the main source of
problems affecting the family in general, but to
have a job is not only a means to solve economic
difficulties but also to bridge inequality gaps
between women and men. Those charged with
realising the action to solve job shortages were,
according to the participants, the same agents
that are part of the solution. It means that both
private and regional/municipal offices should
initiate diversification of local employment op-
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FIGURE 7.7 Reproduction of men’s solution-tree
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FIGURE 7.8 Reproduction of women’s solution-tree
PICTURE 7.19 Reproduction of women’s solution-tree
TABLE 7.29 Women’s solution-tree (Árbol de Solu-
ción).
Purpose: To analyze the possible solutions to the
proposed problems.
Participants: Joanna Bianchi, Norma Salgado and
Lorena Leal.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre. Date: July 24th,
2001.
Duration: One and a half-hour.
Process and
comments:
See comments in Problem-Tree.
Facilitator: The Author.
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expected from these agencies, which implied
excluding themselves from taking the initiative.
ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO
PROBLEMS
The problem-tree and solution-tree exercises
(for both men and women) showed considerable
consciousness and reflection about their
situation. As opposed to the women, the fishers
included themselves in their solution to the
problem.
Regarding the men’s solution, laws against
theft already exist, which makes the solution
proposed by the fishers difficult to comprehend
and implement. Nonetheless, the fishers’ have a
point since despite having exclusive use rights,
MA resources cannot be said to be the property
of the MA and the fishers in the same sense that
a house would be.
The Union has exclusive use rights to
the MA, but marine resources are fugitive
and normally become property only after
captured. Nonetheless, since fishers are fishers
and not lawyers, they proposed as a solution a




Since the evaluation of the methodology used in
El Quisco was analysed in Chapter One, only
the tables are presented here. Three main
questions are answered: What did you like?
What did you not like? What did you learn?
(Tables 7.30A, 7.30B, 7.31A and 7.31B)
CONCLUSIONS
In the late 1980s, when the collaboration with
the University and the self-imposed ban started
in El Quisco, the Union had already developed
assets that paved the way for the MA. The unity,
TABLE 7.30A General evaluation of the methodology and the process, men (Evaluación del Proceso y los
Métodos).
Purpose: To evaluate the process and the methods.
Participants: See Table 7.29. Some of the participants were not present in the first evaluation, which was complemented
later by Armando, but not with all the fishers, whose participation varied from exercise to exercise.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre. Date: July 25th, 2001. Duration: One hour.
Process and Difficult to perform with all the members that were part of the exercise from the very beginning.
comments:
Facilitator: Initiated by the author and complemented by Rosson, A. in the days following my departure.
TABLE 7.30B Reproduction of the general evaluation of the methodology and the process, men.
Participants What did you liked?
1&2 Good experience, new experience. Facilitators were common people, easy to access. Good and
nice (Rafael Pizarro and Jose Cisternas).
3 I liked the approach based in the MA. The participation of people in groups is good; the methods
allow the participation of all present (Carlos Valencia).
4 I liked to be informed and learn about ourselves. It is important for us that our labour is known
(Juan Carlos Campos).
5 Good. We work in groups, ideas are understood, and one participates with those who work (Patricio Aranda).
6 Interesting to get to know the work in groups. Presentations can be made (Guillermo Alvarez).
7 I liked the study system (Ruben Marchant).
8 Nice way of working, one learns more (Enrique Leal).
9&10 Easy (Francisco Aranda and Fernando Romo).
11 I liked the work in groups (Manuel Bravo).
12 Groups work is good (Orlando Mella).
13 Interesting work (Gonzalo Leiva).
14 Nice work (Ricardo Moraga).
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collective decision-making ability and the nego-
tiation power were part of the soft capital assets
that the fishers of the Union already had in their
tradition. These have been strengthened with the
struggle over the physical landscape with the
Yacht Club and from the periodical negotiations
over the restaurant’s concession. It is also from
the leasing of the restaurant and the fish shop
that the main incomes of the Union are derived.
Due to its improved negotiation position, the
Union has prospered in areas other than fishing
leading to a diversification of activities.
Since the first self-imposed ban in the late
1980s up to 2001, the following milestone
achievements were obtained: the official request
of the MA in 1995; the first harvest of the MA
during 1993 done individually by boat groups;
the substitution of individual harvest with
TABLE 7.30B (Continued)
Participants What did you not like?
1&2 Nothing, we lacked more participation (Rafael Pizarro and Jose Cisternas).
3 Little cooperation from the union’s members to assist in the workshops (Carlos Valencia).
4 That not all the people participate when it concerns everybody (Juan Carlos Campos).
5 There was lack of information regarding the MA. Those who work are always the same (Patricio Aranda).
6 Lack of cooperation of the comrades so they can understand the process. Scarce disposition from the people if
there is not income involved (Guillermo Alvarez).
7 There was poor assistance from the rest of members (Ruben Marchant).
8 Nothing (Enrique Leal).
9&10 Nothing (Francisco Aranda and Fernando Romo).
11 Little cooperation from some of the members (Manuel Bravo).
12 Scarce participation from some members (Orlando Mella).
13 Nothing (Gonzalo Leiva).
14 Not to have been able to participate in everything (Ricardo Moraga).
Participants What did you learn?
1&2 We learned how to be prepared for next time (Rafael Pizarro and Jose Cisternas).
3 I learned that all people can participate, not only the directors of the union. That it is possible to obtain ideas
from the rest, from the base, that all can have an opinion (Carlos Valencia).
4 More communication between the members; better understanding of the system (Juan Carlos Campos).
5 It is convenient to work in group, things are discussed (Patricio Aranda).
6 One learns to express what one thinks and expose those ideas (Guillermo Alvarez).
7 One obtains new knowledge (Ruben Marchant).
8 One learns how the MA got started (Enrique Leal).
9&10 One shares ideas when discussing with others (Francisco Aranda and Fernando Romo).
11 I noted that people could express their ideas and that consensus was quickly reached in the dialogue (Manuel
Bravo, President of the union).
12 One learns the ideas of the others (Orlando Mella).
13 One learns how to work in group (Gonzalo Leiva).
14 One learns to know the process off the MA (Ricardo Moraga).
TABLE 7.31A General evaluation of the methodology and the process, women (Evaluación del Proceso y los
Métodos).
Purpose: To evaluate the process and the methods.
Participants: Joanna Bianchi, Norma Sagredo and Lorena Leal.
Place: The Union’s Social Centre. Date: July 24th, 2001. Duration: One hour.
Process and As it became too late, this exercise was left to be done after my departure. Rosson succeeded in gathering only
comments: three of the women that had been participating previously.
Facilitator: Rosson, A.
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common harvest during the second harvest year
of 1997; an application for two new MAs under
the same union in 1997. The latter did not
prosper for unclear reasons, but an expert
expressed that this could have a connection
with the fishers’ desire to have an area free of
explicit restrictions on Loco harvesting,
although harvesting in these areas would be
illegal. In 1999, the ESBA study was done for
the three zones and the projections for a ten
years period were estimated in terms of landings
and income.
Since the self-imposed ban, the harvest and
selling routines changed. The substitution of
individual harvest by a common harvest hap-
pened in parallel to a move to common
commercialisations. Common harvest decisions
and group negotiation for the price started. As
seen, both postponing harvest due to the low
market price of Locos, and group negotiations
have been part of the early strategies used by the
Union in order to get better prices. The fishers
began to rationalise sale of Locos according to
market mechanisms. This could be construed as
a more active role that goes beyond that of the
mere direct producer, a role that displays market
savvy, indicating that the producers are moving
into new social arenas.
Evaluating the MA, the strategy goes along
three common collective actions: (a) common
management (i.e., administration); (b) common
or collective harvest; and (c) common commer-
cialisation of the species. Giving every diver an
extra monetary share per extraction ‘‘since all
the divers do not realise the same effort in
extracting the resource Loco’’ (Reglamento
interno . . .b.5), seems to make extraction more
effective, avoiding perhaps a kind of ‘‘free-
rider’’ phenomenon.
Regarding harvest and income from the
MA, the results are better in terms of income
if compared to those expected, but less satisfac-
tory in terms of production. The reasons for the
lower production might be several, including
poaching, which cannot be evaluated in this
investigation. If diminishing production is due
to ecological reasons experts have no definitive
answer regarding the cause as ocean phenomena
are complex. Whatever the reasons, the lower
production results make it evident that planning
for marine resources is far from being reliable.
This is a big challenge for the MA, perhaps
possible to solve by diversifying economic
activities even more, to make livelihoods less
vulnerable. In terms of MA production, deci-
sions to harvest according to market fluctua-
TABLE 7.31B Reproduction of the general evaluation of the methodology and the process, women.
Participants What did you like?
1 New ideas come up as you spend time in the group.
2 To spend time in the group and discuss problems that one thinks are private
but turn to be common.
3 Coordination of ideas and to find the average.




Participants What did you learn?
1 To draw conclusions in collective.
2 To gain self-confidence when recognizing that problems are common.
3 To recognize that one is capable of expressing ideas in group and these ideas
have value and are useful and not as wrong as one thinks.
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tions might become risky, adventuring labour
efforts.
Regarding individual income, the calculated
amounts that the fishers said they derived from
the MA are bleak compared to the national
minimum salary. However, the fishers’ liveli-
hoods depend on several activities. Although
this activity may be limited in terms of income,
there is also women’s economic activities, which
needs to be considered in a household situation.
Nonetheless, neither gender group excepted that
the MA alone would solve their economic
situation. If we consider the data given in the
seasonal calendar, the fishers seem to get
incomes two or three times above those of the
minimum salary in Chile. Income is thus derived
from the historical areas, from the MA and
from the other economic activities of the Union,
and from women’s contribution. Most income
comes from the restaurant and fish shop. In this
regard, the El Quisco Union cannot be said to
be representative as not all fishing organizations
have these sources of income, although El
Quisco is not alone in this regard, with many
coves connected to well visited bathing sites
bringing tourism.
What can be said about the success of the
MA as a way to protect the Locos as an
economic resource? As we saw, landing results
oscillate considerably from year to year. None-
theless, it is assumed that without the MA, still
under open access, every fisher would have
extracted as much as possible of the resource
probably without consideration of the legal size
or market price and in competition with each
other, which was the situation prior to the MA
reform. This is not the case any longer in this
particular MA area. Nevertheless, illegal har-
vests seem to continue by the members of the
Union around the MA as it seems also to be the
case in the rest of country (see previous section).
One can only hope that illegal fishing di-
minishes. This may occur given that the MAs
extraction and commercialisation have become
more organised, reducing channels to commer-
cialise Locos outside of this framework. In this
case, illegal harvests (if not well organized with
traffic export purposes) is most probable for the
local and regional market and therefore also
hopefully limited in scope. Theft within the MA
is a more recent problem, and to solve this
problem vigilance is used but this is demanding
in terms of labour efforts. One of the conditions
commonly named by the common resources
approach (Ostrom, 1999; Schlager and Ostrom,
1992) is that the cost of controlling the resource
should not be too high, which seems not to be
the case with the MAs. On the other hand, if
vigilance were more demanding, the more
scarce the fish, the more expensive they become
(Christy, 1992), which also makes the question
of the cost of vigilance relative.
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8 From Seascape of Extinction to
Seascape of Confidence
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Due to high extraction rates in the 20th century
sea resources have become almost non-renew-
able. Industrial fishing is a major cause of
resource depletion whereas small-scale fisheries
have been seen as less threatening for the eco-
system. Nevertheless, through the process of
economic globalization, also small-scale artisa-
nal fisheries have been incorporated into the
international market as a result of the demand
for high value commodities. This has led to
over-harvesting resulting in depletion of coastal
marine resources, showing the interconnection
between consumption in high-income countries
and production in low-income countries. The
implication of this relationship resource exhaus-
tion.
The Chilean experience with the Conchole-
pas concholepas (Loco) illustrates how Chile’s
integration into the global market under the
implementation of a neo-liberal policy led
to a significant increase in artisanal fishing
activities during the middle 1970s showing,
after a short and intensive export period,
abrupt harvest falls in the early 1980s. Loco, a
species indigenous to the Chilean and southern
Peruvian coast, is not alone in being threatened
due to export demand. In response to globali-
zation and market demand of fish, Chile’s
administration adapted and modernized its
institutions, fishing law and regulations.
Although preponderance has been given to
the economic interest of industrial fishing and
international capital, there has also been a
concern for artisanal fishing. In spite of its
rudimentary character, this sector increased its
importance bringing considerable export reven-
ues to the state and to exporting firms. Benthic
resources, exploited exclusively by the small-
scale artisanal fishing sector, show higher
export profits in comparison to those produced
by the large-scale fishery sector (Castilla and
Fernández, 1998, p. 125). Artisanal fishing is
also central for local food security and liveli-
hoods for coastal communities. As a response
to a decreasing Locos harvest and that of other
benthic resources, the Chilean government
attempted, without much success, to adopt
different measures to stop resource depletion,
such as reproductive seasons (19811984), glo-
bal quota (19851989) and total closure
(1990). These failures led to the legislation of
a new co-management formula * TURF.
TURF was adopted to avoid resource depletion
and the social problems that would occur if
artisanal fishers lost this part of their income.
The rights inherent in TURF are given effect in
Management and Exploitation Areas for
Benthic Resources (MEABR), which in vox
populi became the Management Areas (MAs).
Experimenting with no-take sea areas in some
parts of Chile, fishers themselves, together with
scientists were the precursors to the Chilean
TURF initiative. Importantly scientists and
fishers, cooperating at a grassroots level, in-
itiated the quest for more sustainable harvesting
practices. This pioneer work was then formally
institutionalized in the 1991 Fishing Law
(LPA).
A relevant question is whether the pre MA
process can be understood as a ‘‘tragedy of the
commons’’? According to Castilla, the Loco
fishery portrays Harding’s ‘‘tragedy of the
commons’’ where ‘‘Each man is locked into a
system (economic system) that compels him to
increase his herd without limit * in a world that
is limited’’ (in Castilla, 1995, p. 157). This is also
how the situation was perceived by the autho-
rities (Castilla et al., 2007). There was consensus
that there were changes in resource stocks, but
the driving forces seemed unclear. When the
landing of Loco fell dramatically between 1980
and 1981, over-exploitation was never demon-
strated (Castilla, 1995). Castilla himself suggests
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in his 1995 article that ‘the Loco decreases
probably due to over-exploitation’. In the con-
clusion of the same article he writes that the
rationale to introduce MAs was ‘‘the fact that
the fisheries were over-exploited’’ (Castilla,
1995, p. 28, 38).1 The meaning of ‘‘probably’’
(Castilla, 1995) is not completely congruent
with saying (in the same article) that the
rationale to introduce the MAs was the fact
that the fisheries were over-exploited.2 In their
2007 article, Castilla et al. (2007, p. 27) suggest
that ‘‘due to the rise in fishing effort, Locos
experienced over-exploitation’’, leading to
socio-economic conflicts in the late 1980s,
this being the primary reason for
the changes to the 1991 fishery legislation (to
the LPA). Castilla (1995) and Castilla et al.
(2007) thus exhibit ambivalence regarding the
over-exploitation.
Stotz (1997, p. 82) suggests that ‘‘the
fluctuations in the landing of the Locos could
be due to natural variations in the reproduction
of the resource and that this hypothesis needs to
be investigated; a position that Stotz maintained
in 2007 (Stotz, W., Universidad Católica del
Norte, Pers. Comm. via email). Given the lack
of certainty regarding the causes of the dimin-
ishing Loco stocks, it could be argued that an
interpretation of the precautionary principle
had been adopted by scientists, government
and fishing organizations, leading to the regula-
tion of human use of fisheries resources by
different measures. Whatever the causes of the
resource deterioration, the social situation por-
trayed the dilemma of common pool resources;
i.e., the costly and difficult question of how to
limit access amongst multiple and competing
harvesters to ensure sustainable use of a dy-
namic resource system.
The new fishing policy was nestled in a new
democratising political context after Pinochet’s
military government (19731989). Fishers are
now organized nationally once again. Among
the goals that fishers pushed forward in the
1991 LPA was control over the five marine
miles, the priority of coastal communities to
obtain concessions of the interrelated areas of
land, sea bottom and the MAs themselves. This
is the way the Confederación Nacional de
Pescadores Artesanales de Chile (CONAPACH,
2001) perceive their achievements. Artisanal
fishers’ participation is also assured in Art.
145 of the law, including as well the other
fishing sectors in fisheries management, all of
them being represented in the National and
Regional Fishing Councils (Subpesca, 2003,
D.S, p. 85). For instance, according to Meltzoff
et al. (2002), in the old Fishing Law promul-
gated in 1931, artisanal fisheries were not
mentioned. Artisanal fishers also continue to
be a party in the co-management arrangements
represented by their fishing organizations in 35
regional federations (Sernapesca, 2005a), and
two national confederations. Through these
structures fishers’ organizations, with the sup-
port of scientists, have been able to forward
their position, inducing some changes such as
tax reduction.
Fishers’ participation in policy-making has
empowered them as resource users within a legal
framework, which could be characterized as
hierarchical and bureaucratic regarding such
important issues as the very process of getting
a MA. As Meltzoff et al. (2002) suggest,
‘‘Chilean fishers reside outside the culture of
bureaucracy’’. Yet, MAs have expanded all over
the country. The rapid proliferation of MAs
along the Chilean coast perhaps corroborates
the view that the fishers themselves consider the
new regulated fishing of benthic resources as a
valid alternative regime compared to the pre-
vious situation. Having said that, since the
beginning of the 1980s there was not open
access in practice. However, various institutio-
nalized protection measures adopted during this
time did not reduce resource harvesting as
fishers found ways to extract as much as
possible. This took the form of not always
respecting the legal size, selling at a low price
and in competition with others.
1 According to the 1991 Fishing Law an overexploited
resource ‘is that hydro-biological resource whose level of
exploitation is greater than that technically recommended
for its conservation in the long run’ (LPA 1991, Titulo I,
Disposiciones Generales, Art. 38).
2 ‘Probably’ means that ‘the evidence makes it rational to
believe, but does not make it certain that the proposition is
true’ (Bowell and Kemp 2005:86).
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In less than 10 years, the situation changed,
from 103 MAs in May 2000, to 664 by March
2007, and many fisher organizations were
granted exclusive rights over their traditional
fishing grounds. The old fishing strategy was
giving way to harvesting marine benthic re-
sources in accordance with management plans
developed with the assistance of scientific
experts, fishers and under the examination of
fishing authorities; i.e., within a co-management
framework with multiple stakeholders involved.
By introducing the MAs, government inte-
grated a bottom-up approach with top-down
management, where authorities are still not
ready to delegate resource management (Meltz-
off et al., 2002). Other scholars seldom go
further than characterizing the Chilean MAs
as co-management without describing the spe-
cificities of what they mean (see co-management
continuum (Hauck and Sowman, 2005), Fig. 2.2
in Chapter Two). This is perhaps because it is
not easy to determine the types of co-manage-
ment given the complex nature of co-manage-
ment arrangements and practice, including
aspects of power sharing amongst multiple
levels and partners. At what level (provincial,
municipal and and/or village) should power be
exercised and it relation to what?
In the co-management continuum referred
to above, the Chilean case could perhaps be
characterized as an example of co-operative co-
management * government and user group
share decision-making, powers and responsibil-
ities (Hauck and Sowman, 2005) as Gelcich
et al. (2006a, p. 963) suggest, although this takes
a top-down fashion in some locations with
traditional resource management institutions
in place as it may not harmonize with the
traditional system. Seeing it at the MA level,
the arrangement could be characterized as a
delegated co-management type, where govern-
ment delegates a considerable part of its powers
and responsibilities to an organized user group
(Hauck and Sowman, 2005). In this line we find
Moreno et al. (2007) who informs about a
regional, formal multiple stakeholders partici-
patory forum (Comisión de Manejo de las
Pesquerı́as Bentónicas de las Regiones X y XI
(CoMPeB)) in southern Chile for the urchin
fishery, which have become an effectively regio-
nal participatory form of governance.
All in all, most voices seem to be positive to the
model and practice of MAs. Stotz (1997) is among
those who are critical to the adopted MA policy
and its implementation (not to the model itself); he
posits that the MA remains an experiment whose
results cannot be predicted. Furthermore, Stotz
(1997) emphasizes that the benefits from MAs go
beyond only increasing or securing fish produc-
tion. Their importance seem to be principally
biological and social. Their major values are that
they favor the generation of resource management
knowledge, allowing experimental treatments and
control of different areas. In this way, MAs
contribute to the regulation of the fishing activity
and at the same time involve and strengthen
fishing organizations. The MAs thus contain an
educational value for all participating parties
(artisanal fishers, university researchers, govern-
ment officers and other professionals), favoring
the development of management strategies that
integrate the biological with the social and eco-
nomic aspects. Castilla and co-researchers, in spite
of some criticism to the MA policy due, for
example, to its major emphasis on a single species
(Loco), belong to those most positive to the MA
regime, portray it as a success story (Castilla et al.,
2007; Defeo and Castilla, 2005):
(1) MEABRs constitute today a co-management suc-
cess with long-term effects in the economic welfare of
fishers for the first time in Chile ( . . .). (2) The
strengthening of organizations/syndicates led to the
implementation by fishers themselves, of effective
monitoring, control and surveillance procedures that:
(a) attenuated governmental enforcements cost; (b)
significantly increased the effectiveness of management
strategies based one control of the amount of catch and
effort exerted, allowing the components of this multi-
faceted system to think that sustainability could
actually be achieved in artisanal fisheries. Global
operational management instruments (minimum legal
sizes, gear restrictions) and area-based tools (catch
levels per fishing ground) are more feasible to be
implemented now than before (Castilla et al., 1998;
Castilla and Defeo, 2001). (3) The co-management
MEABRs have also been a success from a scientific
point of view: allocation of TURFs fulfilled objectives
for management conservation (Castilla, 2000) and have
served as experimentation tools to refine stock assess-
ment and management procedures (Defeo and Castilla,
2005, p. 275277).
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These authors point out, however, that the
above description corresponds to exampleswhere
legislation has been properly used (central Chile)
and have a relatively long experience in using the
TURF regime. Moreno et al. (2007) describe
similar positive results for southern Chile.
Importantly these results have been achieved
in spite of the fact that the Chilean TURFs are a
response to a crisis management situation, as
several authors have suggested. The introduction
of TURFs in crisis scenarios is not unusual.
Frequently, governments push co-management
solutions to encounter a crisis, delegating the
resource management task to the fishers too late,
i.e., when over-exploitation has already occurred
(Berkes et al., 2001). This central issue of
handing over responsibility of an exhausted
resource could have been a reason that MAs
have become unsuccessful in the Chilean case.
This perhaps furthermore reinforces the idea that
the MAs are giving satisfactory results, although
many problems remain, as I will discuss below.
The Chilean co-management approach
seems to be leading, although with some ambi-
guity, to some of the benefits stressed by Hara
(2003, p. 23) such as participatory democracy,
broader and shared knowledge, better regula-
tions, increased legitimacy, increased adherence
and increased proficiency. Unlike the Japanese
TURF, the Chilean TURF does not seem to
embrace a decentralized management, adaptive
management process, use of local resources,
local and scientific knowledge, multi-scale and
interlinked management, or the promotion of
sustainable use in an economic context (Makino,
2005). Multi-scale and interlinked management
is in line with the propositions that Defoe and
Castilla (2005) recommend as the next step for
the Chilean coastal fisheries to implement. Both
marine parks and reserves are in fact already
considered in the 1991 Fishing Law (Moreno et
al., 2007, p. 46).
The use rights associated with the Chilean
TURF regime include (see Chapters One, Two,
Five, Six and Seven) exclusive, non-transferable
temporal access to a specific fishing ground,
implying an exclusive extraction right, the man-
agement of the area itself as well as the power to
exclude others. The management responsibility
of the MA includes the decision to determine the
number and type of species to be exploited
(subject to obligatory scientific advice), when
and the amount of the total allowable quota to
harvest, and income distribution. As a collective,
they can also negotiate better prices with the
buyers and take out loans, insurance, among
others.
The right to alienate a MA is excluded from
the MAs’ bundles of rights. Sea tenure is limited in
time. Thus it is a vulnerable form of tenure since it
must be renewed every four years. This abbre-
viated temporal approach enables the State to
exercise the ultimate control over the MAs and
fisherorganizations. The State represents the long-
term public interest of resource conservation,
which implies limiting the exercise of fishers’ full
rights. Through the MAs, the State also uses
public funds to co-finance the conservation of
nationalized common pool resources. There is also
perhaps an intention of ‘‘learning by doing’’
within the legislative framework. Laws and de-
crees are susceptible to change and improvement if
necessary. Furthermore, stakeholders other than
resource users have a say through administrative
advice and scientific information in coastal fish-
eries, such as regional fisheries authorities, local
universities and research agencies.
Under the new MA regime, fishers and
divers * organized as collectives * are using
the coast and its resources under the institution
of the common instead of fishing in individual
small groups. Not only sea tenure of the MA is
common, but also its management, the harvest
and the resulting economic benefits. The MA
shows that to manage common pool resources,
ownership of the resource * whether private or
public * is not a necessary condition or
requirement since what is important is the
delegation of resource management to a re-
source dependant user group which is then held
responsible and accountable for exploitation of
the resource. Thus, TURFs are a kind of ‘‘sea
tenure’’; a tenure that does not imply ownership
but a right of use in which the producers control
the means of production in a limited coastal sea
territory.
The process of capital accumulation does
not necessarily mean privatization of the means
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of production, which is still in the hands of
small-scale producers in many low-income
countries. Profit appropriation can still take
place through the commoditizing of small-scale
artisanal production. The integration of small-
scale fishing production into the international
circulation sphere does not imply a privatization
of common pool resources, but rather the
commoditizing of its resources. Therefore the
Chilean TURFs as a production form rather
represent the communalization of common pool
resources or res publica as coastal resources
belong to the nation. In other words, although
producing for the international market, the
MAs represent an example of a commons
institution, which gives them use rights to a
parcel of a global common pool resource like
the sea. Therefore my position fits amongst
those who see the MAs as an effort to treat the
ocean as common property (Payne and Castilla,
1994, p. 10), or rather as a common pool
resource. Within this perspective, and within a
broader perspective, the MA could be seen as a
way to defend the loss of natural heritage and
genetic resources while simultaneously creating
spaces for economic development at various
levels.
With the globalization of trade, the MAs
mean that a new capacity building is taking
place that is empowering the fishers as a
collective and enhancing their local strength as
producers within the international context.
Alternatively, as a result of being subject to a
demand dictated by international markets, the
fishing agenda no longer belongs to the fisher in
the same way that it did (Meltzoff et al., 2002).
Although an MA covers an insignificant part
of the Chilean coast in area terms, through the
constant incorporation of more fisher organiza-
tions into the MA system, a regulated harvest
should be contributing to the recuperation of
Locos and of other benthic resources, while also
securing an important part of artisanal income.
The goals of sustainable management, including
the protection of habitat and conservation of fish
stocks, as well as maintaining or improving the
economic compensation of fishing, have been
partially accomplished by the MAs.
Both in El Quisco and Puerto Oscuro,
fishers told me they believed that the Locos
population was recuperating. This has been
validated by other studies (Castilla, 1983; Cas-
tilla, 1995; Stotz, 1997; Montoya, 2004; Castilla
et al., 2007; Moreno et al., 2007). For example,
the extraction quota of Locos had increased
from 2000 to 2003 by 540 percent, according to
an official evaluation of 92 MAs. Economically,
the price for Locos increased during the same
period by 76 percent (Montoya, 2004, p. 68).
Export volumes are relatively constant and in
spite of them being smaller now than before
MAs were established, average prices per net
tonne have increased. Between 1993 and 2005,
all the yearly net tonnes export prices were
above the pre-1993 levels. Although TURF has
brought better incomes from benthic resources,
and even though their importance in economic
terms for the fishers are apparently low com-
pared to fishing income from the historical
areas, incomes from MAs in the studied cases
are not totally satisfactory; a situation shared
with other MAs.
This is also confirmed by Meltzoff et al.
(2002, p. 88), among others, who suggest that
the economic reliance on Locos to sustain a MA
is insufficient. The regional characteristics of
the species vary and official standardizing
measures (10 cm/length since 1981) do not, for
example, consider variations that fishers know
exist. Meltzoff et al. (2002, p. 88) are critical
that MAs are implemented without considering
regional and biological differences, when for
example the Locos grow faster in the south,
leaving at odds northern fishers who respond by
fishing illegally.
Landing results in both cases studied oscil-
late considerably from year to year. Also the
variation between the real harvests and those
expected is considerable, showing that planning
is far from reliable. Apparently, in 2007 in
Region IV, there were less harvestable Locos in
the MAs. There are also problems regarding
trade, leading to lower prices. There is appar-
ently an over production in the international
market. Officially the causes are not clear, but
unofficially it is believed that this is due to (a)
the competition from the Peruvian Loco; and (b)
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illegal harvest in Chile, but refined and exported
by Peru. In both cases, the price is lower than
the Chilean price (Cerda, G., Sernapesca, Pers.
Comm. via email 2007-07-03). Also, Montoya
(2007) from the Fishing Subsecretary expressed
the same worries as discussed in the last section
of Chapter Five.
Experiences in both case studies have been
otherwise positive in terms of strengthening
fishers’ so-called soft assets. This is reflected in
the language that fisher leaders and many
fishers use which show the incorporation of
scientific, environmental and official terms. An
important element in co-management situations
that relates to fishers’ knowledge of the species,
such as regional local variations of Locos’ size
referred to above, is the different perceptions
that exist among fishers, biologists and ecolo-
gists. Fishers follow their judgement in relation
to their own collective and long-term field
experiences and knowledge of the sea with a
tendency to focus on immediate survival needs.
This may make it difficult for them to relate to
the abstract models of scientists (Meltzoff et al.,
2002).
In the MA version of co-management,
scientists, fishers and authorities have different
and perhaps not compatible interests (Meltzoff
et al., 2002). While fishers mostly envision MAs
as a possibility to improve incomes from a
vulnerable species, biologists see it as an oppor-
tunity to manage selected species and preserve
biodiversity and healthy eco-systems. Govern-
ment has several interests: to secure artisanal
fishers’ livelihoods and tax revenues, facilitate
international trade, and to preserve the species.
In other words, the ecological (conservation)
and economic (profitable co-management) goals
can be difficult to combine (Meltzoff et al.,
2002). Asociación Chilena de Pesca (s.a.) stres-
ses that both the 1991 LPA and the rules of MA
specify that the principal purpose is the con-
servation of the hydro-biological resources, but
also that the MAs are aimed to give economic
usufruct rights to artisanal fishing organiza-
tions. Another way of asking this is whether it is
possible to conciliate the same foreign market
demand that almost compelled Locos to extinc-
tion with a sustainable harvest? Thinking dia-
lectically, might the current solution to the
depletion of Locos lie in the same factor that
caused it? It seems at least to be clear that the
Chilean TURFs are a positive outcome of a
development trend that was highly problematic
for resource users and for the eco-system.
Consultants and universities are important
stakeholder groups within the co-management
arrangement. With some exceptions (Stotz,
1997; Melztoff et al., 2002), an issue that is
seldom discussed in the literature is the obvious
interdependency between the MA fisher orga-
nizations and the expert-based institutions sup-
porting the MAs. Every year these two entities
are required to cooperate to perform the
monitoring of Locos. Doubtless, the initial state
subsidies granted to the fishing organizations to
support the cost of the initial baseline studies
(ESBA) were spent on consultants and univer-
sities. There does not seem to be any documen-
tation that records the consultancy firms that
have been established to support the MA
regime, but it is clear that a number of them
have flourished. Since their relationship is a
commercial one, one would expect that the
fishers have the option to change consultancy
firms if they are unsatisfied. It was confirmed by
Mr. Ocares (Pers. Comm. 2007) that this has
occurred. This implies that there is a mutual
dependency that characterises the relationship.
There is also another social factor that can
be problematic and to which the government
has not paid sufficient attention and support.
There are some competencies such as literacy
and dealing with administrative matters for
which the leaders of the fishing organizations
need more training and support. Hersoug et al.
(2004) indicate that literacy may be an impor-
tant requisite for co-management. This view
brings to mind Meltzoff et al.’s (2002) comment
about fishers’ alienation from bureaucracy. No
doubt this is a difficult barrier to overcome.
As discussed earlier, fishers take care of the
species within their MA, however, illegal har-
vests are seemingly continuing by both MA
members and non-members. This is another
problem that is not given enough attention
when the MA regime is evaluated or examined,
with Stotz (1997) and Meltzoff et al. (2002)
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being exceptions. As there is no reliable statis-
tical information on illegal fishing after (or
before for that matter) the introduction of the
MAs in Chile, it is difficult to evaluate this
problem. Among non-MA fishers, illegal fishing
occurs both in historical areas and in the MAs.
Illegal fishing in the historical areas is a problem
related to the dilemma of common pool re-
sources; it is difficult to limit entry in practice
through vigilance and enforcement due to the
large scale of the coast.
Illegal fishing within the MA by ‘‘outsiders’’
is a more recent problem. Given the limited
spatial character of the MAs, more vigilant
patrolling is used to solve this problem, but
this is demanding in terms of labour efforts. One
of the conditions commonly cited as part of an
effective common pool resources approach
(Schlager and Ostrom, 1992; Ostrom, 1999) is
that the cost of controlling the resource should
not be too high; this does not seem to be a
problem for the MA case study areas. If
vigilance was more demanding, the more scarce
the product, the more expensive they become
(Christy, 1992), making the question of the cost
of vigilance a relative matter. In other words,
vigilance is viable due to high prices. This
problem is also related to the characteristic of
common pool resources meaning that although
a fisher organization has exclusive use rights to
a parcel of water, this does not completely
secure its holders ex ante rights to the sedentary
species living there as the stock can be easily
taken by outsiders.
Both cases of illegal fishing described above
(non-MA members in the historical areas and in
the MAs) could be related to the ‘discontents’ of
the system. Gelcich et al. (2005) found among
fishers some negative perceptions towards the
MAs because these have reduced open access
areas (historical areas), leaving those fishers
reluctant to adopt the MA unsatisfied and
hence weakening the social ties in fishing
communities. This issue relates to a political
problem mentioned in Chapter Two (Christy,
1992); an issue that I have saved for this chapter.
Christy (1992) means that the major problem
associated with the establishment of localized
TURFs is that some users may become ex-
cluded, which is an event that may lead to
opposition. In the Chilean TURFs, the exclu-
sion problem takes at least three expressions.
The first group is those fishing organiza-
tions which for different reasons do not want to
be part of the system, as Gelcich et al. (2005)
found in their study in Los Vilos. To apply for a
MA is a voluntary decision. However, some
organizations may apply for a MA in order to
protect their traditional fishing grounds, as
reported from southern Chile (Gelcich et al.,
2006a). A fisher organization may as well apply
for a MA to use it as coverage for selling benthic
resources fished in the historical areas (Gelcich
et al., 2005). I leave it unsaid whether any
organization would for this purpose follow the
elaborate MA allocation process, considering all
the costs and efforts.
The second excluded group is fishers regis-
tered at Sernapesca who for some reason are not
affiliated to any organization, this being an
individual decision. The total number of regis-
tered fishers in 2005 was around 57,000 (see
Table 4.8), and the number of organized fishers in
diverse organizations was in the same year only
42,000 (see Table 4.14). This means that around
25 percent or around 15,000 fishers are unorga-
nized. They cannot apply for a MA as only fisher
unions, associations or cooperatives are eligible.
So both becoming an organizational member
and for the organization to apply for a MA is
voluntary. One can discuss of course whether the
national ban on Locos extraction outside the
MAs leaves fishers’ organizations with any other
legal alternative than to enter into the system? It
seems to be just a question of time and bureau-
cracy before all the working fishing organiza-
tions are part of the system in order to be able to
exploit benthic resources.
The third excluded group are illegal fishers
that are not officially registered at Sernapesca,
which is compulsory. Non-registered fishers are
outside the legal system, thus they fish without
permission. The number of fishers in this
situation in 2001 was estimated by CONA-
PACH (2001) to be around 3,000.
Consequently, those becoming negatively
affected by the allocation of an MA are fisher
organizations that do not want to be part of the
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TURF system, in addition to unorganized and
unregistered illegal fishers. Whether the expan-
sion of MAs, as implied by Gelcich et al. (2005),
leads to conflicts among different types of
fishers or not, depends on the local context.
Perhaps among these fishers * organized,
unorganized and unregistered * it is possible
to find ‘‘discontent’’ fishers practising illegal
fishing possibly as a counterreaction, but as
suggested, only a part of these excluded fishers
are in fact divers.
The second aspect of the exclusion problem
is when more than one organization aspires to
the same fishing ground. For those cases, the
1991 Fishing Law (LPA) establishes three pre-
ference criteria for a fair allocation. In decreas-
ing order these criteria are: nearness to the
required MA, number of members, and
antiquity. The organizations that are excluded
have to apply for another fishing ground. All
the organizations falling in this situation may
feel unsatisfied with the allocations of fishing
grounds. However, the search for other
fishing grounds is not new as the number of
local grounds of some traditional fishing
communities is not sufficient for all fishers,
especially for the new generations. This explains
why fishers from Los Vilos have spread along
the coast of the province Choapa, in the coves
of Huentelauquén, Puerto Oscuro and Puerto
Manso since the late 1960s. Therefore, when
these fishers applied for their MAs in these
locations it was not because the MA application
process itself left them without grounds in their
own locality, but because they had de facto
appropriated their present MAs grounds prior
to the MA reform. In this sense, the MA reform
converts many fishing organizations into de jure
appropriators of the sea areas and many MAs
build obviously upon traditional and/or infor-
mal functioning local institutions (see below).
This does not imply that the form under which
production is organized is the same as before
the MA. There rests, in my view, the big
difference. However, in terms of time span, the
self-allocation of coves that fishers groups have
tacitly undertaken themselves is a matter of
decades and not of centuries in contrast to the
Japanese TURFs. Thus, the Chilean MAs can
be seen as a relatively late phenomenon as
compared to the Japanese. Nonetheless, it is
difficult to generalize around time perspectives
due to the big differences existing between
fishing coves and local fishing traditions. In
Southern Chile particularly, there are fishing
coves that are directly connected to commu-
nities inhabiting the same physical place, some
of them indigenous, and probably with a longer
tradition than those belonging to the post
colonial period. There is a lack of systematic
historical and social science studies that show
the formation of fishing traditions along Chile’s
long coasts. However, following Berkes et al.
(2001), it could be argued that many MAs are
not so much community oriented but rather
organization- and resource-base oriented. Many
of them are also ‘‘virtual’’ communities, by
which Berkes et al. (2001) mean the co-location
of fishers for fishing purposes, having their
household and families in another place. This
is the case with the coves Huentelauquén,
Puerto Manso and Puerto Oscuro. Gallardo
et al. (1993) studied eight rural coves in the
Iquique region in Northern Chile and found
that 92 percent of the inhabitants of these coves
came from regions other than Iquique. This
confirms my tenet that if MAs become perma-
nent, permanent settlement should also be
expected.
Gelcich et al. (2005, 2006a) warn about
MAs weakening traditional institutions having
negative effects on the level of trust within
communities and thereby intensifying users’
conflicts. Therefore, this view, if it were valid,
would mean that MAs reduce the adaptive
capacity of the management system thereby
jeopardizing the ‘‘resilience’’ of the system. In
the case of one specific MA studied by Gelcich
et al. (2006a) this takes some of the following
expressions. For example, the MA fishing orga-
nization must give notice to the fishing autho-
rities every time a resource extraction activity is
planned. Such a requirement is problematic in
practice, given the isolation of many rural coves
and because harvest depends on sea conditions,
the reason why the learning process associated
with harvest decisions gets ‘‘lost in favour of a
frenetic one-day harvest every month’’ (Gelcich
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et al., 2006a, p. 963). Another way of seeing this
is that fishers must apply their sea knowledge
anyway on the days they set off for harvest,
although under the MAs the do it less often.
Another argument is that, given fishers’ rural
isolation, it can hardly be easier to frequently
sell small quantities than to concentrate both
work and selling load during few days in the
year. The ‘‘frenetic’’ days of concentrated har-
vest allow free time to undertake other activities
to secure other incomes.
Another example that Gelcich et al. (2006a)
mention as creating problems is the substitution
of individual bargains by a collective one due to
decision making in the MAs being concentrated
in few hands. To have elected representatives to
make decisions on behalf of members is one of
the ideas of organizing as democratic collectives.
The same principle allows changing, through
elections, the directive if it is not deemed to be
functioning well. So both harvesting and bar-
gaining are largely viewed as advantages of the
MAs as a group. Together fishers can get better
prices than as dispersed individuals. This argu-
ment is also emphasized by Defoe and Castilla
(2005, p. 277) who suggest that one of the
incentives of the MA is that resource quotas are
given to the community or associations. ‘‘Thus,
Community Fisheries Quotas (CFQs), as op-
posed to individual quotas, provide the right
incentives for cooperation instead of negotia-
tion between fisheries.’’ They declare moreover
that the system from the beginning considered
Individual Non-Transferable Quotas (INTQs)
for small-scale fisheries, which became substi-
tuted soon by the CFQs. This process is parallel
to the transition from individual harvest to a
collective or common one within the MAs,
described earlier in this study. Taking care of
the species in common leads to harvesting and
selling it in common.
The obligation to inform in advance about
the harvest day to fishing authorities raised by
Gelcich et al. (2006a) certainly is problematic
and reflects a kind of paternalism in the MA
system. As Meltzoff et al. (2002) suggest, the
paternalist parts of the MAs are not totally
congruent with the government’s idea to convert
the fishers of the MAs into stable, non-migrating
businessmen. This type of paternalism existed
also in the legislation of the agricultural com-
munities (DFL 5; Gallardo, 2002) in Chile but
was taken away after Pinochet exited from office.
Before the 1993 modification of the law:
the General Boards of the community * ordinary or
extraordinary * must be assisted by the lawyer of the
Office of National Estates, who will have the right to
express his opinion. To this end, the community was
able to notify the lawyer in writing with respect to the
date and time for the board meeting. If the lawyer did
not attend the meeting, the Board was able to send the
decisions to his office within 15 days, or face the
nullification (sic!) of the accords (Gallardo, 2002,
p. 350351).
The legal framework of MAs could easy
emulate the modification of the 1993 legislation
of the agricultural communities (Law 19.233;
Gallardo, 2002). There are several similarities
and lessons to be learnt from the long process of
legal recognition of the rights of the institution
of the commons of the agricultural communities
of Chile and the TURFs regime, but this will
hopefully be the issue of another study.
The use rights associated with the Chilean
TURF differ for example from those associated
with aquaculture concessions. Concession rights
can be passed through inheritance or to third
parties (LPA, 1991: Tı́tulo VI de la acuicultura,
Parráfo 2, Art. 81 and 82). Furthermore, while
artisanal fishers have problems in building the
necessary infrastructure in the coves due to
private property rights, the ‘‘concessionaries
and authorized title holders can perform in
the concession all those material work, peers,
landing place, investments and installations,
previous authorization from the competent
organ, when necessary’’ (LPA, 1991: Tı́tulo VI
de la acuicultura, Parráfo, 1, Art. 72). The lack
of the same privileges for the MAs may be seen
as a paternalist attitude on the part of the State.
According to Gelcich et al. (2006a, p. 953,
964), Defeo and Castilla (2005)3 suggest that the
implementation of the MAs in Chile was initially
performed in areas with no working traditional
3 Although Gelcich et al. (2006a) refers to Castilla and
Defeo (2005), the article corresponds to Defeo and
Castilla (2005).
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resource management institutions, but as MAs
spread, the implementation soon started to
embrace areas with working traditional natural
resource management systems. It is in the former
cases where the MAs were effectively working in
a sustainable way, while in the latter case the
positive effects were not so clear. No specific
examples are mentioned by Gelcich et al.
(2006a) of areas where no existing traditional
resource management institutions were in place,
or how or whether in these cases fisher organiza-
tions were applying for MAs. Nor is the meaning
of traditional in terms of time perspective
discussed. Then one could ask, how does it
come about that there were fisher organizations
at all applying for MAs? A social organization
does not appear from nowhere. Furthermore,
the first areas experimenting with protected
areas were coves inhabited by existing fishing
organizations and with which Castilla, himself,
was collaborating, although these were not the
first organizations to formally become or be
allocated MAs. The first areas to become formal
MAs were, as reported by Sernapesca, in region
IV, more specifically in Los Vilos where Gelcich
et al. (2005) have been conducting their studies.
According to these authors, in Los Vilos in the
pre MA regime period, there was only a single
organization (AG (guild association) San
Pedro). When it applied for a MA, this produced
tensions among fishers thus leading to two
unions: the AG San Pedro and the cooperative
Los Vilos, both having historical roots in the AG
San Pedro. The third union Gelcich et al. (2005)
found in los Vilos was Los Lobos, formed in
2001 with fishers that have no relation with the
other two fisher organizations. However, this
does not mean that they are fishers without
fishing background; they presented themselves
to these researchers in their study as the claimant
of historical areas (Gelcich et al. 2005, p. 386)
belonging to those challenging the MA regime
that I would consider as belonging to the group
of ‘‘discontents’’. Some of the areas mentioned
by Sernapesca as being among the first to
become formal MAs are those belonging to the
Canela commune. And all of them have been in
place * formal organizations or not * since
the 1960s and a significant number of its
members are from Los Vilos. It is in this sense
that I mean that many MAs were established
with connections to de jure appropriators of
already occupied areas and therefore build upon
pre-existing traditions. There are no studies
addressing these issues so far; isolated rural
poor fishing communities and artisanal fishers
have not hitherto been the concern of scientists.
Castilla and colleagues, through their numerous
studies especially on Locos, have not only put
Chilean artisanal fishers’ livelihood and con-
cerns on the national scene but also given them
an international profile. It is important to recall
that many organizations had to disappear dur-
ing the dictatorship due to political repression;
this also includes fisher organizations.
Nonetheless, Gelcich et al. (2005) warning
about MAs weakening traditional institutions
can be related to Christy’s (1992) recommenda-
tions that studies on the TURFs should con-
sider the assessment of the conditions
permitting the creation of localized TURFs or
the safeguarding and development of customary
territorial rights, focusing on the ways in which
the benefits of traditional systems are shared or
distributed to ensure an equitable distribution
of benefits both within communities acquiring
the rights and among neighbouring commu-
nities of small-scale fishermen.
Apart from the illegal fishing performed by
‘‘outsiders’’ discussed above there is also illegal
fishing by MA members in the historical areas.
This is attached to the dilemma of common
pool resources, as the historical areas cannot be
controlled in the same way as a MA. One can
only speculate that illegal fishing by MA
members in the historical areas is a persistent
custom that has not yet been eradicated given
that MAs are still relatively new. The problem
may reflect incapacity to galvanize/socialize the
new regime. Another reason may be ignorance
about the interconnection of the parts of the
eco-system; a hypothesis that deserve to be
studied. Another reason why illegal fishing
apparently persists among members of MAs in
the historical areas relates to economics, i.e.,
MAs do not achieve expected results. In the MA
approach, the Government has put more em-
phasis on marine tenure than fisher incomes
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(Meltzoff et al., 2002). The uncertain and
sometimes poor economic results from MAs
compel some fishers to complement their liveli-
hood by harvesting outside their MA. The tax
burden is still a major challenge for artisanal
fishing organizations, especially if the MAs are
not giving expected economic results, be it
because of El Niño, sea pollution or the effects
of industrial over-fishing. The tax system lacks
a connection both to actual production and
market prices. If taxes on MAs were harmo-
nized with real production, it could improve the
economic situation of the MAs and this, in turn,
could perhaps diminish the fishing pressure in
the historical areas. This burden is a challenge
for the fisher organizations to handle in the near
future. Having different tax rules for use rights
to the sea than for those for on land seems to be
discriminatory, particularly given that those
practising artisinal fishing are amongst the
most vulnerable in Chilean society. This dis-
criminatory aspect is a challenge for govern-
ment. The costly follow-up reports are another
economic burden for the MA fishing organiza-
tions, making them less profitable. Nonetheless,
illegal fishing specifically by MA fishers is a
serious problem since the aim of the MAs was
precisely to halt resource depletion. As the
historical areas and the MAs are interconnected
spatially and ecologically, to take care of one
but not the other makes resource conservation
ineffective; a problem that is exacerbated by
illegal fishing by ‘‘outsiders’’ both within the
historical areas and the MAs.
One can only hope that the rate of illegal
fishing is reduced over time with the establish-
ments of MAs. The MA system itself should in
theory discourage individual fishing and selling
of the species since the regular production
allows the MAs to offer better and higher
quality volumes for export, which they as
organizations can negotiate to get favourable
prices. To sell outside these channels is less
profitable. The MAs have ordered not only
extraction but also commercialization, reducing
channels to commercialize the harvest outside
this framework. In this case, illegal harvest (if
not well organized with traffic export purposes
as some suspect) is most probable for the local
and regional market and therefore also hope-
fully limited in scope. This is a further problem
that needs to be addressed.
Within an MA, group control which is
usually effective within relatively small groups
with face-to-face relationships, is at work. The
sense of ownership that an MA creates also
gives incitements to follow the rules. Lastly,
also formal rules of every organization clearly
define rights and duties. Thus, it is believed
that the interests to secure future availability
of the resource on the part of the fishers
facilitates both the imposition of the manage-
ment measure as well as the will to put it in
force. The ‘‘most effective form of enforcement
occurs where it is in the self-interest of the user
to comply with the rules’’ (Christy, 1992, Chap.
2, p. 4) or ‘‘one cares about what one owns’’
according to a fisher from Puerto Oscuro (see
Chapter Six). One could also perhaps add
that the TURFs cannot be created and imple-
mented by government unless the fishers believe
in the usefulness of the measure and are ready
to practice it. According to Stotz (1997, p. 69
70), when working with the fishers of the
Fishing Confederation of the Choapa Province
(FEMEPACH), he expressed to them that
legislation is inefficient in protecting the re-
source if the users do not collaborate, but the
fishers can protect the resource without the need
of a law.
A general assumption on human nature is
that without institutions, the tragedy of open
access takes place, while with institutions in
place (Ostrom’s tenet), the tragedy is avoided
due to group control (Röling, 2008).4 A socio-
logical query here is whether there exists a social
situation that is prior to social institutions when
more than one individual is involved and the
relationship is somehow stable. Much of the
research in social sciences is a reaction against
the assumptions about the rational individual
who maximises her benefits without considering
either the resource or her group fellows. It is
4 ‘Convergence of sciences: the management of agriculture
research’ (Power Point Presentation), Kick-Off Workshop
Natural Resource Management & Livelihoods (NRML)-
Research school at SLU, 2008-04-23.
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interesting to note here the parallel between the
person causing the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’
and methodological individualism’s philosophi-
cal assumptions about the individual, on one
hand and, on the other hand, the opposite
position of an eco-system management ap-
proach that tries to bridge the divide between
man and nature and their interdependency with
methodological collectivism’s assumptions
about society.
A methodological individualist describes
particular individuals without using the concept
of structure (group, community) (Gilje and
Grime, 1992). For example, the individual fish-
ers and their actions are linked to each other,
which leads to a social phenomenon; say the
‘‘tragedy of the commons’’. In this sense the
‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ as a social phenom-
enon is an aggregate of particular individuals’
characteristics and this aggregate builds a
pattern: over-fishing. The sum of their particu-
lar individual actions leads to resource deple-
tion. The question that methodological
collectivism poses is: what is an individual?
The methodological individualist supposes that
the individual is what she is independently of the
group to which she belongs, without acknowl-
edging that a human being is created and
affected by the social system. She is part of
and therefore a product of the social system she
lives in. If we think away the social, the
individual is reduced to an asocial animal
denuded of language and culture. The metho-
dological collectivist postulates that it is the
society and its institutions which give identity
and meaning to the action of the individuals
because they establish the conditions that are
necessary for actions to take place. Norms and
rules as social phenomena can only be under-
stood starting from groups, not from indivi-
duals. A person knows she is breaking a rule
because she interacts with others. She cannot
know that she is breaking a rule as a result of
motivating forces connected to her own beha-
viour or reactions. To follow rules presupposes a
community with other people and therefore also
the existence of institutions. In other words, the
rational individual who maximises her benefits
without considering society and institutions to
which she belongs hardly exists, and if she does,
she will probably soon turn into a pariah. That
institutions may work poorly and rules are not
followed by some individuals is another story
but this does not mean that every individual
tries to maximize their own interest without
considering the rest, i.e., that this rational
choice individual would be the rule. However,
that some may not follow rules is worth con-
sidering and a pertinent question would be why
these people fall out of the system when the
possibility to be part of it exists.
The MAs entail challenges not only asso-
ciated with fisheries, but also within social
arenas beyond fisheries. So far we have not in
this chapter considered the problem of fishers’
access to the land closest to the coves. My view
is that given that MAs are becoming a perma-
nent solution for the exploitation of coastal
benthic resources, fishing in rural areas may
lead to tensions as the fishers settle on coastal
lands without entitlement, or are hindered from
developing their own fishery infrastructure.
Furthermore, this issue is related to tenure
security, which the MAs do not necessarily offer
as they are given for four years at a time.
Nonetheless, access to the coastal border entails
two different scenarios: within private landed
properties and within State property. The issue
that I have focussed on in this study is fishers’
settlement problems and their need of infra-
structure within private property that fringes
the coast; a problem seldom acknowledged,
except sometimes by mass media.
Arrizaga et al. (1989, p. 299) and Gallardo
et al. (1993) address the problems of fishers’
settlement within State property. Both Arrizaga
et al. (1989) and Gallardo et al. (1993) suggest
that part of the solution of an integrated coastal
development is the granting of coastal conces-
sions for fishing communities and the regular-
ization of their deed titles in state lands.
According to Christy (1992), a relevant condi-
tion helping the formation of TURF is the
cultural aspect of the specific country’s property
rights tradition. He suggests that if there is
private right to land, the possibility to extend
rights to the sea should not be a problem. Sea
tenure has been in fact granted, albeit tempora-
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rily, through the TURF in Chile, but the land
fringing the sea is in many rural areas under
private ownership, which poses problems. I
would argue that the more rooted the tradition
of private property rights to the land are, the
weaker the possibility of others to access these
lands, except through market mechanisms.
When coastal land becomes subjected to market
forces, the more difficult it is to ensure access
for fishers just based on the good will of the
landowners. The increased demand for summer
houses from an increasing middle- and upper-
class in Chile during the last decades has
contributed to this situation.
If in times prior to the agrarian reform of
the mid 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, when
oligarchy monopolized land and power, land-
owners had a paternalistic attitude to fishers,
after the agrarian reform when many properties
were expropriated, paternalism is likely in many
cases to have been replaced by other proble-
matic attitudes. Even during the dictatorship,
landowners could still be generous due to the
security they felt under Pinochet’s regime.
The new generations of landowners have lost
the security the old oligarchy had, and is now
not that condescending, given that they are
required to act in a democratic system. Both
El Quisco and Puerto Oscuro fishers experi-
enced paternalism on the part of the landowners
in times past. The El Quisco Union bears in fact
the name of the old landowner of the lands once
surrounding the cove. Fishers from Puerto
Oscuro have experienced a lack of mercy from
landowners during the democratic period,
facing access problems and difficulties to build
a minimal infrastructure, let alone build a
settlement, although here, the Municipal autho-
rities intervened and secured some land to build
permanent houses for fisher families on land
not belonging to the landowner family,
although not in the cove.
Another interesting issue that the case of
Puerto Oscuro conflict raises is the involvement
of other stakeholders, a typical co-management
situation regarding the administration of both
coast and fisheries. When in the ongoing Puerto
Oscuro lawsuit the landowners directed their
claims to the civil juridical system (where it
belongs), the summer house owners directed
their concerns to the Navy which administers
the costal border, and the Ministry of Real
National Estates which administers the beach
terrain of public good. So the sectoral interests
of diverse stakeholders are all interrelated. As
mentioned in Chapter Five, the Government’s
delay in implementing the MAs has a back-
ground in a hesitation to give sea tenure to the
fishing organizations (Meltzoff et al., 2002, 93
94); a problem that is embedded in the char-
acteristics of co-management where several
actors with different degrees of power and
economic interests have a voice. This implies
conflicting interest among them. The unwilling-
ness to delegate tenure, management and re-
sponsibilities can be interpreted as a lack of
trust in grass root organizations, but it is most
probably rooted in a reluctance not to encroach
more powerful coast stakeholders such as
industrial fishers, aquaculture and the tourism
industry, not to forget coastal landowners.
According to Meltzoff et al. (2002), both the
Chilean navy and politicians wanted to keep
coastal waters under open access and tried to
limit the percentage of coastal territory with MA
potential, but did not succeed. Yet, in spite of a
neo-liberal economic policy framework which
strongly emphasises export as a kind of develop-
ment panacea, within a seascape dominated by
strong private property rights to land, backed by
the Constitution, artisanal fishers are somehow
at odds. The legal system is unable to fully handle
the consequences of the reform, and prevailing
power relations and private property rights work
to the disadvantage of the fishers. To draw a
parallel to McCay (1996, p. 208) ‘‘restricted
access can result in sharp social discrimination,
as in beaches reserved for the wealthy’’.
The artisanal fishing sector, in itself, pre-
sents many other weaknesses and despite the
development of the MA regime in Chile, the
sector still shows many rudimentary character-
istics. In 1986, pre-MA, the Ministry of Eco-
nomy stated that artisanal fishing in Chile was
at a level of primary development; i.e., the
artisanal fisher, seen individually, operates with
equipment type and the scale of boats that only
allow subsistence, but they lack the capitaliza-
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tion to take this activity to a higher stratum of
operation (Arrizaga et al., 1989, p. 294).
Also Gallardo et al. (1993) commented on
problems related to artisanal fisheries in
Northern Chile, suggesting that they were
suffering from production instability, a lack of
diversification, new and precarious labor orga-
nization, spread commercial activity and a
profound social marginality exacerbated by the
little or non-existent social assistance from the
State. As solutions, Gallardo et al. (1993)
proposed strategies such as improvement and
diversification of the productive activity, the
regulation of settlement places by imparting
deed titles, access to credit systems, strengthen-
ing labour and social organization, as well as
group management and commercialization. Ar-
rizaga et al. (1989, p. 298) suggested regarding
the quality of life for the fishers in their
communities, that ‘‘to increase the production
and efficiency means not only to apply techni-
que to the processes in order to optimize the
levels of extraction, but also diversify the
capture, introduce cultivation techniques as
well as to leave behind the primary level of the
activity, adding value to the resource through its
elaboration’’.
With the introduction of the MAs, many of
the problems have changed and many of the
suggested solutions discussed above have been
implemented or developed in relation to the
TURF regime, but the sector still shows many
of the characteristics associated with small scale
and subsistence artisanal fisheries. Of the 17
fisheries related characteristics enumerated by
Berkes et al. (2001) (see Table 2.2 in this study),
the Loco fisheries under the MA regime shows
14 related to either small scale or subsistence,
artisanal categories, such as rudimentary means
of production (small boats with outboard
motors and manual gears), disperse ownership,
part time commitment, seasonal occupation,
and multi-occupations, low investment, limited
catches capacity per fishing, family related and
low division of labour, lack of processing of
catch that goes to export, low level of incomes
and reduced local management units. The only
characteristics related rather to industrial large-
scale fisheries in the Loco fisheries under the
MA regime is the disposal of catch, which is
mainly sold to external, organized markets and
the extent of marketing is mainly in Asia.
Despite this their integration into the economy
is only partial. Due to the MA reform, fisheries
data collection is not difficult given the author-
ity’s capacity; and that biological data, pros-
pected landing and real harvest are demanded
by the authority yearly and performed by fish-
ers and certified consultants.5
During the development of the MAs both
threats and problems have emerged regarding
the fate of the MAs. Many of the concerns still
to be studied are of a social science character,
but research financing in Chile regarding
benthic resources seems mostly to support
narrow biological research. Nonetheless, within
the biological area, an important issue to be
studied are the consequences of the increasingly
larger exploitation of diverse types of weeds for
exportation; another activity born in connec-
tion with export (Ahumada and Retamal, 1988,
p. 650), during the mid 1970s, and that some
fishers perceive as making benthic resources
more vulnerable. What are the consequences of
coastal weeds cutting for the habitat of Locos
and other benthic species?
From a social science perspective the issues
that remain and deserve to be studied are many:
for example, which fishing organizations have
not yet applied for MAs and what are the
reasons behind this? Also the extent and basis
of illegal fishing, both among non-MA mem-
bers and among MA members needs to be
examined. What are the levels of organization
and occurrence of illegal fishing? What are the
channels and routes it follows and what are the
groups prone to collaborate in this illegal
activity? Regarding access to coastal land it is
relevant to identify and systematize the MAs
being created within both private and state
property. How many MAs are facing problems
of access, infrastructure and settlement? What
forms do these take within private landed
properties and state property? What are the
regions where there is a major concentration of
5 However, it should be noted that data collection for illegal
fishing is not available.
Chapter 8: From Seascape of Extinction to Seascape of Confidence 187
MAs and what does land tenure structure look
like? How many MAs have not got their right
renewed after the first four years and what are
the main reasons for their non-renewal? What
are the circumstances of these areas? Another
issue that deserves attention is the relationship
between MAs and consultancy firms and the
possible dependency of the fisher organizations
with MAs on these institutions.
Lastly, on the global scale, possible threats
to benthic resources are the periodical influence
of natural factors such El Niño (o La Niña),
which change environmental conditions. An-
other threat that affects the whole eco-system is
climate change, which impinges specially on the
survival of cold water species in the Humboldt
stream. Climate warming, mostly a consequence
of rich countries’ way of life and consumption,
affects not only consumers and producers of the
South and the North, but the whole eco-system,
which we all are responsible for.
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Código Civil de la República de Chile. Biblioteca
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N. 355, sobre áreas de manejo y explotación de
recursos bentónicos, Ministerio de Economı́a,
publicado diario oficial 1995-08-26. Available on-
line at www.sernapesca.cl, 1995.
Subsecretarı́a de Pesca (Subpesca). Las àreas de
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use Figure 3.2 and 3.3 from Beatriz Farias, 2006-
09-03 [ssmbcos@defensa.cl].




Sernapesca, permission to use Pictures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3,
1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 7.5; and all
pictures from Table 7.14 from Elissetche Fumeron,
J., SIAC, oficina central Servicio Nacional de
Pesca,Valpo., Chile, 2007-08-21 [jelissetche@
sernapesca.cl].
Sernapesca, if not other is specified, all material from
Sernapesca is with permission from Lillo Barros,
D. A.,2008-04-07 [DLILLO@sernapesca.cl].
Sindicato de Pescadores El Quisco, verbal
permission from the Union to use Picture 7.7,
July 2001.
Subpesca, if not other is specified, all material from
Subpesca is with permission from Bolbarán, D.,
email 2008-04-08 [dbolbaran@subpesca.cl].
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